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The Routledge Handbook of Smuggling offers a comprehensive survey of interdisciplinary research 
related to smuggling, reflecting on key themes, and charting current and future trends. 
Divided into six parts and spanning over 30 chapters, the volume covers themes such as 
mobility, borders, violent conflict, and state politics, as well as looks at the smuggling of specific 
goods – from rice and gasoline to wildlife, weapons, and cocaine. Chapters engage with some of 
the most contentious academic and policy debates of the twenty-first century, including the 
historical creation of borders, re-bordering, the criminalisation of migration, and the politics of 
selective toleration of smuggling. As it maps a field that contains unique methodological, 
ethical, and risk-related challenges, the book takes stock not only of the state of our shared 
knowledge, but also reflects on how this has been produced, pointing to blind spots and 
providing an informed vision of the future of the field. 
Bringing together established and emerging scholars from around the world, The Routledge 
Handbook of Smuggling is an indispensable resource for students and researchers of conflict 
studies, borderland studies, criminology, political science, global development, anthropology, 
sociology, and geography.  
Max Gallien is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) located at the 
University of Sussex, a Fellow at the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD), 
and a Senior Fellow at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (GITOC). 
He is a political scientist specialising in the politics of informal and illegal economies, the 
political economy of development, and the modern politics of the Middle East and North 
Africa. 
Florian Weigand is the Co-Director of the Centre for the Study of Armed Groups at the 
Overseas Development Institute and a Research Associate at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science. He works on armed conflict, illicit economies, and international inter-
ventions, and explores the politics and societal dynamics of conflict zones, borderlands, and 
other complex environments. He is the author of Conflict and Transnational Crime: Borders, 
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Max Gallien and Florian Weigand   
Smuggling is an economic activity that is politically defined and socially embedded.1 In its 
functional essence, smuggling is typically trade, anchored in the demand for certain products 
and the costs of their movement. At the same time, it is segmented from legal trade through 
laws, which are, along with their enforcement, deeply political, tied into processes of state- 
formation and demarcation, economic regulation and prohibition, and geopolitics and conflict. 
Unlike most trade, smuggling in its perception and study is also intimately tied to the figure of 
the ‘smuggler’ and the particular social space of the borderland in which they are imagined to 
operate – as a risk-taker, a broker, a hustler, a worker, a profiteer, a villain, or a local hero. 
Consequently, the study of smuggling always has attracted a range of disciplines: anthropology; 
geography; economics; sociology; history; law; and political science. Even so, it rarely has been 
genuinely multi-disciplinary. Discussions are frequently siloed along regional, disciplinary, and 
methodological lines that are connected insufficiently with each other. Frequently, smugglers 
appear not just on the geographic margins of states but on the margins of arguments that are 
primarily not about them and are imagined and framed to fit the respective assumptions, 
theories, and ideologies.2 
This handbook is intended to work against these tendencies and toward what might be 
called ‘smuggling studies.’ Its aim is to bring diverse disciplinary perspectives on smuggling 
together in one place and in conversation with each other, to highlight themes that emerge 
across different areas: the complex relationships among smugglers, states, armed groups, and 
globalised markets; the role of and impact on borderland communities; the sometimes coun-
terintuitive effects of conflict and ‘anti-smuggling policies;’ and the drivers of heterogeneous 
dynamics across goods and routes. It also seeks to reflect on the methods and politics that have 
shaped the study of smuggling and to outline pathways for future research and collaboration. 
First and foremost, it seeks to present the value of understanding smuggling by placing 
smuggling at the centre of a field of study, not casting it at the margins, merely as a policy 
implication or a bogeyman. The remainder of this introduction is split into two broader sec-
tions. The first summarises key observations in the study of smuggling, highlighting central 
themes around conceptions, routes, actors and regulation, while also tracing some of the key 
developments and fault-lines in this field of study itself. The second section then provides an 
overview of the purpose, perspective, and content of this volume. 
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Defining smuggling – in time and space 
We define smuggling as the purposeful movement across a border in contravention to the 
relevant legal frameworks.3 It should be clear from this that smuggling, as an activity and as a 
field of study, is fundamentally politically defined. Both the borders that make smuggling cross- 
border trade and the laws that make it illegal are social and political constructs. This of course 
means that the boundaries of smuggling are movable and embedded as much in the context of 
an activity than in the activity itself. Critically, they are conditional not just in space but also in 
time. As historical studies of cross-border trade have often highlighted, the same exchange of 
food and livestock between two settlements can over the years and without any variation in its 
practice change from a neighbourly exchange to legal international trade to smuggling. 
As many contributions in this volume have highlighted (for example, Nugent; Andreas, in 
this volume), the history of smuggling, deeply entwined with the processes of border-making, 
colonialism, and the territorial expansion of states, is an excellent illustration of this dependency 
on politics. It highlights again the fundamental contextuality of the topic at hand, as different 
goods and trade corridors have been criminalised and decriminalised across history, while 
borders have been drawn, erased and re-drawn. While it is frequently referred to as the 
‘shadow’ or ‘dark side’ of globalisation, trade or border making, a more historicised approach to 
smuggling takes away some of the perceived neutrality or inevitability of the dividing line 
between the legal processes and its ‘underbelly.’ It notes that what is today often taken self- 
evidently as ‘global drug smuggling’ would have been incomprehensible to an observer from 
200 years ago, not just because the borders across which these goods move have changed, but 
because the very conception of ‘drugs’ as a particular set of criminalised medically harmful 
recreational substances is distinctly contemporary (see Porter and Hough, 1996). 
Naturally, these processes of rule-making and boundary-making have not been shaped 
merely by geography, changing social norms and their legal codification, but also by political 
and commercial interests (see for example Durán-Martínez, in this volume). Here, the political 
drivers behind the historical geographical expansion of the nation-state and of empires have 
shaped critically the making of borders, the creation of borderlands and the construction of a 
global legal trade system. Smuggling today often happens across borders that were drawn by 
colonial powers through communities that remain closely connected (see for example Titeca, in 
this volume). As historical scholarship has often highlighted, the expansion of state and imperial 
structures has not demarcated only smuggling, but often not shied away from encouraging it or 
drawing on it where it was useful, from arms supplies to blockade busting to the opium wars 
(Andreas, 2014; Harvey, 2016). Opium in particular of course highlights the complex re-
lationship among empire, economic interests, bureaucratic development, and the criminalisa-
tion of certain trades (Kim, 2020). It also fits into a wider picture, especially with a view to 
narcotics, that serves as a reminder that the colonial and imperial history of the making of 
smuggling both through border-making and the making of global rules of trade and con-
sumption have been embedded deeply in unequal power structures and consequently have been 
racialised (Koram, 2019) and gendered starkly (Schuster, in this volume). As we note below, the 
politics of making smuggling – and making smugglers – still disproportionately affects com-
munities not just at geographic but also political margins of the modern state system, from 
travellers to nomadic pastoral communities. This is especially true given how closely connected 
modern policy on smuggling is with language around ‘poor governance,’ ‘weak states,’ and 
‘under-development,’ considering the power structures that have shaped its context necessarily 
unsettle common de-politicised conceptions of smuggling and anti-smuggling policy. 
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While the making of laws and of borders has shaped smuggling, smuggling can also do the 
same trick in reverse. As a range of contributions in this volume have highlighted, smuggling 
has actively shaped how borders and borderlands have developed. While Scott famously framed 
borderlands and their mobility as essential resistance against the ‘last enclosure’ of the state 
(2009), historians have frequently highlighted the ways in which border communities and 
smugglers have at times themselves contributed to shaping and legitimising border structures 
(Nugent, 2002 and in this volume). At the same time, smuggling has been connected to the rise 
of vast state enforcement apparatuses, both within countries and acrossborders. It has con-
tributed to the justification of state and imperial expansion and contributed to the shape of 
modern bureaucracies and state structures (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2008), and influenced 
legislation, from tariffs to prohibition. 
Naturally, none of these dynamics are merely historical: legislation around trade and taxa-
tion, prohibition and tariffs still are constantly evolving and re-shaping the barriers between 
legal and illegal trade. In the last few years, a legal global trade in cannabis products, long almost 
entirely limited to smuggling, has been developing again. Taxes and tariffs on different goods 
are constantly re-negotiated, and arguments around smuggling are still actively shaping lobbying 
efforts – for example around taxes on tobacco products (see Gallien, in this volume). While the 
past decades have seen fewer borders being re-drawn, customs unions and trade agreements are 
changing the boundaries and barriers of the global trade system, simultaneously accompanied by 
new trade infrastructure and industries of border fortification, shaped again, by discourses of 
smuggling and porosity (see Andreas, 2009; Andersson, 2014; Gazzotti in this volume). 
As the politics and the violent history underlying the creation and maintenance of modern 
state and legal systems have created the boundaries that characterise smuggling, they naturally 
have complicated its definition. Similarly, they have shaped how scholarship has conceptualised, 
characterised and named smuggling. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the literature on the topic 
currently has not endorsed one universal set of terms. Researchers, including the authors in this 
volume, have used a variety of conceptions of the term, or sub-sections of it, and a variety of 
language around it, from illicit trade to contraband to shadow trade to informal cross-border 
trade (ICBT) to trafficking. This tapestry typically becomes even more diverse when we leave 
the language of academia and talk to those engaged in smuggling themselves. Here, some may 
speak of “livelihood trade,” others of “informal trade,” and others just of “business.” Given the 
politics of the ‘boundaries of smuggling,’ it should be unsurprising that the language around it 
has become varied and contested, as academics, policy practitioners and smugglers all seek to 
establish and subvert these boundaries and the connected normative claims about the activity, 
the political context that names it illegal, or the local social context that may frame it as immoral 
or heroic. 
The term ‘smuggling’ in particular, may be seen by some as endorsing a statist perspective 
towards the activity. We would like to highlight here that this is not our intention – we trust 
our audience not to read a normative position in the term, and defer to the importance, in 
evaluating smuggling, of its aforementioned context, of which this volume provides riches. We 
feel it critical to maintain both the fact that the defining features of smuggling are socially 
constructed and the conviction that this does not make them meaningless in practice. Our 
aforementioned definition groups within its conception of smuggling some practices which are 
entirely normalised and tolerated, and which would see both those involved in the trade and 
some of those studying it balk at the term. We note, however, that the illegality of an activity 
still can have critical consequences for those involved in it, even if activities are normalised. It 
can shape the routes or profits available, the payments traders must make, or the violence they 
may be subject to, including at the hand of the state. 
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We do not seek to and did not impose a uniform terminology, definition, or perspective on 
the authors of the individual chapters, as will be evident to the reader. Instead, the claim that we 
seek to make here is that, within this diverse language, and within these contingent and shifting 
boundaries, there lies a field of study to which a variety of methodological and disciplinary 
perspectives are making contributions that can speak to each other and be legible across ter-
minological differences.4 Finally, it is worth noting that while smuggling requires borders, these 
do not necessarily have to be (or lay claim to being) national borders between states. Goods can 
be smuggled into a prison, past a barricade into a city under siege, or from an area controlled by 
an armed group to a territory dominated by a different group. The focus of this volume, 
however, lies primarily in smuggling across international borders, alongside the particular 
geographic, social and political structures that they give rise to. 
The content of smuggling 
The study of smuggling has seen the development of numerous sub-divisions and sub- 
categorisations of its titular activity, some structured around the scope of the activity (such as 
bootlegging vs wholesale smuggling), the actors involved (see Dobler, 2016 or Goodhand et al., 
in this volume), or the routes taken (such as maritime smuggling, see Bruwer in this volume). 
Other distinctions have categorised territory according to its position in a wider smuggling 
macro-structure, dividing between spaces of production and transit, and between entrepot and 
consumption territory (Igue and Soule, 1992; Bennafla, 2014). While we do not expand on 
these here, we think it worth expanding on some distinctions and observations that are based on 
the goods that are being traded. Again, some preliminary conceptual points are in order. 
First, some chapters in this volume reference a distinction between ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ 
smuggling. This distinguishes between the smuggling of goods for which a legal trade corridor 
exists that is not subject to additional restrictions, such as rice (Quitoriano, in this volume) or 
gasoline (Eaton, in this volume), and the smuggling of goods for which it does not, which 
typically includes goods such as firearms (Marsh and Pinson, in this volume), narcotics 
(Mansfield; Duran-Martinez, in this volume), or rare wildlife (Felbab-Brown, in this volume). 
Second, this volume also includes chapters on the smuggling of people. We have included 
them not because we understand the smuggling of people and the smuggling of goods as 
essentially the same, or because we seek to understand humans merely as ‘cargo.’ As each of the 
respective chapters highlight, human smuggling spurs unique dynamics: it complicates the roles 
of smugglers and of law enforcement and gives rise to further distinctions around consent and 
relationships between smugglers and smuggled that are not applicable to the smuggling of 
goods. However, we have decided to include these studies in this volume because we believe 
that the two areas of scholarship can benefit from closer communication, especially given the 
rich and critical history of scholarship on human mobility. As the different contributions in this 
volume powerfully illustrate, the study of smuggling of people has made contributions to our 
understanding of the role of networks, the politics and effects of anti-smuggling policies, and 
the entanglement between smuggling and livelihoods that provide critical interventions into 
our understanding of smuggling more widely (see Bird; Deshingkar; Gazzotti; Raineri; van 
Liempt, in this volume). 
Historically, the study of smuggling has not been characterised only by disciplinary and 
methodological divisions, but also often by segmentations based on the study of different goods, 
with particularly active sub-fields developing around the smuggling of different narcotics, 
hydrocarbons, and agricultural products. The chapters on different smuggled goods in this 
volume can be read as empirically rich single case studies on commonly smuggled goods. Read 
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alongside each other, they provide an illustration of the power that comparisons between 
different goods can have in the study of smuggling. Contributions to the study of particular 
goods again demonstrate how much the dynamics of smuggling are subject to the particular 
contexts in which they operate. They provide an important reminder that this is not just 
context-dependent on laws and borders, although both can also be good-specific, but also one 
shaped by value chains, industries, and markets. 
Studying smuggling with a focus on particular goods also situates the role of illegal move-
ment across borders within the larger life of these commodities. It can point to the importance 
of different production economies – some of which are highly labour intensive and connected 
to politically tolerated livelihood strategies. This can be observed in the case of some agri-
cultural production of narcotics such as cannabis in Morocco; others also are an important 
source of revenue for competing authorities such as in the case of opium in Afghanistan (see 
Mansfield; Ahmad, in this volume). Similarly, consumption markets can shape the politics of 
smuggling, as has been particularly noticeable in the context of firearms (Pinson and Marsh, in 
this volume) (where actors are worried about the effect on the capacity for violence of the end- 
user), or in foodstuffs, (where smuggling routes have often been central to maintaining live-
lihoods) (see Scheele, 2012; or Quitoriano, in this volume). 
Focusing on particular goods can also help illuminate the heterogeneity in power, access and 
profit along smuggling value chains and the different actors involved (see for example Mansfield, 
in this volume). It also demonstrates that smuggled goods don’t exist always as smuggled goods – 
while some value chains are entirely illegal, others dip in and out of legality as they cross borders 
and boundaries, passing from export processing zones to free ports and to consumption markets. 
Consequently, they closely tie in to the changing politics of trade liberalisation, regulation, and 
taxation in recent decades (Meagher, 2003). Here, work on the smuggling of licit goods, in 
particular, has foregrounded the importance of examining the role of legal industries in smuggling 
as well. While they often frame themselves as victims or competitors of smuggling, work on 
cigarette smuggling or wildlife trade, for example, has highlighted both the role of formal sector 
actors in smuggling economies and the continuous re-negotiation of the boundaries between legal 
and illegal trade (see Felbab-Brown; Gallien, in this volume). Furthermore, focusing on value 
chains frequently points to the importance of formal and informal finance, of licit and illicit fi-
nancial flows, and of money laundering and currency exchange as critical features of smuggling 
today. These issues are particularly prevalent if we consider where smuggling typically is studied. 
Localising smuggling 
As this volume shows, there has been a strong theoretical and empirical connection between the 
study of smuggling and the study of borders and borderlands, particularly in African countries 
and low- and middle-income countries across the globe. In a sense, this is unsurprising – 
moving goods across borders is a defining part of smuggling, state capacity to limit these types of 
activities is arguably lower in low-income countries, and the production centres for some of the 
most studied smuggled goods, such as cocaine or opiates, lie in the so-called ‘Global South.’ 
However, as a range of contributions in recent years has illustrated, it is important to 
complicate this picture. Scholarship on bordering and the externalisation of borders (see Pena, 
in this volume) has shown that borders themselves are often more complex and geographically 
expansive institutions than the proverbial line in the sand. A focus on borders themselves, 
however, also risks over-emphasising one particular aspect of smuggling activities – the logistics 
of movement – at the expense of dynamics of production, consumption and in particular 
financing, which are more frequently located in the political and economic centres (see 
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Meagher, in this volume). Seeking to understand the relationship between the centre and the 
periphery – geographically, politically, legally, economically – has been one of the central 
contributions of the study of smuggling to social sciences more widely, but also remains an 
ongoing challenge.5 
The frequent focus of the study of smuggling on low- and middle-income countries presents 
a parallel dynamic. As many of the chapters in this volume highlight, they present particularly 
important and insightful places of study, where smuggling overlaps with ongoing state trans-
formation processes, and where some of the most visible changes and intense human costs and 
suffering in connection with smuggling are concentrated. It is critical, however, to locate these 
as nodes in wider networks which also feature high-income countries – as key consumption 
markets for narcotics, as key financial centres for the movement and investment of capital, as 
logistical centres for global transport networks, or as drivers of the rules of global trade and 
mobility that shape legal and illegal trade structures alike. 
Building on these considerations, it is important to recognise that just like legal trade, 
smuggling today is a truly global phenomenon. Naturally, there are different corridors and 
geographic weights to the trade of different goods, and some countries more frequently take the 
role of production, consumption, or transit space. However, not only is there no country on 
the globe today that is not in some way implicated in smuggling structures, but smuggling is also 
deeply embedded in the increasingly globalised economy and its structures and infrastructures of 
finance, shipping, mobility, and technology. Consequently, it is critical to take a wider look at 
the geography of smuggling and consider it more explicitly in the context of the development 
of the global trade system more broadly. While many of the most visible dynamics around 
smuggling may lie in borderlands, it is important both to connect these developments to dy-
namics that lie in the political and commercial centres, and re-evaluate the role of these spaces 
in smuggling. 
Parallel to discussions on the spaces of smuggling lies increasing scholarship that asks how 
different smuggling actors and networks intersect, particularly in borderland spaces. One strand 
of the literature has frequently highlighted the potential for new connections to be formed 
between different smuggling networks in these spaces (see Idler, in this volume). In these 
strategic nodes, where the flows of various smuggled goods, licit and illicit, converge, different 
actors at times share a labour pool, local interlocutors, routes, information, or interests. That 
argument has often been extended to point to the risk, or perhaps the suggested proclivity of 
smuggling networks to engage closely with other non-state actors in these spaces, to form ‘dirty 
entanglements’ (Shelley, 2014) with organised crime groups or particularly terrorist organisa-
tions. Naturally, these arguments have been focused in particular on spaces of conflict and 
contested governance. 
Recent years, however, have also seen scholarship seeking to ‘untangle’ these suggested 
entanglements, and highlight the complex and often adversarial micro-dynamics between these 
different actors on the ground. Authors have shown that alongside entanglements often lie 
segmentations between different actors and networks, based on different risk trade-offs, dif-
ferent normative evaluations of different activities, or different regulatory structures in which 
smuggling is embedded (Gallien, 2020). The question then becomes how and when different 
actors connect in borderlands. Here, a rich history of scholarship on borderlands has once again 
highlighted the importance of local political and social contexts to understand processes of 
brokerage, social and economic capital accumulation, moral economies, and practical norms 
that shape these interactions (see Goodhand, Raeymaekers and Titeca, in this volume; as well as  
Roitman, 2004; Titeca and Herdt, 2010; Raeymaekers, 2014; Hüsken, 2018; Raineri, 2019, 
among others). This connects to another central theme in recent scholarship. 
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Regulating smuggling 
Unsurprisingly, the way in which things are smuggled varies significantly across goods, routes, 
and regions. Some smuggling routes pass across rural and barely noticeable borderlines, others 
through heavily fortified checkpoints or across the high seas (Bruwer, in this volume). While 
many goods are hidden from the eyes of state officials while they pass across borders, this is not 
always the case. One of the most notable themes in recent scholarship on smuggling is also 
perhaps one of the most counter-intuitive with respect to common portrayals of smuggling as a 
lawless game of cat and mouse. As multiple chapters (e.g., Raeymaekers, in this volume) and 
recent scholarship have more broadly highlighted, smuggling is typically conducted neither in a 
‘lawless zone’ nor entirely under the radar of the state. Instead, smuggling is itself embedded in 
various forms of regulation. 
Some regulation is inherent in smuggling operating as a trade – it is affected by formal legal 
frameworks, laws of demand and supply, by price differences and changes in these parameters. 
While these can introduce fluctuations and uncertainty into the life of smugglers, much other 
regulation is often intended to increase predictability for actors involved. This includes reg-
ulation created among and between smugglers – cartels on the more well-known end of the 
spectrum, but also arrangements around insurance, debt and divisions of retail territory. Most 
remarkably perhaps, scholarship has also shown that the relationship between smugglers and 
state agents is often substantially more regulated than commonly assumed. For example, looking 
at the Congo-Uganda border, Raeymaekers (in this volume) shows that many ‘borderland 
bandits,’ which play an important role in the smuggling economy and the way it is governed, 
owe their position to connections with the state. Rather than being characterised by mere 
evasion or perhaps unstructured petty corruption, recent scholarship has described a variety of 
more structured relationships, regulating how goods can be smuggled, at what price and under 
which conditions (i.e., Titeca and Herdt, 2010; Ahmad, 2017; Gallien and Weigand, 2021;  
Raineri and Strazzari, 2021). This can be found throughout the chapters in this volume, a few 
of which have further demonstrated that these dynamics take on an additional complexity when 
they are set in a context where also non-state armed groups are active (see Brenner; Thakur, 
Ahmad, in this volume). These examples highlight not merely that smuggling is often more 
structured and regulated than common imaginaries suggest, but also point to the complex 
interplay between such arrangements and ideas of legitimacy and local normative conceptions. 
Here, communities themselves can emerge as regulatory actors. Local understandings of 
what type of smuggling is and is not appropriate, moral, or religiously permitted might not 
always present a unified evaluation of smuggling practices or by themselves drive out less ac-
cepted variants. Being highlighted frequently across these chapters (see for example Titeca; 
Quintaro; Schomerus and de Vries, in this volume), they present another level of regulation 
that smugglers engage with as they negotiate their relationships with their communities as 
customers, employees, neighbours, brokers, or customary governance actors (see also 
Goodhand et al, in this volume). Critically, acknowledging different community-centred 
perspectives on smuggling present an alternative account of smuggling to one that is solely 
focused on compliance with formal legal frameworks. They can help widen the vocabulary and 
categories relevant in describing and understanding smuggling. As particularly the chapters in 
the ‘borderland’ sections in this volume highlight, community perspectives can locate eva-
luations of smuggling in the political, economic and social environments of borderland com-




As we have noted above, the study of smuggling has often stood at the margins of separate 
academic enquiries, with smugglers being cast in supporting roles to support theories and policy 
recommendations that were not grounded in an in-depth analysis of smuggling itself, be it in 
studies on trade liberalisation, globalisation or war economies. Consequently, research that has 
sought to centre smuggling in its analysis has often struggled not merely with the terminology 
but also the figure, imaginary, and common perception of ‘the smuggler’ itself. As scholarship 
on human smuggling in particular has noted (see for example Sanchez, 2014; Gazzotti, in this 
volume), the figure of the ‘smuggler’ has increasingly become a boogeyman in the policy 
literature. Here, it has functioned not merely as an analytical shorthand, but also has provided a 
canvas to project blame for the horrific human costs at the intersection between modern sys-
tems of mobility, smuggling, and state policies. While this dynamic is somewhat less developed 
in the context of the smuggling of goods, here, too, a closer look at recent empirical scholarship 
on smuggling offers at least three important correctives. 
First, as recent scholarship on the issue, and a range of contributions in this volume de-
monstrate, there is enormous and analytically relevant diversity in the people who are involved 
in smuggling (see for example Dobler, 2016; Sanchez, 2014; Goodhand, in this volume). While 
common conceptions of ‘the smuggler’ are typically associated with men, women play a variety 
of visible and less visible roles in smuggling networks around the globe. Schuster (in this vo-
lume) illustrates the “powerful modes of feminine concealment work” in her study of Ciudad 
del Este, on the Paraguayan side of the Tri-Border Area with Argentina and Brazil. Similarly, 
actors from varying class and social backgrounds can be involved in smuggling networks, which 
can at the same time present tools for social mobility and contain highly uneven and oppressive 
divisions of risk and profit. While the distinction between ‘small fish’ and ‘big fish,’ between 
bosses and their more vulnerable employees in common accounts of smuggling capture some 
imbalances of power, modern networks are often not just hierarchical structures but complex 
and dynamic assemblages of capital, labour and relationships. 
Second, a simplistic focus on the figure of the ‘smuggler,’ even if more broadly conceived, 
also risks misrepresenting the way in which people engage in smuggling networks. Frequently, 
as ethnographies on smuggling, in particular, have noted, smuggling is not a full-time activity, 
and does not define comprehensively, economically, socially, or politically those involved in it. 
On the one hand, framing smuggling as something that is only done by ‘smugglers’ risks ig-
noring the degree to which smuggling is also practiced or facilitated by tourists and migrants 
crossing borders, or neighbouring pastoral communities keeping up long-standing exchanges of 
goods, or doctors, lawyers, and architects making a bit of money on the side (e.g., Peraldi, 2001;  
Scheele and McDougall, 2012). On the other hand, framing everyone involved in these ac-
tivities as a ‘smuggler’ often risks expanding normatively charged terms to huge groups of 
people, and deepening prejudices around borderland communities. 
Third, the figure of the ‘smuggler’ also risks limiting the driving role and agency of 
smuggling to those involved in moving goods across borders, and conceptually segments them 
from the wider networks of relationships that make up smuggling today. As noted above, 
smuggling does not exist always in antithesis to or competition with state law enforcement, but 
is embedded in structured relationships with state- and non-state governance providers. 
Focusing merely on the figure of the smuggler risks drawing a firm line through complex 
networks of facilitation, toleration, accountability, and profit that involve state- and non-state 
actors. It also risks drawing too firm a line between legal and illegal trade. Business communities 
have frequently relied on the figure of the ‘smuggler’ in order to lobby policymakers. Adopting 
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their discourse risks overlooking that legal and illegal trade are also shaped by each other – 
migration systems are perhaps the most striking but by far not the only example of this. See for 
example the chapter on cigarettes in this volume. It presents businesses in contrast to smugglers, 
camouflaging that formal enterprises themselves sometimes are involved in activities such as tax 
and tariff evasion. They may tolerate smuggling if it brings their goods cheaply into a different 
market, or engage in smuggling themselves. 
Clearly, the solution here is not to do away with the term altogether – it is used frequently 
throughout the volume by authors who still manage not to fall prey to the pitfalls outlined 
above. We believe the best way forward is instead to continue to contextualise and complicate 
the term, to highlight the diversity of activities, and to present scholarship that takes a wider 
view at the wider networks and political economy structures in which smuggling is embedded. 
Smuggling and conflict 
Smuggling can be a crucial aspect of armed conflicts, ensuring the survival of civilian popu-
lations, financing warring parties, and even creating economic incentives to continue fighting 
(Keen, 2007; Andreas, 2008; Kaldor, 2013). Consequently, smugglers frequently feature in the 
literatures on war economies, conflict, and security. Recent work on smuggling and conflict, 
including contributions in this volume, has sought to unpack the complex interplay among 
these phenomena (see for example Walther and Miles, 2017; Duran-Martinez, 2018; Walton 
et al., 2018; Brenner, 2019; Idler, 2019). 
On the one hand, wars and armed conflict often shape the dynamics of smuggling. Armed 
conflicts create new demands and, in the context of evolving war economies, new opportu-
nities for smuggling. For example, armed groups often depend on smuggled weapons and goods 
(Pinson and Marsh, in this volume). Meanwhile, the needs of civilian populations during armed 
conflict give rise to survivalist smuggling activities as well as the rise of “smuggling tycoons,” 
who accumulate considerable wealth (Ahamad, in this volume). Armed conflicts create new 
opportunities for “network specialists.” Goodhand, Koehler and Bhatia (in this volume) il-
lustrate the crucial role of brokers, who act as intermediaries among the various parties involved 
in the smuggling economy. Perhaps counterintuitively, state actors in armed settings frequently 
feature among those that benefit from smuggling economies (see Weigand, 2020; Mansfield, in 
this volume). 
However, scholarship on smuggling and conflict has noted that armed conflict can also 
inhibit smuggling, and many smugglers try avoiding conflict zones on their transit route as they 
are notoriously difficult and expensive to navigate (Gallien and Weigand, 2021). Successful 
smuggling in conflict zones frequently requires negotiations with and payments to numerous 
authorities, including state actors and non-state armed groups (Ahmad, 2017; Thakur and 
Brenner, in this volume). Profit margins in the smuggling economy of conflict zones are often 
low due to the high costs of transportation, even in the smuggling of high value goods. In his 
detailed analysis of the opium trade in and out of Afghanistan, Mansfield (in this volume) shows 
that smuggling is only profitable for the numerous involved actors, if conducted in large 
volumes. 
Meanwhile, peaceful or stable environments are more conducive to smuggling. Thakur (in 
this volume) illustrates how political agreements, such as ceasefires, between armed groups and 
state actors at the India-Myanmar border have exacerbated the smuggling economy, while 
enabling the various political authorities to collect more taxes and levies from smugglers. 
Conversely, states have tried to intervene in the smuggling economy with political objectives. 
However, such interventions have not always had the desired consequences. Brenner (in this 
Studying smuggling 
9 
volume) shows how US policies aimed at curbing the revenues generated by armed groups 
through ‘conflict minerals’ in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, shifted how those armed 
groups generated revenue and ultimately resulted in more violence. 
Disciplines, methods and motivations 
We started this introduction noting that despite the existence of substantial work on smuggling 
in different disciplines, and despite overlapping themes and concerns, there often has been 
relatively little interaction and conversation among them. As in adjacent fields, some of this has 
been shaped by broader disciplinary and methodological divisions, as well as different con-
ceptions of what ‘data’ on smuggling looks like, and the types of contexts in which this is 
accessible. From a methodological point of view, this relative ‘siloing’ likely has done a par-
ticular disservice to the generation of knowledge on smuggling. As methodological work on 
researching smuggling and illegal activities more widely has pointed out (see i.e., Ellis and 
MacGaffey, 1996; Gallien, 2021; Siu and Bensassi; Dobler; De La Rosa and Lara, in this vo-
lume), the particular challenges in researching these activities make work across methodologies 
and across disciplines particularly important and potentially particularly productive. 
Furthermore, different methodologies share wider challenges around ethics and risks (see 
Huesken, in this volume) and the trade-offs of localising smuggling (see Dobler, in this volume) 
that can provide a starting point for conversations across disciplinary divides. 
Beyond methodologies, it appears that another dynamic that has deepened gaps among 
disciplines are disciplinary assumptions about the motivations of smuggling and smugglers. 
Consequently, one central feature in strengthening the literature’s ability to interact and bridge 
the gaps among them is to emphasise that as the features of smuggling are diverse, so are its 
motivations, and the two should not be conflated or assumed to be singular. Smuggling is an 
economic activity and price differences, tax rates or transaction costs often feature in the cal-
culations of smugglers. A broader view at different literatures on smuggling cautions against 
suggesting, based on that observation, that smuggling is exclusively motivated by economics, or 
that by definition it is essentially equivalent to tax evasion (Pitt, 1981). Similarly, as we have 
noted above, smuggling is defined and shaped by politics, and can be in itself a highly political 
activity. Political effects and motivations don’t always overlap, however, and the micro-politics 
of smuggling can be complex and counter-intuitive. Hence, a wider look across different lit-
eratures and disciplinary traditions also cautions against assuming, a-priori, that smuggling is 
necessarily also politically motivated, or, more importantly, that its politics are always inherently 
subversive and antagonistic toward the state. 
Similarly, smuggling has deep historical roots, and much of what today is framed as 
smuggling routes across borders created in colonial contexts are in fact trade routes that pre-date 
both the borders and the laws that make the trade illegal. While it is worth highlighting this fact 
as a relevant complication of more criminalising approaches to smuggling, here too it remains 
important to remain cautious in transitioning from a feature to a motivation, noting that 
smuggling, even if it is along the same routes, is not always motivated by a historical continuity 
or path dependency. As much historical work on smuggling has shown, trade across similar 
routes can transform substantially and swiftly over time as its economic, political, and social 
environment shifts. 
A similar point is true for the observation that smuggling is socially normalised in borderland 
environments. As scholarship in borderland studies has often found, smuggling frequently is part 
of the everyday lives of borderland populations, no matter how much external observers may be 
scandalised by it. Scholarship on these issues also cautions that here, again, it remains important 
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not to draw a line from the everyday normalised practice to conclusions about the beliefs and 
motivations of people involved in the trade. Recent work in borderland studies, in particular, 
has highlighted critical diversities – while some smuggling may be normalised in communities, 
other activities might be tolerated grudgingly. While some smuggling activities may be em-
bedded socially and central parts of borderland livelihood strategies, other activities at the same 
time may have unleashed dynamics of profit, competition, and violence that communities 
observe with unease (for example see Meagher; Titeca, in this volume). 
Examining the conceptual challenges in studying smuggling and pointing to underlying 
common themes, previous sections in this introduction have noted the various possible points 
of connection for work on smuggling among different disciplines that have worked in this 
space; particularly anthropology, sociology, history, political science, and economics.6 These 
considerations of methods and motivations further highlight the way communication between 
disciplines can strengthen work in this area, and provide new avenues for collaboration and 
complicating dominant assumptions. Challenges around ethics and localising smuggling for 
example, as discussed in this volume, exist across disciplines and would benefit from closer 
conversations. Similarly, work across different perspectives can help embed localised ethno-
graphies in transnational analyses or challenge macro-level discussions through more critical 
perspectives. Legal scholarship and anthropological accounts of practical norms typically have 
different starting points, but both contribute to analyses of the different regulatory levels that 
surround smuggling. This leads us directly to the purpose and structure of this volume. 
This book 
This book aims to provide the first systematic introduction and comprehensive mapping of 
research on smuggling in a variety of disciplines, with a view to aiding the formation of a more 
well-connected field of ‘smuggling studies.’ We aim both to provide an entrance and reference 
for new scholars of the field and a point of connection and inspiration for collaboration, and 
new perspectives for established researchers. As we have argued above, research on smuggling 
has been produced in various disciplines. Geographic sub-fields have frequently been seg-
mented from each other by disciplinary boundaries, ideological divergences, methodological 
differences, and linguistic gaps. Hence, our intention is to move the study of smuggling from 
the edges of different discussions and disciplines to its own centre, creating a cornerstone for a 
more thorough investigation that draws on the insights of the various disciplines that consider 
the topic. 
The book is structured around larger thematic debates. It covers themes ranging from the 
methodological challenges in researching smuggling to its central conceptual histories and 
debates. It provides introductions of how selected goods are smuggled around the world, of-
fering empirical texture and comparative insight. In addition, it seeks to link smuggling 
scholarship to central discussions in social sciences, such as the nature and development of the 
state, the construction of borders, mobility, and armed conflict. 
The handbook begins with a discussion of the methodologies, terms and perspectives that 
have shaped how smuggling has been studied in different disciplines. This first section of the 
handbook has two main functions. On the one hand, it aims to provide an introduction and 
methodological toolkit to those readers who are new to the field, and are thinking about 
conducting research on the topic. On the other hand, as the book also seeks to reflect critically 
on the knowledge generated on smuggling so far, it seems only fitting to begin it by discussing 
the tools and ideas that have been used to help trace blind spots and ways forward. After 
addressing the question of where to go to study smuggling and discussing the way localising 
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smuggling shapes its study (Dobler, in this volume), a chapter on ‘smuggling ideologies’ 
(Meagher, in this volume) traces the distortions that overly ideological or programmatically driven 
perspectives on smuggling have introduced into its study. The following chapters discuss different 
quantitative (Siu and Benassi, in this volume) and qualitative approaches (de la Rosa and Lara, in 
this volume) that have dominated the study of smuggling, as well as the ethics, risks and security 
challenges that are linked to and have influenced the study of smuggling (Hüsken, in this volume). 
The second section of the handbook looks at borderlands and their people. Building in 
particular on the rich literature on borderland studies, this section zooms in and takes a closer 
look at the dynamics of smuggling at the local level to provide an understanding of how 
borderlands function, how smuggling is understood locally, and the role of communities, 
brokers and other actors in the local smuggling economy. The section begins by tracing the 
historical creation of borders (Nugent, in this volume) and reviewing how different scholarship 
has conceptualised borders, borderlands, and frontiers (Peña, in this volume). After investigating 
the role of brokers in local smuggling economies (Goodhand, Koehler, and Bhatia, in this 
volume), the section looks at the politics of smuggling and the role of the state in the smuggling 
economy at the local level (Raeymaekers, in this volume) and analyses the role of smugglers in 
their local communities (Titeca, in this volume). The following chapters explore local narra-
tives, memories and histories in the context of smuggling (Schomerus and de Vries, in this 
volume) and unpack the role of gender in the smuggling economy and how gendered tropes 
shaped our perception of the topic (Schuster, in this volume). 
The third section provides an overview on various goods that are frequently smuggled, 
identifying common routes, practices, and procedures. In doing so, the handbook considers 
both licit and illicit goods and a range of case studies from around the world. The section begins 
with a discussion of goods that are widely considered to be illicit, such as cocaine (Durán- 
Martínez, in this volume), opiates (Mansfield, in this volume), weapons (Marsh and Pinson, in 
this volume), and wildlife (Felbab-Brown, in this volume). It then proceeds to a discussion of 
goods that are commonly viewed as licit, such as cigarettes (Gallien, in this volume), petroleum 
products (Eaton, in this volume), and rice (Quitoriano, in this volume). The final chapter of the 
section investigates the intersection between the flows of different goods (Idler, in this volume). 
The fourth section focuses on the smuggling of people and the intersection between mo-
bility and smuggling. It both introduces central concepts in this literature and discusses the effect 
of restrictions on and the criminalisation of mobility (van Liempt, in this volume). It provides 
an introduction to the networked structure and the social organisation of migrant smuggling 
(Raineri, in this volume), and examines its relationship with wider structures of labour cir-
culation, considering, in particular, its gendered effects (Deshingkar, in this volume). The final 
chapter of this section uses the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on borders around the globe to 
draw out lessons on human smuggling more widely (Bird, in this volume). 
The fifth section then explores the role of smuggling and conflict as the two topics are often 
portrayed as closely linked. On the one hand, armed conflict and wars are commonly associated 
with bolstering smuggling economies. On the other hand, illicit trade is often viewed as a driver 
of armed conflict, providing income opportunities for armed groups and corrupt state actors 
alike, and incentivising the continuation of war. This section aims at providing a more nuanced 
understanding of what frequently is called the ‘conflict-crime nexus.’ After looking at the role 
of smuggling in historical wars (Andreas, in this volume) the section looks at smuggling and war 
economies (Ahmad, in this volume) and explores the role of armed groups in smuggling 
economies (Thakur, in this volume). In the conclusion of the section, the handbook analyses 
the effects of policies aimed at curbing smuggling to fight insurgencies or to reduce armed 
conflict (Brenner, in this volume). 
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The final section of the handbook engages with how smuggling currently is addressed and 
could be addressed differently, also providing a stepping stone for policymakers thinking about 
how to engage with the topic. Following a discussion of maritime borders (Bruwer, in this 
volume), the handbook takes a critical look at policing and law enforcement in the context of 
smuggling (Gazzotti, in this volume). The section and the handbook conclude with a chapter 
that takes us back to the local level, exploring community adaptation and resilience (Herbert, 
Reitano, and Gastelum Felix, in this volume). 
While we tried to cover a large range of perspectives and approaches in this handbook, it is 
naturally not without limitations. The set of goods covered here is limited and selective. It is 
meant to provide an introduction to the diversity of goods and the factors that drive their 
unique dynamics, not to diminish the relevance of smuggled goods that we do not cover here, 
such as amphetamines, electronics, alcohol, garments, or works of art and heritage. Crucially, 
the role of financial flows requires further investigation. There is also a disciplinary bias within 
this book – while we have aimed to bring together different perspectives here, our focus has 
been on the social sciences. This has been shaped both by our own perspective on the field and 
an intention to seek out literatures that may speak to each other particularly well, and is not 
meant to discard work on smuggling in the arts and humanities.7 Geographically, the handbook 
engages primarily with smuggling in low- to middle-income countries, while also arguing in a 
range of chapters for a wider global view of these activities that include the role of consumption 
markets and networks in high-income countries. We recognise that representation in this 
handbook does not reflect these goals fully. While we have managed an equal distribution of 
genders among the authors, authors from or based in low- to middle-income countries are still 
under-represented among the contributors to this book. Nevertheless, we hope that the book 
contributes to a deeper knowledge and further networking within the field that also strengthens 
connections among fields and will further shift these balances in future volumes. 
As this handbook aims at providing an overview of the entire field of what we describe as 
smuggling studies across disciplines, perspectives, and worldviews, it also illustrates tensions 
within this field. Different scholars in this handbook engage with different types of questions 
and relate their work to different strands of literature. They take different positions on the 
frameworks, meanings, and definitions of smuggling, and especially on the role of state and 
policy actors in relation to these activities. Some chapters in this volume focus on suggesting 
ways to advance our thinking within the frameworks and languages provided by states and 
policymakers, especially in order to develop ways to address pressing issues in a relatable way on 
the short term. Others focus on a more critical engagement with the assumptions and defi-
nitions that are proposed by states and make suggestions for how to change our thinking about 
smuggling – how we study it, what we think the problem is, and what answers could be – in a 
more substantial way. As throughout the different issues presented here, we see value in this 
diversity, and hope that our readers share this view. 
Notes  
1 We would like to thank Peter Andreas, David Brenner, Gregor Dobler and Shalaka Thakur for their 
comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. More importantly, as we draw here on chapters throughout 
this handbook, we would like to thank all the authors in this volume for their thoughtful contributions 
and for sticking with this project during what was for many a challenging time. We would like to 
thank Rosie Anderson and Helena Hurd at Routledge, and Camilla Ridgewell at the LSE. We ac-
knowledge and are grateful for the funds provided by the ESRC and the London School of Economics 
and Political Science in order to make this handbook open access. If you’re surprised that we’ve snuck 
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a whole acknowledgement section into a footnote – this is a handbook of smuggling. What did you 
expect?  
2 For an illustration of this point in the context of African borderlands, see Meagher (in this volume).  
3 This is typically conceptualised as the movement of goods or people, but could similarly refer to capital 
or information.  
4 We note that this field naturally has a close overlap with what is usually referred to as ‘borderland 
studies’ – this will be evident throughout this volume, which has a large set of contributions from 
leading scholars typically associated with this field. As we note in the section below, the two do not 
precisely map on top of each other: not all borderland studies focuses on smuggling, and not all analysis 
of smuggling can or should be located in borderlands, as scholars might instead focus on financial actors 
in economic centres, on policy makers in political centres, on larger transcontinental networks or on 
maritime smuggling.  
5 Dobler in this volume provides a deeper discussion of this issue.  
6 This also applies to connections between different fields of study, such as borderland studies, work on 
war economies, the study of transnational organised crime or of informal economies.  
7 One exception to this perhaps represents the cover of this handbook – a painting by Fernanda Morales 
Tovar, entitled “Displaced nexus.” From her series “Archeologies of the environment,” the image 
spoke to us as an illustration of the fact that institutions such as borders are constructed not merely 
architecturally but socially, and benefit from an analysis that centres people’s role in their emergence, 
maintenance, and perhaps subversion. We were glad to find an illustration that moves away from 
common visual representations of borders merely as lines or walls, and of smugglers merely as masked 
men. We hope that the readers will find their own connections between the artwork and the chapters 
in this volume – our favourite is that the painting’s central object shades the landscape behind it in a 
different colour, mirroring the description of the border as a prism for stories and perceptions in the 
chapter by Schomerus and de Vries in this volume.  
Works cited 
Ahmad, A. (2017) Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power. Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Andersson, R. (2014) Illegality, Inc. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.  
Andreas, P. (2008) Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Andreas, P. (2009) Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
(Cornell Studies in Political Economy). 
Andreas, P. (2014) Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Andreas, P. and Nadelmann, E. (2008) Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International 
Relations. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bennafla, K. (2014) ‘État et illégalisme: quelle géographie? Une approche par les flux marchands depuis 
l’Afrique et le Moyen-Orient,’ Annales de geographie, n°, 700(6), pp. 1338–1358. 
Brenner, D. (2019) Rebel Politics: A Political Sociology of Armed Struggle in Myanmar’s Borderlands. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
Dobler, G. (2016) ‘The Green, the Grey and the Blue: A Typology of Cross-border Trade in Africa*,’ The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 54(1), pp. 145–169. doi:  10.1017/S0022278X15000993. 
Duran-Martinez, A. (2018) The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops and Politicians in Colombia and 
Mexico. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ellis, S. and MacGaffey, J. (1996) ‘Research on Sub-Saharan Africa’s Unrecorded International Trade: 
Some Methodological and Conceptual Problems,’ African Studies Review, 39(2), pp. 19–41. 
Gallien, M. (2020) ‘Informal Institutions and the Regulation of Smuggling in North Africa,’ Perspectives on 
Politics, 18(2), pp. 492–508. doi:  10.1017/S1537592719001026. 
Gallien, M. (2021) ‘Researching the Politics of Illegal Activities,’ PS: Political Science & Politics, 54(3), 
pp. 467–471. doi:  10.1017/S1049096521000317. 
Gallien, M. and Weigand, F. (2021) ‘Channeling Contraband: How States Shape International Smuggling 
Routes,’ Security Studies, 30(1), pp. 79–106. doi:  10.1080/09636412.2021.1885728. 
Harvey, S. (2016) Smuggling: Seven Centuries of Contraband. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.  
Max Gallien and Florian Weigand 
14 
Hüsken, T. (2018) Tribal Politics in the Borderland of Egypt and Libya. 1st edition. 2019. New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Idler, A. (2019) Borderland Battles: Violence, Crime, and Governance at the Edges of Colombia’s War. Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Igue, J. O. and Soule, B. G. (1992) L’etat entrepot au Benin: commerce informel ou solution a la crise. Paris: 
Karthala. 
Kaldor, M. (2013) New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Keen, D. J. (2007) Complex Emergencies. 1st edition. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity. 
Kim, D. S. (2020) Empires of Vice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Koram, K. (ed.) (2019) The War on Drugs and the Global Colour Line. London: Pluto Press. 
Meagher, K. (2003) ‘A Back Door to Globalisation?: Structural Adjustment, Globalisation & Transborder 
Trade in West Africa,’ Review of African Political Economy, 30(95), pp. 57–75. 
Nugent, P. (2002) Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Lie of the 
Borderlands Since 1914. Athens, Oxford: Legon, Ghana: James Currey. 
Peraldi, M. (2001) Cabas et containers. Activités marchandes informelles et réseaux migrants transfrontaliers. Paris: 
Maisonneuve & Larose. 
Pitt, M. M. (1981) ‘Smuggling and Price Disparity,’ Journal of International Economics, 11(4), pp. 447–458. 
doi:  10.1016/0022-1996(81)90026-X. 
Porter, R. and Hough, M. (1996) ‘The History of the “drugs Problem”,’ Criminal Justice Matters, 24(1), 
pp. 3–5. doi:  10.1080/09627259608552771. 
Raeymaekers, T. (2014) Violent Capitalism and Hybrid Identity in the Eastern Congo: Power to the Margins. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Raineri, L. (2019) ‘Cross-Border Smuggling in North Niger: The Morality of the Informal and the 
Construction of a Hybrid Order,’ in Polese, A., Russo, A., and Strazzari, F. (eds) Governance Beyond the 
Law: The Immoral, The Illegal, The Criminal. Cham: Springer International Publishing (International 
Political Economy Series), pp. 227–245. doi:  10.1007/978-3-030-05039-9_12. 
Raineri, L. and Strazzari, F. (2021) ‘Drug Smuggling and the Stability of Fragile States. The Diverging 
Trajectories of Mali and Niger,’ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, pp. 1–18. doi:  10.1080/17502 
977.2021.1896207. 
Roitman, J. (2004) Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Sanchez, G. (2014) Human Smuggling and Border Crossings. London, New York: Routledge. 
Scheele, D. J. (2012) Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Scheele, J. and McDougall, J. (eds) (2012) Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Scott, J. C. (2009) The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Shelley, L. I. (2014) Dirty Entanglements. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Titeca, K. and Herdt, T. de (2010) ‘Regulation, Cross-border Trade and Practical Norms in West Nile, 
North-Western Uganda,’ Africa, 80(04), pp. 573–594. doi:  10.3366/afr.2010.0403. 
Walther, O. J. and Miles, W. F. S. (2017) African Border Disorders: Addressing Transnational Extremist 
Organizations. London, New York: Routledge. 
Walton, O. et al. (2018) Borderlands and Peacebuilding: A view from the Margins. Conciliation Resources. 
Available at:  https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/borderlands-and-peacebuilding-a- 
view-from-the-margins (Accessed: 7 June 2021). 
Weigand, F. (2020) Conflict and Transnational Crime: Borders, Bullets and Business in Southeast Asia. 









Gregor Dobler   
Where would you go if you wanted to study smuggling? 
The different answers scholars give to that question structure the emerging academic field of 
studies on smuggling. On the one side, scholars in security studies or international relations 
often look upon smuggling networks as global or at least regional phenomena that are not 
associated with specific sites as much as with a flow of goods and a counter-flow of money. 
These scholars study smuggling from a bird’s eye perspective, using all available data to un-
derstand the direction, amounts and consequences, of illegal trade flows. Very often, they do 
not “go” to any specific research site. 
On the other side are those (often academically at home in anthropology, geography, history 
or the more qualitative brands of sociology or political sciences) who study smuggling as the 
illegal transport of goods across a national boundary – a site-specific activity mostly happening 
in borderlands, where smuggling networks turn into local realities and can be understood in 
their consequences. 
This handbook brings together scholars from both perspectives. My own outlook on 
smuggling to a great extent has been shaped by the second approach. I came to the field with a 
primary interest not in smuggling, but in borderlands. When I started doing fieldwork in a 
border region, I found smugglers at work, so I had to become interested in smuggling. Similar 
things apply to some of my closest colleagues, many of them loosely organised in the African 
Borderlands Research Network (ABORNE). Our fascination with the borderlands has given 
rise to a huge and very useful corpus of empirically nuanced, theoretically sophisticated studies 
on smuggling that have collectively changed our understanding of borders and their con-
sequences for societies. These studies have allowed us to understand better how states and 
societies forcefully interact in borderlands, how practical norms are renegotiated in border 
situations, and how money is being made and boom towns are emerging, only to decline again 
a few years later. Borderlands are places where things happen. Since often enough, these ‘things’ 
are shaped by smuggling, borderlands research has also become a catalyst for new perspectives 
on smuggling. 
Such studies in borderlands typically localise smuggling in a double sense. On the positive 
side, they are uniquely placed to understand the consequences smuggling has for the people 
who engage in it and for the societies and governance processes shaped by it. They make 
smuggling visible as a real-life practice of human beings, a practice in which different societal 
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fields intersect to generate unforeseen consequences, and they show both smuggling’s wide 
variety and its embeddedness into local social, political, economic, and cultural contexts. 
There is a downside to localising approaches, as well. Borderland studies are rarely able to 
capture the complex, globe-spanning smuggling networks into which local activities on the 
border are embedded, and they are not well suited to addressing smuggling that does not 
happen on the border, but is organised from corporate offices in the world’s capitals. Focusing 
on the consequences smuggling has for a local society may make us overlook a bigger picture – 
and may lead policy practitioners to understand smuggling as a problem that can be addressed by 
policing the borderlands. 
Both on the positive and on the negative sides, the methodological decision to localise 
smuggling in the borderlands has consequences for what we see (see also the Introduction to 
this volume). In this article, I first lay out what I see as major strengths of a localising approach. 
In a second step, I analyse some shortcomings and potential blind spots of studying smuggling 
from a borderlands perspective. Finally, I suggest ways of expanding the reach of borderland 
studies without losing the advantages of localised research, and of combining localised with 
more systemic approaches. Since my own expertise is in the borderlands, the entire paper rather 
sums up my experiences with localised research than offering advice on how to use systemic 
approaches. Analysing where systemic approaches find their sites of research and suggesting 
ways to improve them would need a second, corresponding article – written by somebody 
much more grounded in that perspective than I am. 
Understanding smuggling: the strengths of a localised perspective 
I can best illustrate the strengths of a localising approach to smuggling by using examples from 
my own research on the borderlands between Namibia and Angola (Dobler 2008a, 2008b, 
2009, 2014, 2017). Localised research, I will argue, allows us to gain a real-world perspective on 
smuggling. It helps us to understand the intricacies of moving goods across a border – intricacies 
that have hidden consequences for wider networks, as well – and to analyse the ways smuggling 
is embedded into other activities and into the surrounding society. Without such a real-world 
understanding of smuggling, we run the danger of isolating smuggling from its social en-
vironment and to misunderstand it as a class of activity set apart by its nature, where often 
enough the only thing that sets it apart from other trade activities is the state’s (or the re-
searcher’s) gaze. 
Oshikango is a Namibian town on the border to Angola that experienced massive trade-led 
growth after the end of the Angolan civil war. The town is situated at the point where regional 
transport corridors from the Southern African harbours of Walvis Bay and Durban cross the 
Angolan border. During the 2000s, the lack of infrastructure in war-torn Angola coupled with 
currency regulations and differently structured trade networks in both countries turned 
Oshikango into a necessary nodal point between two segment of international trade networks: 
the segment in which goods produced in different parts of the world reached Southern Africa, 
and the second, separate segment in which Angolan-based traders organised the cross-border 
movement of goods into Angola. A large percentage of all goods consumed in the southern 
regions of Angola not only had to pass through Oshikango, but were offloaded here and stored 
into bonded warehouses. From these warehouses, Angolan trades acquired them and imported 
them into Angola, paying cash in US dollars even for huge truckloads of whisky worth a 
hundred thousand dollars or more. 
As a consequence, Oshikango was more than just a border post through which goods were 
exported. It was the meeting point between trade networks and the place in which the transfer 
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between two national realms of regulation could be negotiated. If you had enough local 
knowledge here, you could circumvent taxes and import duties and multiply your profits. 
Smuggling networks did not only pass through the town; they were organised here. 
For me, this turned the town into an ideal place to understand both the technicalities of 
smuggling and the consequences of smuggling for society in a borderland. For both aims, I 
needed quite a lot of local embeddedness and a long presence in everyday life. For some time, I 
compiled the daily account statements in a liquor warehouse; I worked with UNCTAD’s 
Asycuda software used for processing export papers, sat around in offices and spent the evenings 
hanging out with warehouse owners, clearing agents, or local politicians. In this, my approach 
was very typical of localising studies. Like many colleagues, I found that I could acquire in- 
depth local knowledge that would not have been accessible in any other place and by any other 
method. It allowed me to develop a real-world understanding of smuggling, and to identify 
structures that were important far beyond the local level. Let me only mention three points as 
examples. 
First, I learned to understand that nothing about cross-border trade in Oshikango was 
straightforward. I realised how many difficult decisions had to be taken when filling in a 
customs form in Asycuda. I understood how customs officials could, in all legality, make life 
difficult for traders by taking slightly longer than necessary to process papers – in particular 
where warehouses had to have bank guarantees for road bonds, so that a new shipment could 
only be made after the papers of an earlier one had come back from the border and the road 
bond had been cleared. This, in turn, made good relations between warehouse owners and local 
state agents crucial; being there allowed me to witness how such relations were kept up in 
everyday practice. I began to see how Chinese traders could, through fake invoices in a cross- 
border business conducted in US dollars, get their hands on unregistered hard currency very 
useful at home, or how customs officials had to use a fine judgment to evaluate invoices – not 
necessarily to separate real values from fake ones, but to maximise their own profits without 
being exposed to sanctions from their superiors. I understood why Angolan importers often 
chose the long detour to the next border post some 300 km east, where import duties on the 
Angolan side more easily could be avoided. 
Through each of these examples, I began to understand how extensive the grey zone be-
tween outright smuggling and completely legal cross-border transactions was. In Oshikango, 
very few goods crossed the border in completely illegal and unregistered ways. On the side of 
petty smuggling, local residents carried goods for everyday consumption or for village trade 
across the border; at the other end of the spectrum, cocaine and stolen diamonds were brought 
in from Angola clandestinely. Most money, however, was made in the huge zone between 
these extremes – the zone in which people needed the right stamps on the right paperwork in 
order to bring goods across the border. Goods were officially registered as exports on the 
Namibian and as imports on the Angolan side, and cross-border profit was hidden in the 
interstices of both sets of paperwork. 
Was this smuggling? Was it legal trade? What in a bird’s eye view might look like two 
different sets of practice done by two different sets of people (‘traders’ and ‘smugglers’) became 
visible on the ground as positions on a sliding scale which the same actors occupied in different 
situations. “Clear distinctions between the good and the bad,” as Thomas Hüsken put it re-
ferring to Paul Nugent’s study on the Ghana-Togo frontier (Nugent 2002), “are often mis-
leading or part of self-legitimizing narratives” (Hüsken 2019, p. 166). 
Secondly, the difficulty in telling traders apart from smugglers shaped local perceptions and 
the local embeddedness of cross-border actors. Nobody I spoke to in Oshikango had a clear 
moral view on ‘smuggling.’ Oshikango’s smuggling networks did not operate in a shady 
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underworld, and they were not set apart from the world of upright citizens by the illegality of 
their actions. The boundary between right and wrong was just as difficult to draw as the 
boundary between smuggling and trading. People did make moral judgments about variants of 
trade, but their criteria differed from the legal judgments by state authorities. 
Much has been written on the difference between ‘illegality’ and ‘illicitness’ (Roitman 
2008), and often, scholars have identified local ‘practical norms’ that define the borders of licit 
behavior and govern the interaction between state authorities and traders (Titeca and Herdt 
2010; de Sardan 2013; Meagher 2014; Heitz-Tokpa 2019; Gallien 2020a; Tazebew and Kefale 
2021). In Oshikango, there were indeed a certain number of practical norms that a researcher 
could have codified at any given moment. Few of them, however, applied to transactions in any 
abstract sense. Everybody might know what honest trade should look like, but deviations from 
that model were judged concretely and in relation to the parties involved, not merely in relation 
to rules. Defrauding individuals was worse than defrauding institutions, and defrauding people 
or institutions close to oneself was worse than defrauding distant others. Nobody cared much 
about tax avoidance in China, and few people cared deeply about tax avoidance in Namibia. 
Even when traders were known to sell defective goods to an anonymous buyer, this affected 
their reputation and undermined trust in them, but it did not usually generate a strong moral 
judgment. If a trader defrauded a close business partner, however, the treachery this involved 
made the transaction reprehensible in the eyes of most. 
As a consequence of this relational character of moral evaluations, a researcher needs deep 
knowledge about the local context even to begin understanding what constitutes a licit or an 
illicit transaction. This, in turn, complicates our understanding of smuggling. Each individual 
cross-border transaction has consequences on the local level; it affirms or changes rules of 
acceptable behavior, affects social ties among the people involved, re-draws social boundaries 
and generally contributes to the reproduction of society. The outcome of this process is not 
predictable without understanding how that particular transaction links to the everyday life of 
people in the borderland. 
Thirdly, research in Oshikango made me understand that smugglers and state institutions are 
not in any naturally antagonistic relation. Both need each other and cooperate with each other. 
“In practice,” as Hüsken sums up his findings about smuggling between Egypt and Libya, 
“smugglers, soldiers, customs officers, policemen and the ordinary citizen are very much in-
tertwined actors for whom smuggling is a field of economic cooperation, social arrangements 
and political strategies” (Hüsken 2019, p. 166). Most ethnographies of cross-border situations 
come to similar conclusions (Egg and Herrera 1998; Raeymaekers 2009; Titeca 2012; Ng’askie 
2019; Gallien 2020b; Weigand 2020; Gallien and Weigand 2021). Smugglers do not by-pass the 
state; they use it selectively. State agents, in turn, do not fight smuggling as such. They rarely 
care much about the legality of transactions on the other side of the boundary, and if they insist 
on legal practices on their own side, this is often a means to increase demand for their own co- 
operation. 
These three examples should illustrate how much a localised perspective on smuggling can 
add to our understanding of smuggling and its consequences for society. I could multiply the 
examples, both from my own work and from that of many colleagues. The question I am 
concerned with here, however, is not whether localised studies allow us to understand the 
borderland, but in how far they help us to understand global smuggling networks. Why should 
we care how a concrete load of goods crosses the border, what paperwork is involved, and what 
different people living in the borderlands think about that transaction – as long as the goods, in 
the end, pass to the other side, evading state scrutiny and regulation and often enough causing a 
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lot of harm to people in the receiving society? What, in short, can localising perspectives teach 
us about smuggling networks? 
I will address this larger question in two steps. First, I want to take a step back and show what 
elements of smuggling might remain hidden from a localising perspective. An entirely localised 
perspective, I will argue, indeed creates the dangers of overlooking important aspects of 
smuggling and ultimately of romanticising smuggling as a local practice. 
In a second step, I then try to show that ignoring the borderlands and their localised dy-
namics to focus on the big picture instead is no solution either. Smuggling networks are 
crucially shaped by the local contexts in which they are embedded, and small changes on the 
ground may lead to their re-organization or even abandonment. Just as a perspective solely 
grounded in the local cannot fully grasp the entire network, a systemic analysis alone cannot 
make us understand these links between local and global dynamics of smuggling; by necessity, it 
remains ignorant of far too many defining features of smuggling networks. 
Understanding smuggling: blind spots of a localising perspective 
Localising perspectives could distort our image of smuggling in two ways. First, they could 
tempt us to over-emphasise elements which are crucial on the local level, even if they have few 
consequences for the entire smuggling network. 
To take just one example, borderlands scholars have placed a huge emphasis on local power 
structures. How does state power interact and intersect with the power of formal or informal 
non-state actors? What role do smuggling networks, violent gangs, private security firms, or 
local youth associations play in maintaining public order in borderlands? What kinds of gov-
ernance emerges at the margins of the state, and how can we conceptualise it? Such questions 
are crucial for describing and understanding border situations in general; the more volatile and 
dynamic situations tend to focus the attention of border scholars in particular. They have 
become the focus of a wide array of fascinating studies and have enriched our empirical 
knowledge and theoretical understanding of border situations. These qualities might, however, 
tempt us to overestimate their importance for understanding smuggling: borderland studies 
have such interesting things to tell us that we might assume that the borderland indeed is where 
the only relevant action is. 
Even for the goods that shape local networks of power, though, the borderland often is only 
one segment in a wider network of trade. If weapons smuggled across a border fuel a local 
conflict or change power relations between the state and a local militia, this is very pertinent for 
the local society. Is it also a defining feature of the entire arms smuggling network, or just the 
random local consequence of larger structures? The power that youth gangs acquire by 
smuggling petrol across a border may change local governance structures, but does that tell us 
anything about the entire trade network between refineries and consumers? A localised per-
spective on smuggling might tempt us to overlook other, more mundane aspects of wider 
smuggling networks. Smuggling tends to become visible and have observable societal con-
sequences in borderlands, but that should not make us assume that what becomes visible in 
borderlands is a defining feature of the entire smuggling network, or even that the variants of 
smuggling important for the borderlands are important for countries at large. 
This brings me to the second way in which a localising perspective could distort our image 
of smuggling. Important variants of smuggling never touch the borderland at all, or simply pass 
through it unhindered, invisible, and without generating changes on the local level. I see four 
main variants of smuggling which cannot (or can only with huge difficulties) be observed in the 
borderlands and might disappear from view in a localised perspective: high-stakes smuggling in 
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illegal goods; goods by-passing border situations by air, sea, or in pipelines; illegal trade in legal 
goods; and virtual transactions. 
The first variant, high-stakes smuggling in illegal goods, is simply very difficult to access with 
the means of localised social research. Researchers usually find it relatively easy to obtain in-
formation about the smuggling of legal goods – goods that can be legally traded within a 
country and that, as soon as they have crossed a border illegally and successfully entered a 
different regulatory realm, once again become indistinguishable from non-smuggled goods. 
Accessing smuggling networks that focus on goods whose possession and trade are illegal in 
themselves is much harder. Smuggling hard drugs, military weapons, or counterfeit currency are 
cases in point, as is illegal trade in ivory, rhino horn, or other material protected by international 
conventions and national laws (Hübschle 2014, 2016; Minnaar 2015; McCurdy and Kaduri 
2016; Haysom 2020). Their very existence has to remain hidden, and by definition successful 
traders manage to keep them secret – from their social environment as well as from researchers. 
Reliable information on their trade can be obtained much more easily by investigative work 
covering the entire market, than by localised fieldwork in a cross-border situation. 
The second variant of smuggling that can escape a localised perspective concerns goods that 
are either too small to be visible on the border, or that travel on different routes bypassing 
border posts. In mid-2000s Oshikango, rumors about diamond smuggling from Angola 
abounded, and many people suspected local warehouse owners of buying illegal stones. If such 
trade indeed happened, however, nobody but those directly involved in it had reliable in-
formation about it. Diamonds could be concealed much too easily, and the proceeds from 
diamond smuggling hidden among other large cash transactions. From the neighboring country 
Zambia, gold (a by-product of industrial copper mines) is flown to South Africa for refinement 
in company helicopters; if some of that gold escapes registration (as it routinely did until 2010), 
that variant of smuggling remains completely invisible from the borderlands (personal com-
munication from field data by Rita Kesselring). On a rather different scale, oil or gas pipelines 
often pass through border regions, but no borderland actors are involved in selling or buying 
the commodities transported through them. If we want to know whether oil or gas is ap-
propriately taxed and registered, the borderlands are not the best places to start. 
A third variant of smuggling bypasses borderland actors, as well: smuggling organised by 
actors elsewhere in goods that could be legal, and which pass through border regions without 
changing hands or being offloaded. In the Southern African border regions I am most familiar 
with, timber trade would be a case in point. Illegal logging frequently leads to the export of 
timber from protected forests, but borderlanders (or researchers with local knowledge in the 
borderland) usually are in no position to assess the legality of the truckloads of tree trunks they 
see passing (Lescuyer and Tal 2016; Lukumbuzya and Sianga 2017, see also Cerutti et al. 2018). 
Finally, and most importantly, while borderlands are often helpful places to understand the 
movements of bulk goods, they are not the best places to learn about the ownership of goods in 
transit, or movements of capital. Smuggling comes in many guises. An ethnography of a border 
town in Southern Africa – say, Oshikango, Chirundu, Musina or Kasumbalesa – can teach us a 
lot about medium-scale traders who doctor invoices or use transit trade regulations for round- 
tripping of goods. From a local perspective, these variants of smuggling are important; they 
generate wealth and power, change statehood and governance and, by privileging certain 
economic activities, channel investment and growth into specific regions and sectors. Seen on 
the national scale or in a global perspective, their effects are dwarfed by other, less localised 
phenomena. 
In Chirundu, for example, a border post between Zambia and Zimbabwe, most of the trucks 
passing through carry copper cathodes. Copper in various forms accounts for roughly 80% of 
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Zambia’s exports. This trade certainly leaves traces in border towns; truck stops, motels and bars 
are just as important elements of the local economy as clearing agents and freight forwarders’ 
offices. The commodity itself, however, just passes through once the load is cleared. Most 
copper loads that cross the border are owned by international trading firms, more often than not 
subsidiaries of the companies who own the mines (Dobler and Kesselring 2019). If smuggling 
happens here, it is not organised by a local strongman whose good relations with a particular 
customs officer on night shift allows him to bypass regulations. It is organised, with all pa-
perwork in perfect order, in global corporate offices and facilitated by tax advisors and ac-
counting firms. Its techniques are not visible in the borderland. They consist of intra-firm profit 
shifting, in tax-optimization strategies, in the gentle overpricing of supplies or the declaration of 
mining supplies as investment goods in order to make use of tax exemptions, to name but a few 
(Lundstøl et al. 2013; Readhead 2016, 2017; Guj et al. 2017; Brugger and Engebretsen 2020). 
Researchers (and customs authorities) usually find it even more difficult to obtain reliable in-
formation on such practices than on, say, diamond or drug smuggling, and they leave few traces 
in the borderlands. 
In an earlier paper (Dobler 2016), I developed a typology of cross-border trade that also 
applies to smuggling, differentiating between ‘green,’ ‘grey,’ and ‘blue’ trade. I call ‘green’ trade 
the local trade carried out on foot or on bicycle away from official border posts and under the 
radar of border authorities. ‘Grey’ trade is in goods transported in lorries on roads; it needs the 
border post and its paperwork, relies on local knowledge in the border region and thrives in the 
economically, politically, and socially dynamic sphere of the borderland. For ‘blue’ trade – trade 
across the oceans and through the air – borderlands are often a nuisance, and the ideal of 
crossing a border would be the frictionless transport corridor with paperless one-stop border 
posts. 
Since ‘green’ and ‘grey’ trade are the domain of the borderland and of borderlanders, lo-
calised research in borderlands privileges them compared with ‘blue’ trade and smuggling. The 
dynamism of the borderland can make us forget what is invisible here, and lead us to reproduce 
a somewhat romantic image of the resilience of local practice in the face of global supply chains. 
This is not a problem of localised research as such. Ethnographies of commodity traders, tax 
advisers, or shipping companies could keep the strengths of localised research while providing 
access to different movements of goods. Gaining access and research authorization for such 
variants of localised research is usually far more difficult than localising one’s perspective in the 
borderlands. 
In Bert Brecht’s Threepenny Opera, the villain Mack the Knife rhetorically asks: “What is a 
picklock to a bank share?” Just as qualitative social scientists often find access to criminal 
subcultures easier than to corporate elites, borderland scholars find it easier to focus on people 
involved in ‘grey’ smuggling networks, whose trucks, forged invoices, and bribes are more akin 
to picklocks than to bank shares, than on those organising blue trade across the globe. The real 
money, and the real harm, is not in smuggling Chinese sneakers or barrels of petrol across an 
African border; it may not even be in the illegal supply of small arms to a local militia. It is in the 
respectable smuggling networks of the corporate world that are all but invisible from the 
borderland. 
How to remain localised without being restricted to the local 
This brings me back to my initial question: where would you go to study smuggling? 
My own choice has been to study smuggling in the borderland, using the method I am most 
familiar with and most competent in: long-term participation in other people’s everyday life. I 
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find I can best understand what life means in any given place by living in that place and sharing 
the everyday interests of the people who are constantly busy remaking this place. 
Since I remain convinced by the strengths of this approach, I have started this article by 
outlining some of them. I also have come to realise limitations of this approach for under-
standing smuggling, and enumerate some of them in this paper. For me, the practical con-
sequence of acknowledging these limitations should not be to give up on localising smuggling. 
Rather, research on smuggling should move beyond the alternative of either localising or 
adopting a systemic, bird’s eye approach (for similar arguments, see Malik and Gallien 2020;  
Walther 2018 and the Introduction to this handbook). 
Some important aspects of smuggling can be understood only through localised research. 
The consequences of smuggling for governance and the workings of state institutions, for 
example, cannot be deduced from above. The technicalities of smuggling, the everyday or-
ganization of smuggling networks, the large grey zone between legal and illegal trading practices 
and the links between them – all these themes need careful, empirically open research on the 
ground. If the aim of such research is not only to understand one particular borderland, but to 
analyze the organizational and social consequences of smuggling, we cannot do without in-
formation that remains invisible for a localised perspective anchored in a borderland. 
Seen from the other end of the spectrum, systemic perspectives can teach us a lot about 
smuggling routes, about the overall extent of smuggling, about the integration of states into the 
global economy and about the links between legal and illegal segments of global commodity 
chains. Without grounding and testing such knowledge in real-life perspectives gained through 
localised research, however, our ideas about the consequences of such systemic aspects in a local 
context will remain mere conjectures. 
More importantly still, the local embeddedness of smuggling can have consequences for 
smuggling networks that reach far beyond the local arena. Global networks of ‘blue’ trade might 
be antagonistic to borderlands dynamics and try to replace them by more frictionless structures, 
but they still pass through the borderlands and interact with state institutions as they are. As long 
as these institutions and their governance effects are shaped by the localised practices of ‘grey’ 
traders and other borderland actors, they also influence practices of global trade flows. One last 
Southern African example can illustrate this point: copper mined in the DRC is usually 
transported to the Southern African harbors in two segments. The first segment runs from the 
mines to offshore warehouses in the Zambian Copperbelt. It uses different trucking companies 
and different truck drivers than the second segment, which links the warehouses to the harbors 
in Durban or Walvis Bay – simply because navigating each different local state and each dif-
ferent border situation needs a distinct set of skills, of local knowledge and of local political 
connections. The difference between both segments is not so much shaped by the ‘blue’ trade 
networks as by borderland interactions among more local actors, but all traders and smugglers 
have to deal with the resulting structures. ‘Grey’ and ‘blue’ trade interlink and influence each 
other. To understand the global trajectories of goods, we also need an understanding of their 
local pathways, the comparative advantages of different transport routes and their structuring 
effects on global networks. 
It is of course easy to argue for a combination of localised and systemic perspectives, but how 
can we achieve the combination in practice? No individual research project can do everything 
at once. Researchers have to decide what methodology to adopt, how to use their limited 
resources, and how to write in accordance with the preferences of their own field. IR specialists 
are not going to turn into anthropologists. How can we broaden our perspectives? 
For each individual project, the salient point is of course that the method fits the research 
question. Both localising and systemic approaches have to be self-critical in this regard. 
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Localising studies in borderlands are excellent for some purposes, but they cannot answer all 
questions. Generally better suited to understanding a local society than to assessing the extent of 
global networks, they might distort our image of what smuggling is if we do not move be-
yond them. 
To some degree, we can avoid such distortions without leaving a particular borderland. By 
broadening localised research designs, we can avoid letting the field alone structure what we 
find. To people living in a borderland, for example, trucks with copper passing through might 
remain irrelevant, since their presence does not affect local society directly. Their social in-
visibility must not prevent us from including them in our analysis. 
Often, simple hand-made statistics can offer a first corrective to local perspectives and allow 
us to control for our own biases. What goods are passing through? What do we know about 
their trade? Who owns the trucks passing through, and who owns the loads? Who is involved in 
their trade, and what do we know about the larger networks to which that trade is linked? How 
well can we understand these networks from the local perspective? Such simple questions often 
have allowed me to perceive blind spots in my own outlook. 
A second corrective is offered by a broader view on the economy of a country and a region. 
What goods should pass through a border? Are some invisible, and why? Who would know 
about their trade, and where would they cross the border? If we know that cocaine is consumed 
in the capital, we can start asking how it reaches the country; if we know that gold is trans-
ported to be refined in a different country, we can ask how it gets there. We still might not be 
able to get in-depth information about these variants of trade from the borderlands, but in-
tegrating them into our overall analysis will give us a better assessment of the border situation. 
A third corrective is provided by a question I find much more difficult to answer in practice: 
Where do profits from cross-border trade end up? How much actually stays in the borderland, 
how much flows elsewhere? Here, as well, the borderlands will not provide all answers we may 
seek, but asking these questions will change how we perceive the borderlands and their in-
tegration into wider commodity chains. 
Taken together, such correctives allow us to link our in-depth knowledge about a specific 
border post or a specific cross-border situation with other perspectives generated through 
different methods. Ultimately, however, we can only understand smuggling networks collectively 
– through co-operation among different researchers using a wide variety of methods in many 
different places. Smuggling networks link specific places and regions; in each place, they en-
gender different forms of social change. Studies that concentrate on the structure of the net-
works alone will not be able to grasp their local embeddedness and the changes they bring to 
local societies, and will fail to explain how the network’s structures are influenced by localised 
dynamics. Studies that concentrate on the local alone will struggle to see the full extent of the 
network and to evaluate how important those interesting developments in the borderland are 
for the bigger picture. Taken together, however, both perspectives can link up and illuminate 
each other. Just like smuggling, research on smuggling needs teamwork that links up people 
with different specializations. 
Such teamwork comes with its own challenges. Localising and systemic perspectives on 
smuggling are usually pursued by different disciplines, each of which naturally sees the others’ 
methodological choices as misplaced and its results as largely irrelevant to the questions that 
really matter. We peddle in different goods and often see each other as competitors rather than 
as partners. With this, we ignore a lesson smugglers could teach us: that a certain degree of trust 
in the other, cooperation, and a healthy division of labor according to expertise and posi-
tionality increase each party’s benefits. 
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The most stimulating research on smuggling has, to my mind, emerged from networks 
which have managed to overcome such antagonistic tendencies and have brought the different 
approaches into a real dialogue. I think here of the collaborative work done by ABORNE, or 
of Valueworks, a collaborative research project on copper’s value chain organised by Rita 
Kesselring and funded by the Swiss Network for International Studies. Although it was not 
focused primarily on smuggling, Valueworks could serve as a model for smuggling studies, as 
well. It combined localised studies in Zambia, Switzerland and China with cross-cutting per-
spectives on global production networks, financialization or tax regimes – and brought both 
into dialogue with civil society groups and activists. The cooperation has been eye-opening for 
everybody involved, and has brought fascinating results (see Kesselring 2019 for an overview). 
Cooperation needs patience, tolerance, and curiosity (and sometimes the right funders), but 
in my experience, the outcome justifies the additional effort. Cooperation enables us to describe 
more accurately what smuggling is and what consequences it has, and it helps us to theorise 
smuggling in more accurate and more helpful ways. This handbook is in itself a vivid testimony 
to the potential of a collaborative approach to the study of smuggling, and it shows what we 
could gain by constructively linking localising and systemic research perspectives.  
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Theory and reality in African clandestine 
economies 
Kate Meagher   
Introduction 
In Africa, clandestine economies get an identity change about once every decade. From the 
mid-1970s to the mid-1980s they were associated with economic distortions (May 1985; World 
Bank 1981); from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s they were about indigenous en-
trepreneurship and regional integration from below (Egg & Igue 1993; MacGaffey 1991; World 
Bank 1989). From the late 1990s through much of the ‘noughties’ they have been linked with 
corruption and criminalization of the state (Bayart et al. 1999; Reno 2000); from the late 
‘noughties’ clandestine trade was all about real governance and more authentic forms of state 
formation (Menkhaus 2006/7; Raeymaekers 2010). Recently, a more selective approach dis-
tinguishes ‘acceptable’ clandestine trade that creates employment for women and youth, from 
criminal revenue streams for rebels and global terrorists (Van den Boogaard et al. 2021; Kodero 
2020; Maguire and Haenlin 2016; Titeca 2019). With so many changes of character, it is 
pertinent to ask whether these reflect shifts in the nature and effects of clandestine economies 
themselves, or shifts in the way they are perceived by international researchers and development 
practitioners. 
A close empirical examination of African clandestine economies (or informal cross-border 
trade, aka ‘smuggling’) reveals that they have always involved a variety of elements, ranging 
from responses to economic distortions through indigenous entrepreneurship to criminaliza-
tion, depending on which countries or regions one is looking at, and when. In some countries, 
such as Nigeria, clandestine trade has weakened industrialization efforts and undermined the 
formal economy; in others, such as Benin or the Gambia which derive significant revenue from 
operating as local import hubs, it is central to the organization of the formal economy (Bach 
1999; Golub & Mbaye 2009; Igué 1977; Sall & Sallah 1994). In still other countries, such as 
Sierra Leone or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), clandestine economies are 
bound up with rebels and rogue military forces that ravage the state and society, while in 
contrasting cases, such as Senegal, clandestine trade has actually contributed to social stability 
and processes of state formation (Babou 2002; Lindley 2009; Malcolmson 1996; Reno 2003;  
Renton et al. 2007). 
In this chapter, I will consider the role of ideological framing and international policy 
objectives in shaping and reshaping our understanding of African clandestine economies, 
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focusing on the ongoing tension between criminalizing smuggling activities and portraying 
them as developmental sources of state building and poverty alleviation. I argue that prevailing 
development perspectives on African clandestine economies often obscure rather than clarify 
the changing effects of illicit trade on governance and development in various African contexts. 
To trace the gap between smuggling ideologies and smuggling realities, I will focus on informal 
cross-border trading systems in West Africa during the 1990s and their role in underpinning 
criminalization discourses, and on violent Eastern African cross-border trading complexes in the 
2000s centred on the Great Lakes region, which have been central to hybrid governance 
narratives of the constructive role of smuggling networks in African state formation. In both 
cases, the liminality of smuggling and a tendency to pathologize or essentialize African realities 
provide a palette for theorizing illicit trading activities around international notions of the ‘right’ 
kind of order, rather than around the national political and economic processes and popular 
development aspirations. 
African clandestine economies and model shopping 
African clandestine trading systems have played havoc with conventional theories of states and 
economies – they expanded rather than contracted in the face of liberal market reforms, and 
became entwined with rather than replaced by the formal institutions of the state (Egg & 
Herrera 1998; Hibou 1999; Meagher 2003; Nabuguzi 1994). By the late 1990s, the recognition 
that smuggling was neither reined in by liberalization, nor transformed into a seedbed of liberal 
entrepreneurship turned from disillusionment to alarm as African trading networks began to 
seize the opportunities of liberalization and globalization to expand their clandestine reach into 
the global economy (Duffield 2000; Meagher 2003). This set the stage for the rise of crim-
inalization perspectives, which defended the Weberian model of the rational-legal state by 
pathologizing African clandestine trade as mechanisms of violent predation, ‘war economies’ 
and ‘shadow states’ (Bayart et al. 1999; Collier & Hoeffler 2000; Reno 2000). 
A decade later, these Afro-pessimist interpretations have given way to more sanguine views 
of the developmental capacities of non-state forms of order. Weberian models of the bu-
reaucratic state have been overtaken by models based on Olson’s stationary bandit and Tillyan 
notions of state formation as a violent process. In the process, the developmental implication of 
Africa’s smuggling networks are being rehabilitated across the continent. What is going on? 
Have African clandestine economies changed the way they operate, or have researchers de-
veloped better approaches to understanding their impact on development, or is something else 
afoot? 
Two main processes seem to be at work here, one practical and the other theoretical. On the 
one hand, a recognition of the poor performance and high cost of conventional approaches to 
state-building are encouraging a search for alternative means of restoring order in hard-to- 
govern regions of the continent (Menkhaus 2006/7; Reno 2004; see also Meagher 2012). As 
Thomas Bierschenk (2010:2) points out, decades of detailed anthropological work on informal 
and non-state forms of organization have revealed that ‘political order is possible without the 
state,’ leading to a rethink of imported Weberian models of the rational bureaucratic state, 
increasingly regarded as an unnecessary luxury for Africa’s fragile regions. On the other hand, 
emerging theoretical perspectives that focus on the notion of ‘hybrid governance’ suggest that 
violence and rival forms of order and authority may be part of more authentic processes of state- 
formation rather than symptoms of criminality and state failure (Boege et al. 2009a; Hagmann & 
Peclard 2010; MacGinty 2010; Menkhaus 2008; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2008). Non-state 
forms of order not only offer better value for money, but a new theoretical packaging suggests 
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they may be acceptable and even preferable paths to development (Boege et al. 2009a:14). 
Similar to Keebit von Benda-Beckman’s notion of ‘forum shopping,’ prevailing development 
thinking seems to have gone shopping for new models of African clandestine trade to fit 
changing political and developmental objectives (Benda-Beckmann 1981). 
In the process, thinking about clandestine economies has shifted away from Weberian 
models of economic and political institutions, to a realization that the opposite of rational 
bureaucratic order is not disorder and corruption, but informal forms of order. The image of a 
‘shadow economy’ regulated by a ‘shadow state’ is giving way to the recognition of a range of 
indigenous institutions that create local forms of order in the shadow of the state. This has been 
facilitated by an improved institutional understanding of informal forms of order, and a reali-
zation that they can be enlisted to create a measure of stability at lower cost. As James Ferguson 
(2006:208) argues in his provocative book Global Shadows, engaging with informal systems of 
order and authority means that ‘capital investment can be institutionalized in a way that makes it 
possible to cut out the “overhead” of a national-level societal project and to provide political 
order “flexibly” on an as-needed basis, to restricted and delimited non-national spaces.’ This 
‘aha moment’ has been followed by an explosion of interest in arguments by Charles Tilly and 
Mancur Olson that violence and protection rackets are not necessarily signs of criminality and 
regulatory collapse but harbingers of new, more locally-embedded forms of order (Olson 1993;  
Tilly 1985). While Tilly (1985:170) stresses the interdependence among war making, state 
making and organized crime, Olson (1993:569) critiques the denigration of predatory states, 
arguing that ‘the metaphor of predation obscures the great superiority of stationary banditry 
over anarchy and the advances on civilization that have resulted from it.’ 
While Tilly expressed reservations about the extension of his theories from early modern 
Europe to contemporary developing countries (Tilly 1985:185–186), recent research on cross- 
border trade and informal markets has revealed greater confidence in the applicability of these 
ideas to twenty-first century Africa. Contemporary studies of clandestine trade in the DRC, 
Uganda, Somalia and various parts of West Africa have all drawn explicitly on the work of Tilly 
or Olson to suggest that large-scale smuggling activities and violent forms of regulation are not 
instances of African regulatory pathologies, but represent the replacement of imported and 
unworkable ideal types with more embedded systems of order and state formation (Boege et al. 
2009b:601; Chalfin 2010; Menkhaus 2006/7; Raeymaekers 2010; Reno 2009; Titeca 2011:61). 
In addition to bringing new scholars of African clandestine trade to the fore, some more 
established proponents of criminalization perspectives have shifted gear. William Reno initially 
associated ‘illicit economies’ with corrupt ‘Shadow States’ using corruption and violent pre-
dation to dismantle rational bureaucracies (Reno 1997, 2000, 2006). In subsequent work, Reno 
has turned to Tillyian and Olsonian notions of violence as an alternative source of order, and 
uses them to show how violence and war economies in contemporary West Africa can lead to 
‘indigenous … as opposed to internationally scripted transitions’ (Reno 2009:317). He high-
lights the shift from predation to peaceful economic competition in West African contexts, as 
networks of violence and plunder built up during conflict are transformed into legitimate 
political and business relationships, leading to the claim that ‘These developments represent the 
emergence of new forms of governance outside the framework of imported notions of reform 
and state-building’ (Reno 2009:313). 
This greater appreciation of local institutional process, warts and all, is certainly to be 
welcomed. The bizarre twist in this theoretical rehabilitation of African clandestine economies, 
however, is that they tend to be applied to contexts in which cross-border trading activities are 
empirically more violent and criminal than those conventionally cited to support the older 
criminalization narratives. Examples of the criminalization of African states and economies in 
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the late 1990s tended to be drawn from relatively peaceful informal business systems in West 
and West Central Africa (Egg & Herrera 1998; Flynn 1997; Grégoire 1992; Gregoire & Labazee 
1993; Igue & Soule 1992; Meagher 2003). By contrast, contemporary ‘hybrid governance’ 
views of clandestine trade as transformative tend to be drawn from contemporary cross-border 
trading complexes in Eastern Africa, where violence and criminality have made cross-border 
trade increasingly inimical to popular welfare (Amnesty International 2005; Eichstaedt 2011;  
Global Witness 2009; Human Rights Watch 2005). Examining why largely peaceful informal 
commercial networks were represented as criminal, and largely violent smuggling systems are 
being represented as sources of stability and political transformation raises important questions 
about the ways in which prevailing interpretations of African clandestine trade are shaped by 
ideological agendas rather than by empirical realities. 
The criminalization of smuggling in West Africa 
Many of the most iconic cases of the criminalizing influence of cross-border trade have been 
drawn from West African clandestine trading systems, as exemplified in the work of Bayart et al. 
(1999), Janet Roitman (2004) and Mark Duffield (2000; 2001). Likewise, Daniel Bach’s (1999) 
research on informal trade and regional dis-integration draws heavily on West African examples 
which dominate the Francophone literature (Egg & Herrera 1998; Igue & Soule 1992), and 
William Reno’s (1997, 2000, 2006) model of the shadow state rested heavily on research in 
Sierra Leone and Nigeria. 
Similar research on clandestine trading networks in Zaire/DR Congo was occasionally 
featured in criminalization narratives of the 1990s (Reno 1998; Bayart et al. 1999), but was 
much less prominent, owing in large part to the limited global presence of Congolese trading 
networks. As recognized by Janet MacGaffey and Remi-Bazenuissa-Ganga (2000), Congolese 
trading networks of the 1980s and 1990s lacked the institutionalized corporate organization of 
their West African counterparts, confining them to relatively low-level international trading 
activities. By contrast, West Africa’s dynamic smuggling networks used liberalization for a 
dramatic expansion of their engagement with the global economy, raising alarm in the inter-
national community by their ability to bypass formal regulatory structures and subvert the 
intentions of economic reforms (Meagher 2003). Yet a closer look at the evidence shows that, 
despite the perceived threat in international policy circles, the vast majority of West African 
smuggling activities were neither criminal nor violent. They were dominated by trade in legal 
commodities through illegal channels, and were much less involved with war, illegal goods, or 
the creation of peripheral centres of power in the ‘borderlands.’ 
War economies vs empirical evidence in West Africa 
Criminalization perspectives of the late 1990s routinely linked the highly organized clandestine 
trading systems of West Africa to ‘violent modes of accumulation’ based on war, criminality, 
and trade in illegal goods. The core actors of cross-border trading networks were frequently 
represented as ‘warlords,’ ‘mafia entities,’ and ‘rebels’ or armed youth, whether the indigenous 
commercial groups at the heart of these networks had anything to do with war or not (Duffield 
2000; Reno 1998; Reno 2000; Roitman 2004). Reno (2000:434) states bluntly that ‘this 
commerce accompanies armed conflict, and plays an important role in provoking and 
prolonging much of the warfare in Africa.’ 
In other cases, the link between transnational smuggling networks and violence has been 
made by dismissing any meaningful distinction between violent and peaceful modes of 
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clandestine trade. Roland Marchal and Christine Messiant (2003:100) express exasperation with 
the tendency of commentators on war economies to create an impression of clandestine trade as 
a ‘belligerent factor by definition.’ David Keen’s (1996) notion of war as ‘the pursuit of eco-
nomics by other means’ has been used widely to merge the notion of clandestine trading 
networks with war economies, even where there is no evidence of war or violence. Reno 
(2006:31) contends that smuggling networks ‘fuse the exercise of political power to violent 
predation in informal and clandestine markets … well before these places come to international 
attention as conflict zones.’ Similarly, Mark Duffield (2000:79–80) claims that 
Given the general characteristics of transborder trade, it is possible to argue that there 
is a similarity between peace economies and war economies … Even when violence is 
not visible, similar processes of exclusion and oppression can be in operations but at a 
lower key … War and peace are relative rather than absolute conditions.  
Many of the criminalization narratives also focus attention on illegal goods as the core com-
modities involved in smuggling networks. Reno (2000:433), Bach (1999:12), Bayart et al. 
(1999) and others represent African clandestine economies as a nexus of drug smuggling, piracy, 
blood diamonds, arms, and human trafficking. Janet Roitman (2004:155) gives a similarly 
nefarious list of smuggled goods in the Chad Basin. Mark Duffield (2001:156) concedes that 
African smuggling networks are not necessarily associated with war and illegal goods, but 
contends that the same networks used for trading medicine and manufactured goods are used 
for money laundering and arms trading, without providing any supporting evidence for this 
claim. 
Closer empirical examination reveals that the bulk of cross-border trade in West Africa is 
made up of legal goods, has little to do with conflict, and is centred on a dynamic of currency 
conversion rather than money laundering (Chalfin 2010; Egg & Herrera 1998; Egg & Igue 
1993; Igue & Soule 1992; Meagher 1997, 2003). Numerous studies have documented that the 
driving force behind the expansion of cross-border trade in West Africa has not been war or the 
lure of high value minerals, but fiscal and monetary disparities created by the patchwork of 
Francophone and Anglophone colonies across the region. In particular, disparities in tariff and 
subsidy regimes in neighbouring countries, and the existence of the internationally convertible 
CFA Francs side-by-side with the inconvertible currencies of most Anglophone economies 
have animated cross-border trade (Herrera 1997; Igué 1977; Meagher 2003). A wealth of 
detailed empirical research conducted by Francophone as well as Anglophone researchers in 
Nigeria and neighbouring countries has shown that the commodities involved in West African 
smuggling networks throughout the 1980s and 1990s were dominated by legal goods such as 
agricultural goods, textiles, cigarettes, used cars, pharmaceuticals, electronics, and other man-
ufactured consumer goods (Egg & Herrera 1998; Meagher 1997; Meagher 2003; Moussa et al. 
2010). While drug and diamond smuggling have increased in the region, they are not carried 
out by the main cross-border trading groups and remain peripheral in terms of value. West 
Africa is only a transit point for drugs, and diamonds have played a relatively minor role in the 
value of the region’s clandestine trade (Meagher 2003; Reyskens 2012). Even at the height of 
West African drug smuggling in the mid-2000s, the total value of West African drug smuggling 
has been estimated at $2 billion, which is less than 2% of West African clandestine economies 
(African Economic Development Institute 2013). 
The largest cross-border trading complex in West/West Central Africa, centred around 
Nigeria, is almost entirely made up of states that are not at war, including Nigeria, Benin, Togo, 
Niger, Cameroun and Chad. Only one of these states, Chad – the most economically peripheral 
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– could be defined as a ‘conflict state’ in the heyday of West African clandestine trade. Nigeria, 
the hub of this clandestine trading complex, hosts the largest informal economy in West Africa. 
Nigeria’s informal economy is estimated at about 60% of GDP in a country that accounts for 
60.5% of West Africa’s GDP (Economic Commission for Africa 2007; Meagher 2010). This 
puts Nigeria’s clandestine economy alone at about 40% of West African GDP. Transit and re- 
export trade in Benin and Togo have been put at about 75% of their GDP, most of it informal 
and based on legal goods (Golub 2010:24). 
Beyond the Nigerian cross-border trading complex, the next major centre of cross-border 
trading networks is in the Senegambian region, where again, the core activities revolve around 
consumer goods and peaceful trading activities (Babou 2002; Diouf 2013; Ebin 1993; Lambert 
1989; Sall and Sallah 1994). The World Bank puts Senegal’s informal economy at 60% of the 
country’s $14 billion GDP, or about 2% of West African GDP (Golub & Mbaye 2009; World 
Bank n.d.). The Mouride trading networks that dominate Senegal’s clandestine economy en-
courage a strict moral code of piety, frugality and hard work, and their expanding involvement 
in cross-border trade since the 1970s has underpinned one of the most stable democratic states 
in Africa. The long-standing conflict in the Senegalese region of Casamance has been so low 
key that some have dubbed its combatants ‘part-time rebels,’ and it has little role in Senegal’s 
clandestine trading activities (Evans 2003; Foucher 2003). Indeed, Martin Evans (2003) argues 
that the term ‘war economy’ is inappropriate to the Casamance conflict. 
The only parts of West Africa where classical war economies have predominated during the 
latter part of the twentieth century are in Liberia/Sierra Leone and in Chad, areas largely 
peripheral to West Africa’s major cross-border trading systems. None of West Africa’s major 
indigenous globalized trading networks, including the Hausa, Igbo, and Mourides, are based in 
these areas, though Lebanese networks have been more active. Clandestine economies in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone involved instrumental arrangements with foreign networks and militias 
rather than institutionalized commercial networks based on local commercial norms and values. 
Moreover, the entire combined economies of the Liberia and Sierra Leone is less than half of 
the clandestine share of Senegal’s economy, and less than one percent of the GDP of the West 
African region (Global Finance Magazine 2011a; Global Finance Magazine 2011b; Smillie et al. 
2000). The same is true of Guinea Bissau, dubbed Africa’s first ‘narco state.’ While drug 
trafficking is estimated at twice the country’s gross domestic product, this still amounts to less 
than 2% of clandestine trade in the West African region (Madeira et al. 2011; Reyskens 2012;  
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011). 
A pluralization of regulatory authority? 
Criminalization narratives of West African informal economies have sought to understand not 
only how clandestine economies restructure flows of goods and resources, but how they re-
organize the sources and sites of power in the process of shifting it outside formal regulatory 
structures of the state. Notions of a criminalized ‘shadow state’ saw power largely exercised 
through networks of ‘front men’ including corrupt officials, strong men and armed youth, 
sometimes engaging with global corporate linkages operating outside legal regulations (Bayart 
et al. 1999; Chabal & Daloz 1999; Hibou 2004; Reno 2000; Reno 2004). Using an ethno-
graphy of clandestine trading networks, Janet Roitman (2004) mapped the regulatory trans-
formations taking place, which were said to generate new sites of power operating at the 
borders rather than in capital cities. 
While initiating important debates on the regulatory restructuring effected by large clan-
destine economies, these representation of clandestine power networks are sorely in need of a 
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reality check. Those familiar with the structure of smuggling activities in the countries of the 
‘Chad Basin’ know that prior to 2010, Hausa-Fulani commercial groups rather than military or 
rebel groups have been the central players, and the regulatory centre of these networks is not at 
the borders, but in the inland commercial capitals of informal trade, such as Kano in Nigeria, 
and Maradi in Niger (Hashim & Meagher 1999; Grégoire 1992). The same is true of the 
Mouride trading networks, which are not intertwined with the military or with rebels, and have 
their informal organizational capital in the inland city of Touba, not at the borders (Babou 
2002; Malcolmson 1996). Not only are these main West African trading networks not geo-
graphically peripheral, they are not socially or politically peripheral either. Both the Nigerian 
and the Senegalese trading networks hail from major national power-holding groups within 
their respective societies. The Hausa-Fulani block have been at the centre of state power for 
much of Nigeria’s post-colonial history, and the Mourides have had close relations with systems 
of power in Senegal since colonial times (Beck 2001; Dahou & Fouchard 2009; Diouf 2013). 
Far from creating new sites of power, these networks have played a key role in consolidating 
state power through socio-political linkages with and dependence on supportive relations with 
the state. 
The key point here is that West African smuggling networks have been represented as 
criminal, violent and disruptive of constituted authority when the evidence suggests that in 
most of West Africa they were predominantly peaceful commercial systems that reinforced state 
power. What is intriguing is that now that the pendulum is swinging back toward a more 
positive view of African smuggling networks, attention is shifting away from largely peaceful 
West African networks to focus on much more violent, militarized and politically disruptive 
smuggling networks operating in Eastern Africa. In short, what was peaceful was represented as 
violent and disruptive, and what is violent and disruptive is now being represented as 
developmental. 
The ideological rehabilitation of smuggling in Eastern Africa 
Since the mid-2000s, Eastern Africa has displaced West Africa as the epicentre of empirical 
research and theoretical debates on clandestine cross-border trade. In the Eastern African 
context, I will concentrate on the largest clandestine trading complex operating in the Great 
Lakes region, involving the DR Congo, Uganda, Sudan and Rwanda, along with Kenya and 
Tanzania as key entry ports.1 Recent studies of clandestine cross-border trade in Eastern Africa 
emphasize the cooperative relations among smugglers, military actors, state officials and popular 
forces, who have created practical regulatory solutions to the problems of governance created 
by state predation and collapse. Negotiations among these actors in the Uganda-DRC-Sudan 
border regions are seen as a source of ‘practical norms’ that fill the gap between the legal and the 
possible in difficult circumstances, leading to a shift of regulatory authority from the decrepit 
structures of weak or collapsing states to ‘military-commercial networks’ that restore order and 
reconnect the region with the global economy (Raeymaekers 2010; Titeca 2012; Titeca & de 
Herdt 2010). In other words, violent clandestine trading networks are being reimagined as ‘law 
makers’ rather than ‘law breakers.’ A closer look at smuggling networks in the region raises 
questions about the optimistic interpretation of the transformations underway, calling for a 
more detailed consideration of their association with violence, the role of licit versus illicit 
goods, and their impact on regulatory authority. 
Smuggling in Eastern Africa has a long history dating back to pre-colonial times, involving 
trading networks that link the Eastern DRC to the global economy through ports in Kenya and 
Tanzania, via Uganda, as well as interaction with networks in neighbouring Sudan, Rwanda 
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and Burundi (Meagher 1990; Titeca 2012; Vlassenroot et al. 2012). Since the late 1980s, 
however, these trading systems have been transformed by constant waves of conflict in the 
region. Unlike West Africa, violent conflict affecting virtually all of the countries in this cross- 
border trading complex has raged for much of the last three decades, including the war in 
southern Sudan, the First and Second Congo War, the Rwandan genocide, the conflict in 
Burundi, and the Ugandan civil war and enduring low-intensity conflict of the LRA and other 
rebel groups in northern Uganda. 
In the process, clandestine trade has been reshaped by military activity, rebel incursions, and 
waves of refugees moving back and forth across borders, leading to a significant militarization of 
previously largely commercial cross-border trading networks. In contrast to West Africa’s 
smuggling networks, military forces and rebel militias are central players in clandestine 
economies of the Great Lakes. In the DRC, Timothy Raeymaekers and Koen Vlassenroot have 
documented the collaboration of cross-border traders with local rebel groups (Raeymaekers 
2010; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2008). On the Ugandan side, a number of scholars have 
noted that many of those involved in clandestine trade are rebels, former rebels or soldiers 
(Titeca 2006; Titeca & de Herdt 2010; Vlassenroot et al. 2012). Titeca (2012:52–53) and others 
have detailed the increasing involvement of the Ugandan military and state officials in cross- 
border trading activities in northern Uganda from the late 1980s, leading to a genuine ‘military- 
commercial nexus’ that has intervened significantly in the regulation of clandestine trade, 
collaborating with Congolese rebels across the border to ensure access to the product of Ituri 
gold fields (Human Rights Watch 2005; Titeca 2011; Vlassenroot et al. 2012). Vlassenroot et al. 
(2012:5) state that ‘during the Congolese wars, these networks’ mode of exploitation and 
commercialization became entirely militarized.’ The involvement of Rwandan officials and the 
military in the cross-border mineral trade in Eastern Congo is well documented, making the 
conflict in Eastern Congo a ‘self-financing war’ (Jackson 2002:24). The Sudanese branch of this 
trading complex is equally militarized, with rebels and soldiers displacing local commercial 
groups in cross-border trading activities (Shomerus & Titeca 2012; Walraet 2008). 
Militarization has been accompanied by the replacement of commercial relations with in-
creasingly violent forms of regulation. While cross-border trading relations in West Africa were 
regulated by institutionalized commercial practices and reputation-based sanctions, Eastern 
African clandestine trade is dominated by ‘violent modes of accumulation.’ In the DRC, 
militarized trading monopolies have marginalized independent traders, and have developed 
coercive and often violent relations with society (Human Rights Watch 2005; Jackson 2002;  
Meagher 2012; Raeymaekers 2010). Accounts from DRC and Uganda speak of forced labour, 
violent treatment of uncooperative local officials, and the manipulation of ethnic antagonisms 
for the violent restructuring of production and trading networks (Titeca and de Herdt 2010;  
Vlassenroot et al. 2012). 
The key goods involved in these Eastern African trading networks also show a strong leaning 
toward illicit rather than legal commodities. While manufactured consumer goods play a role, 
the driving force behind the trade is conflict minerals and arms. In Uganda, Titeca (2012:2) 
notes that ‘[t]he export of manufactured goods to Congo and the import of gold remain the 
basis of the cross-border contraband trade …’ Plundering Congolese gold and timber are key 
incentives to cross-border trade in Uganda, where gold now plays a prominent role in the 
country’s official exports, despite the fact the Uganda has virtually no gold mines (Human 
Rights Watch 2005). In Rwanda, a range of conflict minerals, including tin, tantalum and 
tungsten ores, are central incentives to continued cross-border trade with the DRC. By the late 
noughties, tin ore rose to become Rwanda’s largest export by value, (Garrett & Mitchell 
2009:39; UNCTAD 2010:10). The return trade for these conflict minerals includes arms as well 
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as manufactured goods (Human Rights Watch 2005; Renton et al. 2007; Titeca 2012). In 
short, conflict minerals and arms play a central role in Eastern African clandestine trade, in 
contrast to the central role of legal goods and convertible currency in West Africa. 
Finally, the notion that these militarized smuggling networks are becoming new sources of 
legitimate authority in their respective regions is not supported by the evidence. Raeymaekers 
maintains that militarized trading networks in Eastern DRC are engaging in ‘state-like func-
tions,’ owing to their increasing involvement in taxation and the provision of a range of in-
frastructure and social services, including roads, health centres, schools and electricity. Titeca 
(2012) notes similar activities on the part of cross-border traders in northern Uganda. However, 
the assertion that this creates local legitimacy clashes with evidence that relations between 
militarized trading networks and local people are highly coercive, based on forced labour, fear 
and violence. Stephen Jackson (2002:35) argues that smuggling networks, once accepted as 
legitimate sources of popular livelihoods and accumulation, are widely regarded by local po-
pulations to have been ‘criminalized’ by the process of militarization. Indigenous regulatory 
systems have increasingly been replaced by illegitimate authority based on violence and military 
might, riding roughshod over local political, social and commercial governance norms (Tegera 
& Johnson 2007; Tull 2003). 
In the context of violent reallocation of power and resource control, Eastern African 
clandestine economies seem to be shifting regulatory authority away from the state. In contrast 
to the situation in West Africa, the groups involved in Eastern African cross-border trading 
activities are peripheral rather than central to national constellations of power. In Eastern DRC, 
the Nande and Banyarwanda communities at the helm of the main militarized trading networks 
in the region are peripheral groups in the post-independence national power equation, which 
has been dominated by the more politically central Lunda, Luba and BaKongo (Tegera & 
Johnson 2007; Turner 2007). Even within Eastern DRC, the Nande historically have been 
economically rather than politically influential, and the framing of the Banyarwanda as foreign 
migrants has made their political standing inherently precarious and dependent on patronage 
from the centre (Renton et al. 2007; Turner 2007). Both groups have forced their way onto the 
national political agenda by using spoilers’ tactics of violent control of resources in the border 
regions, leveraging international support to punch above their weight in national politics. 
Similarly, the Lugbara who dominate smuggling networks in northern Uganda are marginal to 
the national commercial and political equation in Uganda, (Meagher 1990; Titeca 2009;  
Titeca 2012). 
Moreover, these claims to power from the periphery are dependent in all of these cases on 
influential external players who use peripheral local groups as proxies for strategies of illicit 
access to local markets and resources. Neighbouring countries and international political and 
economic interests are heavily implicated in backing East Africa’s militarized cross-border 
traders in the violent reassignment of property rights and access to global markets (Global 
Witness 2009; Human Rights Watch 2005; United Nations 2012). Far from supporting more 
authentic processes of state formation, these smuggling networks are contributing to the hol-
lowing out of the state, both politically and materially, as they seize unaccountable regulatory 
control over local populations and divert resources from the state coffers into private pockets 
and circuits of international capital, undermining public accountability and national resource 
control. 
In a further ironic twist, as African clandestine economies become associated with positive 
transformations, even the peaceful clandestine economies of West Africa are taking a violent 
turn in the face of chaotic governance, rising poverty and expanding unemployment. Since the 
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late noughties, illegal oil bunkering linked to militarized networks of former Niger Delta 
militias represents an expanding share of the Nigerian clandestine economy, and the violent 
Islamic group known as Boko Haram has relied increasingly on the clandestine fish and pepper 
trade from the Chad Basin, with increasing involvement of the Nigerian military (Salkida 2020;  
Wallis 2012). Similarly, the Mourides networks of Senegal became increasingly politicized 
under the former President Wade, weakening their stabilizing and legitimating influence on 
governance (Beck 2001; Babou 2013). This makes a shift in the political economy literature 
toward an increasingly positive interpretation of clandestine economies even more puzzling 
(Golub & Mbaye 2009; Reno 2009). 
Conclusion 
The question raised by this chapter is whether prevailing theories about the developmental 
implications of smuggling networks are driven more by empirical realities or by international 
policy agendas. The cases of West African smuggling complexes in the 1990s, and Eastern 
African smuggling networks from the late noughties suggest that ideological agendas from 
above play a greater role in the way we think about appropriate forms of order and disorder 
than empirical processes from below, particularly in African contexts. The vast majority of West 
African smuggling activity prior to 2000 was dominated by legal goods, had little to do with war 
economies, and in many cases tended to reinforce rather than undermine state power. Yet 
smuggling was widely represented as criminal networks based on violence and war that were 
inimical to state building. 
By contrast, smuggling networks between East Africa and the DRC have been more widely 
associated with war economies, conflict minerals, arms trading, and state instability. New de-
velopment ideologies, however, now deploy economic and political models drawn from Tilly 
and Olson to represent these violent networks as the beginnings of more authentic processes of 
African state formation. It is perhaps no accident that these ideologies help to legitimate pro-
cesses that diffuse power and resource control away from the state, and facilitate efforts by local 
strongmen to assert contractual control over labour and property rights in the service of direct 
economic linkages with the global economy. 
This raises two key questions about the broader trajectory of research on clandestine 
economies. The first is about models, and the second is about motives. Regarding models, the 
use of the Tillyan and stationery bandit models in explaining the developmental implications of 
contemporary smuggling networks demands closer scrutiny. As Anna Leander (2004) and 
Charles Tilly (1985) have pointed out, the dominance of external resource flows prominent in 
many developing country contexts undermine the very dynamics of centralization and civil 
accountability that turns war making into state making. Likewise, Brenda Chalfin (2010:234) 
argues that the pluralisation and externalization of regulatory authority retools rather than 
weakens African states, but acknowledges that the shift ‘comes at the expense of accountability 
and the formulation of clear lines of authority in relation to the public …’ New models of how 
smuggling affects state formation need to be attentive to the implications of existing interna-
tional conditions on processes of civil accountability. 
Regarding motives, it is worth asking why Weberian ideal types of the modern state have 
been so unceremoniously dropped in favour of new models of engagement with informal order 
and authority. The answer seems to lie in a growing sense that the international economy can 
work with informal institutions, which has liberated worried ideologues from their dependence 
on states as the key agents for maintaining order in the developing world. Roitman (2004:205) 
was one of the first to point out that, although clandestine trading systems rested on 
Smuggling ideologies 
39 
“nonliberal” forms of order, ‘the regimes of exchange and non-state-based forms of economic 
regulatory authority that prevail in the Chad Basin are not averse to free-market principles …’ 
Similarly, research on Somalia by Reno (2003) and Menkhaus (2006/7) found that per-
ipheral orders built on clandestine economic networks could, in the right combination of 
circumstances, be compatible with order, peace-building and global economic integration. This 
new political economy of clandestine trade seems to offer a solution to vexing development 
problems by providing mechanisms of stability and market integration that bypass un-
cooperative states with a growing range of more pliable local regulatory forces. As Reno 
(2003:40) explains, informal local actors and regulatory systems: 
offer at least the possibility of … successful integration into the world economy on the 
basis of transnational family and clan cultural networks rather than the centralizing 
administrative projects that scholars of early modern European state-building describe 
(and which the World Bank and other officials increasingly prescribe).  
This leaves us with a few nagging questions about how ideologies of appropriate order influ-
ence the way smuggling is theorized. Do new forms of order and authority emerging from 
clandestine trading networks in border regions really give rise to more authentic forms of state 
formation à la Tilly and Olson, or does their appeal lie in their capacity to bypass the state and 
respond to global market incentives? The contemporary role of smuggling networks in terrorist 
financing suggests that a responsiveness to free market principles may not always ensure con-
structive or compliant forms of order. This raises the further question of who decides which 
types of clandestine networks foster more legitimate forms of governance and which types are 
oppressive or criminal? Answering these questions in the interest of progressive economic 
transformation requires greater attention to whose priorities of order and authority are being 
promoted in the way that we theorize clandestine trade. 
Note  
1 Somalia is also a regionally important player in clandestine trade which fits the East African pattern, but 
will be excluded for reasons of space.  
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LORRIES AND LEDGERS 
Describing and mapping smuggling in the field 
Nikki Philline C. de la Rosa and Francisco J. Lara Jr.   
Introduction 
The inherent complexity in the nature and characteristics of smuggling makes it notoriously 
difficult to study. Early efforts to shine the light on the underbelly of cross border trade with its 
hidden activities, shadow networks, and violent entrepreneurs were fraught with many diffi-
culties and challenges. People who knew or were involved in smuggling were unwilling to 
divulge its operations because they benefitted from the continuance of this illicit trade and they 
knew the threats that lay behind exposing the shadow authorities and criminal networks behind 
the enterprise. 
Traders are understudied because of their tendency to lie, evade, or not talk at all (Harris 
1992, p. 138; Mines 1972, p. 47; Neale et al. 1965, p. 33). Consequently, research on trade, 
whether legal or illegal, is often descriptive in nature, limited in scope, and offers few ex-
planations beyond notions of illicitness and embeddedness and the role of kinship ties and 
customs in shaping economic activity in local communities. 
Meanwhile, the methods that are used to investigate smuggling are activity shaped by 
people’s perceptions of the “dual” nature of shadow economies such as smuggling that exist and 
operate on the “margins of the law” (Lara and de la Rosa 2016 p. 50, 253; MacGaffey and 
Bazenguissa‐Ganga 2000, p. 9). On the one hand, smuggling often conjured images of illegality, 
coercion, and danger when it involved the illegal transport and entry of deadly substances and 
materials such as drugs, guns, and explosives. A menu of illicit goods could turn the data 
gathering process into a difficult, covert, and sometimes dangerous experience. 
On the other hand, smuggling was foreshadowed by a vibrant cross-border trade in food 
items, prestige goods, and other benign consumer products long before states were formed in 
these areas. The reappearance of these goods as smuggled items seemed to many as merely a 
continuation of the previous trading arrangements that were seen as sustainable livelihoods and 
a form of coping or survival economy for poor communities. They were thus treated differently 
and often leniently by state agents. 
Indeed, in many places, these enterprises were a boon to disadvantaged groups such as 
small women traders or indigenous peoples who had marginal capital and often transported 
food products across borders. The distinctive perception that such unregulated trade was 
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“not illicit or illegal” continues to have traction especially in places where entitlements and 
livelihoods have collapsed from civil wars, complex emergencies, and pandemics.1 
Distinguishing between what is “illegal” and what is “criminal” is a constant dilemma for 
state agents at the borders.2 For many border enforcers, this is determined by the type of goods 
that are traded, the relative size of the transaction, and the power and influence of the smuggler, 
which in turn influences perceptions about what type of smuggling should be prohibited and 
what could be allowed.3 
This chapter sheds light on the qualitative methods that are used to penetrate both the 
“illegal” and the “criminal” aspects of the smuggling apparatus that thrives side by side with 
formal cross-border trade and has been the subject of many studies of informal economies 
around the world. We train the spotlight on at least three of these methods, including (1) the 
use of participant observation to scope trade routes and uncover smuggling networks, (2) the 
use of in-depth interviews and trialogues to generate primary data from insiders and other key 
informants and, (3) the use of new mapping techniques using Global Positioning System (GPS)/ 
Geographic Information System (GIS) technology. 
Finally, there are old and new sources of secondary data including archival material and 
global trade databases that are examined in this chapter, including analytical approaches such as 
value-chain analysis and network mapping. 
Brief background 
Smuggling is an enterprise where criminal activities and survival strategies overlap — a pecu-
liarity that shapes the research method used, leading to a combination of data gathering pro-
cesses that include those conducted openly and aboveground, as well as those that require 
secrecy and stealth. 
For example, tapping into the rich knowledge and experience of government officials, 
business groups, law enforcers, port laborers, and transport workers, to name a few, could be 
undertaken openly through structured or unstructured interviews, group discussions, survey 
studies, and field visits. 
Meanwhile, secrecy and stealth may be necessary in cases where interview subjects are 
engaged directly in the smuggling of prohibited and deadly contraband such as narcotics and 
illegal drugs or illicit guns and munitions, or when researchers closely observe, examine, and 
monitor smuggling activities and behavior, including the accompanying corruption and vio-
lence that activity involves. In these instances, key informant interviews, mediated interviews, 
and participant observation are useful tools. 
Qualitative studies have opened the door to the vibrant and robust existence of shadow 
economies and their economic logic and embeddedness, including the social networks sur-
rounding them. In Africa, studies of illicit cross border trade used research methods such as 
participant observation and the mapping of entire transport and trade routes in countries such as 
Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo or DRC), where people and goods travelled for 
thousands of miles aboard lorries and trucks (McGaffey 1991), or in Nigeria, where the rise of 
informal yet dynamic and ethnic-based enterprise clusters produced high-quality garments and 
shoes that were smuggled to other countries (Meagher 2010). 
In Nigeria and Somalia, armed extremist groups such as Boko Haram and the Al Shabaab 
militias continued to engage in the national and transnational trafficking of weapons (Musa 
2013; Petrich 2018; Onuoha 2013). Interviews and observations of how nomadic pastoralists 
and herders used specially crafted skin or thatched bags attached to camels, donkeys, and cows 
to conceal guns and move these across borders enabled researchers to shed light on the 
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smuggling of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the region. Boko Haram members are 
said to stuff their weapons in goods that are transported via heavy trucks, trailers, and lorries, 
passing security and border officials with very little or no scrutiny at all. Continued access to 
smuggled weapons explains why the conflict in Nigeria continues to thrive despite a series of 
military attacks against Boko Haram. The continued smuggling of weapons in Nigeria reveals 
why the security of the border is synonymous with the security of the state. 
Meanwhile, studies of weapons smuggling undertaken by the El Shabaab extremist group in 
Somalia was made possible when they functioned as a shadow state handing out receipts for 
illicit payments and illegal taxers collected from gun traffickers. Access to those “receipts” 
would be a windfall for any researcher. “Unlike the state, al-Shabaab does not double-tax 
people. The group also continues to function as a shadow government in areas that it no longer 
physically controls, replacing the state as the provider services, including Islamic courts, hu-
manitarian aid and healthcare” (Petrich 2018). 
In Southeast Asia, the practice of documenting illicit payments made in various coastal 
trading outposts in the Southern Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia across the Sulu and 
Celebes Seas followed similar processes common to Africa (Quitoriano 2019; Villanueva 2016). 
Granular studies about the smuggling of drugs, gems, motorcycle vehicles and other transport 
vehicles, including endangered animals saw the use of cross-border transactions and in-depth 
interviews with border guards to ascertain the existence of a parallel “globalization from below” 
(Van Schendel and Abraham, 2005). 
Studies about the smuggling of weapons and their licit and illicit links in domestic gun 
markets are crucial. Cukier and Schropshire (2000, pp. 105-26) state how on the global level, 
“information about the legal firearm trade is limited,” but the “information on illicit trafficking 
is even more incomplete.” They used primary data gathered from field observations including 
CCTV footage, and secondary data from customs reports, purchase orders, and invoices 
documenting import and export transactions. They found out from field reports that the cross- 
over of firearms from the international to the local level matched the same period when the 
cross-over from the legal-formal to the illegal occurred. Their study exposed how army stocks 
of weapons and munitions are plundered, straw purchases and resales of weapons are made, 
export documents are falsified, and the reactivation of decommissioned weapons is undertaken. 
Lorry riders and maritime voyagers 
Robust observations of smuggling behavior, practices, and networks were generated through a 
data-gathering and documentation process that gathered granular details from long and 
painstaking fieldwork on land and seagoing vehicles. 
Three investigative methods have been used to capture their dynamics. The first entails 
researchers joining lorries and truck convoys as participant observers to monitor and determine the 
scale of formal and informal payments in stations and checkpoints along the way (MacGaffey 
1991; Scheele 2012). The second entails locating yourself at a particular boundary crossing or major 
port to observe, monitor, and sketch the flow of goods and examine the various actors involved 
in the smuggling process (Quitoriano 2019). The third entails examining the content and 
volume of goods transported by informal freight vehicles to be stored in stockpiles, warehouses, 
ice plants and cold storage facilities before comparing these with customs duties and port au-
thority collections (Villanueva 2016). 
Using informal interviews and participant observation techniques saw many researchers 
boarding lorries and trucks or joining seagoing vessels that traversed maritime borders to ob-
serve the commodities, transactions, and actors engaged in illicit trade.4 
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Some researchers went beyond mere observation and directly engaged in the procurement 
and transport of tradeable food and clothing products through borders without paying duties so 
they could intimately study the smuggling process.5 Lower-middle class women, oftentimes 
teachers or local government employees, were also involved in the smuggling of consumer 
goods such as rice, cooking oil, and petroleum across the Sulu and West Philippine Sea and 
shouldered the increased overheads from bribing customs and port authority agents. 
The use of ledgers to record minute as well as major transactions is important in doc-
umenting both qualitative and quantitative data that can be parsed to determine temporal trends 
in the prices of goods and the different mark-ups that bloat the price of smuggled items as they 
move towards their destination. The women traders are eager to record their transactions in 
such ledgers or notebooks that are rich sources of data. Their notes are also important in 
drawing up a cost-benefit analysis of transactions to indicate where most of the profit goes after 
overhead costs, including illegal payoffs are accounted for. 
Observations on the road and on the sea also became a familiar method for evaluating the 
activities of indigenous economic networks operating behind smuggling activities. In fact, 
trucking and lorry-rider studies were so effective that even The World Bank (2006) engaged in 
the monitoring of tollgates in Aceh, Indonesia, and in other landlocked areas of Central and 
Western Africa to determine the amount of illicit taxes or illegal toll fees paid by entrepreneurs 
and traders across trade routes. Researchers were able to calculate and document the total 
amount of bribes collected in various checkpoints and the added overhead costs that were 
shouldered by traders. 
A study on the economics of extortion in Aceh (Olken and Barron 2009). used the same 
methodology of participant observation by local Acehnese research surveyors and enumerators 
accompanying Indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips to and from Aceh. The research observed 
over 6,000 illegal payments to police, soldiers, and weigh station attendants. Results revealed 
that bribe rates were sensitive to critical changes in the external context, such as the political 
agreement between Indonesia and Aceh and the withdrawal of over 30,000 police and military 
troops from Aceh province. Bribery rates also fluctuated due to factors such as the distance of 
toll gates and checkpoints to point of origin, the type of trucks used, and the different geo-
graphical borders along their route. 
Border observation methods in studying trader activities in informal cross border trade in 
Africa quantified trade flows at border crossings and the rents needed for smooth entry and exit 
of goods and people (Morrisey et al. 2015). Granular data from direct observation and in-
ferences from secondary data were crucial sources of information for understanding the in-
tricacies of illicit trade. 
Other studies were based upon observations on a seagoing vessel traversing the Sulu Sea 
carrying smuggled rice and other commodities that enabled researchers to draw detailed 
flowcharts of illicit transactions (Quitoriano 2019; Villanueva 2016). In the port of Tawi-Tawi, 
data gatherers stationed themselves near warehouses to count the number of pokol-pokol trucks 
carrying sacks of rice from ships at anchor towards their destination warehouses and later 
compared the volume of rice traded with the public records of imported rice and their cor-
responding duties. 
The researchers were able to identify the most sought-after goods that were transported 
across the sea from Malaysia and Indonesia that were allowed entry without duties, the marginal 
cost of transporting goods at each stage of the journey, and the different set of actors (state and 
non-state) that facilitated the entry of these goods and their distribution. 
Travelling by boat across maritime borders allowed researchers to observe and interview 
traders to distinguish the different types of vessels, the types of goods being transported, and the 
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routes used – between pernicious and deadly and the coping trade of foodstuffs, beauty pro-
ducts, and fighting cocks. Group discussions with the women traders produced graphic value 
chain maps and detailed cost–benefit analysis. 
Key-informant interviews and trialogues 
Primary data generation from key actors who know about or are directly involved in smuggling 
can be generated through in-depth interviews, life histories, and “mediated conversations” or 
“trialogues.” Interviews can be layered according to the nature of the goods and the type of 
trader-actor and state agent involved. There are at least three layers of respondents that can be 
interviewed to examine the links between the formal-legal, illegal, and the criminal. 
The first layer includes those respondents embedded in the formal trade apparatus and are 
knowledgeable about all the legal institutions and processes that need to be examined to acquire 
an understanding of how the system is supposed to operate. Potential respondents include 
officers of government agencies such as treasury and customs officials and port authority per-
sonnel. Another vital source of information are the banks and other financial intermediaries that 
provide credit and capital. Finally, they include revenue and licensing offices of local gov-
ernment units who know the strengths as well as the loopholes in the system that allows 
smuggling to thrive. 
The second layer refers to the illegal traders who smuggle food commodities, fuel, and other 
non-lethal but strictly regulated commodities. The big buyers that stockpile supplies for the 
wholesale and retail markets belong in this category, together with the thousands of small 
entrepreneurs, mostly women, who are engaged in a trading business that is embedded in 
kinship ties and various social networks. They are the traders who traffic prohibited goods and 
evade all duties and taxes on their entry, conspiring with the drivers and captains of vehicles and 
vessels and their crew. It is that side of cross-border trade that “depends heavily on personal 
relations because of the importance of trust for activities that are often outside the law and 
which therefore lack its sanctions” (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000, p. 7) 
Finally, there is the third layer of respondents who are often covert, armed, and very capable 
of using deadly force to penetrate regions and countries to trade their illegal contraband. They 
possess considerable resources and assets, including a fleet of vehicles, ships, and aircraft and 
strategically located warehouses to transport and stock their contraband. Some of them are 
regionally connected such as the Triads and the South American cartels and they buy protection 
from local police and security forces. They trade various weapons, drugs, protected wildlife, and 
are sometimes engaged in human trafficking as well. Some are involved in trading nuclear 
material and chemical agents sanctioned under international laws. 
Key informants and unstructured in-depth interviews 
In-depth interviews are often used throughout these layers because the method offers a “far 
wider and more open-ended” elaboration of the topic (Nichols 1991, p. 13). In contrast to the 
structured interview that is often used in survey studies, in-depth interviews are unstructured, 
and are especially useful for lengthy discussions about the nature of a particular business, their 
open and hidden aspects, and the participation of numerous actors in transactions. 
The interviewer begins by first sketching the outline of a particular trading transaction from 
the procurement of the commodity, its transport and distribution, the gauntlet of rent seekers 
from source to buyer, and the prices at the end of the transaction. The sketch is then used to 
arrive at a list of issues and questions that serves as a guide for the interviewer’s examination, 
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instead of a fixed set of questions. Based on the in-depth interviews conducted with various 
actors in an entire smuggling chain, the researcher will be able to determine the total cost of 
corrupting the various state and non-state actors or shadow authorities along the way. 
Family histories 
In-depth unstructured interviews can also be utilized to produce a family history of actors 
engaged in the business of illicit trade. Individual and family life histories are critical in the study 
of illegal economies embedded in kinship ties and identity groups. This is particularly important 
and useful in places such as DRC, where “traders rely on personal ties based on the bonds of 
kinship, ethnicity, friendship, religion, and nationality” (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 
2000, p. 110). In their remarkable study of transnational traders, MacGaffey and Bazenguissa- 
Ganga (2000, pp. 111–116) demonstrate how illicit trade and smuggling was undertaken using 
family histories and kinship ties from the DRC to Paris, France. Using case histories of family 
businesses, they described and explained three histories of people importing African foodstuffs 
to Paris through the help of family members living in Africa. 
The use of life histories has also been used to determine the effects on youth socialization of 
the illicit trade in weapons. Lara (2014, pp. 88–89) describes the life history of a young Muslim 
and how the smuggling of AK-47 rifles to support the Moro insurgency revealed the class 
cleavages in Muslim society and made him aware of the rival identities that rewarded some 
insurgents with the best rifles, while the others had to contend with old M14 and M16 rifles. 
Mediated interviews or trialogues 
Finally, mediated interviews or trialogues are “difficult” conversations that can only be con-
ducted with the participation of a third party who is known and trusted by the respondent.6 
Trialogues are utilized when confidential in-depth interviews of key resource persons, in-
cluding persons formerly or still involved in smuggling, are sought for the insights that they can 
provide. The method has been used in investigating and studying dangerous smuggling en-
terprises such as the illicit weapons and drugs trade, human trafficking and smuggling, or 
kidnap-for-ransom activities Gutierrez 2014; Quitoriano 2016). 
The mediated interview fills the trust gap between the researcher, who is new, to the 
respondent, who is involved in what is considered a criminal activity that could be penalized 
with a steep fine or imprisonment. For example, in the case of illegal guns, the risk of pun-
ishment is high. Even those legally involved in gun trading and smuggling were reluctant to 
divulge their identities. The conversations were repetitive, requiring two or more meetings 
with a subject over a fortnight to get in-depth details and enable the researcher to debrief with 
the third-party interviewer and adjust guide questions as the topic progressed and new insights 
were uncovered. 
Access of the researcher to trusted interlocutors to mediate conversations with actors in the 
trade was key. Trust between the researcher and the interlocutor and trust between the re-
spondents and the interlocutor determined the level of information and the quality of analysis 
that was generated. 
The mediated conversations were primarily organized around the time, location, topic, and 
pace determined by the respondents. The choice of respondents was determined by mediators 
who possessed personal, professional, and functional links to the subjects. The mediators were 
in turn chosen based on the level of trust they had established with the researcher. 
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In one study of gun smuggling, the mediator was himself a part-time trader in guns, par-
ticularly the low-cost guns preferred by low-income buyers such as taxi drivers. Because of the 
sensitivity of the theme and the nature of the interviews done, a blind list of all respondents 
whose names and interview dates were withheld for security purposes, and later submitted by 
the researcher to the editors and the academic consultant of the research for proper verification 
(Quitoriano 2016). 
In another study, interviews with law enforcers and retired military officers revealed the 
smuggling of hardware, electronics, dry goods, and pirated merchandise, as well as the trade in 
black-market petrol, stolen four-wheel-drive vehicles, ivory, horns of rhinoceros, gold, arms, 
and drugs. A discharged former military man stated that “Over time, I understood that, even if 
the border zones are poor, one nonetheless makes big money there” (Roitman 2005, p. 155). 
Mapping and geo-tagging techniques 
Capturing the complex market information essential to exposing smuggling requires an in-
teroperable approach to monitor, track, and document the trafficking of goods across land and 
sea. The use of mapping and GIS technologies is one such interoperable system that can 
monitor and geotag smuggling-related sightings and incident reports, enabling the identification 
of smuggling routes, the tracking of vehicles and vessels carrying illicit goods, and the potential 
ports of entry and exit of prohibited commodities. 
In the much-traversed Sulu and the South China Sea where all seagoing vessels en route to 
China from the Indian Ocean pass, naval and coast guard authorities have used the mapping and 
geotagging of incidents to produce spatial maps that graphically show where smuggling ac-
tivities are happening.7 
The process entails the gathering of secondary data from customs and port authority officials 
of smuggling incident reports on land and sea and geotagging the location of those incidents on 
a land and sea map.8 Once they are placed on a map they can demonstrate where smuggling 
incidents are happening and provide leads to where these incidents will re-emerge. They can 
geographically reference data that could then be overlaid to other datasets. They are also a useful 
fusion of both evidence gathering and presentation processes of data and visualization. 
Secondary data in archives and global databases 
Studying smuggling entails the gathering of robust secondary data that can provide 
information about incidents, actors, and costs. Researchers can look back in time and assess 
historical data about the bustling entrepots where cross-border trade occurred over time and 
look at archival material that can be a rich source of ethnographic material, narratives, and 
stories about the porous borders where people traded freely from pre-history to the 
contemporary period. 
Other researchers have used financial reports from customs and port authorities in mainland, 
air, and coastal ports where smuggling incidents abound. Cases of smuggling, especially those 
that lead to violent conflict, can also be found in police and military incident reports, and in 
newspaper and other media reports. These reports include data on the date when the smuggling 
incident occurred, when and how it was disrupted, the actors involved, the type and volume of 
commodities seized and their estimated market prices. 
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Archival documents 
Using personal accounts in historical source documents is important in the depiction of the 
actors themselves of the realities observed temporally and contextually. These source docu-
ments include original letters and reports, diaries of colonial residents, appeals for support, 
reward, and promotion, long-winded recommendations, and decrees inspired by local ob-
struction of government goals (Scott 1976). 
They also include historical records of smuggling activity that were accompanied by violent 
clashes between smugglers and border guards as the demand for consumption goods grew in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century. For example, Kwass (2014, p. 5) pointed to the evolution of 
the consumer revolution in France and its links to the global context to explain, through the use 
of after-death inventories and probate records “that list, in exquisite detail all the movable goods 
an individual possessed at the moment of his or her death,” revealing how “probate inventories 
placed French consumption on the map.” 
Kwass looked at these historical records as important sources of evidence about the causal 
impact of consumption on the trade of goods, but he also admonished researchers about the 
inadequacy of the data because “inventories reveal little about where goods came from, who 
produced them, and what path they took before reaching consumers.” The missing data may 
hide smuggling behavior, requiring additional research to understand the “boisterous and often 
violent world of production and exchange that brought goods to market in the first place.” 
Meanwhile, Andreas’s (2013, pp. 9–15) classic study of American smuggling underscored the 
significance of smuggling activities in America as both a barrier but also an enabler of rapid 
development. He argued that despite the paltry quantitative data available, historical accounts 
provided other sources of data that were just as important. Historians trained the spotlight on the 
“uneven balance in cargo between incoming and outgoing ships, private correspondence, and 
travel accounts.” Their studies showed the “magnitude of the illicit trade in molasses is revealed 
by the discrepancy between official imports and the amount of molasses actually needed to keep 
colonial distilleries running.” These findings would help usher the wider use of global trade data. 
In pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Mindanao in the Southern Philippines, genealo-
gical documents such as the tarsilas of Muslim families and clans, including maps, descriptions of 
scientific findings and colonial governance structures, maritime journals, and historical accounts of 
incidents and patterns of smuggling and border formation are plentiful and have been used in 
scholarly work.9 These historical journals, dating at least a century-old, uncover the authentic 
early descriptions, terminologies, and references to routes and places, motivations, and person-
alities involved in cross-border trade (Majul 1977; Scott 1978, p. 174; Tagliacozzo 2005). 
New insights can also be culled from these old and original documents – or pieces of 
“incidental intelligence,” – referring to data that was unintentionally gathered, or mentioned in 
passing, that contain more historical relevance than what the authors wanted to say (Scott 1978: 
182). Correspondingly, such accounts from historical source documents, written or visualized 
in maps, illuminated border formation and the evolution of what is licit and illicit – such 
definitions are a reproduction of colonial power – and how illicit trade was also a form of 
resistance by the colonized (Schendel and Abraham 2005; Tagliacozzo 2005). 
Global database 
Another robust source of secondary data are the descriptive statistics made available by recently 
established global databases containing data that graphically reveals the hidden income streams 
and profits from smuggling activities. 
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In the past two decades, quantitative data has been used as a powerful component of 
qualitative research. The establishment of the United Nations Commission on Trade (UN 
Comtrade) has been a helpful secondary source of data that can give leads on the importance 
and magnitude of certain commodities that are traded and their effects on revenue generation, 
or the lack of it, in countries where smuggling is rampant. It widened the possibilities for 
comparative analysis of country performance in monitoring cross-border trade. 
The UN Comtrade institutionalized the harvesting of official and hence formal country 
trade data that can be used for comparative assessments of trade output and to determine trends 
in the expansion or contraction of commodity trade in the world.10 It speeded up the work of 
other multilateral financial, developmental, and security agencies involved in determining 
smuggling activity, corruption in customs taxes and other revenues, money laundering activ-
ities, including drug trafficking. 
In the case of gun smuggling in the Philippines, UN Comtrade data was crucial in exposing 
how (1) weapons were being smuggled into the Philippines through the ports of Manila rather 
than from the porous borders of the Sulu Sea and (2) that there was a yawning gap between the 
numbers and prices of weapons exported to the Philippines versus the official reports of im-
portation at the border (Quitoriano 2016). Meanwhile, the use of UN Comtrade data in 
Myanmar exposed smuggling in the gems market (precious and semi-precious stones, except 
diamonds) when contrasted with reports of exports and imports of gems to China, Thailand, 
and other importing countries. 
Analytical approaches 
Value chain and network analysis are useful analytical approaches for assessing the data on illicit 
cross border trade. Value chain analysis involves a process of meticulous investigation and 
analysis of the entire structure of production, trade, and distribution and assessing the im-
portance or value (monetary or otherwise) of each stage in the process. Illicit trade can be better 
understood if each stage of the process is subjected to a cost-benefit analysis, including the flow 
of contraband among a different set of actors. 
In gathering the evidence to test how costs and profits are distributed in illicit cross-border 
trade, many studies of smuggling across the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia featured cost- 
benefit studies to establish the amount of income/profit generated from illicit trade among 
value chain actors (i.e., small traders, brokers, kumpit boat operators, state regulatory agencies, 
port operators/owners, laborers and haulers) using mainly primary data from personal accounts 
and life stories of small traders and key informant interviews with customs and trade officials, 
local government officials, port personnel and laborers, drivers/haulers, warehouse owners, and 
wholesalers and retailers11 (Figure 4.1). 
The studies discovered the huge rents that accrued to state agents, and the beneficial income 
streams that flowed to various stakeholders including vessel owners and laborers, women tra-
ders, and youth workers hired to prepare the vessels. Profits range from 100% to 150% of 
investments made prior to each maritime “shopping trip” and back across the Sulu and Celebes 
Seas (Villanueva 2016). The value-chain analysis also revealed the various social networks based 
on true and fictive kinship ties built on trust established over many years of dealing with each 
other across “free trade areas” such as the Sulu Sea. 
Other studies of smuggling presented modes of organization built along clan, ethnic, or tribal 
linkages that were central to successful involvement in illicit cross-border trade. Studies by  
Gallien (2019), Chouvy (2013), Olken and Baron (2009), and Schendel and Abraham (2005) 
examined the distinct and efficient modes of organization that fitted the nature of the activity 
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being undertaken. For example, traders engaged in the transport of benign products had their 
own social network and distinguished themselves from the ‘truly unlawful’ and ‘highly illegal’ 
elements of the cross-border trade engaged in kidnap for ransom, drug trafficking, human 
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Figure 4.1 Economic value chain of cross-border trade in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi (Villanueva 2016).  
de la Rosa and Lara 
54 
Other studies of network economies were also the focus of the study of livestock marketing 
in Northern Kenya. Mahmoud (2008) used case history and participant observations of live-
stock markets and travelled in livestock trucks on a 48-hour journey along the Moyale-Nairobi 
road to uncover and understand trust relationships embedded in horizontal social networks as an 
effective risk-minimizing strategy for traders in highly economic and politically volatile 
contexts. 
Limitations in qualitative studies of smuggling 
Despite the strength of the qualitative methods mentioned above, there are several challenges 
and limitations for each of these methods and processes that need to be understood to enable 
researchers to avoid mistakes, mitigate weaknesses, avoid pitfalls, and to be honest in declaring 
the strengths and limitations, the nuances and caveats of each study. Four of the more important 
limitations are discussed here. 
One, there is always a challenge in making claims about the nature of the general population engaged in 
cross-border trade based on the limited observations that can be generated in qualitative studies. The 
frequent use of unstructured, in-depth interviews and participant observation leads to smaller 
observations that can be criticized for providing evidence that is seen as wanting, when it comes 
to the creation of anti-smuggling policies and actions. 
In addition, the use of mapping techniques cannot produce real-time information, as access 
to satellite technology is expensive and often beyond the reach of the researcher, except if the 
study is funded by the government. 
However, these may all be true, but big-N studies are not really a requisite in understanding 
smuggling and in countering or prevent it. Qualitative data, despite its limitations, has been 
used to identify loopholes and leakages in tax collection and has enhanced revenue generation. 
A good case in point is cigarette smuggling in Europe and the networks around the world that 
feed the illicit enterprise. Joossens and Raw (1998, pp. 66–69) showed how a simple com-
parison of exports and imports plus the monitoring of smuggling routes and some arrests helped 
bring about the tighter regulation of cigarette trade, including an international transport con-
vention, and a total ban on transit trade – sale by the manufacturers to dealers, who sell on to 
smugglers. 
Indeed, unstructured interviews, mediated dialogues, and participant observation are 
methods that can enable an explanation of the logic behind smuggling, the processes and 
outcomes that occur, the costs and benefits, and most importantly, the actors and networks 
involved – with more certainty and reliability than quantitative studies can deliver. Besides, 
looking at the conceptual is as important as assessing the empirical and understanding the logic 
of the illegal, as opposed to the criminal, represents a new way of conceptualizing smuggling. 
Moreover, a solid analysis from small observations is infinitely better than an erroneous in-
terpretation of large datasets. 
Nevertheless, to mitigate concerns about the validity of the evidence, quantitative studies 
such as surveys can be undertaken, including attitudinal and perception studies with the use of 
Likert scales. Mapping that uses Google Earth and ARC-GIS software can reproduce maps 
more easily and can be made more widely available by governments. 
Two, knowing what information is needed and what indicators are available is burdened by the few 
secondary quantitative studies that can provide leads for deeper qualitative analysis. Indeed, studies of 
smuggling fall into the set of subject matters that “lies beyond the margins of calculation” 
(Duffield 2001, p. 143) and is seen as impenetrable to social scientific investigation because 
robust data is difficult to get, and the true picture is not recorded in national accounts. 
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Some tactics that have been used include “doorstepping,” where the researcher goes directly 
to the target respondent in the hope of getting an extensive interview, which of course is easier 
said than done.12 Another method is the conduct of repeated interviews starting with pre-pilot 
and pilot interviewing. In contrast to doorstepping, the piloting process promotes a no-rush 
approach, taking time, and doing a baseline interview (Olsen 1992, p. 67). 
Another way is to start with media reports or journalistic studies, which may in turn lead to 
questionnaires and interview guides. However, journalistic methods must be used with caution 
as they may entice respondents to shut up, instead of warming up to the interviewer. What 
really helps in these circumstances is to get the respondent to lead you into the discussion and to 
enumerate the leads themselves. An inductive approach can go a long way in identifying the 
key issues that could be discussed in-depth. 
Three, mediated dialogues rely on finding traders to talk to, and in learning to manage conversations 
and meetings with them (Harris 1992, pp. 139–147). The problem arises from the typically low 
sample of traders that are willing to talk and are actually chosen in a sample to talk. Another 
problem is managing conversations and meetings in private and getting the respondents to 
behave in a way that enables the researcher to get the information needed. 
Finding traders who are genuinely knowledgeable about the hidden world of smuggling and 
can provide valuable knowledge of all three layers of formal, illegal, and criminal trade is 
difficult. Catching one is often treated as a singular chance to interrogate a key informant and to 
employ mediated dialogues to keep them engaged and comfortable. 
However, oftentimes the respondent refuses to be recorded or will only allow the use of 
some and not all the information gathered. There are additional challenges in recording the 
process while conducting the interview as well, especially in the absence of technical support. 
The bigger challenge also lies in recalling or remembering all the valuable and necessary details 
that emerge. 
Additionally, managing meetings with traders is difficult because they have acquired a style 
and tendency to test the interviewer’s knowledge of trade, so tricking the interviewer is 
common and unavoidable. It is the result of years of partaking in subterfuge and the consequent 
“wisdom of the streets.”13 
One way of mitigating this difficulty is to conduct iterative interviews with subjects to 
enable the researcher to return to the salient topics discussed, not only to check the validity of 
the recorded conversation, but also to instigate the respondent to add more detail, or to get 
wider consent for the type of information that can be shared. Mediated dialogues can also be 
planned in such a way that the third person in the room takes on some of the tasks of recording 
the discussions. 
Four, there are clear ethical issues about field research, especially the use of participant observation 
methods or mediated dialogues that may entail breaking the law, which is clearly the case when one 
participates directly in smuggling activities (even if the contraband is not criminal in nature), or meets with a 
crime lord on the run from authorities. Even in cases where the researcher is only indirectly involved 
as an observer, there is still a thin line here between observing something illegal taking place and 
tolerating it by not reporting it to the authorities. 
Another ethical danger is to be an “advocate” on behalf of those who engage in the illegal 
yet socially embedded feature of smuggling activity, which redounds to tolerating illegality or 
illicitness because “they are not of a criminal nature.” Among others, James Scott’s (1985, 1976) 
studies have suggested that these activities can be viewed as “weapons of the weak” or part of an 
alluring “moral economy” where social capital abounds. A related danger here is “brokerage,” 
where a non-partisan and non-controversial researcher provides information about a covert 
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world, for example, and justifies releasing sensitive and confidential information because you 
believe that your role is to interpret that world (Wilson 1992, pp. 179–184). 
All of these are well and good, but they do not lessen the fact that smuggling does exacerbate 
the nature of fragile and weak states and is certainly a drag on the state-building project. Also, it 
is important to recognize that engaging in brokerage can be misinterpreted and misused. It is 
always important to recognize that your knowledge and judgement as a researcher is limited, 
and it is better simply to let the subjects speak, instead of speaking on their behalf. 
Indeed, the most effective response to the ethical dilemma is to ensure that direct partici-
pation in illegal activity is avoided and observation and advocacy are only directed towards 
raising the voice that is unheard and the profiles that are not seen. In short, participant ob-
servation can be ethical if it goes beyond proclaiming good and evil, but instead “enables the 
reader to hear the voices and appreciate the actions of as many of the different people involved 
as possible.” Other practical steps can also be undertaken, such as getting consent from the 
respondents before each interview, revealing the interests and organizations behind the study 
being conducted, and guaranteeing confidentiality and anonymity to all respondents. 
Conclusion 
Smuggling and other forms of illicit trade are difficult to trace and deter, not because they are 
hidden from view, but because few have undertaken qualitative studies that reveal the logic and 
inner workings of smuggling activities beyond the analysis that comes from quantitative data 
that is at best inadequate, and at worse, misleading. There are few studies that link trade to 
market changes, political opportunities, or the social milieu that surrounds trade, whether illicit 
or not (Chouvy 2013). This inadequacy leads to two outcomes: one, data is concealed; two, trade 
flows become invisible. 
Recent years have seen greater strides in exposing smuggling activity through the use of 
qualitative research. At the same time, states, development workers, academics, and community 
organizers are generating fresh data that offer the numbers and the stories that deepen our 
understanding of smuggling activities. These methods have been tested repeatedly by re-
searchers around the world to strengthen their academic and policy research and the creation of 
countervailing strategies and organizational responses against smuggling. 
The use of in-depth interviews and participant observation in the analysis of smuggling, plus 
wider access to archival or historical accounts remain the mainstay in studies of illicit cross 
border trade. Some enhancement is happening through new mapping and geo-tagging tech-
niques provide clearer visual evidence of smuggling. New global databases such as the UN 
Comtrade provide secondary data that can be compared and contrasted to help expose the illicit 
flow of goods and monies generated from smuggling. 
There are new discoveries and counter-intuitive findings of how smuggling operates, how 
much of it is hidden, and how much of it is part of an effective governance toolbox for 
managing supply and demand of vital or deadly commodities, preventing crisis and unrest, or 
strengthening legitimacy and authority. 
Indeed, it is important to recognize at the outset that smuggling is not completely outside 
the gaze of the state, as evidenced by different studies showing how illicit activities are un-
dertaken in both a clandestine or open manner by actors who might also be agents of the state 
(Schendel and Abraham 2005; Villanueva 2016). Empirical data can also be distinguished as to 
whether smuggling economies are pernicious and criminal or are mainly coping and survival in 
nature, hence illuminating the interplay between the illicit and clandestine, and the “embedded 
and instituted” nature of these economies. 
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These distinctions are important and sensitivity to the dualistic nature of smuggling is crucial 
in insulating the scholar or researcher from being turned into an accomplice in the state’s 
business of curtailing all forms of economic informality (Lara and Schoofs 2016; Lara and de la 
Rosa, 2016). 
This chapter has reinforced the importance of qualitative methods for examining smuggling 
activity around the world. Examining smuggling remains difficult and challenging, and still 
requires a lot of flexibility and adaptation, combined with a fair measure of luck and the use of 
investigative skills to generate data. Smuggling will continue to involve different degrees of 
circumvention, secrecy, and rule breaking, and a stronger effort must be made to open this 
sector to research and investigative studies. 
Notes  
1 Villanueva (2016, p. 272) notes how traders and law enforcers categorize contraband goods smuggled 
into the porous borders of the Sulu Sea as either “allowable” or “highly illegal.” Ford and Lyons (2012) 
note the same perceptions about smuggling in their study of Riau Islanders who engage in trade 
between Indonesia and Singapore. For the Islanders, smuggling is viewed as a legitimate response to 
local needs and the perceived failures of the national government and legal system—a fact that points to 
the need to explore local ecologies of licitness (and illegality) not just in terms of community per-
ceptions but also in terms of different levels of the state. 
Mayer (2018) makes the same argument in the case of West Africa. She points out that media and 
policy reports often portray human smuggling or irregular migration as a greedy and unscrupulous 
enterprise, despite the fact that “many migrants from countries such as Senegal treat their handlers as 
friends rather than criminals and do not see themselves as “smuggled,” but rather as people “making 
calculated choices to migrate based on a host of social factors.”  
2 Interview with a Philippine Port Authority officer. Zamboanga City. Name and date withheld.  
3 Losby et al. (2002) underscored the difference between what is illegal and what is criminal. The 
informal economy includes both illegal and legal aspects that are often defined by the nature of the 
enterprise or the goods and services concerned. Many of these enterprises are “not intrinsically un-
lawful” but violate some rule or law, such as the failure to pay taxes or license fees for micro- 
enterprises. They are illegal but not necessarily criminal.  
4 Harris (1992, p. 142) argues that “in the field study of trade, the researcher is necessarily always an 
outsider … as the ‘participant observation’ of trade is never undertaken.”  
5 Interview with a professor from the Mindanao State University in Tawi-Tawi, Mindanao who has 
made countless trips from Tawi-Tawi to Sabah and Sandakan to engage in the so-called barter trade. 
Name and date withheld.  
6 These are difficult processes because they require strict confidentiality and even stealth especially if the 
key informant is on the run. It is normally used in cases where the respondent is directly involved in 
smuggling activity that is criminal in nature, as in the smuggling of narcotics and guns. Journalists are 
skilled in conducting trialogues.  
7 Active Philippine Coast Guard Officer interviewed about the smuggling of weapons and the entry 
routes used by ISIS militants in the Sulu Sea towards Sulu and Zamboanga. The same official noted 
how they mapped the location of floating cocaine bags picked up by fishermen from the sea to 
interdict cartel operations in the surrounding waters of Mindanao. Name and date withheld. 
8 International Alert Philippines (2015) Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS) report in-
cluded smuggling incidents recorded in police conflict data with latitude and longitude information 
that enabled the identification of smuggling-related conflict incidents in the high seas.  
9 The tarsila, zarzila or tarzila is a genealogical map that traces the ancestry of Muslim clans and is often 
annotated by economic and political signifiers.  
10 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division. (2020). Download 
trade data. UN Comtrade. Available at https://Comtrade.un.org/data/.  
11 Kumpit are sea-faring vessels that regularly traverse the maritime borders and can carry as much as 200 
tons of cargo. Pokol-pokol refers to the flatbed lorries that are usually powered by a Toyota 4K engine 
and used to transport goods over land. 
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12 “Doorstepping consists simply of knocking on someone’s door, talking your way inside and subse-
quently emerging triumphantly with the desire information” (Johnson-Thomas 2000, p. 13).  
13 They tried to get me to pay for the costs of food and some liquor at the start of an interview, which 
I refused. However, they got me inspired when they started talking and revealed who among the 
government authorities had the real “vetting powers” in the illegal import of weapons. I succumbed to 
their request and gave them a round of beer Filipino researcher-writer on cross-border trade (name and 
date withheld).  
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5 
QUANTIFYING MISSING AND 
HIDDEN TRADE 
An economic perspective 
Sami Bensassi and Jade Siu   
1. Introduction 
Quantifying smuggling is necessary for researchers and policy makers to understand its con-
nection with the political, economic, and social system. It is also a necessary step to answer 
policy questions, such as those related to public finances, trade and industrial development. 
Despite its necessity, measuring smuggling activities is inherently difficult. Researchers are 
continuously confronted with the challenge of assessing the extent to which the data they have 
on the characteristics, activities, and behaviours of smugglers are accurate and complete. To 
what extent can we trust what respondents report? What type of smuggling activities are we 
able to capture and what type of activities are we not able to capture? How are the data which 
we collect affected by those who collect them? 
Another challenge in quantifying smuggling arises from the fact that the (il)legality of trading 
activities is not a binary concept. The degree to which traders are compliant with the law varies, 
and could be visualised as a spectrum. On one end of the spectrum, there exist traders who are 
complying fully, paying all necessary taxes, abiding by regulations, and registering officially. 
Trading activities away from that end of the spectrum could be labelled as smuggling. Due to 
the heterogeneous nature of smuggling, quantifying smuggling becomes complex and perhaps 
seemingly impossible. In this chapter, we provide a starting point to break down this com-
plexity. We categorise two types of smuggling activities: “missing” trade and “hidden” trade. 
We define “missing” trade as the trade of goods which are declared correctly in the custom 
office of one country but not in the office of another country. For example, some goods might 
be misclassified as another product or under-invoiced so as to reduce the amount of tax which 
needs to be paid. Scholars have been taking advantage of this characteristic to detect smuggling 
activities by uncovering discrepancies, or “missing” trade, existing between flows recorded by 
the custom offices of the exporting and importing countries for the same bilateral exchange. 
These methodologies have evolved from using aggregated country-level trade flow datasets, 
which are usually publicly available, to using highly disaggregated custom-level data. 
There are trade flows which do not pass through customs at all. Accordingly, unlike 
“missing trade,” these trade flows are “hidden” and cannot be detected by examining statistical 
discrepancies in customs records (see Figure 5.1). Nevertheless, they are prevalent in land 
borders, and there has been an increasing recognition amongst governments and scholars that 
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ignoring “hidden trade” would lead to an underestimation of the size of smuggling. In this 
chapter, we review the relevant methodologies used to quantify “missing” and “hidden” trade. 
While estimating the size of smuggling is a useful starting point to gauge its importance in an 
economy and to explore factors associated with smuggling at a macro level, more information is 
needed to delve into the nuance behind the motivations and behaviours of various actors 
involved in smuggling. Why do smugglers smuggle, and how? What are the incentives of other 
actors, such as customs officers? What would change their behaviours? Even if incentives could 
be designed to adjust their behaviour, would this be socially and economically desirable? In the 
past few years, economists have begun to explore these questions quantitatively using micro- 
data on individuals and firms who engage in smuggling in some way. 
While these studies have provided new insights by quantifying the extent of associations, 
causes and consequences of smuggling at a micro-level, the literature remains thin, and richer 
analysis using mixed methods is needed. 
We begin the Chapter by reviewing the earlier attempts to test economic theories on 
smuggling. We then examine the developments of various tools to detect “missing trade” after 
the seminal work by Bhagwati (1964) in Section 3. In Section 4, we review the progress made 
to capture the size of “hidden trade.” In Section 5, we discuss recent quantitative studies using 
micro-data. We conclude in Section 6 by discussing the future research agenda to better 
quantify the size of smuggling, and its impact on different aspects of our lives. This Chapter 
focuses on the smuggling of goods which are legal themselves, as opposite to goods, such as 
narcotics, wildlife products and arms, which are illicit. The trade activities which we describe 
are also known as informal cross-border trade (ICBT), and can occur in both land borders and 
at ports. Our examples are mainly drawn from East and West Africa, the area of our expertise, 
but these methods are applicable to other regions with porous borders. Due to our background, 
we put greater focus on discussing the economics literature but we also draw on quantitative 
studies beyond the field of economics when appropriate. 
2. From theory to data 
During the 1960s and 1970s, trade economists were keen to understand whether smuggling 
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Figure 5.1 Difference between “missing trade” and “hidden trade”.  
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model to understand the welfare effect of smuggling by incorporating smuggling into trade 
theory involving two goods which can be traded with transportation costs. This framework 
examines whether the presence of smuggling enhances welfare through increasing overall levels 
of trade, or reduces welfare, through diverging trade.1 They found that if tariffs are not pro-
hibitive, smuggling is generally welfare-reducing. 
Theoretical models of smuggling have evolved since Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) to in-
corporate more realistic smuggling behaviour and market structures which provide a better 
understanding of the mechanisms through which smuggling can affect welfare. For example, 
theories have sought to refine the modelling of costs and risks faced by smugglers, such as cost of 
goods being confiscated and fined (Sheikh 1974), costs of packaging to hide smuggled goods 
(Thursby et al. 1991), as well as the stringency of enforcement (Martin & Panagariya 1984). 
Even so, models fail to take into account that smuggling is most perverse in economies where 
weak institutions and poor infrastructure have pushed up trade costs. With that in mind, by 
extending Bhagwati and Hansen’s (1973) model, Deardorff and Stolper (1990) found that 
smuggling is in general, welfare-enhancing. They argue that in African economies where there 
are large market inefficiencies, traders conduct informal trade for survival, rather than purely to 
evade tax. The inefficiencies which they refer to are trade regulations imposed by governments, 
such as quotas and price controls. Instead of modelling smuggling requiring an extra resource 
cost, they model smuggling as a cheaper option than formal trade when regulations are too 
cumbersome and costly. More recently, using a modern bilateral trade model, Dutt and Traca 
(2010) theoretically modelled tariff evasion and corruption, and found that the welfare effect of 
corruption associated with tariff evasion is ambiguous, and is dependent on the level of tariffs. 
Despite working with limited reliable data at the time, scholars made innovative use of key 
macroeconomic data, such as prices and exchange rates, to test these theories. For example, Pitt 
(1981) directly tests Bhagwati and Hansen (1973)’s theory by defining the incentive to smuggle 
as the black market exchange rate divided by official effective exchange rate for rubber export 
in Indonesia. He argues that Bhagwati and Hansen (1973)’s model is inconsistent with his data. 
Against the backdrop of the implementation of structural adjustment programs, which includes 
devaluation, Dercon and Ayalew (1995) compares incentives for smuggling coffee, which is 
affected by the parallel market exchange rate, before and after the revolution in Ethiopia 
(from 1974). 
Estimating the extent of smuggling has also become more sophisticated as more up-to-date 
and disaggregated data on prices and production of goods become available. Golub and Mbaye 
(2009) demonstrate the usage of several key economic indicators to estimate the size of 
smuggling between The Gambia, a country with a relatively free trade regime, and Senegal 
which takes a more protectionist approach to its trade policies. While it is widely known that 
there are large volumes of re-exports from The Gambia to Senegal, the official trade statistics 
collected by the Senegalese customs show that there is almost none. Golub & Mbaye (2009) 
firstly quantify the amount smuggled from The Gambia to Senegal by making use of the fact 
that, in absence of smuggling and measurement errors, domestic consumption is equal to do-
mestic production plus net imports (imports minus exports). They construct a simple ratio of 
net imports minus production over domestic consumption for Gambia. If all trade is recorded, 
this ratio should be 100%. A ratio larger than 100% suggests that there exists some trade ac-
tivities not recorded by the customs. They found that in 2004, this ratio for sugar was 400%, 
indicating a large volume of sugar imported into Senegal is unrecorded. They also used a second 
method to understand the incentives behind smuggling. They compared the wholesale prices of 
relatively homogenous goods, such as sugar, rice and wheat, in Banjul, The Gambia and Dakar, 
Senegal. They found that there were substantial price differences between the two places, and 
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this was especially pronounced in the case of sugar, in line with the first evidence. Similarly, 
sugar was found to have especially large differences in trade taxes between the two countries. 
This study provides a good example of how to make effective use of different data sources and 
methods to triangulate the size of smuggling. 
3. Quantifying “missing” trade 
One of the most widely adopted methods of detecting smuggling today is the one originally 
proposed by Bhagwati (1964). This method focuses on estimating a specific type of smuggling. 
This type of smuggling, or “quasi-smuggling” as labelled by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), 
involves goods that are transported through customs offices, but under-invoiced to reduce the 
amount of tax which needs to be paid. For example, a trader evades taxes by misreporting the 
price of the product or the quantity of the product. The method of quantifying this “missing” 
trade involves comparing the data provided by national customs agencies of the exporting and 
importing countries for the same trade flow in a given time. In particular, trade statistics 
provided by the exporting country tend to be more accurate than trade statistics provided by 
the importing country, since traders have the incentive to evade import duties. The method, 
known as mirror statistics or trade gaps, has the advantage of simplicity. It involves a com-
putation of straightforward subtractions, and makes use of publicly available data, such the UN 
COMTRADE database, which is the principal source of trade data. 
Bhagwati (1964) was also clear about the limitations inherent to this method. It is not 
possible to rule out other reasons such as time differences in reporting, errors in reporting, or 
the use of third country in international trade (entrepots economies) to explain the observed 
discrepancies. He states “‘proof’ [of smuggling] is thus impossible; only ‘plausibility’ can be 
procured by the method proposed” (Bhagwati, 1967, p. 70). 
For three decades, Bhagwati’s (1964) mirror statistics method attracted very few interests. It 
was not until the seminal paper of Fisman and Wei (2004) when Bhagwati’s (1964) method was 
applied into econometric analysis. Using disaggregated trade data between Hong Kong and 
mainland China, Fisman and Wei (2004) found that there is a strong positive relationship 
between the extent of trade gap and tariff rates: one percent point increase in tariff rates is 
associated with 3% increase in trade gap. (5.1) shows the formulation of the trade gap which 
they adopted, and have since been extensively used in other studies. The subscripts i; j; k and t 
indicate that the gap value is calculated for the trade flowing from country i to country j, for a 
category of product k at a specific time t.2 
gapvalue = log exportvalue log importvalueijkt ijkt ijkt (5.1)  
Fisman and Wei (2004) also extended Bhagwati (1964)’s method to not only detect tax evasion 
by firms underreporting the value of imported goods but also to detect tax evasion achieved by 
firms purposefully misclassifying products. By intentionally mis-reporting the classification of 
the product, traders are then subject to lower taxes compared the taxes if they were to declare 
the importation of the actual good. Fisman and Wei (2004) investigates the extent of tax 
evasion through misclassification by calculating the average tax rate of a group of products 
which are “similar,” defined as being in the same four-digit category of the Harmonized System 
code. They found that, keeping tax rates as constant, trading a good in a group of “similar” 
products with a lower average tariff increases the trade gap. 
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Javorcik and Narciso (2008) extend this method by examining the extent to which tariff 
evasion is more prevalent for products which are more “differentiated” (e.g., shoes) than 
products which are homogenous (e.g., Irish potatoes), as it is harder for the customs officer to 
assess the true price of a “differentiated” product. In addition, they distinguish the channels 
through which tariff evasion is implemented: is it by misreporting quantity or is it by mis-
reporting price? They do this by first examining the differences in quantity recorded by ex-
porting and importing countries (which should be close to zero if there exists no quantity 
misreporting), and then separately examine the differences in unit values recorded by the ex-
porting and importing countries (importing country should have higher unit value than ex-
porting value as it includes cost of freight and insurance). They found evidence that tariff 
evasion between Germany and Eastern European countries are through the channel of mis-
reporting price rather than through misreporting quantities. 
Several studies followed, quantifying the associations between trade gaps and tariffs measures 
for various countries and products. Mishra et al. (2008) found that higher trade gaps between 
India and its top 40 trading partners are associated with higher tariffs, with an association 
stronger for differentiated products. Similar results are found for Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria 
(Bouet & Roy 2012), trade between Kenya and Tanzania (Levin & Widell 2014) and for 
Ethiopia (Mengistu et al. 2018). 
The method of trade gap is then applied to understanding beyond the association of tariff 
evasion and tariff measures. These include studies which examine the relationship between 
trade gap and corruption (Berger & Nitsch 2008, Jean & Mitaritonna 2010, Worku et al. 2016,  
Kellenberg & Levinson 2019), political connections (Rijkers et al. 2017), trade agreements 
(Stoyanov 2012, Sequeira 2016, Javorcik & Narciso 2017), export restrictions (Vézina 2015) 
and VAT (Ferrantino et al. 2012). These studies show that the trade gaps can be large and are 
observed in various settings (between developing nations, between developed countries, and 
between developing and developed countries). They have provided consistent evidence that 
these gaps are connected to the level of tariffs in the importing country and corruption in the 
importing and exporting countries. 
Another method which makes use of customs data is the price filter method. First proposed 
by Paul et al. (1994), this method has been used in a number of studies (de Boyrie et al. 2005a,  
de Boyrie et al. 2005b, 2007). One of the benefits of the price filter method is that it is practical. 
It makes use of data that customs agencies gather on a day-to-day basis. The method detects 
fraud by comparing the reported price of a particular shipment with what could be considered 
the arm’s length price, or an objective price, of the goods traded. If the reported price is 
abnormal – above or below the arm’s length price range – the record of the shipment is 
considered suspicious. This arm’s length price can be calculated in different ways. For example, 
if a market price is available, the market price plus or minus a certain percentage can be used as 
the arm’s length price. In occasions when market prices are not available, one can use the 
average price of shipments of similar goods (WCO 2018). This corpus of research also has been 
valuable in showcasing and perfecting this method to help customs agencies flag potential 
unlawful behaviours. 
Nonetheless, the arm’s length price thresholds used to compare prices could be ad-hoc. 
Customs officers may not be well-informed about the actual value of the goods and thus unable 
to determine whether the value declared by the importer is accurate or not. By using a ran-
domized control trial (RCT), Chalendard et al. (2020) found that providing more detailed and 
precise valuation information to customs officers at the ports of Mozambique can increase fraud 
detection. There are also other countries which seek to provide additional information to 
customs officers through pre-shipment inspection of imports (PSI), where a private firm 
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provides a report to the importing customs, verifying the classification and valuation of the 
goods before shipment. While this could reduce tax avoidance of the goods which require such 
a report to be issued, total tax avoidance may not have decreased if there are alternative methods 
to smuggle, as found in Yang (2008) in the ports of the Philippines. 
Recently, Demir and Javorcik (2020) proposed a new method which makes use of a sta-
tistical test to detect import tax evasion. More specifically, they make use of the Benford’s law, 
which provides the probability a number will appear as a leading digit3 in a dataset. They found 
that while export statistics and import statistics of goods which are not subject to tariffs conform 
with the law, import statistics of goods which are subject to taxes do not. This provides an 
indication that deviation from the law is related to import tax evasion. 
They then measured the extent of import tax evasion by calculating the deviation from the 
law. They also found that their results, when using this new method of detecting import tax 
avoidance, are consistent with using the trade gap method proposed in Fisman and Wei (2004). 
Despite the extensive usage of these indirect methods, the “original sin” of these methods 
comes back to haunt economists interested in smuggling and tax avoidance as soon as it is used 
in institutional and political debates connected to these questions. A telling example has been 
the controversy followed by the publication of the 2016 UNCTAD report on illicit financial 
flows. Denouncing the behaviour of specific countries based on the trade gap method opened a 
stream of justified criticisms vis-a-vis the origin of the gaps and risked a rebuke of any analysis 
based on this methodology. As cautioned by Bhagwati (1964), there could be various reasons 
other than smuggling activities, which explain the presence of discrepancies in trade statistics.  
Forstater (2018) highlights some of these factors, which include discrepancies between trade 
statistics provided by UN COMTRADE and those provided by national statistical offices. The 
use of mirror statistics also relies on one reporting country having an accurate set of trade 
statistics, which could be the case for trade flows involving a high-income country. This could 
be problematic when attempting to detect smuggling between two low-income countries 
which may have low statistical capacity. In addition, while trade statistics aggregated at a high 
level are easily accessible to all researchers, mirror statistics are most revealing when using highly 
disaggregated trade data. 
If these indirect methods are able to provide only a partial picture of smuggling occurring at 
customs, it does not provide any information about trade flows which are not recorded either 
side of the border. Such trade flows are prevalent among low-income countries. This issue of 
“hidden trade” has been known through qualitative and case studies for a long time (Igue & 
Soule 1992, Titeca & Celestin 2012, Walther 2015, Bensassi et al. 2017). The next section of 
this chapter is dedicated to discussing methods used to reveal this trade. 
4. Quantifying the “hidden” trade 
Much of the “hidden” trade, although not recorded in national statistics, is highly visible in 
real-life. While some traders intentionally avoid customs offices to evade taxes, other traders are 
crossing borders which were part of historic trading routes before the borders were drawn 
(Golub 2015). In recent years, there has been a shift in perspectives, by some governments and 
international organisations, from criminalising these activities to acknowledging that some of 
this informal trade could play a role in reducing poverty and food insecurity (Afrika & Ajumbo 
2012, Koroma et al. 2017). 
As part of this shift, there has been increasing effort by governments to collect data on these 
informal trade activities. In the perspective of a government, understanding the level of in-
formal trade is not only for the purposes of law enforcement and tax revenue collection, but also 
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for basic accounting purposes. For countries with porous borders, relying on official trade 
statistics will skew the actual trade balance. For example, Uganda has found that their trade 
balance figures from Bank of Uganda (BoU) were USD 500 million higher than those recorded 
by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) on the expenditure side of the National Accounts. 
They later were able to reconcile the gap, explained partly by informal cross-border trade 
(UBOS 2006). 
Data collection efforts by governments are varied. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, to our 
knowledge, Uganda has implemented the longest-standing systematic survey on informal 
cross-border trade. The pilot took place in 2004, and the full survey has been implemented 
every month since then. Its neighbouring country, Kenya, has also implemented a similar data 
collection exercise, but only for one month in 2011 and 2012 (KNBS 2012). We show the 
border crossings which have been monitored through these efforts in Uganda and in Kenya in 
Panel A of Figure 5.2. Rwanda also has been monitoring informal trade at all its border 
crossings since 2012 (NISR 2014). In West Africa, Nigeria has conducted a similar survey in 
2013 and 2014 (CBN 2016), and Benin in 2010 and 2011 (INSAE 2011). Although the data 
collection in Benin was only implemented for one month in 2010 and 2011, the survey covered 
Figure 5.2 ICBT survey points monitored by governments of Nigeria and Benin. 
Notes: Panel A are the border crossing points monitored by the governments of Kenya and Uganda. Panel B are the 
border crossing points monitored by the governments of Benin and Nigeria. Panel C are the border crossing points 
monitored by  Jibao et al. (2017), requested by the government of Sierra Leone. Panel B are the border crossing 
points monitored by the government of Namibia. Authors approximated the GPS coordinates by gathering in-
formation about the locations of the border crossings reported in  UBOS (2006),  KNBS (2012),  CBN (2016),  Jibao 
et al. (2017) and  EAN (2016). Coordinates for the border crossings in Benin are obtained in  Bensassi et al. (2018).  
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more than 150 border crossings, with many being in remote border crossings. Panel B of 
Figure 5.2 shows the density of crossings which were monitored along Benin’s borders. 
Responding to the request from the Head of the Trade Promotion Authority, Jibao et al. 
(2017) monitored 12 informal border crossings and seven official border crossings in Sierra 
Leone (Panel C of Figure 5.2). In Southern Africa, Namibia monitored informal trade at six of 
its border crossings from 2014 to 2016 (Panel D of Figure 5.2) (EAN 2016). Mozambique and 
Malawi have also implemented similar surveys (IMF 2020). In addition, there have been sys-
tematic data collection efforts by non-governmental organisations. Famine Early Warning 
Systems Network (FEWS NET) collect monthly data on informal cross-border trade of main 
staples at various border crossings across the African continent to monitor food security. 
Regional Agricultural Trade Intelligence Network (RATIN) also records informal cross-border 
trade of key agricultural goods along the borders between East African countries. While the 
availability of these datasets are a stepping stone to understanding ICBT, data collection efforts 
of governments and agencies could be shaped by various political and economic agendas, many 
of which are not known to researchers. As a result, researchers should be aware that depending 
solely on them may provide a skewed picture of the composition of goods and the extent of 
cross-border trade globally. 
The governmental surveys have mainly been guided by the methodology documented by  
Ackello-Ogutu (1996). It details the methodology which the researchers followed when esti-
mating informal trade at the borders between Kenya and Uganda, and those between Tanzania, 
Malawi, and Mozambique and their neighbours. This methodology consists of a two-stage 
process. The first stage is to obtain a list of commonly-used border crossing points, which are 
usually close to border towns and customs points (Ackello-Ogutu 1996). By consulting with 
different actors and visiting border posts, the research team eliminates border posts which do 
not fit a set of predefined criteria, such as prevalence of trade activities and security. In the 
second stage, the research team decides how frequently they will monitor the border crossing 
points. For example, due to resource constraints, the research team from the Ugandan gov-
ernment enumerates only two weeks each month. An up-rating computation can then be 
conducted to obtain a monthly statistic. This method of up-rating accounts for seasonality 
across months and days of the week. During enumeration weeks, enumerators are stationed at 
various points of established informal border crossings to enumerate products as traders pass by. 
While this method of direct observation is cost effective, there are several factors which 
could lead to an underestimation of informal cross-border trade. First, direct observation places 
importance on the experience and attentiveness of enumerators. Enumerators could miss 
products travelling across borders. This is particularly the case in border crossings where the 
flow of goods is high and goods are varied. It is also difficult to enumerate goods which are 
transported in trucks and cars. Second, traders could change their behaviour when the enu-
merators are present. Traders might be wary of the enumerators, especially if they are known to 
be from the government. This could, however, be less of a concern with repeated data col-
lection efforts as traders start to recognise that enumerators are not there to arrest them. Third, 
due to security concerns, enumeration only takes place during daylight. This means the quantity 
of goods moved at night is unknown and may be significant. Lastly, while it may be true that 
most informal cross-border trade activities occur in established border crossings, there still exists 
smuggling outside these established crossings. 
One way to verify the degree of mismeasurement in these estimations is to compare data 
collected in the same border crossing monitored by separate governments. For example, there 
are overlaps in the Kenyan and Uganda data collection in the southern part of the border (Panel 
A in Figure 5.2). Regardless of the degree of underestimation, these surveys have shown that 
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this type of informal crossborder trade is large in magnitude, in comparison with official trade 
recorded at the customs. For example, Bensassi et al. (2018), using the data collected by the 
Benin’s National Institute of Statistics (INSAE), estimated that the size of informal exports from 
Benin to Nigeria is five times the size of formal exports. In a smaller magnitude but still 
substantial, BoU and UBOS estimated that informal exports from Uganda to its neighbours 
valued USD 538 million in 2018, which was 38% of formal exports to its neighbours 
(UBOS 2019). 
Having gauged the size of informal trade through these surveys, research questions on causes 
and consequences of informal “hidden” trade at a macro-level can be investigated. There has 
been a particular focus on the relationships between trade policies and smuggling. For example,  
Bensassi et al. (2017) observed that there are few overlaps between formal and informal trade of 
goods between Benin and its neighbours, and found that import bans and tariffs have a positive 
and significant impact on the volume of goods traded informally. Eberhard-Ruiz and Moradi 
(2019) and Siu (n.d.) make use of the ICBT survey dataset collected by UBOS and BoU to 
estimate the impact of trade policies on informal trade flows between Uganda and its neigh-
bours. Using data collected by FEWS NET, Burke and Myers (2014) used informal trade 
volumes among Southern African countries in their price model and found that, in general, for 
trade routes with high levels of informal trade and limited government oversight, there is rapid 
price transmission – a way of measuring how the prices in one market affect another market. 
They found this result to be different when governments are heavily involved in the import of 
grain (Myers & Jayne 2012), suggesting that government regulations are not impacting informal 
trade the same way it is impacting formal trade. Also analysing prices of staples, Porteous (2017) 
attributes the lack of effect of maize export bans on price differences between markets in East 
and Southern Africa to imperfect enforcement and the prevalence of informal trade. 
5. Quantifying behaviours 
In recent years, scholars have started to move from relying on macro-level data to collecting 
micro-level data on different actors involved with informal trade to understand motivations and 
incentives better. There have been a number of quantitative studies which make use of original 
surveys to document the profiles of traders. As expected, these surveys are usually conducted at 
border points where informal trade is known to be prevalent, for example along the border 
crossing points between DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda (Brenton et al. 2011, Titeca & 
Celestin 2012, Croke et al. 2020), important land borders in Sierra Leone (Jibao et al. 2017,  
Van den Boogaard et al. 2018), main border crossing points into Botswana (Ama et al. 2013), as 
well as border towns between Uganda and Kenya (Tyson 2015, Siu n.d., Wiseman 2020). 
There are other considerations as well. Tyson (2015) made her selection based on its prevalence 
of smuggling, whether a relevant policy intervention has been implemented, its population 
density and safety concerns. While these criteria allow research to take place ethically, safely and 
cost effectively, these criteria can also lead to research bias where too many scholars focus on a 
specific location. Apart from conflict borders, there could be other border points where in-
formal traders operate but in a less clustered manner. These traders will not be captured by 
surveys which focus on areas where informal trade activities are most well known. 
Designing the sampling strategy is challenging in the context of smuggling. In order to 
ensure their sample is representative of the population, scholars pay great attention to the 
sampling strategy. Generally, the most practical way for a scholar to define the sampling frame is 
to access a list of firms/people of interest. For instance, Sequeira and Djankov (2014) and  
Sequeira (2016) obtained a list of all official clearing agents in Mozambique and South Africa, 
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and randomly drew clearing agents to track. This, however, often is not available when sur-
veying informal traders. Some scholars draw a random sample participants without a pre- 
defined list. For example, Titeca and Celestin (2012) conducted interviews with “every fifth 
trader to arrive” in all the four sites they had selected around the Great Lakes Region, and Jibao 
et al. (2017) chose every twentieth trader who crossed the border. This method is difficult to 
implement systematically on the ground, and the choice of respondents could be influenced by 
the enumerator’s ways of working. 
In the absence of a readily available list of the population to draw from randomly, some 
scholars seek to create their own list. Siu (n.d.) and Wiseman (2020) defined the sampling frame 
geographically, which involved listing traders within a predefined distance away from the of-
ficial border post. Brenton et al. (2011) implemented a two-step process in their sampling 
strategy. They firstly listed small-scale crossborder traders who were passing through selected 
border crossings within a one-week period. They were informed of which markets these traders 
operate in. The enumeration team then went to these markets and selected the traders to 
survey. 
Scholars collecting representative samples of informal traders have so far focused on those 
who trade in small volumes (e.g., Brenton et al. 2011, Titeca & Celestin 2012 and Wiseman 
2020). This particular focus could lead to research bias. For example, using their survey data,  
Titeca and Celestin (2012) found that small-scale informal cross-border trade in the Great Lakes 
region is dominated by women. While this provided an important insight, this gender ratio may 
not be the same when examining larger-scale informal traders. 
Designing a sampling strategy such that the sample of respondents represents the population 
of interest is not always applicable, such as when studying networks among individuals or firms.  
Walther (2015) provides an approach to analyse social networks between cross-border traders. 
Using existing trade data, he first identifies the products important for his analysis of cross- 
border trade operating in the border markets located between Niger, Nigeria and Benin. He 
then identifies the key actors involved in trading these products. As he explains, the next steps 
in deciding whom to interview is fundamentally different from the sampling strategy described 
above. 
In contrast to traditional surveys that consider social actors as independent units that can be 
added until they constitute a representative sample of the population, our data refer to non- 
independent observations. Sampling a population would not work in our case because we don’t 
know how the social actors are intertwined with each other before we start our analysis and, by 
randomly selecting some of them, we would miss a large number of relevant connections. In 
order to address this issue, we used snow-balling techniques. Snowball sampling is particularly 
adapted to the study of cross-border traders, who don’t belong to a formal professional in-
stitution in which insiders could easily be distinguished from outsiders, and whose number and 
activities are extremely difficult to evaluate from the investigator’s perspective. 
This approach has been applied to different settings and questions, such as understanding the 
role of gender in rice trade networks (Walther et al. 2019) and livestock trade networks in West 
Africa (Valerio et al. 2020) Beyond deciding whom to interview, collecting quantitative data on 
illegal activities are challenging. It is hard to distinguish “true” information from “cheap” talk 
(Fisman 2009), in particular regarding bribes payment associated with informal trade. While it is 
impossible to know for certain, there are ways to improve the quality of the responses and to 
check the extent of over/under-reporting. 
A starting point is to use local terms in the questionnaire, making use of the fact that 
“legitimacy” is not objective and fixed (Titeca & Flynn 2014, Van den Boogaard et al. 2018). In  
Siu (n.d.), the questionnaire asked which border crossing s/he crossed by naming the border 
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crossings, instead of imposing labels such as “informal” and “official” routes. Researchers should 
also be conscious about who is asking the questions and how that would affect the responses. 
For example, an interviewer who is also a trader working in the area might be able to gain 
consent from more traders to participate in the interview, but the respondents could also be 
dishonest when speaking to someone they know. The responses could then suffer from social 
desirability bias. Alternatively, traders could be suspicious of an interviewer who is not from the 
area, and may not agree to be interviewed. 
There are also innovative methods to verify how the data collection process has altered the 
responses. Some traders might choose not to answer questions related to bribe payments.  
Bensassi and Jarreau (2019) check whether these traders have characteristics that differentiate 
them from other surveyed traders using econometric analysis. In Sequeira (2016), they are 
concerned about the reliability of the bribe data self-reported by clearing agents. To address 
this, they randomly selected clearing agents to be monitored by observers with experience in 
the shipping industry. This reduces suspicion from the clients. They found that reports of bribes 
are lower for clearing agents who have been monitored. However, this under-reporting is less 
so for cases when both the clearing agent and the client gain from the corruption activity; i.e., 
when tariff rates are higher. 
Mixed methods also allow triangulation of information gathered using quantitative and 
qualitative methods. In Van den Boogaard et al. (2018), the researchers gathered information by 
using a quantitative survey and using qualitative methods. They highlighted that the coherence 
in their qualitative and quantitative data has provided them confidence that the responses which 
they obtained are credible. 
There are other methods used in quantitative studies of other topics which could be applied 
in the context of smuggling. Blattman et al. (2016) proposes to verify responses to sensitive 
questions, such as those on crime, in quantitative surveys by randomly selecting a subset of those 
who were interviewed to be followed up by a qualitative researcher. The qualitative researcher 
then work to build a relationship with these selected respondents and elicit responses of the 
same questions. There are also other methods which might be more feasible if scholars are time- 
constrained in their data collection period. This includes the use of list experiments where 
respondents are randomly provided with a list of statements: one set has a sensitive statement 
and the other does not (McKenzie & Siegel 2013). They then verify survey responses using 
administrative data (Deming 2011). 
Quantitative surveys are not only a tool to collect information about the characteristics of 
traders and other actors, but also are used to answer questions, such as, “What changes the 
behaviour of actors?” and “How do the behaviours of actors change over time?”. One method 
to answer these questions is for scholars to design and evaluate a programme which may affect 
traders’ behaviour over time. Croke et al. (2020) test whether a training programme targeted at 
small-scale informal cross-border traders reduces bribery payments by using a randomised 
control trial (RCT). Within their sample of 628 cross-border traders, they randomly selected 
half to participate in a training workshop. With this method, they were able to compare the 
outcomes of those who participated in the workshop and those who did not. While this 
methodology is common in quantitative studies, applying it to smuggling-related research can 
be particularly challenging. One challenge is to trace the participants, as the authors admit that 
some traders provided false names at baseline. Two years after their baseline, out of their 
original sample of 628 cross-border traders, they were only able to track 84% of the sample. 
Other studies examine changes in the behaviour of actors by combining both macro and 
micro-level data. Sequeira (2016) examines what happens to tariff evasion (measured by the 
trade gap) and the amount of bribes paid (measured using firm-level data) as a result of a policy 
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aiming at reducing tariffs for certain imports into Mozambique. Some products have changed 
tariffs, while others have not. This variation allows the author to compare outcomes of these 
two groups. Similarly, Siu (n.d.) first uses macro-level formal and informal trade flow data to 
understand whether a border facility has reduced informality, and then she gathers trade-level 
data to understand who chooses to cross the border informally. Chalendard et al. (2020) uses 
both administrative and survey data to examine how customs officers’ behaviour changed as a 
result of being provided third-party information on import values. After using administrative 
data to understand changes in inspection actions change, as described in Section 3, they in-
vestigate whether better information provided by the in-house team improved customs per-
formance using a RCT. By using both methods, they are able to understand how information 
affects customs performance in a more nuanced manner. 
6. Future research agenda 
This chapter provides a dissection of the general term “smuggling” for quantitative analysis. 
Equation 5.2 describes the value of total bilateral trade for a specific product. 
Total Trade Reported Trade Missing Trade Hidden Trade= + + (5.2)  
For too long, Missing Trade has been ignored and Hidden Trade has been considered negli-
gible. The assumptions on which this relies are wrong. By using creative methods, scholars have 
revealed that missing trade can be important even for trade between developed countries 
(Stoyanov 2012). Recently, with governments and international organisations shifting their 
perspectives away from thinking about informal trade as a purely criminal activity, scholars have 
made inroads into quantifying “hidden” trade. As captured by previous qualitative studies, this 
type of smuggling is found to be a fundamental component of trade among developing nations 
(Bensassi et al. 2018). These studies show that the size and characteristics of hidden trade vary 
across country pairs on the basis of trade barriers, currency movements and the state capacity of 
the countries concerned. 
True, missing trade and hidden trade are inherently difficult to measure. As we have seen in 
the past, however, this endeavour is worth pursuing. Working with a largely theoretical 
economics literature on smuggling, Bhagwati (1964) took up the huge empirical challenge of 
quantifying smuggling with basic trade statistics readily available. His method of mirror statistics 
has paved the way for the next generation of scholars. By applying Bhagwati’s (1964) method 
into econometric analysis, scholars have made great strides in quantifying the extent to which 
trade and tax policies, as well as institutional factors such as corruption, affect smuggling. Efforts 
in collecting data on hidden trade have provided governments with a more accurate view of 
their country’s trade balance. Scholars collecting micro-data on different actors have provided 
important insights into the mechanisms behind smuggling and the incentives of different actors. 
Scholars have also begun to quantify the extent to which behaviours adapt when faced with 
operational and environmental changes. 
Despite recent headway, quantitative studies on smuggling remain relatively thin, with many 
questions still unanswered and challenges left untackled. First, precision in detecting missing 
trade can be improved by designing new quantitative methods beyond the use of mirror sta-
tistics. There are fresh opportunities to use transactional data at the customs level, as more 
customs offices work towards digitalising and automating their operations. Some governments 
have even been working towards linking previously siloed administrative datasets, such as 
transactions data at customs and income taxpayer data, for research purposes. To improve 
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knowledge about hidden trade, we call on governments of nations where there is a high 
prevalence of informal trade (revealed through qualitative evidence) to follow the example of 
Uganda and systematically estimate informal trade at land borders. By publishing these esti-
mates, scholars can then make use of these resources to generate better knowledge of the 
interdependence between informal and formal trade, and to quantify the extent to which these 
activities can contribute to or hinder economic development goals. 
At a micro-level, more attention is needed to understand how survey respondents answer 
questions related to smuggling. Scholars can adopt methods designed for other research areas, as 
we have highlighted in this Chapter. More pertinently, scholars should complement qualitative 
approaches with quantitative methods. Triangulation of different data sources, across disciplines, 
will not only reduce the likelihood of inaccurate conclusions based on biased data, but will also 
provide a more holistic picture of the research question at hand. This direction could overcome 
some of the existing challenges in understanding actors involved in smuggling activities over 
time, the true incentives behind their decision-making, and their real responses when faced 
with new barriers and opportunities. 
Future studies should venture beyond the current focus of existing quantitative studies. We 
should acknowledge that scholars have only begun the journey of estimating “hidden” trade. 
We still know little about the prominence and size of trade activities in remote areas, far away 
from key border towns where most studies have been situated. Night trade activities, due to 
safety concerns, are also less quantified. With the focus on smuggling of legal goods, methods to 
quantify smuggling of illicit goods remain elusive. Yet with the help of technology and new 
ways of data collection, such as collection of user data by the mobile phone app Sauti (which is 
targeted towards supporting cross-border traders), some of these barriers could be overcome in 
the future. There should be a shift away from focusing on small-scale traders to understand how 
and why traders of different sizes enter, thrive, survive, and exit the profession. There should 
also be a better spread of studies in different countries and continents, from countries in Africa, 
where most research on informal cross-border trade takes place, to Asia and South America. A 
more diverse body of studies will enable researchers to verify the extent to which these methods 
are applicable in different contexts. By further refining and expanding the toolbox of methods 
to quantifying smuggling, we then can understand better the extent to which informal trade is 
operated and incentivised differently across cultures, climates and institutions. A collective effort 
to reduce research bias will be a promising way forward to produce richer and more relevant 
research which would not provide benefits only to a selected convenient few. 
Notes  
1 Azam (2007) and Golub (2015) provide a good summary.  
2 Notice that this formulation has to be modified to take into account of the case where only one of 
country has reported a trade flow and is similar to calculation of the trade gap as a share of the import 
value of the good: gapvalue = (Export − Import)/Import.  
3 For example, the leading digit of 187 is 1.  
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RESEARCH IN DANGEROUS 
FIELDS 
Ethics, morals, and practices in the study  
of smuggling 
Thomas Hüsken   
Introduction 
Writing about cultural habits and practices that are labelled as illicit is difficult, particularly when 
those who practice them are your hosts, conversational partners, and friends. The Oxford 
Learner’s Dictionary tells us that smuggling is “the crime of taking or bringing goods secretly and 
illegally into or out of a country.”1 Etymologically, the roots of the word come from the Low 
German schmuggeln, which means “to lurk.”2 Thus a smuggler is not only a person involved in 
the clandestine transportation of goods and people, but is also someone who lurks (behind 
bushes) and is potentially dangerous as well as morally ambivalent. On the other hand, 
smuggling has often been a topic of romantic discourses that portray smugglers as social rebels, 
or situate smuggling in the context of political resistance (Girtler 2006) against state authorities 
and their territorial regimes. States label forms of trade and exchange as smuggling when these 
activities collide with border regimes, taxation laws or other legal regulations. History reveals 
how these regulations change in time and thus turn practices that were once legal into 
something illegal.3 Smugglers themselves also have varying perceptions of their conduct. They 
may see (or present) themselves as part of a moral economy of the underprivileged (Wagner 
2010, 80ff), or just follow a rational logic of profit maximization. Even ordinary people judge 
and deal with smuggling in quite different ways. At times, they are the customers of smugglers 
and purchase goods on black markets without a sense of guilt; at others, they consider smugglers 
criminals who endanger law and order. Seminal studies like Nugent’s Smugglers, Secessionists & 
Loyal Citizens on the Ghana–Togo Frontier: The Lie of the Borderlands since 1914 (2003) have 
shown that clear distinctions between the good and the bad are often misleading or part of self- 
legitimizing narratives. This applies, for example, to the distinction between the smuggler as a 
criminal and the morally superior ordinary citizen or to state authorities as representatives of 
law, order and justice. In practice, smugglers, soldiers, customs officers, policemen and the 
ordinary citizen are very much intertwined actors for whom smuggling is a field of economic 
cooperation, social arrangements and political strategies. Thus, the distinctions between legal 
and illegal or formal and informal economies have little relevance in the empirical study of 
smuggling and the real practice of borderland economies and beyond (Hüsken 2019, Gallien 
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2020). What smuggling is and what it is not seems to depend on the position or situation of the 
person, group, institution or regime defining it. 
There is certainly no room for such ambivalence in the perspective of governments, in-
ternational intervention regimes or the politics of migration control (van Schendel and Itty 
2005, Raeymaekers 2014, Gaibazzi, Bellagamba, and Dünnwald 2017). Here, smuggling is 
discussed as a threat to state-centred definitions of sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship, and 
as the adversary of the formal economy. It is seen in the context of human trafficking across 
borders, as part of the transnational drug trade or the illicit trading of arms, or in relation to 
global jihadist terrorism. Smuggling has thus become a major object of the securitization po-
licies (Scheele 2012, Amar 2013, Hüsken 2019) conducted by states, intelligence services, and 
military interventions. In the context of civil wars and the disintegration of nation states, non- 
state actors such as militias and organized crime networks also seek to control or appropriate 
transregional and cross-border trade routes and resource flows. In this context, borderland 
populations and their transgressive practices are exposed to state and non-state policies led by 
the imperative to control or suppress what is labelled as illegal or as unwanted connectivity. 
Likewise, researchers and their counterparts can become the objects of state and non-state 
repression, threat and violence simply by the fact of their interactions in the field. 
When risk, safety, security and securitization become important issues in fieldwork, fun-
damental questions are raised about methodology, ethics and the integrity of academic 
knowledge production. This article tries to find answers to this complex issue. However, my 
contribution is neither intended as a research ethics guide, nor as a methodological toolbox. 
Instead, I try to review discourses and practices related to the notion of morality and research 
ethics in the study of smuggling and the social sciences. The article begins with a discussion of 
institutionalized ethics review boards as a means to ensure ethical compliance in research and 
academic knowledge production. It then proceeds with an exploration of the concept of an 
implicitly reciprocal and negotiated morality that develops through the interactions between 
researchers and their counterparts4 in the field. This is followed by an examination of covert 
research practices that have emerged in the context of the securitization of fieldwork. The last 
section of the article then considers how risk can be anticipated by embedding research in local 
safety practices and the joint anticipation of risk as well as by methodical pluralism and every 
day diplomacy.5 
Ethics review boards 
Ethics review boards are a mandatory, albeit not undisputed practice in the social and cultural 
sciences of the anglophone world (Dingwall 2012).6 Ethics review boards can be found in 
university departments, national academic associations, and national funding institutions or can 
exist as national committees. In the case of the United States, they are, for the time being at 
least, part of national legislation (Sleeboom-Faulkner et al. 2017). In addition, an increasing 
number of journals request evidence of ethics review as part of the submission process leading to 
publication. Here, ethical approval has come to act as a kitemark or official endorsement not 
only of the safety of the research method used in a particular piece of work, but also regarding 
the integrity and probity of the researcher. Boards and commissions made up of fellow scientists 
or academics from fields other than that of the researcher, and representatives responsible for 
gender, diversity, and ethics who likewise may be unfamiliar with the researcher’s field or 
region of study, now play an important role in the process of approving or rejecting research 
projects.7 The recent debate in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland reveals some of the con-
troversial points related to this development. In an article published in 2017, the German 
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medical anthropologist Hansjörg Dilger (2017, 192) argues that research ethics in German 
Social and Cultural Anthropology should no longer be characterized by an “voluntaristic and 
self-imposed muddling through.” Instead, he argues for a professional and institutionalized 
ethics review process based on the internationally established norms documented in most of the 
ethics declarations of professional science associations such as the Association of Social 
Anthropologists of the UK (ASA),8 the American Anthropological Association (AAA),9 or the 
American Political Science Association (APSA).10 The envisaged professionalization and 
standardization is understood as a proactive initiative to catch up with the natural sciences and 
clinical studies where institutionalized ethics review boards have been established since the 
beginning of the new millennium (Marshall 2003). At the same time however, the necessity to 
sensitize research-promoting institutions and ethics review committees to the special conditions 
of qualitative field research has been underlined. Furthermore, it has been noted that “quali-
tative researchers find it far more relevant to promote ethical reflexivity in teaching and research 
practice than to introduce ethics review boards” (von Unger, Dilger, and Schönhuth 2016, 1). 
It appears that the motivation of the authors is to find a balance between “doing anthropology 
ethically” and “doing ethics anthropologically.” For now, the German Anthropological 
Association provides questionnaires such as a “reflection sheet”11 (to be completed and peer 
reviewed in dialogue before fieldwork) and a so-called “risk analysis”12 (to be completed before 
travel) for voluntary use and for self-assessment only. In addition, anthropologists have pre-
sented tutorials on research ethics for self-study or for use in workshops (Schönhuth 2021). 
Again, these tutorials are voluntary and do not deny researchers the right to make independent 
decisions. 
It seems that the anglophone world has already passed through this process, albeit with 
different trajectories. While the administration of research ethics in the United States appears to 
be in the process of returning the responsibility for ethics review to the research professions and 
departments, Europe is increasingly institutionalizing and centralizing the issue of research 
ethics, thereby risking or accepting estrangement from the research professions. Not only 
leading funding programmes for research such as Horizon 2020 of the European Research 
Council (ERC), but also important national funding institutions like the German Research 
Association (DFG), require extensive and detailed information on research methodology, sex, 
gender and/or diversity, and ethics in project applications.13 In addition, some countries of the 
global south have established national ethics review boards in order to safeguard the ethical 
conduct of (foreign) research.14 In the case of Horizon 2020, the research ethics screening 
process includes an ethics self-assessment (in the proposal), an ethics review (two stages), and 
ethics checks and audits (during the project and up to two years afterwards if necessary).15 
Committees and science officers can reject research in regions that are not considered safe for 
empirical field research or withdraw approval if the security situation changes. They can also 
sanction unethical conduct (any conduct supposedly violating the ethical principles of the 
ERC) of the researcher in the course of the project.16 While ethics review boards seem to be 
accepted in the natural sciences, they have received criticism in the social sciences and especially 
in social and cultural anthropology (Dingwall 2012, Sleeboom-Faulkner et al. 2017). The 
critique points out that ethics review processes are legalistic procedures that fail to address the 
processual, unforeseeable and often ambiguous character of fieldwork based on qualitative 
methodology. It is argued that the concept of ethics review boards assumes that “social science 
researchers control the research process and are in charge of the research situation, which is not 
the case in most qualitative, ethnographic research” (von Unger, Dilger, and Schönhuth 
2016, 8). 
Research in dangerous fields 
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A nonreflexive application of ethics screening along selective cultural, moral and legal 
standards can cause far-reaching ethical dilemmas for researchers. For instance, the guideline for 
“Ethics in Social Science and Humanities” by the ERC prescribes that criminal activity wit-
nessed or uncovered in the course of research must be reported to the responsible and ap-
propriate authorities, even if this means overriding commitments to participants to maintain 
confidentiality and anonymity.17 Confidentiality and anonymity, however, are an indispensable 
part of the research ethics declarations of all professional associations in the social sciences. Thus, 
the policy of the ERC not only creates a moral dilemma for researchers but virtually generates 
unethical behaviour. In the case of my research in the borderland of Egypt and Libya this would 
have meant exposing my counterparts to the prosecution of the Egyptian and Libyan autho-
rities, who consider most transgressive practices in the borderland as criminal. A similar critique 
has been directed at the principle of informed consent18 in the social sciences. While informed 
consent is indispensable in medical science, it simply cannot be so easily applied in the social 
sciences and in research on smuggling. Not only is the researcher unable to anticipate with 
whom, for how long, to what end, and where they will work, but also people like smugglers 
(who are acting under the suspicious eye of states, services and organizations) will certainly not 
sign papers that reveal who they are and what they are doing.19 
However, there is an even more fundamental problem. Ethics review boards are obliged to 
follow the security regulations (including travel restrictions) of state departments. The pro-
fessional assessment of the researcher is not considered sufficient. If there is a travel warning 
from the respective foreign ministry, research trips will not be approved or only permitted 
under safety precautions that are difficult or impossible to meet for researchers. With a few 
exceptions, such as in the case of the DFG, which leaves the decision with the university and 
the respective scientists, this is true throughout Europe. As a result, an increasing number of 
researchers have stopped conducting research trips. Instead of ethical compliance, the uniform 
and formalized structure of such ethics reviewing provokes counter strategies by researchers. 
This can include the customization of rigid ethical principles and standard research models by 
stretching the meaning of planned activities to tick the right boxes (Sleeboom-Faulkner et al. 
2017, 73). It can also mean, though, that the real practice of research is concealed in order to 
avoid a negative evaluation by the committee. Here, the strictness of the guidelines leads to 
actual unethical behaviour, namely the pretense of conforming, or concealment, as strategy and 
tactic. In practice, conflicts between researchers and ethics committees are frequent, and have 
led to a new form of mediation conducted by experts (often fellow researchers) who are 
commissioned to moderate between the two parties. In particular, the ethics screening and 
reporting in the course of a research project forces researchers to hide the ambiguities of the 
research practice and to translate them into a code that conforms with legalistic terms. The 
rendering of the ambiguities of research into bureaucratic and legal codes calls to mind what has 
been described as the “anti-politics machine” (Ferguson 1994) of development, where politics 
are rendered technical in order to process them within the framework of development co-
operation. Instead of ethical compliance, a culture of “hidden transcripts and practices” (Scott 
1990) is established that is not only an indication of the over-bureaucratization of science but 
also represents a culture of distrust. 
Morality and ethics in the practice of fieldwork 
The different ways of perceiving and defining smuggling – as a transgressive practice and culture 
of borderland populations or as an illegal or illicit action (see above) – highlight the fact that 
smuggling is a controversial and conflicted field of practices and worldviews (Hüsken 2019). 
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Thus, research on smuggling too contains epistemological, social, political and moral ambiv-
alences and ambiguities for researchers and interlocutors alike. Because of this, a non-normative 
empirical approach based on the merits of cultural relativism as advocated by Franz Boas and 
many generations of anthropologists (King 2019) is the essential premise in the study of 
smuggling. In the sense of Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s introduction to their 
seminal volume African Political Systems (1940, 4), we should not ask ourselves how things ought 
to be done but direct our attention to the ways they are done by people. In other words, our 
interest must be the emic perspective and the lived practice of people. Thus, the adoption of 
normative epistemologies centred around statehood, formal economy, legalism and secur-
itization do not make sense in our approach to smuggling and smugglers. As independent 
researchers, we need openness without prejudice paired with curiosity and empathy. However, 
even a non-normative approach does not free us from the ambivalences and ambiguities of 
smuggling as a practice and a field of study. Counterparts may be dangerous or endangered, 
malevolent or vulnerable. Practices and contexts can be shaped by risk, danger and secur-
itization, or be surprisingly uncomplicated, ordinary and even officially tolerated. Within this 
fuzziness, called practice, researchers and counterparts alike are constantly making decisions that 
constitute the morality, the sociality and the politics of fieldwork. Because morality and ethical 
judgments can vary widely within and among cultures, societies, milieus, groups and in-
dividuals, this process is certainly complex. I agree with the German ethnologist Annette 
Hornbacher, who sees moral decisions in fieldwork as “responsible judgments in view of 
complex challenges and sometimes aporetic dilemmas, especially in transcultural practice” 
(Hornbacher 2017, 214). In my view, research ethics must be based on an implicitly reciprocal 
and negotiated morality that develops through the social interactions between researchers and 
counterparts, and cannot be delegated to a set of positive laws or normative rules imposed, 
monitored and safeguarded by specialists, for example, ethics review boards. This process can be 
complex, contradictory and conflictive, but is also an essential and indispensable part of research 
practice. In this context, ethics declarations and tutorials can certainly play an important role as a 
benchmark for compliant scientific work. Even here, however, we always must reflect carefully 
on their boundedness in certain cultural traditions and revisit their adequacy in the context of 
every piece of research. 
Since the days of Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942),20 the critical reflection of fieldwork as 
a complex social process with eminent moral issues has been part of the identity of cultural and 
social anthropology. The alleged scandal in connection with the posthumous publication of his 
diaries in 1967 does not contradict this but rather confirms this thesis (Malinowski 1967). The 
debate about the crisis of ethnographic representation (also known as the writing culture de-
bate) initiated by Clifford and Marcus (1986) was certainly another important step in the critical 
self-reflection of the discipline and its methodology. More recently, colonial and postcolonial 
studies and queer and critical race theory have produced a growing body of literature that 
engages with the critical revision of existing hegemonies in academic knowledge production 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2013). In this context, fieldwork and participant observation are 
examined and critically reviewed, and authors and activists call for a fundamental moral, ethical, 
methodological and political revision of all aspects of fieldwork which goes beyond the es-
tablished ethics declarations of professional science associations.21 All this has certainly broa-
dened our perspective; however, as Lewis (2014) has argued, the debate has left little room for 
contributions that do not deal with criticism and deconstruction. The focus on alleged hege-
monic power structures (mostly defined as white, male, heteronormative, or Western) and their 
impact on academic knowledge production obscures the actual polycentricity of power rela-
tions in research practice. In this practice, the relationships between the strong and the weak, 
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the powerful and the powerless, the vulnerable and the malevolent, the good or the bad, or the 
right or the wrong, are complex, multilayered and dynamic. Within this complexity, the 
vulnerability of researchers and counterparts is certainly an important aspect, but is one which is 
always accompanied (if not counteracted) by agency and resilience. 
If we instead leave the negotiation of morality and research ethics where it belongs, namely 
in the hands of the principal actors involved (researchers and their counterparts), we therefore 
need to discuss the elements involved in this negotiation process. Almost every introduction to 
anthropological fieldwork emphasizes the necessity of trust and empathy as significant resources, 
and in fact these are the basis of all social interaction in ethnographic research, particularly 
participant observation and in-depth interviewing. In classical ethnographic fieldwork carried 
out over a one-year period, or through repeated research over longer periods (Spittler 2014), 
researchers and their counterparts can begin an interpersonal dialogue or negotiation about the 
good in (their) human practice, which is what ethics as a theoretical consideration about 
morality is actually about. Ideally, this dialogical negotiation opens the way for the social and 
moral contextualization of the research among reliable local partners and the gradual devel-
opment of stable relationships with key informants based on shared and mutually practised 
(moral) principles such as confidentiality, accountability and trust (Hüsken 2019, 22ff). 
Together, they form what has been called the “ethics of reciprocity” (Schönhuth 2021, 50). As 
anthropologists, we know that this process is fundamental to how and what kind of knowledge 
is gained. 
However, this is only an ideal model, and I do not wish to advocate a false romanticization 
of ethnographic fieldwork here. Fieldwork and participant observation are only in retrospect a 
coherent endeavour. In fact, fieldwork can be an experience of unpredictability and insecurity. 
The negotiation of a shared morality can therefore be controversial, and there is no guarantee of 
its success. However, ethical judgements and decisions are an expression and a consequence of 
human freedom, reason and responsibility. This includes decisions that involve risk and safety. 
Commissions, screenings and ever new rules can neither anticipate nor replace this process. 
Again, we must leave these decisions in the hands of the researchers and their interaction 
partners in the field, accepting the possibility of success or also failure. If questions of morality 
and ethics have to be lived through anew in every research project, then we must expect an 
honest and transparent disclosure of this process. Although most colleagues involved in the 
study of smuggling underline that ethnographic fieldwork has been the foundation of their 
empirical work, we hear relatively little about what this actually meant in detail and almost 
nothing about moral and ethical challenges. With the promotion of ethical reflexivity in 
teaching and research practice we can respond to critique without falling into forms of post-
modern hyper-reflexivity. Instead of a critical philosophy of science (much needed in other 
contexts), we should stick to the pragmatism of empirical studies. If there is a paradigm to 
follow, then I would suggest Robert Chambers’ words about the merits and pitfalls of empirical 
research: “Start, stumble, fall, stand up and use your own best judgement at all times” (quoted 
by Schönhuth (2021, 106). 
Hidden practices and the securitization of fieldwork 
The issues of risk, safety and security in fieldwork are now the subject of broad discussion across 
the social and cultural sciences. With regard to the Middle East and North Africa, some authors 
argue that recent political developments have turned the region into “no countries for an-
thropologists”22 where (ethnographic) fieldwork on the ground is hindered, prohibited and 
threatened. The detention of researchers by security apparatuses – albeit not a new 
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phenomenon – is becoming more common and can be lethal, as the tragic case of Giulio 
Regeni, a doctoral student at the University of Cambridge shows.23 The empirical study of 
smuggling has so far been spared such tragedy. In some border regions of Tunisia, even border 
officials talk unreservedly about their involvement in formalized smuggling systems with fixed 
tariffs and conflict resolution mechanisms. In the Libyan region of Fezzan however, any open 
conversation on illegal transborder trade (such as human trafficking and slave markets close to 
the border) can cause severe safety issues (including persecution by organized crime networks 
and militias) for researchers and their counterparts alike (reported by an Algerian historian and 
ethnologist working in Fezzan who wishes to remain anonymous). Other examples of such 
issues include the experience of German ethnologist Georg Klute, who during his field studies 
in Guinea-Bissau in 2010, recognized Italian mafia gangsters (engaged in drug trafficking) in the 
streets and restaurants of Bissau. His local counterparts strongly advised him to avoid any 
contact (including eye contact) with these actors due to safety issues. An American colleague, 
who wishes to remain anonymous here, has also been under United States police surveillance 
since his research on the United States–Mexico border, while colleagues working in the border 
area of China and Central Asian states report systematic surveillance by Chinese authorities. 
In a conference contribution in Zürich in 2018,24 David Shankland, Director of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute, reported about his own experience of vulnerability when he was 
abducted by drug smugglers in Morocco. According to Shankland, the current situation and 
developments require researchers to develop strategies and tactics of protection. As a con-
sequence of increased security risks in recent years, social science departments may either 
prevent researchers from going to unstable areas or introduce security protocols similar to the 
ones deployed by humanitarian organizations to protect their staff. This would restrain the 
researcher’s movements and require regular contact with local security services, and might 
impede the ability of researchers to participate in everyday life (Akcinar et al. 2018, 38). These 
developments are, albeit to different degrees, not exclusive to the African continent or the 
Middle East. The securitization of fieldwork on smuggling also takes place regarding the 
borderlands of Russia, central Asia and China (Ibañez-Tirado and Marsden 2020). Meanwhile, 
the issues of the possible risk involved for and the potential vulnerability of counterparts have 
been addressed by David Spener (2009) in his book Clandestine Crossings: Migrants and Coyotes 
on the Texas-Mexico Border. 
Despite the debate and the obvious relevance of the topic, only some authors reveal the 
related methodological and ethical problems of their research. This has to do in no small part 
with the difficult role of the ethical review processes discussed above. Another reason for this 
may also be the fact that disclosing problems or even failure in the research process is not very 
conducive to a successful academic career at a time when the publish or perish paradigm applies 
more than ever. Instead, a hidden securitization of research practices has emerged, that is again 
seldomly openly discussed. In a recent publication, Peter and Strazzari (2017) have taken the 
important and commendable step of ensuring more transparency in this field. Based on research 
experience in Mali and Darfur, they uncover the ongoing securitization of fieldwork in so- 
called “zones of danger.” Securitization is understood in two ways: “research is increasingly 
framed as a security concern; and it is framed by security concerns. In both cases, extraordinary 
means and procedures are invoked in the name of security” (Peter and Strazzari 2017, 2).25 
Thus, researchers who deal with sensitive issues or contested fields receive special attention 
from state, military, intelligence, development, and non-state actors (Hüsken 2019, 20ff). By 
defining and securitizing zones of danger, these actors can approve or deny access as well as 
influence researchers and research (Peter and Strazzari 2017, 3). In this respect, zones of danger 
are a direct result of securitization and differ from the notion of dangerous fields put forward by  
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Kovats-Bernat (2002). Peter and Strazzari identify three emerging practices that have significant 
consequences for research and academic knowledge production: remotely managed research; 
the outsourcing of logistics and fixers; and embedded research (Peter and Strazzari 2017, 7–8). 
The following considerations take their contribution as a reference point for further discussion. 
The practice of remotely managed research is based on the contracting of local researchers to 
gain access to dangerous areas and to circumvent travel restrictions. These local researchers are 
used for data acquisition and processing, and often only receive a limited amount of research 
training from the principal researchers. In such a practice, the principal researcher never per-
sonally experiences the context he is studying. The local researchers are often graduate students, 
local activists, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or development employees. 
Their participation in research can be an attractively paid service, but their work usually does 
not allow them to further pursue an academic career (as in the case of a doctoral student who 
carries out fieldwork for a collaborative research project), nor is it recognized as an independent 
academic contribution. When empirical research and contact and interaction with counterparts 
rests on the shoulders of often only superficially trained research assistants, questions are raised 
not only about the quality and reliability of information gathered but also, and even more so, 
concerning the academic knowledge production based on it. In addition, the local team and its 
interlocutors are the people ultimately potentially placed at risk. In the study of smuggling in 
warzones such as Fezzan in Libya, this practice is well established within think tanks, among 
journalists and in development agencies. However, the local researchers involved are seldom 
mentioned in publications; instead, the principal researcher appears as the genuine author and 
expert. Equally ambivalent is the fact that field research of longer durations in zones of danger26 
relies to a great extent on professional researchers of local or regional origin. These researchers 
are not research assistants but fellow academics. Their local belonging and regional ties, lan-
guage and cultural skills often allow them to circumvent travel restrictions and access the field. 
However, their research is dangerous and often only possible as undercover research or on the 
basis of pure observation. Nevertheless, their contributions flow (often anonymized for security 
reasons) into the publications of Western scholars who can afford to publish openly. This 
practice delegates risk to a group of academics who are already politically and financially 
precarious. Furthermore, it enhances the asymmetries and unequal relations between Western 
and non-Western academic production on the global south, in which the latter has been and 
continues to be underrated and overlooked or serves as the provider of local collaborators for 
Western researchers. 
Remotely managed research has also increased through the digitalization of communication 
via social media and the internet. Digital ethnography relies (among other things) on content 
analysis of social media or blogs, mobile phone communication, and online focus and discussion 
groups, and is undoubtedly an important field of study (Pink et al. 2015). However, digital 
discursive and performative practices are not necessarily congruent with the non-digital lived 
practice of people. Emerging research techniques such as the real-time interviewing of local 
interlocutors or experts via social media and video tools (Peterson 2015) that are integrated into 
workshops or conferences evoke a questionable representation of reality. In the video stream, 
local interlocutors (similar to the old-school live reporting of war reporters in television) seem 
to report directly from research sites where professional researchers cannot go. Reality, it seems, 
is streamed in real time into the office, meeting or conference room. Although the professional 
researcher or the academic participants of workshops and conferences are not able to con-
textualize who these speakers actually are and with what kind of authority they speak, these 
informants are nevertheless treated as authentic representatives of the real issues on the 
ground.27 In addition, encounters in digital spaces are far from safe. The digital surveillance 
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techniques (tracking) of intelligence services can expose local experts and interlocutors to 
persecution when they speak about sensitive issues.28 Thus this variant of remotely managed 
research may protect the professional researcher but not necessarily their counterparts. 
In the second practice identified by Peter and Strazzari29 – outsourcing of logistics and fixers 
– fixer agencies provide services to the researcher such as transport and accommodation, guides, 
translation and interpretation, and research assistance (see above). In 2005, Robert Fisk used the 
term hotel journalism30 to criticize international journalists in Iraq who instead of doing in-
dependent research, wrote reports based solely on the services of fixers and research assistants. 
The role of fixers and research assistants in academic research and knowledge production is still 
a blind spot and unclear to the academic and broader audience. It marks, however, the shift 
from independent research based on fieldwork among real people and in concrete localities, 
towards a commodification of information in a market of knowledge brokers. In countries that 
are experiencing intense conflict or civil wars (such as Libya), individual brokers or broker 
networks (often in the institutional form of think tanks or NGOs) have developed into a major 
source for academic knowledge production. Information and knowledge brokers can be 
committed to science, they may have purely monetary interests, or deliver knowledge ac-
cording to particular political goals. All three motives are unfortunately seldom openly reflected 
by researchers, who nevertheless claim to have authentic information. 
In the third practice Peter and Strazzari identify – embedded research – the researcher 
participates (or is employed) in military operations and international intervention regimes, 
cooperates with intelligence services, or gains access to zones of danger by benefiting from the 
security architecture of an international organization. This practice is undoubtedly the one most 
disputed in the social sciences. This is particularly true for the Human Terrain System (HTS), a 
United States Army support programme employing personnel from the social sciences, for 
example, anthropology, sociology, political science, regional studies and linguistics, to provide 
military commanders with an understanding of the local population in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
2007, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) published a 
statement opposing HTS as an unacceptable application of anthropological expertise that 
conflicted with the AAA’s Code of Ethics.31 Most anthropological associations around the 
world follow the AAA’s Code of Ethics.32 In addition, social scientists who officially work for 
the military have been challenged by critical academic and public debates (Lucas 2008). Some 
have nevertheless become official parts of the military apparatus and its related institutions 
(Haugegaard 2020). A more hidden reality of embedded research occurs with regard to the role 
of intelligence services. All over the world, intelligence services pursue an active recruitment 
policy which focusses on researchers who work in danger and conflict zones or deal with illicit 
practices such as smuggling. Intelligence services offer concrete advantages such as payment, 
visas and travel permits, and technical equipment to their academic collaborators, but they may 
also appeal to the civic duties of researchers as loyal citizens to convince scientists to colla-
borate.33 Due to the secrecy policies of intelligence services and the lack of transparency among 
academics, it is difficult to say how many researchers are involved in these practices and how 
their academic work is affected by this form of embeddedness. In any case, involvement with 
intelligence services draws science into the logics of spying and secrecy, which makes an open 
and trusting collaboration between researchers and counterparts impossible. A much more 
common form of embedded (or assisted) research in zones of danger takes place in the context 
of international organizations, peace missions, and development cooperation. International 
organizations can provide security, and can also facilitate access to the field or even offer the 
opportunity to conduct fieldwork in the context of the security architecture of an international 
organization. However, embeddedness and involvement come with consequences that can 
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compromise research. Interlocutors and local populations may identify the researcher with the 
respective international organization. Thus, the interaction between researcher and counter-
parts can take the form of a donor–beneficiary relationship that clearly differs from a re-
lationship based on reciprocal learning and exchange. Just as local populations may identify the 
researcher with an international organization, the researcher too may adopt the normative 
perspective and the organizational interests of the security provider.34 A particular case is the 
ensuring of security for researchers by regional or local security forces. These forces may belong 
to the state, but they can also be local militias or vigilante groups. Here, the researcher can 
become entangled in conflict formation and dynamics (Kovats-Bernat 2002) that are difficult to 
anticipate and may affect his position as an independent researcher. 
Based on my own research experiences in Libya and the research for this article, the practices 
described are currently increasing.35 They are thus the effects of the global trend of secur-
itization inscribed in independent research. This is certainly a worrying prospect. However, 
there may still be valid ways out of securitization. In the concluding section, I would like to 
explore these. 
Hic sunt leones! Sed autem socii! 
The seminal volume Fieldwork under Fire, edited by Nordstrom and Robben (1996), discusses 
the effects that violence, threat and confrontation with suffering can have on researchers and 
research. At the same time, it exemplifies how local populations organize normality in war or in 
risk-filled and violent circumstances. The empirical cases show how agency, resilience and 
inventiveness confront and overcome vulnerability. This does not mean that vulnerability 
disappears or no longer needs to be addressed, but the cases nevertheless help us not to 
overvalue it. All over the world, the populations of borderlands are showing remarkable re-
silience to state-orchestrated policies of control or to the threat of non-state actors such as 
organized crime networks or militias. These populations assert historical cross-border con-
nectivities and use them in productive ways, even in difficult times (Scheele 2009; Feyissa and 
Hoehne 2010; Korf and Raeymaekers 2013, Hüsken 2019). Researchers can benefit from these 
experiences and skills if they achieve local acceptance and, ideally, are able to embed their 
research in local safety practices. In a recent article, Henig, Marsden, and Ibañez-Tirado (2016) 
have highlighted skilled forms of “everyday diplomacy” which distinguish local populations in 
their capacity to handle challenges (such as securitization). This is in my experience particularly 
true for the provision of safety in insecure fields of action such as borderlands. From mid-2012 
on, my own research in the borderland of Libya and Egypt was confronted with criticism, 
avoidance and then also with threats by radical Islamist groups. I was stopped, held and in-
terrogated at militia checkpoints several times. In 2018, I spend two weeks doing research in 
Tobruk with my passport held at Tobruk airport by local tribal security personnel. However, I 
could always rely on the safety networks of my counterparts – not only those of local politicians, 
entrepreneurs, and tribal leaders, but also those offered to me by ordinary people. Based on 
their local knowledge and learned competency, these counterparts either prepared me for 
problems, showed me limits, or solved precarious situations pragmatically and competently. 
Even more valuable than this was the fact that the awareness and joint anticipation of risk and 
potential vulnerability proved a key element in relationships of trust and reciprocal solidarity 
(Hüsken 2019, 15ff). Thus, the researcher can find allies even when there are lions around. 
Embedding research in local assessments of risk and local safety practices can be a way out of the 
“security archipelago” (Amar 2013) created by the regimes of securitization described above. 
Of course, this form of embedding and the safety that comes with it only succeeds via repeated 
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research over longer periods. It also requires courage (including the courage to accept and admit 
failure) and the willingness to engage in thick participation.36 
However, I do not wish to downplay risk, nor do I intend to glorify or romanticize research 
in dangerous fields. Risk requires safety precautions, methodological pluralism and a particular 
form of everyday diplomacy. Useful and pragmatic guidelines for safety precautions in dan-
gerous fields have been provided by a number of authors (Kovats-Bernat 2002, Goldstein 2014) 
and these need not be repeated here. It goes without saying that methodological pluralism is a 
potent remedy in difficult research fields. The methodological developments and advances of 
the last few decades offer an almost inexhaustible reservoir of possibilities, which is exemplified 
in many textbooks (Iphofen and Tolic 2018). Multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995), tandem 
and team research (Lecocq et al. 2013; Schlehe and Hidayah 2014), indirect questioning, pure 
observation, choosing neutral places for conversation, etc., have great potential for the study of 
smuggling. In addition, online tutorials (Schönhuth 2021) include checklists and self-tests on 
assessing risks, methods, and research ethics. 
In dangerous fields, and even more so in securitized zones of danger, the researcher enters a 
complex field of relationships, negotiations, compromises, and research adaptation that can be 
anticipated only partly by the above-mentioned prescriptions. Here, researchers need to de-
velop a particular form of everyday diplomacy in order to cope with these challenges. Caution, 
a realistic assessment of the possibilities and limits of research (involving local expertise), and a 
critical reflection of the possible consequences of one’s own actions for others must be the basis 
for responsible diplomatic judgements and practices. This refers to ways of coping, avoiding, or 
cooperating with international organizations and the military, and includes negotiations and 
forms of coexistence with border authorities (Spener 2009, 1ff). It also requires careful tactical 
distance (including exit options) from violent groups such as militias or organized crime net-
works and other potentially harmful counterparts in the field; last but not least, it concerns our 
responsibility for our counterparts in the field. 
The everyday diplomacy of fieldwork, however, must allow for tactical behaviour on the 
part of researchers too, as long as they do not compromise the ethical principles laid out in the 
declarations of our associations. In an earlier publication, I have suggested the notion of dis-
cretion (Hüsken 2019, 18ff) as a way to cope with the challenges of research in times of turmoil 
in Libya. In the novel The King David Report by the German writer Stefan Heym (1973), a 
historian assigned by King Solomon to write the official history of King David is confronted 
with the complex process of writing a political history. In order to protect himself and his work, 
he develops the concept of “discretion” and defines it as “truth domesticated by wisdom” (94). 
I believe that for any researcher confronted with risk or actors who try to compromise the 
freedom of academic research, a practice of discretion is necessary and legitimate. 
I agree with Peter and Strazzari that whenever access to people and areas is determined by 
policies and practices of securitization, we as researchers must pay particular attention to 
methodological transparency and ethical reflexivity. Only by revealing the limitations and di-
lemmas of our research can we improve the quality of our scholarship and enhance the actual 
security of researchers travelling to zones of danger. When we disclose and share the conditions, 
processes, and practices of research and knowledge production without omitting the difficulties, 
ambiguities and dilemmas, we are doing what we ought to do: good science. 
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1 See Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, Oxford University Press, last modified 2018, http:// 
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28 For some time now, my Egyptian and Libyan counterparts have preferred not to talk about sensitive 
issues via social media at all.  




30 See https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/robert-fisk-iraq-hotel-journalism-baghdad-b1 
639391.html.  
31 See https://www.americananthro.org/ConnectWithAAA/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1952.  
32 See paragraph 6 in the Code of Ethics of the AAA: “Responsibilities to one’s own government and to host 
governments” states that “no secret research, no secret reports or debriefings of any kind should be agreed to 
or given.” http://www.americananthro.org/ParticipateAndAdvocate/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1656.  
33 See Hüsken 2019, 20.  
34 See Hüsken and Klute 2015, 321.  
35 Peter and Strazzari (2017, 16) do not seem too optimistic about transparency in this field when they 
state “that the trend within the social sciences seems to be in the opposite direction.” 
36 Thick participation involves training and practice, the complementarity of observation and ques-
tioning, and the involvement and productive use of all the senses: listening and watching, touching, 
smelling and tasting, and physical and mental feeling (Spittler 2014, 213).  
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MAKING BORDERS, CLOSING 
FRONTIERS AND IDENTIFYING 
SMUGGLING 
Comparative histories 
Paul Nugent   
Although there as many histories of border-making as there are lines on a map, most either 
involve some progression from a frontier to a border, or are the result of the splintering of an 
existing state/empire in which case internal borders are typically externalized. The frontier 
exists in the imagination of state actors, representing an area outside their conception of ef-
fective control. Their spatial reading, though, is not always shared by populations whose 
conception of the landscape of power may differ significantly. The border is more of an em-
pirical reality and represents the point at which the writ of one authority definitively ends and 
another conceivably begins. The delimitation of a border by map and/or treaty may not result 
in immediate demarcation of a physical boundary, thereby contributing to a measure of un-
certainty. When it comes to maritime borders, it stands to reason that proper demarcation is 
well-nigh possible. A popular misconception is that there is a sequence according to which 
states are formed and set out to define their borders, whereas these are generally simultaneous 
processes. As Peter Sahlins (1988, 1989) has demonstrated in relation to the protracted process 
of border-making between France and Spain in the Pyrenees, the border was initially actualized 
through the territorialisation of local identities. The territorialisation of the state itself, which 
involved the transplanting of institutions such as Customs officials to the margins, came much 
later – and the demarcation of the boundary line later still. This pattern holds for colonial states 
as well, as I have recently argued in the case of the Senegambia and the trans-Volta in the 
nineteenth century (Nugent 2019). 
Ultimately, it is those who represent the sovereign authority who stipulate what may legally 
cross the border and under what conditions – and hence who also define what constitutes 
smuggling. Clearly, none of this resides inherently in the nature of the goods that are transacted: 
at certain times and places, the trade in narcotic substances (notably opium) has been considered 
legitimate, while seemingly innocuous goods like textiles and groundnuts have been identified 
as contraband. The act of labelling with a view to sanctioning is closely bound up with the 
aspirations of those who purport to rule, but what this means in practice depends on an un-
derlying capacity to make a preferred version of order stick. If policing is intended to stamp out 
smuggling, the very act of cementing a border ironically renders contrabanding more attractive. 
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Borders have historically magnified differences, both because of the differential pace of infra-
structural development and because of different regulatory regimes pertaining to taxation and 
consumption. Moreover, the riskier it becomes to move people and goods across the line, the 
greater the associated rents and the rewards that come with success. It is only at highly mili-
tarized land borders that flows are reduced to a trickle. 
Inevitably, this is all bound up with contests over the moral as much as the physical terrain. 
Whether smuggling is driven by need or motivated by greed is fundamental to establishing the 
limits of acceptable behaviour amongst border populations – which has an important bearing on 
the ease with which enforcement is carried out. A prior question is whether the laws themselves 
are underpinned by any conception of the greater good. In this regard, it is worth recalling 
Adam Smith’s sympathetic depiction of the smuggler as 
a person who, though no doubt highly blamable for violating the laws of his country 
… and would have been in every respect an excellent citizen had not the laws of his 
country made that a crime which nature never meant to be so. (quoted in Evensky 
2011, p. 260)  
In border regions, it is not uncommon for populations to distinguish between smuggling 
that is considered harmless and that which is considered anti-social (Scheele 2012, pp. 95–124). 
This relates not just to the scale of the operation, but to the nature of the goods. Where the 
border is not considered legitimate in the first place, local actors may present smuggling almost 
as an act of social conscience. In cases where related populations straddle the line, as is true of 
the Awlad ‘Ali of the Liberian/Egyptian borderlands, smuggling may even be integral to the 
reproduction of larger kinship networks (Hüsken 2019). Conversely, where the border is a 
consequence of a successful secessionist pitch, populations may be more inclined to co-operate 
in efforts to protect local agriculture and industry from goods entering from the other side. 
These shifts and nuances are what makes smuggling such a fascinating topic for historical en-
quiry and comparative reflection. In this chapter, I will seek to amplify these broad observations 
with reference to a range of different contexts in West Africa, South-East Asia, Western Europe 
and North America. These cases demonstrate that the logics of border-making have shaped 
patterns of smuggling, while the latter has been constitutive of social relations and political 
order. 
Border logics 
Frontiers are inherently ambiguous spaces: while underlying ‘lawlessness’ is associated with 
unpredictability and risk, frontiers also represent arenas of possibility for a multiplicity of actors. 
Indeed, states themselves may derive some benefit from loose arrangements – as with the slaving 
frontier exploited by the Dahomean kingdom in West Africa. The starting point is, therefore, 
to understand why states have found fixed borders desirable in the first place. In the European 
instance, prior to the emergence of properly defined borders, there were often overlapping 
and/or competing claims made by religious authorities, local nobles and of course rival states- 
in-the making (Sahlins 1989). Delimiting the border was about laying exclusive claims to 
populations and territory, while demarcation was an exercise in removing lingering ambiguities. 
In nineteenth-century Europe, this was associated with more effective technologies of mapping 
and better communications between the capital and the peripheries. Much of this technological 
know-how was transferred in short order to empire-building projects in Asia and Africa 
(Tagliacozzo 2005, pp. 28–47, 76–99). 
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More specifically, there are a number of underlying patterns in boundary-making that are 
worth briefly mentioning here:  
a. Firstly, states have often acted according to a defensive logic. In mountainous regions, 
claiming the heights of the land was typically justified on the grounds of establishing better 
surveillance and/or defensible positions. Creating a string of fortifications, or walled towns, 
as well as settling loyal populations in border regions, afforded a means for states to restrict 
the mobility of populations. Across Eurasia, the major threat historically came from men 
on horseback – as Chinese and Russian empire-builders learned to their cost along the 
expanse of the great Steppe (Barfield 1989; Khodorkovsky 2002). Colonial regimes that 
were struggling to assert their authority tended to place great store by securing their 
borders in the belief that dissidents were likely to take advantage of open frontiers. 
Although they were often in active competition with one another, colonial authorities had 
an incentive to co-operate in controlling the movements of potential rebels, as well as 
restricting the flow of firearms and ammunition. During the Cold War, highly militarized 
borders were intended to prevent almost any form of interaction across the line. This was 
reflected in the heavily mined border between Finland and the Soviet Union following the 
cession of Keralia and the excision of Finnish populations at the end of the Second World 
War (Paasi 1999). The land border between North and South Korea is an ongoing case 
where very little gets through (Kim 2014).  
b. Secondly, borders have been drawn with the control of resources very much in mind. In 
densely settled regions, such as in western Europe and much of Asia, there was an incentive 
to lay claim to populations who were the ultimate source of revenue – whether directly in 
the shape of taxes or through labour service and levies on the products of the land. 
Cadastral mapping was an essential aid to improved systems of tax collection in Europe 
(Scott 1998, pp. 44–52), and the same technologies became fundamental to the de-
marcation of international borders. More counter-intuitive is the proliferation of mapping 
‘from below’ which underlines the ways in which border populations became active 
participants in the creation of borders – a theme that emerges strongly in the cases of Alsace 
and Lorraine and Ghana/Togo (Dunlop 2015, Nugent 2002). Equally, states have had an 
interest in laying exclusive claims to natural resources – that is, wildlife, forests, fishing 
grounds, coal and deposits like copper and gold. The conversion of the resource frontier 
into something enclosed by state borders is exemplified by the manner in which the large 
swathes of open frontier that were exploited by fur trading companies were folded into 
imperial Canada.  
c. Thirdly, asserting control over trade routes has been fundamental to the logic of border- 
making. Controlling coastlines with accessible ports, as well as the flanks of navigable 
waterways, has been a key strategic consideration. In Europe, the main river systems – 
notably the Rhine and the Danube - have been fundamental to commercial flows, but also 
were the point at which state borders came together. Across much of Africa, ecologically- 
based trade – for example between the coast, the Sahel and the Sahara in West Africa – was 
of considerable importance in the history of state formation. The taxation of goods in 
transit – such as copper, gold, salt and slaves – provided the material foundations upon 
which state builders consolidated their position. Although this did not necessarily require 
well-defined borders, rulers were careful to control chokepoints such as river crossings. 
Colonial regimes had a particular penchant for deploying rivers as borders for many of the 
same reasons – often choosing to locate the capital on the river. The twin capitals of 
Brazzaville and Leopoldville (Kinshasa) that face each other across the Congo river arose 
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out of commercial and logistical considerations on the part of the French and the Belgians 
respectively (Gondola 2016, pp. 32–35). Inevitably, there was substantial traffic across the 
river during the colonial period, and this remains one of the most active theatres of 
smuggling to this day. 
The most telling difference is not between colonial and non-colonial cases, but between the 
variable capacities of polities in general – ranging from states to more decentralized entities – to 
shape a clear agenda. Historically, weak states have tended to rely on intermediaries such as tax 
farmers and regional lords to manage their domains – building on bonds of allegiance rather than 
on territorial exactitude. In colonial contexts, the exploitation of resources was often left to 
private concessionary companies that exercised some of the vestiges of sovereignty on behalf of 
the metropolitan government. This was true of much of Central and Southern Africa and of 
South-East Asia (notably, Borneo). Where states had a greater capacity to intervene, they were 
more likely to post their own officials to designated border regions. But much depended on the 
willingness of local intermediaries to supply information and to co-operate in day-to-day en-
forcement of the regulations. Un-demarcated borders were perceived as a gift to local populations 
who were the masters of their own terrain and adept at exploiting lingering uncertainties. But 
they also increased the potential points of friction between neighbouring polities. In the case of 
the Cerdanya, Sahlins (1989, pp. 233–234) observes that it was the frequency of disagreements 
about where the border ran – typically when Customs officials were in hot pursuit of smugglers – 
that informed the decision to delineate this section of the Spanish-French border. In colonial 
Africa, where aspiring colonial powers rubbed up against each other, bouts of feverish compe-
tition were generally followed by efforts to settle rival claims by treaty. Around Lake Kivu, Gillian  
Mathys 2014, pp. 127–128) reveals how the decision by the Belgians and the Germans to set up 
border posts mirroring each other at Goma/Gisenyi and Bukavu/Cyangugu between 1900 and 
1906 was an exercise in setting down markers in what remained a disputed zone. The actual 
demarcation of the boundary between the Congo and Rwanda followed some years later. 
Although physical demarcation by boundary commissions was often delayed by decades, colonial 
regimes used maps and local agreements to navigate a way around potential misunderstandings. 
However, even agreeing on where the border ran did not necessarily translate into active co- 
operation when it came to regulating border flows – except when security was a serious issue. 
Colonial regimes feared the loss of people (and cattle) and often discouraged crossings into 
neighbouring territory whilst seeking to poach population from the other side. Those regimes 
that felt less affected by smuggling went through the motions of practising surveillance, but 
devoted minimal resources to it. At times, as we will see, they even provided their tacit consent. 
In what follows, I will turn to three different patterns in the relationship between border- 
making and smuggling with reference to specific case-studies: those where smuggling was a 
response to colonial revenue imperatives; others where the intention was to restrict the flow of 
commodities, substances and people deemed dangerous; and still other cases where the border 
suddenly emerged in a moment of political rupture. 
Colonial revenue logics in West Africa:  
the Trans-Volta and the Senegambia 
In West Africa, most states reproduced themselves through taxes on trade, whether in the 
interior or at the coastal ports. It was much less attractive to tax populations directly – although 
in some places like the Sokoto Caliphate this was practised. A particularly well-documented 
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polity is Asante which regulated the Hausa caravan trade from the Sahel. Hausa traders were 
directed to the trading town of Salaga and were not permitted to continue their journey to the 
capital. The trade to Kumasi and the metropolitan provinces was reserved for state traders and 
favoured merchants. Asante customs officials also taxed the goods which passed along the Volta 
river towards the coast. Ivor Wilks (1975, pp. 58–49) has identified a branch of the central 
bureaucracy whose specific role was to police the ‘great roads’ from designated control posts 
and to deal with the incidence of smuggling. 
In the later nineteenth century, as the Europeans sought to exert influence well beyond the 
coastal trading posts, they came into direct conflict with inland states like Asante. The escalating 
costs of conflict became a source of concern for metropolitan governments. The response of 
local officials to the revenue imperative fell into an established groove. That is, they initially 
sought to establish their own control over chokepoints along the interior trade routes, to rebuff 
the efforts of internal polities to impose their own taxes, and finally to channel the trade to their 
own ports. However, the attempt to operate within the logics of the frontier became in-
creasingly difficult, and as European rivalries intensified there was more of an interest in es-
tablishing spheres of influence and eventually colonies with defined borders. The emergence of 
the Gold Coast conforms to this pattern. After the British invasion of Asante in 1874, the 
kingdom lost control of the Hausa routes which increasingly passed down the eastern side of the 
Volta River. While the British authorities were under pressure from merchants to ensure that 
the trade from the interior came to them rather than their European competitors, the fledgling 
administrations at the coast desperately needed to raise income – especially once the Gold Coast 
colony (minus Asante) was formally consecrated in 1874. The failed attempt to introduce a poll 
tax culminated in a colonial state that balanced precariously on Customs duties. No sooner had 
the British defined their eastern border than a vigorous smuggling trade grew up at its eastern 
margins. In an effort to deal with the problem, the British shifted the border eastwards to 
include the town of Aflao in 1879 (Marguerat 1993, pp. 23–27). The pattern was repeated as 
traders from across the sub-region (including Hausas, Minas and Sierra Leoneans), and even 
some European firms, established themselves just beyond Aflao where there had previously 
been only a cluster of small fishing villages sandwiched between the sea and the lagoon. Hence 
Lomé, the present-day capital of Togo, owes its existence to its sudden emergence as a highly 
cosmopolitan haven for smugglers seeking to evade Gold Coast Customs controls (Marguerat 
1998, Spire 2007). The favourable conditions for the contraband trade endured for some years 
before the Germans arrived on this stretch of coastline in 1884 and staked their own claim to 
what became the colony of Togo. The emergence of a rival colonial power required the British 
to agree on a formal border separating the two colonies, which closed the frontier once and for 
all. The result was the straight line border that remains in place today, running due north from 
the coast at Aflao and then taking a sharp deviation to the west. This was in no sense a natural 
border and in many ways provided the perfect conditions for the pursuit of smuggling. 
After some years, the Germans decided to relocate their capital to Lomé and set about 
constructing a modern city with a wharf to handle ships and three railways to carry cash crops 
from the interior. The Germans and the British had initially agreed to harmonize their Customs 
duties, but this was abandoned by the Togo authorities when they needed to augment their 
revenues to finance the infrastructural push. Higher import duties in Togo resulted in con-
siderable smuggling of manufactured goods from the Gold Coast. The Volta River constituted 
the border for much of its length and provided an easy route for contraband goods travelling in 
both directions. After the First World War, when France and Britain divided the German 
colony in two, the southern border remained intact, but further north it was shifted eastwards. 
For much of its length, the boundary was delimited and later demarcated along the line of the 
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Togoland hills, in the hope that it might constitute a more natural border. However, the routes 
through the forested mountains proved extremely difficult for the Gold Coast Customs 
Preventive Service (CPS) to patrol. Meanwhile, at the coast it was business as usual. British 
trading firms operated stores in Lomé that notionally catered to the local market. Many of the 
imported goods that they sold, however, were transported across the border into the Gold 
Coast, either by pirogues along the lagoons or the sea-route, or overland along countless trails. 
The most important single item in the contraband trade was Dutch gin. The British relied 
overwhelmingly on import duties, and the greatest single contributor to these was the duty on 
gin, followed by textiles and tobacco (Nugent 2019, p. 262). The French maintained head taxes 
and minimized the level of import duty. Although much of the contrabanding was carried out 
by small traders, some of the seizures effected by the CPS pointed to something altogether more 
organized (Nugent 2019, 262–268). Whereas the CPS devoted considerable energy to the 
campaign against smuggling in the 1920s, the French authorities devoted minimal resources to 
this aspect of border control. 
In the Senegambia, the picture was somewhat different because the control of labour was 
closely intertwined with the flow of commodities. The British and the French initially estab-
lished trading posts at Bathurst and Saint Louis with a view to tapping trade along the Gambia 
and Senegal rivers respectively. However, by the mid-nineteenth century, the production of 
groundnuts in proximity to the coastal ports had shifted the centre of economic gravity. In the 
1880s, the French resolved to claim the entirety of the Senegambia, pegging the Portuguese 
backwards towards Bissau and encircling the British in the process. Given vocal opposition to 
relinquishing Bathurst, the question of defining a border between the Gambia and Senegal 
became a practical necessity. In the western sector, a major consideration for the British was 
slave raiding. By settling on a border in 1889, and securing French co-operation, the British 
hoped to establish the conditions that would enable the Jola to cultivate groundnuts in peace. 
The boundary was drawn according to a simple expedient – comprising a straight line from the 
coast, followed by one that tracked the contours of the Gambia river at 10 kilometres from 
either bank (Nugent 2019, pp. 120–122). Again, this was anything but a natural boundary, even 
if it shadowed a natural feature. 
Just as British firms controlled much of the trade in Lomé, it was French firms that 
dominated the trade of the Gambia, which they conducted from wharf towns dotted along the 
river. Once slave raiding had been eliminated, the Gambian groundnut economy depended 
heavily on seasonal labour, or ‘strange farmers,’ drawn from French territory. Part of the at-
traction for these workers was to acquire access to British manufactured goods. In addition, 
Senegalese producers smuggled their own groundnuts into the Gambia in order to be able to 
purchase these same commodities from the wharf towns that were substantially closer. 
Moreover, the Gambia suffered from a chronic food deficit, especially at times when the 
migrant labourers were present in large numbers. Although the Gambia imported rice to cover 
the shortfall, much of it was smuggled in from French territory. All of this was convenient for 
the Gambian authorities because they were able to maximize their groundnut exports and also 
to increase the sale of British manufactures, both of which were taxed. 
In significant ways, British and French priorities were aligned very differently. While the 
French endeavoured to maintain a tight Customs cordon, the British displayed little interest in 
regulating what crossed the border – other than firearms, the occasional marabout (or religious 
leader) and stolen cattle. However, the two sets of authorities did have a shared interest in 
formalizing the strange farmer system. The latter was fundamental to the economic viability and 
public finances of the Gambia, but migrants also earned money that enabled them to pay their 
head taxes in Senegal and Mali. The authorities co-operated to ensure that they were registered 
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and did not criss-cross the border at will. However, this depended on the co-operation of the 
alkalos (village chiefs) in the Gambia who managed the system. While the alkalos received their 
cut, there was inevitably some temptation to let migrants enter beneath the radar of the two 
administrations. While the British favoured permanent settlement, they sought to stamp out the 
practice of short-term migrants bypassing the controls. Although they co-operated in managing 
migration, the Senegalese authorities suspected their Gambian counterparts of actively poaching 
population with a view to promoting permanent settlement. This became a hot issue during the 
First World War when many people crossed the border to escape conscription. 
The trans-Volta and Senegambia cases throw up some interesting parallels and differences. In 
the Senegambia, the flows that were regulated were people as well as commodities, and the 
latter included a cash crop (groundnuts), food crops and imported consumer goods. In the 
trans-Volta, some cocoa was produced, but its production did not depend on labour from across 
the border, while the trade in foodstuffs was less important. The importance of everyday 
consumer goods, however, was as evident, even if alcohol featured less in the list of Gambian 
smuggled goods. In both cases, the leading commercial enterprises were complicit in the 
contraband trade. British firms in Lomé were well-aware that the imported commodities that 
they sold were likely to end up in the Gold Coast, although their standard defence was that they 
had no control once the goods entered the hands of their customers. In the Gambia, French 
firms sold the British manufactured goods that made their way across the Senegalese border, 
while they purchased contraband groundnuts that travelled in the opposite direction. In each 
case, the huff and puff surrounding the campaign against smuggling on one side of the border 
contrasted with the almost complete lack of interest on the other. Finally, populations who 
found themselves located on either side of the line adapted creatively to these realities. 
Borderlanders knew the inland waterways intimately and they were able to make use of the 
many paths and tracks that criss-crossed the landscape. The difference was that whereas 
Senegambian smugglers made extensive use of horse and donkey carts, their trans-Volta 
counterparts were more dependent upon the headloading of smuggled goods. In no sense can 
smuggling be considered something that existed in ignorance of the border – although such a 
defence was frequently invoked by those who were caught red-handed. Much like in 
Cerdanya, populations were well-aware of where the borders ran, even if these were not always 
clearly demarcated on the ground. A.I. Asiwaju (1976, p. 201) has referred to the emergence of 
linked markets all along the colonial border between Benin and Nigeria, underlining the ways 
in which populations appropriated the border. Much the same was true of the trans-Volta and 
the Senegambia where rotating markets became a defining feature of the borderlands. 
Dangerous goods, noxious substances 
Aside from taxing goods, the other main source of smuggling resulted from efforts to control 
the movement of commodities deemed dangerous to some conception of morality and/or 
social order. This was a particular consideration in an imperial context where hegemony often 
dangled by a very flimsy thread. The passage of Muslim religious tracts was monitored very 
closely across West Africa, especially texts that were thought to harbour seditious intent and 
possibly a coded call to jihad. Firearms loomed large for the obvious reason that they afforded 
the means to mount resistance. In the Arabian Sea (Mathew 2016, pp. 82–112) and in the 
watery expanse of South East Asia (Tagliacozzo 2005, pp. 260–282), there was a very substantial 
traffic in firearms that European consuls and colonial regimes struggled to contain. The lack of 
clear maritime borders – despite the agreement of the British and the Dutch to draw a line 
through the Straits of Melaka in 1871 (Tagliacozzo 2005, p. 29) – together with the sheer scale 
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of the trading zone, made this an almost impossible task. The Dutch faced a particular problem 
subduing the rulers of Aceh in the early 1870s and endeavoured to impose a blockade. In the 
West African colonies, the French opposed permitting African access to firearms whereas the 
British were more inclined to accept a case for their use in hunting and to tax their purchase 
accordingly (Sané 2008). In the Senegambia, there was a vigorous illicit trade in arms and 
ammunition between the Gambia, the Casamance region of Senegal and the Portuguese colony 
of Guinea Bissau which was closely bound up with moments of armed resistance. The same 
pattern was evident on the border between Benin and south-western Nigeria, where arms and 
ammunition smuggled into the former was deployed in opposition to French rule (Asiwaju 
1976, p. 200). 
In the case of narcotics, the disastrous social consequences of opium addiction were well 
known from the Chinese experience. In the East Indies, the British and Dutch authorities were 
keen to prevent a spillover into their own domains. However, they did not seek to ban the 
drug, but rather to regulate its supply and consumption. Hence, the rights to sell opium were 
generally farmed to Chinese merchants in return for a commission. Tagliacozzo (2005, p. 201) 
points out that populations were subject to distinct rules relating to consumption of narcotics, 
while the cost of the opium ‘farms’ differed between the British and Dutch territories. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, smugglers moved opium from where it was relatively cheap to where it 
was more expensive. In addition, smugglers imported their own supplies of opium to the 
region, with Singapore serving as a conduit into the Dutch possessions. The numerous islands 
and broken coastlines of the sub-region provided the perfect environment in which opium 
smugglers could transport and conceal consignments of a relatively low bulk, high value 
commodity. 
A strikingly similar story unfolded in the far western borderlands between the United States 
(US) and Canada. Here, a straight-line border had been drawn along the forty-ninth parallel in 
1846, but it was a line on a map and was not really enforced to start with. The Customs 
presence was minimal, especially along the coast where some areas remained in dispute (Moore 
2014, pp. 15–16). Stephen T. Moore indicates that British Columbia had always been more 
closely connected to neighbouring American states than the rest of Canada, while populations 
and consumer items like cotton goods and tobacco had moved relatively freely across the line. 
The borderlanders themselves regarded such smuggling as morally acceptable and, as is so often 
the case, took a certain pride in running rings around the revenue men. However, it was the 
passage of items deemed subversive to the social order in the US that led to a more sustained 
attempt to police the border. Opium was banned in the US in 1914, but not in Canada, which 
meant that there was a lively trade from one to the other. Moreover, following the American 
decision to forbid Chinese immigration in 1882, an active trafficking route through British 
Columbia opened up (Moore 2014, p. 17). As in South-East Asia, much of the smuggling was 
conducted by water along a broken coastline that was very difficult for an under-resourced 
coastguard to patrol (Moore 2014, p. 19). The extensive land border made detection equally 
difficult, not least because of the terrain. 
The other item that was of increasing interest to the US authorities was alcohol. 
Temperance ideas took root on either side of the border in the later nineteenth century, re-
flecting the manner in which missionaries and activists criss-crossed the line. Although British 
Columbia itself went dry during the First World War, this changed just as the Americans passed 
the Eighteenth Amendment that enshrined Prohibition in the US Constitution. Under the 
Canadian Constitution, the regulation of alcohol production and alcohol was a federal matter, 
and the government had no desire to co-operate in the banning of alcohol exports to the US 
which were a source of much-needed taxes. Much of the alcohol that was notionally destined 
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for Central and South America was instead channelled to US ports. Running alcohol across the 
border became a major business which the Canadian Customs authorities did conspicuously 
little to address. Indeed, they even tolerated it as long as the perpetrators refrained from the 
drugs trade (Moore 2014, p. 61). The contraband business ultimately benefited brewers and 
distillers, the bootleggers and the public exchequer in Canada. It also enjoyed the sympathy of 
border populations, especially those living closest to the line. A comparable story can be told for 
the Mexican border (Martinez 1975, pp. 57–77). Canadian manufacturers were the most vocal 
critics for the reason that as alcohol went south, items such as tobacco and textiles were 
smuggled northwards. In the end, it was the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment that brought 
the bootleggers’ boom to an end. 
The irruption of the border 
When a border was newly established, governments generally felt impelled to make a statement 
by establishing control posts. The practical consequences, however, depended on how amicable 
the divorce settlement had actually been. One instructive example of the ways in which borders 
can create an environment conducive to smuggling follows the carving of the Free State out of 
Ireland in 1922. While 26 Catholic-majority counties joined the new state, a rump of six 
counties remained within the United Kingdom as Northern Ireland. The two governments 
immediately established Customs posts where none had existed before, despite the fact that 
there were many unresolved issues about where the border ought to run. Peter Leary (2016, 
pp. 41–45) observes that Catholics tended to be concentrated on marginal lands in the hills, 
while Protestants predominated in the more fertile low-lying areas. Catholics and Protestants 
had tended to frequent different market towns, but the net result of the border was that many 
discovered that these were located on the other side of the border. Although farm produce was 
initially exempt, it was necessary to pay duty on everyday items like soap, tea and cigarettes. 
Moreover, border shoppers were required to use approved crossings even if the goods were not 
dutiable, and this frequently involved an inconvenient detour. While the Customs regulations 
were not wildly divergent to start with, this changed as inter-governmental relations deterio-
rated. In Dublin, the mood was in favour of protectionism after 1932, while the British au-
thorities introduced hefty duties on Irish goods as a form of retaliation. Following tit-for-tat 
exchanges, even agricultural products were covered by duty. The imposition of a 40% duty on 
Irish cattle entering Northern Ireland was particularly stiff (Leary 2016, pp. 130–131). While 
nationalist sentiment justified imposing higher duties, these potentially had a detrimental impact 
on border populations who depended on supplies from the other side. The inevitable con-
sequence was that smuggling flourished, and while governments on the two sides might appeal 
to patriotic duty, this enjoyed little traction – for reasons that Adam Smith would certainly have 
understood. Poor Catholics found a way to fashion an income from smuggling, while 
Protestants grandees in the north were secretly implicated. Apart from cattle, whisky and ci-
garettes and clothing were widely smuggled. In 1938, the two governments attempted to call a 
halt and signed a treaty covering trade co-operation. However, the shortages of the war years, 
during which Ireland remained neutral, led to the systematic smuggling of everyday items like 
bread, sugar, flour and tea. By this point, there was no real doubt about where the border ran. 
On the contrary, it was fundamental to the dynamics of the contraband trade. 
The redrawing of European borders after the Second World War and the rapid onset of the 
Cold War, followed by the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, involved massive population 
displacements and acute consumer shortages that were reflected in smuggling. In post-colonial 
Africa, by contrast, the borders remained remarkably stable despite their supposed artificiality. 
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There has been, though, a proliferation of armed insurgencies in which rebel movements move 
back and forth across borders to escape detection. Crucially, they also finance their operations, 
re-arm themselves and nourish their fighters, from the profits of smuggling – typically based on 
the trafficking in natural resources like timber, precious metals and cattle. However, where 
movements have been able to secure de facto control over territory, they have tended to mimic 
the revenue-collection practices of state entities. In a handful of instances, rebel movements 
have aspired towards creating their own breakaway states, in which cases smuggling has actually 
been the hand-maiden of border-making. This is true, for example, of the Sudan Peoples’ 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) which was always deeply implicated in cross-border 
trade across the sub-region (Walraet 2013, 179–180). Once formal separation has taken place, it 
is difficult for post-liberation governments to turn off the tap. In the case of South Sudan, the 
transition was particularly messy because the border with Sudan, which contains valuable 
oilfields, remained in dispute, while fighting between factions of former SPLM/A stood in the 
way of the creation of an effective central government. Hence the performance of border rituals 
and bureaucratic formalities along particular borders crossings (De Vries 2013, p. 154) has co- 
existed with systematic involvement of the protagonists in the contraband trade. 
Conclusion 
Drawing on a wide range of case-studies, this chapter has distilled some underlying patterns in 
the relationship between border-making and smuggling which can now be summarized. Firstly, 
the manner in which the border took shape has had a significant bearing on the trajectories of 
smuggling. In cases where frontiers solidified into borders, the desire to regulate the flow of 
people and goods was fundamental to the decisions to delimit and eventually to demarcate. This 
is apparent from the works of Sahlins on the Spanish-French border (1988, 1989) and  
Tagliacozzo (2005) on colonial South-East Asia. Holding the line generally went together with 
an official discourse on the evils of smuggling, although states and their minions often benefited 
from it. Across these cases, what is clear is that while the authorities fretted about unclear 
boundaries, border populations were well-aware of where the lines ran and profited 
accordingly. 
Secondly, where the border was located wielded an important influence on the capacity of 
governments to exercise meaningful control. Maritime borders were largely un-demarcated, 
even if they were minutely detailed on maps, and this always created some leeway for inter-
pretation. Mountainous borders were demarcated, but only up to a point. In unforgiving 
terrain, the dice were generally loaded in favour of the smugglers. Thirdly, the dynamic of any 
given border was closely bound up with the ways in which states pieced together their revenue 
streams. In colonial West Africa, the balance between import duties and direct taxes created a 
context in which goods were smuggled routinely while people crossed borders to evade direct 
taxation and conscription. Fourthly, the intent behind tightening borders was often related to 
the traffic in commodities that were deemed injurious to the public good – including firearms, 
alcohol and narcotics, even if each of these was also taxed in particular instances. Finally, where 
borders came into existence abruptly, the same dynamics manifested themselves, but often in a 
telescoped manner. Borders on paper needed to be translated to the landscape. Nationalists have 
also been tempted by the benefits of protectionism. Border populations have generally been 
sensitive to everyday inconvenience, but also to the opportunities that the existence of the 
border presents. As the Irish and US/Canadian cases illustrate, however, engagement in 
smuggling is not in and of itself an indicator of the illegitimacy of a given border. In Africa, 
engagement in contrabanding was paradoxically what enabled borders to be internalized 
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(Nugent 2002). Borderlanders generally came to accept the downsides of partition because of 
the livelihoods that smuggling sustained. At the same time, contraband has underpinned kinship 
relations and regional religious networks, as indicated by Hüsken (2019), whilst forging new 
kinds of connections between commercial centres embedded within larger systems of con-
nectivity as demonstrated by Nugent (2019) and Scheele (2012) for West Africa. In that sense, 
smuggling has had productive effects that are not fully captured by the association with deviance 
and evasion.  
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Changing meanings and the intersection  
with smuggling practices 
Sergio Peña   
1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to contribute to the understanding of smuggling practices 
through the conceptual lenses of borderlands, frontiers, and borders. The analysis is based on the 
premise that smuggling is a multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be understood without 
considering its spatial and temporal dimensions, in which borders play a key role. Smuggling is 
an activity that thrives by taking advantage of structural differences of spaces, adjacent or not, 
for economic gains. The chapter analyzes specifically the intersection between smuggling and 
bordering practice. 
It is important to clarify the meaning of three concepts that are used interchangeably in the 
literature: borders, borderlands, and frontiers. The three conceptual categories are not only 
economic, social, political, and cultural, but also spatial constructs that have meaning and 
content. Thus, the chapter dissects each category to search for its meaning and how it is linked 
to smuggling practice. The main question the chapter poses is: How does bordering affect smuggling 
practice? 
The second section focuses on discussing how borders have been studied to have a grasp of 
theories and concepts that could help us explain how smuggling has been approached and 
defined through the different lenses of bordering practice. The main dimensions discussed are 
ontological and epistemological aspects related to the production of knowledge of borders, 
spatial and temporal conceptions of borders, borders and scalar notions, and borders and actors. 
The third section discusses in more detail the intersection between bordering and smuggling. 
The main emphasis is on explaining how smuggling has adapted to the emerging practices of 
bordering in different epochs; for example, how smuggling changed with globalization and the 
notion of a borderless world, and how it has adapted to the post-9/11 world of security and re- 
bordering. 
There are two key arguments made throughout the chapter. First, borders are no longer 
understood as material, static, homogenous, and binary categories where a line separates and 
differentiates the “in” and “out,” and the State determines what is allowed and what is pro-
scribed. Second, borders instead are now understood as a social product that is heterogenous, 
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polysemic, and dynamic where multiple actors are engaged in the process of creating meaning 
and symbolism. This chapter shows that perceptions and practices of smuggling have been 
affected by this emerging ontological and epistemological frame. New actors besides the State 
have emerged, the scope and scale have also changed, as well as the perception of smuggling and 
the smugglers from local folk heroes to transnational dangers. 
2. Borders, borderlands, and frontiers 
This section explores the meaning and definition of three concepts that often are used inter-
changeably in border literature. The main goal is to see if there are meaningful differences and 
to what extent those help us understand smuggling practice. I argue that even though there are 
some important differences in their meanings, the concept of borders has become the dominant 
one. Frontiers was used more to denote the expansion and control of newly acquired territories 
and it has lost importance as borders are settled and less likely to change. Borderlands is restrictive 
to a region, often defined by local or national governments, at the border and does not consider 
that bordering practices can take place away from the border line. The concepts of borderlands 
and frontiers have become less prominent because they are still grounded in what scholars 
(Agnew, 1994, 2008; Newman, 2006a, 2016; Paasi, 2012, 2014) call the classical notion of 
territorialism that assumes border as “fixed” and a material “thing.” Additionally, it is argued 
that bordering practices can also be found in places not necessarily located at the international 
border line; the argument is that borders can be found “everywhere” (ÓTuathail, 1999; Balibar 
and Williams, 2002; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002; Lyon, 2005; Rumford, 2006) in 
places such as airports, highways, etc. 
Frontiers and borderlands 
The study of Frederick J. Turner originally published in 1893 was very influential in early 
works of frontiers (Stoddard, 1991; Newman and Paasi, 1998; Newman, 2001; Kraudzun, 
2012). Turner’s views on frontiers are closely related to the context of the American expansion 
and settlement of the West’s “empty areas” (Baud and van Schendel, 1997, p. 213); Turner’s 
view of the frontier is a cultural deterministic approach that separates the civilized and un-
civilized cultures, particularly the white settlers from the native populations, a perspective that 
reinforces the view of natives as “out of step with modern society” (Stoddard, 1991, p. 2). 
Furthermore, House (1980, p. 459) states that frontier was a concept used in the diplomatic 
world and defines the frontier as a “buffer zone,” often 10 kilometers in width on either side of 
the boundary. Peripherality is another dimension that is employed in the study of frontiers 
(House, 1980; Stoddard, 1991). House (1980) argues that frontiers face a double peripherality 
because looking at the frontier from both sides, two peripheral zones face each other. 
According to Newman (2001), the study of the frontier moved away from the Turnerian 
cultural deterministic perspective towards a political problematization of the concept. The shift 
towards understanding the frontier as a political problem opened other views as well, including 
economics, administration, inter-state conflict, etc. 
Finding a substantial difference in the conceptual definition of frontiers and borderlands in 
the literature is difficult; often they are used interchangeably. Stoddard (1991, p. 8) attempts to 
differentiate between the two, arguing that “border zone” and “frontier zone” have been used 
as synonyms, but the border zone normally is used to denote an administrative area whereas the 
concept of frontiers is fuzzy and not clearly defined. Because of the fuzziness (Newman, 2016) 
of defining frontiers scholars opted for the use of borderlands because it can offer a better 
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conceptualization of the phenomenon. One advantage of using borderlands, according to Baud 
and Van Schendel (1997) is that the phenomenon can be approached through its “spatial di-
mension.” Newman and Paasi (1998, p. 190) point out that the concept of borderlands allowed 
scholars to approach the topic from the perspective of “conflict, separation, partition and 
barriers” rather than “peace, contact, unification and bridges” which could open a new line of 
inquiry. 
The above analysis shows that it is a futile exercise to try to define clearly the meaning and 
difference between frontier and borderlands. Scholars in recent years have instead opted for 
employing the concepts of borders and bordering for the following reasons. First and foremost, 
frontiers and borderlands are associated with the traditional positivist notion of geography as a 
physical object or “thing,” thus overlooking the hermeneutic and subjective aspects of borders 
and meaning. Second, from the perspective of politics and international relations, borderlands 
were narrowly studied from a perspective of territorialism and conflict, facing the same lim-
itations of what Agnew (1994) called the “territorial trap” (discussed in more detail in the next 
section). Third, the process of integration (e.g., European Union, North American Free Trade 
Agreement or NAFTA) and globalization during the 1980s that relaxed and softened borders 
forced us to conceptualize borders in a non-territorial way and problematize borders in her-
meneutic and relational terms. Finally, the terrorist attacks of 09/11 revived the analysis of 
re-bordering and security, reinforcing the notion of borders as fortress. 
3. Borders and bordering practice 
The noun “border” and the verb “bordering,” that denotes practice and action, have become 
dominant. Also, in the last few decades border studies have gained ground because of globa-
lization processes that created interest in a “borderless world” (Newman, 2006b, 2016; Paasi, 
2012). In the next paragraphs the concepts of border and bordering are scrutinized based on five 
categories: ontology and epistemology; spatial; temporal; scales; and actors. The aim is to ex-
plain how these categories help with our understanding of smuggling practice, which is the 
central purpose of the chapter. For instance, the section describes how smuggling is explained 
from a positivist versus a constructivist ontology of borders and what it means in terms of 
methodology. 
The production of knowledge about borders has oscillated between two schools of thought – 
positivist and constructivist – also referred to as scientific and hermeneutic approaches. Earlier 
studies of borders adopted an ontological view of “naturalized” borders or assumed that reality 
was independent of the social agents (Kolossov, 2005); physical geography became among the first 
fields to study borders from an objective perspective. The decision to engage or not in smuggling 
practice is modeled as a game theory where actors behave rationally and evaluate the probabilities 
of success and failure. Methodologically, the positivists focus on modeling and predicting flows 
across borders by applying models derived from the hard sciences such as physics; borders are 
usually incorporated as a distance or friction variable in the gravitational models. This approach 
had considerable influence in the globalization, international trade, and borderless world studies 
(ÓTuathail, 1999; Balibar and Williams, 2002). 
Critical theory of border studies has relied on hermeneutical or interpretivist approaches; 
these studies consider the role of subjectivity in the formation of identity and narratives of 
differentiation, symbolism, and memory of border places (Newman and Paasi, 1998; Lapid 
2001; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002; Newman, 2006a; Paasi, 2014). In short, the border 
is considered something that is socially constructed instead of being independent of the social 
agent’s subjectivity (Kolossov, 2005). 
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Borders are also analyzed from the perspective of space. The study of borders, from a spatial 
perspective, revolves around two approaches. On the one hand, there is the classical view of 
borders and space defined as the “territorialism perspective.” The territorialism perspective is 
defined by the intersection of three categories: territory/sovereignty/borders. Agnew (1994, 
p. 59) identifies three key assumptions of territorialism: (1) territory and state are one and the 
same and have been “reified as a set of fixed units of sovereign space;” (2) studies focus on 
dichotomies such as national/international, domestic/foreign, overlooking some processes that 
operate at a more local and regional scale; and (3) “the territorial state has been viewed as 
existing prior to and as a container of society,” ignoring local society’s history. The idea of the 
state having all the tools and capability to keep the “container” self-enclosed and under control 
is one of the most criticized assumptions because borders are dynamic and fluid, not in stasis 
(Massey, 2005), and often the national and local interests do not work perfectly in tandem 
(Brunet-Jailly, 2005). Paasi (see Johnson et al., 2011) argues that instead of looking at borders as 
the domain of territorial sovereignty, the focus should turn to problematizing the relationship 
between state power and space, which is more visible at borders. 
On the other hand, the relational view of space and borders incorporates issues of power and 
space as suggested above by Passi (2012). The relational view pays attention to social re-
lationships and how these produced and reproduced space. Social networks are one specific 
tangible form of relational space (Paasi, 2012); borders are the site where a great multiplicity of 
social juxtapositions exist, characterized by movement and diversity rather than stasis and 
homogeneity (Massey, 2005; Johnson et al., 2011). Space is co-produced, renegotiated, and 
contested daily; culture, identity formation, and local social practice become subjects of the 
relational view. 
A new emerging approach is “borderscapes” (Brambilla, 2015) and “borderities” (Amilhat- 
Szary and Giraut, 2015) which, unlike territorialism, place the emphasis on the intersection of 
State/security/mobility. These studies rely on Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics, and govern-
mentality as spatial practice aimed at controlling, punishing, and disciplining bodies.1 The body 
or mobility of bodies (e.g., international migrants) is the subject of study, particularly how 
biometric technology has merged the border and the body to create data and algorithms for risk 
analysis (Lyon, 2005). Some studies (Balibar and Williams, 2002; Lyon, 2005; Rumford, 2006) 
have put forward the notion that borders are “everywhere,” arguing that borders have become 
a-territorial/a-spatial; this is, functions traditionally thought to take place at the border (e.g., 
passport control, customs, surveillance, etc.) now happen in any location, such as airports, and 
city streets and become part of everyday life (Amilhat-Szary and Giraut, 2015), and how these 
bordering practices are resisted and subverted (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999; Kraudzun, 2012). 
The spatial dimension needs to be complemented with the time dimension that pays at-
tention to history. One entry point to the time dimension is the evolutionist approach that sees 
progress as sequential and the new replacing the old; for instance, Marx’s view of history as 
evolution of modes of production from slavery to capitalism. Another entry point is the time- 
space-social simultaneity where the new does not necessarily replace the old but rather they 
relate dialectically, and space and time are fluid rather than in a state of stasis (Soja, 1996;  
Massey, 2005). Earlier literature of borders focused on developing evolutionary typologies of 
borders; for instance, Martinez (1994), a historian himself, argues that borders move from 
alienated to coexisting then interdependent and finally integrated. Baud and van Schendel 
(1997) identify five evolutionary cycles – embryonic, adolescent, adult, declining, defunct. 
Another temporal framework is to break time into modernism and post-modernism. The 
modern is the world that emerged from the renaissance where science and reason are the main 
sources of knowledge. The nation-State, according to Max Weber (2009), is an institution that 
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modernity created to organize society by rational principles where efficiency is highly valued. 
According to ÓTuathail (1998) the modern view of borders is associated with the Westphalian 
nation-State system, and border studies reproduce the “territorial trap” assumptions (discussed 
earlier); the most important aspect to highlight is the notion that states have the monopoly or 
exclusive right over their territory, and they emphasize the role of the state as a source of 
administrating and imposing a spatial ordering to meet national interest goals. The post-modern 
view of the world challenges the “state-centric” approach and focuses on how non-state actors 
(e.g., corporations, mafias, gangs, terrorist organizations, etc.) make the container “leak” 
(Agnew, 1994) and move towards “deterritorialization” processes; in other words, from the 
post-modern perspective, national borders as material “things” or lines that separate are obsolete 
and thus borders need to be approached as social and economic processes that are “boundless.” 
Between the modern view of a “compartmentalized” world of sovereign states and the 
“borderless” narrative of post-modernism, there is the view of selective “de-territorialization” 
(Newman and Paasi, 1998; Lapid, 2001; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002; Newman, 
2006b) arguing that the state still maintains the monopoly of territorial ordering by making the 
border easier to cross for some and harder for others, especially migrants with lower skills or 
human capital. van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002) referred to this as a process of bordering, 
ordering and othering. Finally, an alternative view is the one that argues that the discussion 
should move away from the temporal frame of modern/post-modern, and instead adopt Ulrich  
Beck’s (1992) view of the risk society2 and focus on “de-territorialized threats” and “global 
dangers” (ÓTuathail, 1998) (e.g., terrorism, drugs, and human trafficking, etc.) across borders. 
Border analysis from a scalar perspective moves among the notions of scale as a “container,” 
fuzzy boundaries, and polycentric networks. The Russian dolls known as matryoshka are used 
as an analogy to illustrate the scalar notion of a container where one scale fits into another; the 
largest scale is the national, then the state, and the local is the lowest scale. Processes (economic, 
social, and political) are contained within those scales, and functions are divided in a hierarchical 
and functional way (Jessop, 2002). This scalar notion of a container is a normative “straw-man” 
model of how things ought to be within a political/administrative order. However, the con-
tainer model crumbles with reality. Scales are often reconfigured by state and non-state actors 
who employ their power to re-order or re-scale processes to ensure the profitability of capital 
(Swyngedouw, 1997); scales become fuzzy, and power is polycentric across borders. In sum-
mary, the border moves from being a hard and well-marked edge or line around the container 
to an amorphous object for which it is hard to know where something starts or ends. 
Finally, it is important to discuss border and actors. To uncover who the key border actors 
are, the important question is: Who borders and for what purpose? (Kolossov, 2005; Johnson 
et al., 2011; Newman, 2016). Border studies have demonstrated that the State is still an im-
portant actor that borders. However, new studies have shown that state and local governments 
as well as non-State actors (e.g., corporations, white supremacist organizations, immigrant 
advocates, etc.) are important; Cooper, Perkins and Rumford (2016) referred to this phe-
nomenon as the “vernacularization” of borders. The discussion thus far has shown that one of 
the main actors in the bordering process is the State, since the Westphalian arrangement gave 
the State sovereignty powers and the monopoly to control its territory and borders (Agnew, 
1994). However, the State is an abstract concept that is too limited to explore this issue more in 
depth. It is more important to explore who is in charge of administering the border and 
whether those agents are in tune with the State’s goals (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). Border bureau-
cracies (Heyman, 1995) (e.g., border patrol, customs, immigration, army, navy, etc.) are im-
portant to study, including to what extent they have their own agenda and interests (e.g., 
likelihood of being corrupted, enforcing the law in a strict sense). 
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Multi-national corporations and local business are also important actors that lobby for de- 
bordering. Asymmetries between neighboring countries often play an important role in the de- 
bordering process so that the border becomes a fixed locational asset (Boehmer and Peña, 
2012). How border bureaucracies interact with economic forces is important to explore. 
Bureaucracies could be gatekeepers that enforce the law by the book. They could also facilitate 
exchanges by doing selective enforcement to their own benefit (rent-seeking predatory be-
havior) or simply be laissez-faire (Heyman, 1995). Border society in general is another important 
actor and the issues of identity and culture play a key role; society could ask for stricter en-
forcement of the border (narratives of differentiation and “othering”) or make the border in-
visible due to shared values and identities (“usness”) (van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002). 
Social attitudes towards “deviant,” “contesting” or “subversive” behaviors that often take place 
at the border are important to consider (Brambilla, 2015). For example, borders normally are 
associated with illegal activities so the question to explore is whether deviancy is rejected or 
embedded and part of the border social ethos (Baud and van Schendel, 1997). Lastly, while 
borders have become more and more difficult to cross for some populations, new actors are 
emerging in defense of human and civil rights that have been violated in the process of mi-
grating (Brambilla and Jones, 2020). 
4. Borders, bordering and smuggling practice 
The focus in this section is on answering this research question: How does bordering affect 
smuggling practice? Smuggling is presented as a transgressive social practice that challenges 
borders and formal institutions. The intersection between border spatiality and smuggling also 
brings important insights. What follows is a discussion of three border approaches--the “ter-
ritorialism” view, the relational view of borders, and the notion of borders “everywhere,” or 
mobile borders. By using the conceptual categories (ontology and epistemology, spatial, tem-
poral, scales, and actors) of the previous section, I unpack how smuggling and bordering have 
evolved. 
The territorialism view of borders and smuggling points towards defining smuggling as a 
transgressive practice to the State’s sovereign power and border control. The question that 
is often raised is: To what extent does the State have the capacity and resources to perform its 
panoptical function and prevent smuggling? An important track of analysis in this regard looks 
at bureaucracies as the front line or the most visible face of the State at the border. For example,  
Heyman (1994, p. 55) argues that “the networked and flexible organization of smugglers 
possesses significant advantages over bureaucratic action, especially in a boundary situation 
where smugglers have a safe zone.” In short, from a territorialism perspective, the problem is 
framed as the contradiction of spatial “fixity” and the “fluidity” (Massey, 2005) of illicitness. 
From a relational perspective of space, the focus is placed on the social relationships and 
networks created among smugglers, bureaucrats, and society. Territorialism assumes that the 
State and bureaucracies are in tandem and both work in perfect harmony, and the latter is 
professionally trained in the mirror image of Max Weber’s rational organization; however, 
bureaucracies and State goals are not always on the same page. There are examples, particularly 
in the context of a weak or failed State, when bureaucracies act on their own interest as rent- 
seeking, thus colluding with smugglers (Basu, 2014). van Schendel (2005. p. 51) defines this 
arrangement between bureaucracies and smugglers as the “pax mafiosa” and highlights two 
models of organization that show how smuggling and social networks operate at the border – 
“the double-funnel” (abundance of people involved at the point of origin but few at the points 
of importation) and the “capillary pattern” (many people at the points of origin and destiny). 
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In recent years, particularly after 09/11, the idea of borders “everywhere” or “mobile” 
borders has gained ground in the literature (discussed earlier). This approach emphasized that 
the focus of the State shifted from controlling territory to assessing risk associated with mobility 
(people and goods). Border scholars (ÓTuathail, 1998; Balibar and Williams, 2002; Lyon, 2005;  
Rumford, 2006; Amilhat-Szary and Giraut, 2015; Brambilla and Jones, 2020) argued that as 
States adopt stronger security measures and surveillance functions (e.g., passport control, citi-
zenship IDs, etc.) these are deployed in many locations away from international borders (e.g., 
airports, highways, neighborhood, etc.). The spillover effect of border securitization is the 
increasing costs of smuggling; therefore, the potential profits have attracted new players such as 
cartels and mafias that have either incorporated “local” smugglers or displaced them. The tactics 
of smugglers have become more violent, becoming “deterritorialized threats” and “global 
dangers” (ÓTuathail, 1998; Andreas, 2003), thus the social embeddedness between smugglers 
and society has been somewhat broken. Finally, as States re-territorialize their borders, enhance 
surveillance, criminalize smuggling (i.e., from misdemeanors to heinous crimes), and make the 
land border physically impossible to cross, smugglers “jump scales” and turn to other routes 
such as sea, air, and underground tunnels. 
The attention now is turned to the temporal category and how the symbiosis between 
borders and smuggling has changed, particularly in the transition between modernity and post- 
modernity. The thread that links together the border and smuggling is the practice of bor-
dering, particularly the dialectic between open and closed borders. 
Within the modern epoch, the State used borders (regulating the flows in and out) to pursue 
a “national interest” of inward development and only traded to acquire inputs not found inside 
the nation. Empirical evidence shows that nations have developed at different rates and not in 
synchronicity. Thus, there can be borders where relative asymmetries are minimal (e.g., USA 
and Canada, Western Europe, Brazil and Argentina) or large (e.g., USA and Mexico, Brazil and 
Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Haiti); smuggling is present in both situations, but it is 
more intense where asymmetries are the largest. Smugglers take advantage of these asymmetries 
created by bordering practice or economic development policies (e.g., import substitution vs. 
export oriented). In brief, the modern approach is a State-centric in the sense that the State is 
the only actor with bordering capacity. 
In contrast, the post-modern view is that multiple actors, in addition to the State, have the 
capability of re-bordering and de-bordering. For instance, transnational corporations’ (TNC) 
revenue and stock value are higher than the entire gross domestic product (GDP) of some 
sovereign nations. While economies in the post-modern world became integrated and globa-
lized, so did smuggling; as a matter of fact, drug smugglers re-organized into different orga-
nizational forms (e.g., cartels) and expanded the scale and scope of their activities (ÓTuathail, 
1998; Andreas, 2002) and control substantial amount of financial resources. According to the 
World Economic Forum, drug smuggling accounts for half the assets of illicit economies and 
the financial assets are estimated at $320 billion (equivalent to Colombia’s GDP of $331 billion) 
(World Economic Forum WEF, 2016). Anti-immigrant and xenophobic groups have emerged 
in receiving countries and they have played a key role in re-bordering, therefore, smuggling, 
particularly human trafficking, has become the center of this re-bordering and criminalization. 
Scales are also reconfigured by actors, including smugglers, who seek advantages in the de- 
bordering process. The important question to be addressed is: How do smuggling, borders, and 
scales interact and how have they changed? Several authors argue that borders are experiencing 
a phenomenon of “scale jumping” (Newman and Paasi, 1998; Abraham and van Schendel, 
2005van Schendel van Schendel 2005; Rumford, 2006). This is, the traditional dichotomies of 
domestic/foreign, and national/international, according to Agnew (1994, p. 59), “obscure the 
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interaction between processes operating at different scales.” From a scalar perspective, smug-
gling practices have transformed their scope of action from local-local or cross-border regional 
to transnational. When smuggling becomes a transnational phenomenon, territorial borders 
(i.e., borderlands) lose their fixed locational advantages. Instead of being a central node in the 
flows of smuggled consumer goods such as cigarettes, electronics, etc., they become just an-
other player in the wider and more complex network of transactions; smugglers could “jump 
scales” and bypass borders. Some border cities as commercial nodes of smuggled consumer 
goods have lost not only their fixed locational advantage but also the benefits of arbitrage 
economies were diminished with globalization and the opening of the economy; consumer 
goods can be shipped or transported without needing to cross a territorial border. The border as 
location is affected as well as the enterprise of smuggling goods that now are widely available 
through the formal economy at more competitive prices (Gereffi et al., 2009). Thus, smugglers 
must turn to other enterprises such as drugs and human trafficking. The points of origin and 
destination of smuggling activities have dispersed all over the map and involve a large con-
stellation of actors dispersed across the world, making scales fuzzy. 
According to Rumford, bordering is not always a business of the State; non-State actors are 
more and more engaged in this (see Rumford in Johnson et al., 2011). For instance, vigilantes 
or militia type organizations such as the “Minutemen” on the U.S.–Mexico border have as-
serted for themselves border patrolling functions. One extreme argument is that a “borderless” 
world meant the end of the State as we knew it in a post-Westphalian world. Another more 
moderate argument is that the State had never disappeared; it has just transferred some of its 
sovereign power to non-State actors to adapt to the new realities of the emergence of a 
transnational or global class (Sassen, 2007, pp.164–189) to manage the global network of capital 
accumulation. Simultaneously, with the emergence of a global class that often is associated with 
bankers, accountants, software developers, etc., there is also a global marginalized class that lives 
in global cities and keeps trying to cross the border (physical and economic) seeking a better life 
in more developed nations than their own. As receiving nations “re-border” their homelands, 
crossing borders has become more difficult for the marginalized class. Therefore, the cost of the 
journey has increased as has the need to use the services of smugglers who have turned into 
human traffickers. An important aspect to highlight is that the murky divide between smugglers 
(transporting goods that can be sold legally without coercion in the transaction) and traffickers 
(performing proscribed illegal activities and coercion exists) has disappeared. Smuggling as an 
enterprise has also undergone an organizational reconfiguration, becoming a transnational actor 
that controls large amounts of assets ($2.1 trillion) and a wide network of operators who have 
diversified their economic portfolio (drug trafficking and human trafficking often are controlled 
by the same criminal organizations) (Andreas, 2002). Drug cartels are one example of how 
powerful these organizations have become, with substantial financial and war power that can 
challenge the State authority and its sovereignty over territory – including border points that are 
crucial to their enterprise. For example, some media outlets estimated that “El Chapo” 
Guzman, the most famous Mexican drug lord and head of the Sinaloa Cartel, now in prison in 
the U.S., has assets worth $12.6 billion. As smuggling and trafficking become more profitable 
and wars among criminal organizations or terrorist acts have become more common, the notion 
of smugglers as folk heroes has been transformed into that of a societal menace and a “global 




This chapter has scrutinized the intersection between borders and smuggling, and it has revealed 
interesting connections between both. Borders as social constructs help us understand better the 
triad of smuggling practice, space, and society. The chapter shows that instead of looking at 
smuggling as a “deviant” or “subversive” practice that challenges the State authority and so-
vereignty over its territory, it is more fruitful and insightful to look at smuggling in relational 
terms which reveal how social relations and networks operate at the border to facilitate en-
forcement in a more selective way, mediating between local and national interests. Another 
relevant aspect reveals that smuggling as a social practice is not static but dynamic. Smuggling 
has adapted, for better or worse, not only in its “products and services,” but also its organi-
zational spatial structure linking border and non-border locations in a functional way. 
Smuggling and trafficking have taken advantage of globalization and transnational networks, 
some have become global criminal organizations capable of challenging the State and its control 
of borders. The conceptualization of borders spatially helps us to unpack and explain a variety of 
smuggling practices, providing a more complex and complete picture of the phenomenon. 
Notes  
1 Foucault studies the relationship power-space. The main argument is that space is one dimension 
where power is deployed with the objective of discipline and punishing subjects; spaces instead of 
being a utopia (imagined paradise) are transformed in heterotopias (existing, real, and nightmarish). 
Also, Foucault developed the term “governmentality” as an example of a power technology aimed to 
govern bodies, population, spaces, and movement.  
2 Beck’s central argument is that there is a break in history, and we are moving from modernity towards 
the risk society. The modern world shared the view that economic growth and prosperity were good 
for humankind, thus social values had some cohesiveness around these ideas. However, the risk society 
challenges the basic notion that growth is good and therefore social cohesion breaks down since risk, 
risk assessment and perception become central themes of political communities. Smuggling practice 
(e.g., drugs) and borders are often view as a risk or threat to the local population.  
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Afghan borderland brokers and the 
transformation of the margins1 
Jonathan Goodhand, Jan Koehler, and Jasmine Bhatia  
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on brokers and brokerage in the context of cross border smuggling or illicit 
trade. Drawing on illustrative case study material from the borderscapes of eastern and western 
Afghanistan, we shine a light on the lives of two brokers who act as go-betweens and gate-
keepers in these complex and often conflictual transnational trading networks. One is a tribal 
broker in Nangarhar province on the Pakistan border, and another is an illicit trader in Nimroz 
province on the Iranian border. By focusing on their lives we aim to achieve two things: firstly, 
to present new empirical evidence on brokers, so as to better understand their lives, motiva-
tions, roles and effects – and in particular, how they adapted to border hardening and closures. 
Specifically, we explore the positionality of brokers in terms of their personal backgrounds, their 
ability to straddle lifeworlds, the ‘deal spaces’ they occupy, the resources and commodities they 
move, and the key pathways, corridors and choke points that channel and direct trade flows. 
We also examine the dynamics of brokerage, including the ways that brokers find solutions or 
‘fixes’ to problems but rarely resolve them, and how brokers adapt to (or fail to adapt to) 
moments of rupture in fluid trading environments. Finally, we reveal the effects of brokerage in 
terms of how brokers cumulatively shape the ways in which states and markets function in 
marginal frontier and borderland environments. Though their agency is circumscribed, brokers 
are not merely mediators; they play a role in transforming and reconfiguring connections and 
relationships within political and market systems. 
Secondly, we aim to contribute to wider theoretical debates about brokerage as a lens for 
conceptualising and analysing the dynamics of illicit trade in borderland environments. We 
show that paying careful attention to the edges tells us important things about the whole; the 
lives of seemingly marginal borderland brokers provide a privileged vantage point for under-
standing the wider political economy of (licit and illicit) trading systems, how they change over 
time and their distributional effects within and across borders. 
In the next section we introduce key terms and provide a brief overview of the emerging 
literature on brokers and brokerage. We then set out our analytical approach to this phe-
nomenon, which is followed by illustrative case studies of political and trading brokers in 
Afghanistan. We conclude with some reflections on the theoretical and empirical implications 
of this analysis. 
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Frontiers and borderlands: spaces of innovation and transformation 
In this chapter our focus is on a particular kind of trading space: borderlands and frontier regions 
that straddle the margins of one or more states. Borderlands are classically understood as zones 
straddling an international border, whilst frontiers are more fuzzy political spaces, marking 
zones of transition between different centres of power and regulation. Both are liminal spaces of 
cultural overlap and hybridity. 
Many of today’s borderlands bear the traces of earlier frontier dynamics and the legacies of 
empires, and these dynamics persist beneath the mosaic of nation states (O’Dowd, 2012). 
Rather than disappearing, frontiers tend to wax and wane in boom and bust cycles, linked to an 
amalgam of factors including the retreat and expansion of states and markets, the shifting dy-
namics of conflict, crises of accumulation in metropolitan centers, the building of infrastructure, 
and shifts in global and regional commodity markets (licit and illicit). ‘Frontier effects’ and 
‘border effects’ may coexist and interact in the same marginal spaces, with the salience of each 
shifting over time, as shown in our case studies below. 
Trading routes are often grafted onto longstanding regional networks and connections that 
preceded statebuilding, for example the Silk Route in Central Asia and the ancient trade routes 
crisscrossing the Sahara (McDougal & Scheele, 2012). Border delineation did not so much 
interrupt these regional networks of interdependence as restructure them, leading to smuggling 
networks and semi-licit trade and new regional power centres that were dependent on borders. 
Border zones are often ‘sensitive spaces’ (Cons, 2016), absorbing a disproportionate amount 
of the time and attention of central state elites. They are frequently places where state authority 
and sovereignty are contested, access to the means of violence is fragmented and the existence 
of cross border networks and flows create a centrifugal dynamic that counters the centripetal 
forces of statebuilding. 
Therefore, in studying the margins of the state, we are not looking at disconnected or 
lagging regions, but often spaces that are central to processes of statebuilding and development. 
We are interested here in developing a relational approach, which moves beyond methodo-
logical nationalism, recognizing transnational and subnational processes that are often rendered 
invisible in state-centric analysis. This approach reveals borderlands as places of radical un-
certainty and rapid change, where peripheral elites and borderland populations are constantly 
improvising and innovating in order to survive and sometimes prosper. 
Borderlands as trading spaces 
Borders generate a ‘spatial discount’ for those who are buying, selling or employing to derive 
profits by exploiting differences between regulatory regimes on both sides of a border. In this 
sense, rather than acting as constraints, borders are fields of opportunity. The intensity of 
economic flows and relations may be greater across the border than with the metropolitan 
centre within a state. Although smugglers may resist or subvert the state’s regulatory efforts, 
they are rarely revolutionaries. The relationship between smugglers and state officials is more 
symbiotic in nature, often involving a high degree of collusion (Goodhand, 2020; Nugent, 
2002; Taggliacozza, 2005). 
Border regimes can be understood as interactive orders involving movement and counter 
movement on the part of those who police and those who transgress various border controls 
(Goodhand & Meehan, 2018). This takes place not only at the border itself. The policing and 
enforcement of border regimes can occur through multiple agents in various locations – from 
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the border guards, customs officials, and drones situated at airports, ports, and land borders, to 
financial regulators and migration officials based in capital cities. 
Borderlands have their own particular ecosystems of constraint and opportunity, linked to 
their specific histories and geographies. Two factors are critical in structuring the dynamics of 
borderland trade: first, the type and level of state presence at the border; and second, the depth 
or degree of inequality at the border (Zartman, 2010). According to More (2011), ‘extreme 
borders,’ characterized by large economic asymmetries, exhibit particular ‘pathologies’ – in-
cluding heightened levels of militarization and violence, illicit drug trafficking, and people 
smuggling. Rather than promoting convergence and integration that might help alleviate in-
equalities, the more powerful state typically does the opposite, which has the paradoxical effect 
of steepening these pathologies further, thus increasing the stakes, incentives and risk premiums 
associated with illicit cross-border smuggling, as shown in our case studies below. 
The distinction between formal/legal and informal/illicit trade may carry little meaning in 
the borderlands; indeed, in border zones we see ambivalent and unstable encounters between 
legal and illegal, state and non-state, smugglers and state agents. Legal and illegal forms of trade 
can be understood as a continuum of possibilities that traders can flexibly use as part of a trading 
portfolio. 
Both smugglers and state agents have an economic interest in controlling lucrative cross- 
border trading corridors and choke points, especially when there are asymmetric regulatory 
regimes on both sides. For example, as an unregulated, high-risk, high-opportunity environ-
ment, Goma is a crucial node in the network of East African trading corridors (Lamarque, 
2014). Profits generated from this business, however, are invested on the other side of the 
border, where Congolese businessmen build their houses in the more secure and regulated 
Rwandese state space (ibid). As such, government positions at the border, such as police chiefs, 
customs officials, and border guards are extremely lucrative and cost significant sums to pur-
chase. In order to recoup the initial outlay, officials often rely on rents extracted from the 
movement of commodities and people across the border. This in turn incentivises the pro-
liferation of smuggling routes away from formal border crossings; for instance, on the 
Guatemala-Honduras border there are 15 formal crossing points but more than 100 informal 
ones. These ‘blind spots’ (puntos ciegos) are unofficial border crossings that central government 
officials have little capacity to control (ICG, 2014). 
Traders, brokers and borderland brokerage 
Protracted conflict, illicit economies, and the presence of an international border alongside 
multiple internal borders demarcated by social, political, religious cleavages create a demand for 
brokers in borderland and frontier regions. 
A broker can be defined as someone who acts as an intermediary, playing the role of a go- 
between or fixer. Brokers occupy a space ‘between handshakes and contracts,’ where formal 
institutions cannot be trusted and where informality and social capital are key to getting things 
done – for example, processing conflicts, distributing resources, and accessing rights and en-
titlements. Brokers are ‘network specialists’ whose ability to straddle multiple knowledge sys-
tems and life-worlds enables them to act as gatekeepers across various social ‘synapses’ or ‘choke 
points’ (James, 2011; Wolf, 1956) and in doing so “transmit, direct, filter, receive, code, de-
code, and interpret messages” across these interstitial spaces (Meehan & Plonski, 2017, p. 5). 
The term ‘broker’ is rarely used self-referentially, as most people prefer not to define 
themselves as such (Bierschenk et al., 2002). In fact, in many contexts it is a pejorative term; for 
example, in South Asia brokers or ‘dalals’ are seen as self interested, extractive, dissembling 
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figures (Goodhand & Walton, 2020). Notwithstanding this perception, brokers are ubiquitous 
in many contexts, particularly borderland regions. They are ambiguous and Janus-faced figures 
who serve different constituencies, linking national and subnational political systems, or trading 
networks on two sides of a border. As Wolf (1956) notes, they stand guard over key synapses, or 
points of friction, acting as both the lubricant and the grit in the political or market system. 
To develop further this broad characterisation of brokerage, three points about the posi-
tionality, dynamics and effects of brokerage can be highlighted. 
First, in terms of their positionality, brokers aim to occupy ‘deal spaces’ or points of friction 
within political, economic or social systems that require and create opportunities for some form 
of intermediation and negotiation. In contexts marked by liminality and illegality, brokers fill a 
void created by the absence of formal regulatory mechanisms to allocate resources, process 
disputes and make claims. Brokers can play the role of connecting otherwise inaccessible spaces 
and performing tasks that formal actors are unwilling or unable to do. 
Borderlands are places where the local and global collide and become entangled in complex 
ways. Brokers can be understood as ‘friction specialists’ who mediate, and reconfigure, re-
lationships among communities, armed groups, state entities and businesses, regional patrons, 
and legal and illegal activities (Meehan & Plonski, 2017). Particular communities have his-
torically played outsized brokerage roles – for example the Pashtuns of eastern Afghanistan and 
the Baluch on the borders of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. These groups are both highly local 
and transregional at the same time. They are adept at facilitating border crossings and gate-
keeping. Their identities are bound up with notions and practices of flexible citizenship and 
operating among different normative orders. 
The positionality of brokers varies according to where the demand for brokerage comes 
from – the extent to which brokers are beholden to the central state or societal groups in the 
borderlands – and their location within wider systems of governance and markets. Apex brokers 
occupy key synapses that shape the overall balance of power or distribution of resources within 
political settlements. This tends to be the case in the most salient borderland regions, con-
necting ‘elites that matter’ in the centre and the periphery. Tertiary brokers sit further down the 
political system or value chain – either within more marginalised borderlands or between less 
salient and lucrative internal border regions, rather than the critical interfaces between centre 
and periphery or across an international border (Goodhand & Walton, 2020). 
Second, in terms of the dynamics of brokerage, the ambiguity and contradictions of brokers 
is bound up with their role as fixers who address problems, but rarely fully resolve them.  
Meehan and Plonski (2017) use the term ‘brokerage fix’ to describe the dynamic through which 
brokers perpetually engineer solutions to problems that are always temporary and provisional, 
and lead to new sets of contradictions and challenges, which in turn require new brokerage 
fixes. Successful brokers are able to reinvent themselves continually in order to occupy and 
monopolise deal spaces and to remain relevant. Some experience temporary success in this role 
but are unable to adapt and are marginalised, whilst others may graduate from being a broker to 
becoming a key decision-maker at the centre of power. This leads to questions, when looking 
at individual lives, about whether brokerage can be understood as a long-term career or a short- 
term transitional phase. 
Third, in terms of the effects of brokerage, there is a tendency to view brokers as 
ephemeral, shadowy characters who adapt to change, but are rarely presented as the agents of 
change. Yet they are more than simply ‘intermediaries’ facilitating linkages and flows; they are 
also ‘mediators,’ with a degree of autonomy, agency and power, enabling them to shape, 
regulate, and filter flows (Bierschenk et al., 2002; Latour, 2005; Mosse & Lewis, 2006). They 
enable – and rework – deals among communities, companies and state entities, between 
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peripheries and centres within nations and across international borders (Meehan & Plonski, 
2017). Therefore brokerage may have cumulatively structural effects on wider systems of state 
and market power. Trajectories of change in the borderlands are rarely gradual and linear, but 
marked by moments of rupture or ‘punctuated equilibrium’ in which there are major shifts in 
the dynamics of brokerage and underlying political settlements. The agency of brokers may be 
inflated during such moments of flux. As we explore further below, apex brokers can reshape 
political settlements, whilst trade brokers can set in motion new rounds of investment and 
development in frontier boomtowns. 
The political economy of borderland trading and brokerage networks 
Borderland trade brokers mediate, filter and channel flows of commodities and resources across 
borders. Their power is derived from occupying key choke points or places of friction in 
transnational trading systems. This allows them to generate economic rents, which can in turn 
be translated into political power. Where high trade profits combine with inconsistent state 
control, cross-border networks can become alternative systems of power (Dobler, 2016). In 
Afghanistan for example, when the Taliban came to power in the mid-1990s, they were backed 
by powerful Afghan traders based in Peshawar, Pakistan, whose interests were undermined by 
the instability of warlord-dominated Afghanistan. 
Border zone economies involve a multitude of actors (traders, transporters, brokers, drivers, 
loaders, processors, harvesters, farmers, miners, hotel and warehouse owners, government of-
ficials – customs officials, border police, military, intelligence agencies – commanders, rebel 
groups, militias), and complex assemblages and brokerage arrangements, which bring together 
transport, warehousing and logistics, labour regimes, financing and credit relations, technolo-
gical innovation and market adaptation, information collection, data analysis and market re-
search. Trading networks are highly adaptive and innovative, having been ‘stress tested’ by years 
of conflict, political fluidity and frequent economic shocks in contexts of radical uncertainty. 
Trading routes or corridors – understood here as connected and coordinated bundles of 
transport, logistics, infrastructure, and services that connect centres of economic activity 
(Hagman & Steppatat, 2016) – are continually shifting. These trading routes vary in terms of 
their political and economic salience, the actors involved and the governance and brokering 
relations in which they are embedded. Building on Dobler (2016) a tentative taxonomy of 
trading corridors or pathways is presented in Table 9.1, each being associated with different 
types of brokers and brokering dynamics. 
A number of observations flow out of this typology, which are developed further in the 
empirical material below. 
First, across this typology of corridors there is a need to unpack and analyse power relations 
within trade networks, how governance relations and forms of rent extraction and taxation 
occur at different points in the value chain and the role of brokers in these processes. For 
example, containerised goods on major roads across official crossing points (Type 4) are likely to 
have more formal state involvement, more hierarchical relations, higher barriers to entry and 
greater involvement of apex brokers. In contrast, informal/illicit/semi-licit trade across un-
official crossings along unpaved roads and tracks is likely to involve more players, lower barriers 
to entry, greater involvement of tertiary brokers, less formal involvement of the state, parti-
cularly central state actors – and perhaps may also be more egalitarian and redistributive than 
containerized, formal trade (Mansfield, 2020a, 2020b). Therefore, we can analyse trading 
networks in terms of whether they enforce strong hierarchical ties, or rather whether they 
function through horizontal, diffuse and weak ties. 
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Second, the trading networks vary in terms of their level of (in)formality and the role of 
information. In illicit networks information tends to be highly fragmented and lower-level 
actors are only partially sighted – they are only aware of their sections of the corridor, and other 
nodes in the smuggling network may be unknown to them. However, it is likely that apex 
brokers are able to see the bigger picture and have privileged access to information along 
different points of the chain; in the terminology of network analysis, they have greater ‘be-
tweenness centrality.’ 
Third, each route is associated with different types and levels of friction. Type 4 aspires to 
low-friction or frictionless trade, with fewer intermediaries and flows of goods in containers 
Table 9.1 Typology of trading corridors     
Pathway type Description Key actors, beneficiaries and brokers  
Type 1 Small-scale informal crossings on tracks 
in mountain passes and deserts; informal 
trading in maritime spaces (e.g., drug 
smuggling in dhows along the Makran 
coast of Pakistan). 
Local communities, local elites, and non- 
state actors’ small-scale markets, hotels, 
and tea shops, small-scale brokers, 
women involved in petty trade. 
Type 2 Large-scale informal/illegal crossings: 
large-scale movement of goods along 
unofficial routes/border crossings that are 
not formally regulated or sanctioned 
(e.g., militarised transhipment of drugs 
from Afghanistan across the desert spaces 
of Nimroz). 
Armed groups, government officials 
(unofficially), powerful business leaders 
and brokers, communities in border 
areas involved in the production and 
transportation of goods. 
Type 3 Licit and illicit goods, transported 
through official crossings on tarmac 
roads: movement of goods and people 
across formally sanctioned border 
crossings that may involve adhering to 
regulations governing these crossings 
(e.g., border checks, paperwork, etc.) or 
efforts to transgress regulations and 
checks to move goods illegally by using 
formal crossings and infrastructure (e.g., 
smuggling of drugs and gold through 
Torkham on the Afghan-Pakistan 
border). 
Customs officials, local government 
actors, local strong men, powerful 
business leaders and brokers; frontier 
boomtowns. 
Type 4 Major transnational (in some cases 
transcontinental) infrastructure 
corridors: including trade and energy 
corridors and maritime and airports 
connected to infrastructure and logistics 
hubs in the Gulf (e.g., the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor within China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative; the Chabahar port in 
Iran; the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline 
project). 
Foreign capital and national political 
elites; ‘centres’ more than ‘peripheries’; 
regional powers (particularly China, 
Iran, and the Gulf).    
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running through official border crossings. Theoretically, where there is frictionless trade, then 
there is no need for brokers, but in the ‘real world’ it is difficult to find such situations. In Type 4 
corridors there are fewer points of friction and power is likely to be concentrated amongst a 
small group of apex brokers, often located in metropolitan centres rather than at the border 
itself. Conversely, Type 1 flows involve multiple points of friction and consequently multiple 
points of rent extraction and brokerage. In many ways this makes them more redistributive than 
Type 4 corridors, in which a greater proportion of accumulated profits tend to flow to the 
centres of power rather than the border regions. Border hardening and the investment in 
infrastructure and technologies to manage, filter and funnel flows are likely to increase this 
dynamic of directing the proceeds of trade towards the centre rather than the borderlands. It 
also shifts the pattern of trade flows across borders from a capillary action to a funnel action, and 
as explored in the life histories below, this means that tertiary brokers either get pushed out of 
‘the game’ or they need to reinvent themselves as apex brokers. 
Fourth, as noted, brokerage relations and dynamics vary across these four corridors. They are 
associated with different kinds of ‘deal spaces’ involving differing barriers to entry and different 
kinds of brokers. We need more information about the extent to which brokers are generalists 
or specialists – do they focus on particular kinds of commodities and/or in particular types of 
corridors? How do brokers respond to moments of rupture? How do they reinvent themselves 
to find new ‘brokerage fixes’ and what new sets of contradictions do these fixes produce? 
Studying the complex life histories of individual brokers can help answer these questions. 
Case studies – the life histories of brokers2 
Context 
The border between the Afghan province of Nangarhar and Pakistan is mountainous and rugged 
to the east and south (Figure 9.1), with the Pashtun tribes straddling both sides of the Durand 
line, which marks the international border (Barfield, 2010; Grötzbach, 1990). Nangarhar is a 
politically salient border province with strong connections to Kabul, as well as across the border 
with Pakistan. The main border crossing is at Torkham, the gateway to the Khyber Pass, which 
cuts through the Spin Ghar mountains. Highway A01 is the key transport corridor, running 
through Torkham and connecting Peshawar in Pakistan with Jalalabad, the provincial centre 
and Kabul, the national capital – and since the US intervention of 2001 it also became a key 
transit route for NATO supplies. In addition, there are multiple informal border crossing 
points, which have historically been key smuggling routes for a range of licit and illicit com-
modities (Mansfield, 2020a). Trade is central to the Nangarhar’s economy and in 2018 imports 
and exports through Torkham generated $119 million in taxes (ibid). 
Nimroz, on the other hand, is a remote frontier region of vast deserts with a historically open 
border with Iran and Pakistan. Unlike Jalalabad, Ziranj (Figure 9.1) was a neglected adminis-
trative outpost in a province inhabited mostly by the Baloch, a large but marginalised minority 
that straddle the borderlands of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan (Boedeker, 2012; Larson, 2010,  
Titus, 1996). Arbitrage has been central to the local economy – trading networks are grafted 
onto long standing regional circuits of exchange, which were strengthened in the war years, 
when mostly Afghan Baluch and Hazara communities resettled in larger numbers on the Iranian 
side, establishing supply lines to support the anti-communist insurgency in Afghanistan as well 
as flows of remittances to family members remaining in the country (Kutty, 2014). These 
connections then provided the basis for smuggling narcotics and economic migrants into Iran 
and beyond, as well as bringing diesel from Iran into Afghanistan (Mansfield, 2020b). 
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Geopolitically, the border region has become more salient as Afghanistan, Iran and India have 
made investments in infrastructure to increase trade flows including the construction of route 
606, which has become a major trading corridor linking Chabahar port in Iran with Ziranj and 
the Herat-Kandahar highway (ibid). 
Like many other borderlands, border delineation divided geographically and demo-
graphically contiguous spaces and this separation was amplified by statebuilding processes on 
both sides of the border. The wars of the 1980s and 1990s interrupted these efforts, and 
Afghanistan’s eastern and western borderlands reverted to their historical status as open frontier 
regions, creating new spaces and opportunities for trading networks with low barriers to entry 
and multiple flows. 
However, since 2001 neighbouring states, and to some extent the Afghan state, have sought 
to impose stronger border controls linked to concerns about terrorism and illicit narcotics, and a 
desire to increase official trade flows. This has led to investments in border security including 
fencing and border walls and infrastructure such as road building, customs posts and ware-
housing facilities. The ‘infrastructural power’ of the state (Mann, 1984) now reaches up to the 
borderline and both borderlands have become more regulated, closing off the multitude of 
informal crossing points along the borderline and channelling trade flows and movements of 
people through official crossing points. According to our typology of pathways, the main 
purpose of border hardening was to enhance licit trade flows along Type 3 and 4 pathways and 
to close off Type 1 and 2 flows – through enhanced border regulation and policing. These 
changes drastically reduced informal, largely open-access trade, professionalising and vertically 
integrating both legal and illegal access to the cross-border trading economy (Koehler et al, 
2021; Mansfield, 2020a, 2020b). As explored further below, the dynamics of brokerage shifted 
accordingly. 
The case studies below are drawn from a series of life history interviews with borderland 
brokers and their associates conducted in Nangarhar and Nimroz between August and 
Figure 9.1 Map of Afghanistan, highlighting locations referred to in the case illustrations 
Source: Alcis.  
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November 2020. They illustrate the positionality, dynamics and effects of brokerage: the process by 
which apex brokers come to dominate trading networks, what functions they serve, and how 
their positions as brokers spilled over into other aspects of conflict resolution and mediation. To 
protect the safety of these individuals, their names have been changed. Where appropriate, 
minor details have been changed or omitted to obscure their identities. 
From insurgent to mediator: emergence of an apex broker in Nangarhar 
The first case study looks at the life history of Haji M. Khan, an influential broker and tribal 
mediator. Haji M. Khan was born and grew up in a small village in a mountainous district 
bordering Pakistan in the 1950s. The district has limited agricultural land and he, like most 
people, was employed in the small-scale domestic wood trade with Jalalabad (the provincial 
centre) and Kabul. His family were also involved in informal cross-border trade in wood, 
opium, clothes and dry fruit, transported to the Tribal Areas of Pakistan via mules and donkeys, 
along Type 1 pathways and informal border crossings. Contacts and exchanges across the 
porous border with Pakistan were more frequent and important to Haji M. Khan and his 
community than to Kabul or even Jalalabad. While along this part of the border the dominant 
tribes on the Afghan and Pakistani side were different,3 they had agreed on mutual protection 
agreements (lokhae). Haji M. Khan enjoyed privileged access since part of his lineage, as well as 
his eventual in-laws, were from the Afridi tribe on the other side of the border. 
Haji M. Khan’s cross-border relations provided a lifeline when he, and many other residents 
of the border district were forced to leave their homes during the initial phase of communist 
rule and subsequent Soviet occupation. His family settled in relative safety on the Pakistani side 
of the border while he engaged in jihad against the communist government, eventually com-
manding a front of some 50 armed mujahids. Pakistani support and supplies (with US backing) 
helped the mujahidin to secure control over the border districts, and fighters and supplies moved 
across the border along informal and constantly shifting Type 1 and 2 routes. With the collapse 
of the communist government in 1991, Haji M. Khan became the commander of a newly 
established army base close to the Khyber Pass and district administrator for the mujahidin 
government. Here he became adept at managing and processing conflicts brought to the at-
tention of the district government through tribal elders and their jirgas (tribal or community 
gatherings of elders or ‘white beards’ who take decisions on issues of collective concern). If jirga 
decisions were not adhered to, Haji M. Khan, as representative of the mujahedeen government, 
provided enforcement. 
When the Taliban came to power in 1994, Haji M. Khan fled with his family back across the 
border to Pakistan. However, the Taliban imprisoned his close relatives and pressured him to 
surrender his weapons. Eventually, a delegation of tribal elders negotiated his free return and the 
handover of weapons and vehicles. According to Haji M. Khan, about 100 elders from the 
Pakistan side and 80 elders from the Afghan side accompanied him when he returned, to 
guarantee his safety. After being disarmed, the Taliban released Haji M. Khan’s kin but con-
tinued to monitor his movements. Eventually he decided to return with his family to Pakistan 
and join the anti-Taliban “Northern Alliance” resistance under one of the main commanders of 
the Eastern Provinces. When these efforts failed and his commander was arrested, Haji M. Khan 
settled in Pakistan and focused on building his reputation as a tribal mediator as well as his trade 
and transportation business between Afghanistan and Peshawar. During this period the drugs 
trade expanded and the district became a key centre and trading route with the growth of an 
opium bazaar and many drug processing laboratories. 
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After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Haji M. Khan returned with his family to Afghanistan 
and continued to gain recognition as an important broker in Nangarhar. Two factors helped 
him: first, his jihadi credentials among the Northern Alliance commanders, who returned to 
power after the fall of the Taliban. Second, his knowledge of, and high standing with, the tribes 
on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. Between 2002 and 2019 he was appointed district 
governor (woliswol) multiple times across Nangarhar, many of them key border districts. His 
modus operandi was to work with, and help support, an often fragmented system of tribal re-
presentation, decision-making and law enforcement. He played the role of mediator and 
regulator of conflicts that could not be resolved at a lower level through jirgas. He was viewed as 
an honest broker, who could authorize lower-level mediators to intervene on his behalf. 
Brokerage involved navigating hybrid forms of authority among multiple sovereigns, including 
various levels of government, the Taliban, local strongmen, militias, and in recent years, the 
Islamic State. 
As a district governor, Haji M. Khan attempted to engineer a system of tribal representation 
that – as he saw it – re-connected to a traditional form of tribal governance based on jirgas, a 
system that had been broken by civil war and anti-tribal policies of Taliban rule, and needed 
proactive ‘fixing.’ He selected four elders from each tribe to liaise with the government. In 
some districts he managed to set up tribal counter-insurgency militias and secured state funding 
for them. He also used the re-invented tribal structure to agree and enforce rules on how to 
prevent and sanction collaboration with insurgents and finally how to deal with social, political 
and economic conflicts within and between tribal segments. 
I established a tribal committee and decided that we won’t let the enemies of 
Afghanistan such as Talib, ISIS, thieves, and criminals come to the district, and they 
accepted and signed the treaty that if anyone provides shelter to above insurgents or 
enemies, we will burn his house and he will be fined 10 Lakhs Rs. We made this 
decision with consensus. (Paraphrased from interview)  
As a foundation for this strategy, Haji M. Khan leveraged economic wealth to build social 
capital through networks of personalised trust. This was converted into political power and 
patronage, which further enhanced his economic standing. He understood that political success 
and longevity in a violent and competitive environment depended upon building social 
standing as a just and effective mediator. A reputation for hospitality was underpinned by an 
‘infrastructure’ of high-profile guesthouses across the province where he housed and fed people 
seeking his advice (langar khana). Furthermore, he provided mediation and conflict solving 
services – including delegating issues to other reliable bodies or individuals, without charge 
(e.g., to jirgas specialising in smuggling-related conflicts).4 Finally, Haji M. Khan used his in-
fluence and official positions to facilitate the illicit re-export of goods imported from Pakistan as 
transit goods back into Pakistan via major and well-organised smuggling routes. 
Thousands of people used to be engaged in the transit business. When I was district 
governor, I arranged these transit commodities very well. This trade was arranged by 
cross-border communities [that] cooperate with us. When there was a problem, we 
were jointly solving the trade problems on both sides of the border. Now the transit 
commodities import and export pathway is blocked by Pakistan. […] I gathered the 
tribal elders, youth and influential individuals. Thousands of people are now un-
employed and the way is still blocked. (Paraphrased from interview).  
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Haji M. Khan showed considerable skills in diversifying income and risks, and in securing his 
long-term interests by building social, political and material capital. For example, he managed 
to secure elected positions for two of his immediate kin in the national and provincial councils. 
A third close relative is thought to play a key role in the cross-border trade business, aided by 
the political cover of the other two. 
Eventually, Haji M. Khan was successful in re-establishing tribal representation in his home 
district, earning a widespread reputation and some recognition even in Kabul. He continued to 
play a significant role even after falling out with Kabul appointees in the province and losing his 
job as district governor. At the time of the fieldwork, he was still regarded as an apex broker and 
problem solver in his district; tribal militias loyal to him manned checkpoints and informally 
controlled access to the district undisturbed by the Afghan National Police. The researchers 
found a mostly idle district administration, while the guesthouses of the broker were over-
crowded with people seeking the mediation, support and advice of Haji M. Khan to solve their 
problems.5 However, his position was less stable and according to one of his allies interviewed, 
his interference in Kabul politics had caused him to lose his political backing there, leaving him 
in a now more precarious position. 
A small-scale fuel trader strikes it big: brokerage opportunities in Nimroz 
We turn now to a cross-border fuel smuggler in the South-West of Afghanistan. This is a story 
about how a small fuel trader from a minority group uses his cross-cutting networks to leverage 
new opportunities in a fast changing border zone, working his way up from being a tertiary 
broker to becoming a key apex broker in regional trading networks. 
Haji Aziz, now in his forties, comes from a modest family of shopkeepers and craftsmen, 
with a multi-ethnic background, presenting himself as a mixture of “Hazara, Pashtun, Tajik, 
and Baloch.” When the Taliban were in power, his family moved to Nimroz and he worked in 
shops at the main provincial bazaar of Ghor Ghori, refilling and cleaning fuel barrels smuggled 
across the border from Iran, earning extra money by filtering and selling excess or waste diesel 
on the side. Policing of the Iranian border was patchy and uneven at this time, but conversely 
the demand for fuel and trading infrastructure was low. However, whilst working in the main 
bazaar, Haji Aziz developed relationships with a range of traders and smugglers, including drug 
traders connected to the Taliban, who were concentrated in Ghor Ghori bazaar. According to 
one source, Haji Aziz made his initial capital from drug smuggling; in 2001, when a Coalition 
air raid destroyed the market and forced the Taliban to abandon the area, Haji Aziz was one of 
the few local traders who reportedly stayed behind and appropriated sizable amounts of 
abandoned opium stores. 
During the first decade after the fall of the Taliban government, licit and illicit cross-border 
trade via Nimroz province increased dramatically and Ziranj became a frontier boom town 
(Drugs & (Dis)order, 2020). Haji Aziz became one of the main importers of fuel, and subse-
quently cars, into the province. His business grew rapidly as he started importing fuel directly 
from Iran. He developed friendly and mutually beneficial relations with government and border 
officials and capitalised on his existing inter-tribal and cross-border contacts. A former business 
contact, and later competitor, explained in an interview that Haji Aziz’s business activities 
extended to Kandahar, where he forged strong relations with some of the most influential 
people in Southern Afghanistan, including indirect access to one of the former President’s half- 
brothers, Ahmed Wali Karzai (then head of the Provincial Council). 
However, over the past ten years, trade relations with Iran changed and Haji Aziz was forced 
to adapt his business. First, Iran tightened its grip on the border and brought the many informal 
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crossings under control. Second, international sanctions sent the Iranian Rial into free fall, 
introducing high inflationary risks to cross-border trade. Finally, a significant part of the fuel 
business shifted to other provinces further north, where Iran established large fuel storage fa-
cilities as a new hub to distribute fuel across Afghanistan. 
Haji Aziz diversified his cross-border business, investing more in domestic trade infra-
structure, such as car showrooms and pump stations, in a number of provinces. He also le-
veraged connections with the provincial government and customs services so as to keep 
importing fuel and cars at reduced custom rates. In addition, he established himself as a service 
provider for other cross-border traders, facilitating and mediating their relations with both 
government offices and the parallel Taliban administration. He provides office space for some 
170 licenced commissionkars at the official border crossing in Milak, who facilitate official as well 
as informal customs declarations for traders crossing the border (legal goods flow for the most 
part from Iran into Afghanistan). Haji Aziz’s subordinates provide reduced rates in return for 
informal service fees. He also controls the main scales that weigh incoming cargo, and reduced 
net weights are regularly negotiated and certified against a fee. For a time, Haji Aziz was also 
authorised by Taliban and traders’ unions to collect the unofficial but consistently enforced 
Taliban tax on goods crossing the province, exchanging the official customs tax slip with a tax 
slip recognized by the Taliban. He had negotiated this unofficial but formalised agreement to 
streamline official and informal taxation issues and make cross-border trade more predictable for 
the traders. 
However, balancing commercial imperatives with the interests of powerful governmental 
and shadow-governmental actors involved serious risks and difficult setbacks. First, he lost his 
access to political protection in Kandahar when his link to the presidential family was killed and 
the newly appointed police chief demanded his share in undeclared profits made from the car 
business. Around 2019, Haji Aziz lost his main patron within the provincial Taliban leadership 
of Nimroz in a drone attack and was almost immediately summoned by his successor, who 
suspected him of not disclosing fully the profits made from tax collection on behalf of the 
Taliban. In both cases, he was forced to pay a hefty fine – revealing that even the most in-
fluential brokers must cope with a high degree of uncertainty and unexpected rent extraction. 
Ultimately the power of the armed executive (of both the state and shadow state) trumped the 
financial power of traders and business people. 
Despite these setbacks, there remains a high demand for the mediation skills of Haji Aziz 
from traders and their associates. According to Haji Aziz, he stays out of politics: “I solve almost 
80–100 conflicts per month and I don’t want any money from anyone.” He says that, “people 
trust me, so I should serve them.” He also invests profits into numerous public welfare activities 
in Nimroz, evidence of his significant and enduring influence in the province. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on the role of brokers and brokerage in the context of cross-border 
smuggling and trading networks. By looking at two personal biographies, we aimed to illu-
minate the details and complexity of individual lives, whilst revealing wider processes of change 
linked to border hardening and shifting regional trading systems and political networks. 
Firstly, in terms of their positionality, the two brokers have very different backgrounds and 
biographies, though they share some common characteristics. Both have become significant 
political and economic brokers, starting off as tertiary brokers, but over time graduating into 
apex brokers – though neither is sufficiently influential to be involved in brokering trade along 
Type 4 corridors, and both have been adversely affected and had to adapt to border closures. 
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Though their career trajectories follow a similar arc, their sources of legitimacy and power are 
quite different. Haji M. Khan is embedded in the tribal systems of the borderlands; he melded 
his tribal credentials and ‘architecture’ of hospitality with his jihadi history and his ongoing 
relationship with ‘men of violence’ so as to become a credible broker mediating and managing 
conflicts. 
Haji Aziz, in contrast, is neither embedded in a tribal system, nor self-identifies as a particular 
ethnicity; instead, he positions himself as someone with a hybrid identity who can mediate 
across and among different social and political groupings. Unlike Haji M. Khan, he is primarily 
an economic player who lacks a jihadi history or ‘violence credentials.’ Although this can make 
him vulnerable – as for example when he was arrested in Kandahar – it also means he is able to 
act as a credible mediator with the Taliban, unlike Haji M. Khan. Like Khan, however, he is 
attuned to the importance of social standing and the redistributive role of brokers, as shown by 
his support of social works and welfare in Ziranj. 
Secondly, there are similarities as well as differences in the brokerage dynamics revealed in the 
two life histories. Both are living and operating in contexts of radical uncertainty – like all 
borderlanders living in contexts of fluidity and flux, marked by moments of rupture – including 
the shifts in conflict dynamics linked to different phases of the war, shifting political regimes, 
changes in border security and management, and economic shocks. 
What marks them out from the wider population is their ability to adapt and improvise 
so that they come to occupy key ‘deal spaces.’ These spaces differ and so do the brokerage 
fixes that they offer. Haji M. Khan is an ‘embedded broker’ (Meehan & Plonski, 2017) in 
the sense that his value as a broker lies in his ‘betweenness centrality’ within the tribal system. 
Haji Aziz is a ‘liaison broker’ (ibid) whose value lies in his ability to straddle social as well as 
territorial borders and boundaries. The fixes that Haji M. Khan provides are primarily related to 
localized conflicts and state-society relations. Haji Aziz’s brokerage fixes are primarily con-
cerned with the management and flows of trade, and this depends on an ability to position 
himself above, or at a distance from, the political fray. Both embody the agency and ingenuity 
of borderland brokers, but they are also vulnerable characters, only as powerful as their last ‘fix.’ 
The power of Haji M. Khan, for example, appears to be on the decline, linked perhaps to the 
growing strength of the Taliban, shifts in political coalitions in Kabul and Jalalabad, and the 
effects of border hardening on local trade networks. 
Thirdly, as the last point indicates, brokerage effects may be transitory and ephemeral, when 
viewed from the perspective of one broker or one brokerage fix. However, if we see brokerage 
in more systematic terms, as central to the way that states and markets are managed and 
‘performed’ in the borderlands, then we can see how brokers may over time – certainly within 
the lifetimes of our two brokers – have significant structural effects. Haji Aziz, for example, is 
one of many traders and brokers in Nimroz who has contributed to a remarkable transformation 
of Ziranj from a frontier outpost to a boom town that has attracted internal investment, sig-
nificant in-migration and increased governmental interventions and programmes. Brokerage 
has been central to this process of unruly frontier development, based on agglomerations of 
illegality, including drugs and people trafficking, drug use and processing, and other forms of 
illicit trade. In Nangarhar, brokers like Haji M. Khan have been central to the post-2001 
statebuilding (and counterinsurgency) project – embedded brokers have played a critical role in 
extending the footprint of the state, managing coalitions and distributing rents amongst national 
and local political elites. As a major trading and political hub, Nangarhar is a prize fought over 
with particular intensity, leading to a constant process of political unsettlement and churning 
politics. Brokerage has in many ways entered the DNA of states and markets and is central to 
they way both function and their distributional consequences. 
Jonathan Goodhand et al. 
130 
This brings us to our final point, that studying brokers on the margins can tell us much about 
how the markets and the wider political system works. The personal biographies of Haji M. 
Khan and Haji Aziz are inseparable from the wider spatial and political biographies of the 
frontier regions. Studying the lives of these individuals brings out the complex temporalities, 
socio-spatial relations and power dynamics of border zones, and it powerfully demonstrates 
how these regions are far from marginal or lagging zones; instead, they are best understood as 
transformative spaces and laboratories of change. Studying borders and brokers brings into focus 
the webs of connections, the points of friction and the fluid relations within trading systems. 
Our case studies hint at these processes and dynamics, but there is scope, and an urgent need, for 
further comparative research on this ‘missing middle’ level of analysis that explores the roles, 
dynamics and effects of borderland brokers. We have provided a tentative comparison of 
borderland brokers within different borderland spaces. there is further exciting work to be 
done, however, which develops in more systematic ways this comparative approach across 
regions, historical periods and types of licit/illicit flows. This opens up a range of questions yet 
to be addressed fully about the agency of brokers, how smuggling networks adapt to moments 
of rupture, the distributional effects of these shifts, and the impacts of peripheral trading 
economies on power relations and economic development within metropolitan centres. 
Notes  
1 This chapter draws from fieldwork funded by UKRI Global Challenges Research Fund [Award 
Reference: ES/P011543/1: ‘Drugs & (dis)order: building sustainable peacetime economies in the 
aftermath of war’] and conducted by the Afghan NGO Organisation for Sustainable Development and 
Research (OSDR). The project seeks to generate new evidence on how to transform illicit drug 
economies into peace economies. The chapter also draws upon material and writing derived from an 
ESRC-funded research project ‘Borderlands, Brokers and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka and Nepal: War 
to Peace Transitions viewed from the margins’ (Ref: ES/M011046/1). We are grateful to our field 
researchers in OSDR who conducted the interviews underpinning the case studies in this chapter, as 
well as to the editors Florian Weigand and Max Gallien for their invaluable comments.  
2 The case studies are based on 24 in-depth life history interviews in both provinces as well as 740 more 
focused guideline interviews on licit and illicit economic activities (cf. Drugs and (Dis)order, 2020). 
Specifically on brokerage, our partner OSDR conducted three interviews with the broker and two of 
his associates in Nangarhar in August 2020 and seven interviews with the broker and his associates in 
Nimroz in October and November 2020. In Nangarhar, the associates were tribal elders who have 
known the broker over a long period of time; one of them was a former sub-commander of the 
broker. In Nimroz the associates were former business partners and competitors as well as people 
providing or receiving services of the broker in the context of cross-border trade.  
3 The Afghan-Pakistan border often separates the same tribes or sub-tribes, but not in this particular 
location.  
4 According to one interviewee: 
Haji M. Khan has a lot of resources like he has 26 houses and guest houses in his village […], the 
province and Kabul. [… H]e has lorries, trucks and agricultural lands. His sons also make a lot of 
money as they have high-paying jobs. […] Haji M. Khan represents local communities and 
derives his power from [the tribes in various districts]. [… The tribes] rely on Haji M. Khan to 
put an end to their disputes. Many people gather at his home [every day] and it seems like there 
is wedding party. The reason why people count on him so much is because people are respected 
at his home. He has been doing mediation since when he was a sincere Jihadi commander and 
he keeps doing it.   
5 Typically, people assemble during office hours at the district administration with all sorts of official and 
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SCALES OF GREY 
The complex geography of transnational cross- 
border trade in the African Great Lakes region 
Timothy Raeymaekers   
Border economies 
Borderlands are productive of social spaces at multiple scales.1 This productiveness results from a 
particular power-geometry of territorial borders: in border spaces, the difference between what 
is considered inside and outside, above and below, bottom-up and top-down, legitimate and 
illegitimate is object of a constant negotiation among agencies placed in multiple geographic 
locations. Think, for example, of the complex infrastructures that channel and regulate the 
transnational trade in commodities across boundaries every day: it is easy to imagine that these 
are not fixed in place but span vast networks of policies, and of human and non- (or more-than- 
human) relations. At the same time, the assertion of state territoriality has important con-
sequences for the manner in which such infrastructures take shape on the border (wherever we 
imagine this border to be located), because it is exactly here that claims about national be-
longing, about power and legitimacy are actively being written into political space. This insight 
is important for our understanding of the practices of smuggling, or, more widely, of the vast 
volumes of informal and illegal trade that remain unrecorded in state records, because, apart 
from taking place in the shadow of official state regulations, such practices have been observed 
to be capable of subverting, moulding and even transforming state power in the margins. A 
good example of the latter is the drug economy, which has been shown to transform power 
relations across the globe’s borderlands (for a discussion see Goodhand, 2020). The transfor-
mative effects of transborder exchange are not limited to such illicit commodities, however, but 
they also include the more common aspects of our mobile the global economy. Rather than 
considering state sovereignty at the border as a legal state of exception, which draws a sharp 
boundary between what lies outside and inside, on bottom and on top, within or beyond the 
realm of legitimate agency and interaction (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Agamben, 2003;  
Chatterjee, 2004), this chapter takes a slightly different viewpoint towards the relation between 
smuggling and state territoriality. It considers the territorial border rather as a grey zone, a space 
that actively partakes in making territorial rule operational in a larger web of interconnections. 
In this sense, I insist once again on the productiveness of smuggling and contraband, rather than 
merely highlighting their “illegal” or “criminal” character. In sum, this chapter invites scholars 
to take serious the concrete ways in which unrecorded trade activities contribute to state 
territoriality across borders; in other words, how unrecorded trade practices recalibrate political 
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authority through their operations in the margins of sovereign state laws. After a short overview 
of the dominant schools of thought on smuggling in the borderlands I will illustrate my view 
with a case study from Central Africa. 
A dominant perspective on borderlands is to depict these as spaces of anti-state resistance. 
Inspired by the work of James Scott, who rewrites the history of Southeast Asia’s border areas as 
“shatter zones,” or “zones of refuge” inhabited by people who have been fleeing historical 
waves of state oppression (Baud and van Schendel, 1997; for a critique see Lieberman, 2010;  
Brass, 2012), for example, scholars of Asia and Africa have been able to point out persistent 
frictions among populations whose freedom of movement and subsistence are constantly 
threatened by the centralizing projects of modern states (e.g., De Bruijn et al., 2001; Dereje and 
Hoehne, 2010; Graetz, 2010; Turner, 2010, 2013; Doevenspeck, 2011; Ryzhova, 2018;  
Brenner, 2019). From this perspective, cross-border trade assumes the aura of a silent rebellion 
against state regulations that are considered to be intrusive, illegitimate and oppressive (Shelley 
and Metz, 2017; Endres, 2019). 
Other scholars emphasize instead the creative and innovative potential of economic activities 
that are officially designated as informal, clandestine or criminal in the borderlands. While they 
may be formally casted as a corruption of institutional norms, their hybrid relationality may in 
fact become a platform for radically transforming public authority – particularly in so-called 
weak states or contexts where state sovereignty is fundamentally contested, like zones of 
protracted armed conflict (Menkhaus, 2007; Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Boege et al., 2009;  
Bagayoko et al., 2016; Rolandsen, 2019; Goodhand, 2020). 
Without denying the important political and economic inequalities that these borderland 
economies evidently entail at different scales (for a discussion see Meagher, 2014), one needs to 
be careful to recognize the proximity between economic entrepreneurship and state-making 
projects at territorial borders. Rather than stealing away resources and legitimacy, in many 
instances, cross-border trade, even if clandestine, has been observed to contribute significantly 
to state treasuries and vice versa, be it not through the established legal, official channels. The 
very meaning of smuggling or contraband, therefore – which may range from informal trade in 
household commodities to outright illegal trade in drugs and arms – should be viewed from the 
perspective of a frontier: an oscillating, dynamic space, in which what can be considered as legal 
and legitimate wealth is the outcome of a complex and active “border work” (Reeves, 2014) 
across multiple geographic scales (Cunningham and Heyman, 2004; Roitman, 2005;  
Raeymaekers, 2009, 2014; Chalfin, 2010; Chu, 2010; Goodhand, 2012; Titeca, 2012; Korf and 
Raeymaekers, 2013; Wilson, 2017; Kean, 2018). 
In other words: geography matters, particularly in the way in which capitalist supply chains 
interconnect with territorial authority across borders. Rather than assuming their marginality, 
criminality or illegality, we should consider the potential contribution of borderland economies 
to capitalist development more broadly. 
In my own research in the Congolese-Ugandan borderland between 2003 and 2008, I have 
been trying to find out how the political economy of borderland trade is at once productive of 
the territorial state, but at the same time redefines and repurposes political order through direct 
everyday connections and relations across geographic scales. My ethnography of contraband 
trade in this area builds at once on the excellent work of several colleagues (e.g., Meagher, 
1990, 2003; Roitman, 1998, 2005; Titeca, 2012), as well as border studies (e.g., Newman and 
Paasi, 1998; Donnan and Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Donnan, 1998) and political anthropology 
(Nugent, 2002; Lund, 2006; Klute and Bellagamba, 2008; Arnaut, Hojbjerg, and Raeymaekers 
2008; Hagmann and Péclard, 2010). 
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For a long time, the African Rift Valley, which runs through the current Cong-Ugandan 
borderscape, figured as a shifting African frontier among several, adjacent communities like the 
BaYira and BaHema, whose trade in salt, fish, ivory and artefacts constituted the foundations of 
intense interactions (particularly between Bunyoro and Kasese and the Congolese Mitumba 
Mountains: Kopytoff, 1987; Packard, 1987). These pre-colonial trade patterns contributed to 
an intense cross-border trade in post-colonial times: in a context of rampant economic decline 
and institutional crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, the smuggling of minerals and commodities 
formed an alternative livelihood opportunity there where previous occupations in plantation 
agriculture and mining had been gradually ruined (Mirembe, 2005; Kaparay, 2006;  
Raeymaekers, 2014). In this context, an emerging class of BaNande (BaYira) entrepreneurs was 
able to transmit some of its capital and knowledge into this transboundary economy. In 
Kisangani, for example, around a thousand kilometres from the border, Janet MacGaffey dis-
covered a “thriving business centre,” where “all sorts of people are running successful and 
substantial enterprises, despite the shortages of goods, the deterioration of infrastructure and the 
rampant bribery and corruption so amply documented in the social science literature and the 
local press.” Echoing the predominant optimism about informal entrepreneurship at the time, 
she concluded that “in the midst of irrationality and unpredictability,” some people were 
capable to make things work in an organized and efficient way and engage in “rational” 
economic enterprise (MacGaffey, 1987, p. 1). Yet it would be wrong to assume the BaNande’s 
political autonomy: tradesman and -women maintained close connections with exponents of 
the Zairian and Ugandan state. During the 1990s, these connections intensified in a lucrative 
commodities trade: while producers in North Kivu and Ituri exported almost all their timber 
and mineral resources into Uganda, Ugandan army generals, exported US$ millions worth of 
timber, gold and other valuable resources from Congo during the two Congolese wars of 
1996–1997 and 1998–2003 with the tacit support of President Museveni (Reno, 2000; Fahey, 
2009). During this period, traders also maintained close relations with non-state armed forces, 
whose activities contributed significantly to transboundary economic developments. 
My case study shows that when we study unrecorded trade in borderlands, globally, it makes 
sense to differentiate more carefully between what is meant by “legal” and “illegal,” “formal,” 
and “informal,” rather than assuming such categories as a given. Unofficial transborder trade is 
by definition difficult to detect, and what is usually described as “informal,” “hidden, “parallel,” 
or “underground” economic activity may indeed involve a wide range of degrees of formality 
and illegality. According to Ellis and MacGaffey (1996), a useful way to distinguish between 
trade patterns is between trade that is explained as wholly or partially legal on the one hand, and 
wholly illegal on the other hand. Of the second type on the Congo-Uganda border, one could 
mention for example the trade in marijuana from plantations in South Lubero to Uganda and 
Kenya, or the smuggling of protected animal species and ivory from the Congolese bush to 
Western consumers. Although it is formally prohibited by Congolese law, the drug is com-
monly tolerated even though it potentially finances violent militia activity. A similar permissive 
regime applies to the trade in ivory which, although formally illegal, can be found openly 
outside Congo’s national parks: when strolling the streets of Goma and Kinshasa, it is not 
unusual to meet businessmen offering carved ivory statues or entire tusks to buyers in plain 
daylight. Next to ivory, one can find a whole range of forest produce openly or less openly on 
sale on regional markets, going from tropical charcoal, to protected animal species (birds, 
monkeys), bush meat and occasionally also “traditional” medicine. 
Different degrees of (il)legality reveal the hybrid norms and relations that have characterized 
this trade since colonial independence. While considering this heterogeneity, it becomes clear 
that very little transboundary trade in this African borderland can actually be characterized as 
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entirely illegal (Englebert and Mungongo, 2016). Rather than assuming their anti-state re-
sistance or complicity with public authorities, it is important to consider its contribution to 
mediated state authority, not only at a local but at different geographic scales. Many of the 
border entrepreneurs owe their position and prestige to the simultaneous connections they are 
able to forge to both anti-state forces and to exponents of state administrations (Raeymaekers, 
2014; Titeca, 2012). As I argued elsewhere (Raeymaekers, 2009), the political authority that 
emerges from one’s involvement in this borderland economy cannot simply be categorized 
along a binary axis of engagement and disengagement with the state. Instead, one needs to 
consider the intricate networks of relations between legal state authorities and de facto so-
vereign bodies that determine the concrete ways in which norms and rules are implemented 
along commercial value chains. Whereas state administrations are continuously engaged in the 
attempt to govern citizens within predefined territorial limits, de facto sovereignty in the 
borderland remains characterized by a continuous pattern of negotiation and mediation of 
regulatory authority along a hierarchy of scales (see also Hansen and Stepputat, 2001;  
Humphrey, 2004). 
Over the years I have observed how cross-border traders have been able to “jump scales” 
(Swyngedouw, 1997) while they mediate the regulation of their activities with multiple so-
vereign bodies along established commodity chains. Controlling the nodes of an increasingly 
globalized trade in commodities has given such mobile actors a comparative advantage over 
state agencies with less space of manoeuvre.2 While they still need the state to smoothen cross- 
border connections, this transboundary engagement has contributed to a growing political 
legitimacy of Congolese and Ugandan border entrepreneurs, as they assure beneficiaries low 
import prices and capital gains. Deliberately highlighting the contributions of cross-border trade 
to local “development” has thus become a central strategy for maintaining and consolidating 
power in the borderlands: in a context where state authority remains evidently contested, the 
ideology of marginal development has probably been a key factor of success of these border 
traders as political power brokers.3 
What determines the regulation of this Central African cross border economy is not ne-
cessarily the level of engagement or disengagement from the state, therefore, but the complex 
relational infrastructures that underpin public authority over current trade arrangements. These 
arrangements appear to produce a specific power-geometry (Massey, 1992) that not necessarily 
inverts global-local relations but is able to subvert existing webs of domination and subordination, 
solidarity and cooperation in a wider regional environment. Through their operations, bor-
derland entrepreneurs show that, far from being passive victims and receivers of development, 
they are also capable of creating their life worlds “as places” (Escobar, 2001, p. 15), with 
possibly far-reaching consequences for the definition of public authority across borders. Rather 
than being passively crushed by the anonymous forces of capitalism and globalisation, they 
demonstrate a capability to actively mould the political space in which their operations take 
place. This observation confirms the argument that transboundary markets constitute more than 
a simple economic mechanism; they are a political arena that regulates important facets of social 
life (Roitman, 1998). Following this line of argument, I opt for a more contingent notion of 
political power in the borderlands that emerges in concentric circles and in intersecting geo-
graphical scales. What distinguishes this perspective is its insistence on the immanence and si-
multaneity of social relations on the border and the way these relations come to actively 
construct the space of public authority across borders. 
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Concentric circles 
More concretely, I imagine the system of relationships that regulates cross border trade in the 
Congo-Ugandan border space in three specific, interconnected scales. In the largest, transre-
gional orbit, the trade is organized along a more or less stable commodity chain that connects 
some of the world’s leading markets to remote villages in the rural areas of Uganda and Eastern 
DRC. Commonly, goods are imported by container from China or the Far East through big 
shipping companies such CMC and AGETRAV. Previous to such transports, Congolese tra-
ders have spent months and years looking for the right business contacts on the Asian continent. 
Though some firms work through direct business representations (Coloma, 2010) most 
commercial transactions take place orally, without contracts and on the simple basis of trust. 
Chinese and Congolese small businesses have a lot in common form this perspective, traders 
told me, as they commonly value such trust more than contractual backing and the respect for 
legal requirements (Raeymaekers, 2014). 
Once commodities arrive in Africa (usually in some of East Africa’s big ports like 
Mombassa), a number of private agencies immediately transform their label to goods with a 
lower tax regime (for example, if one sends electric generators, they become “bicycle parts,” 
clothes become “rags” and so on). Customs agents refer to such infrastructures as ‘laboratoires’ 
or ‘agences pirates,’ because they “fabricate” false labels to transit commodities across territorial 
borders. The legitimacy of such agencies is not so straightforward as it may seem though, 
because their insertion into official state records depends on an active negotiation with the state. 
Lists of private customs intermediaries circulate frequently in the Ministries, therefore, as clients 
are included and excluded from such government favours. At the next node in the commercial 
network, Malaba (on the Kenya-Uganda border) functions as an offload and re-loadpoint for 
commodities from standard containers onto several, smaller trucks with canvas sheeting (called 
‘bachiers’), which can carry 1½ containers each. Not unsurprisingly, traders use this transit to 
obfuscate customs control: a ‘déclarant’ – the agent who declares transiting goods in name of the 
private businessman – will do all he can to mix goods of several owners together and benefit 
from the complex paper trails and lack of facilities that customs agencies have to deal with on 
the border. Most commonly, therefore, this negotiation results in an unwritten agreement: in 
return for a small fee, Ugandan and Congolese customs agree to facilitate the crossing of goods 
and adapt the declaration form according to the notification of the declarant. On the Congoles 
side, a ‘vérificateur’ then inspects this declaration form and sometimes does a virtual check “to 
avoid being completely arbitrary” (interview with customs agent, January 2008). Goods are 
never controlled physically though, because there is neither the time nor a designated place to 
do this. If the ‘déclarant’ agrees on this virtual check d, the goods pass onto the provincial 
authorities who demand a supplementary tax of a few hundred dollars to settle the final import. 
Next to these official services, different agencies intervene in this taxation “informally” 
(without legal backing). They include the Congolese civil and military intelligence (ANR and 
DEMIAP), hygiene and environmental services, national police (PNC), several customs bri-
gades, and a range of territorial and provincial agencies and authorities. Besides these “informal” 
taxes, the official customs board may charge up to US$15000 per truck. The final import 
document (‘déclaration d’importantion définitive’) then gets delivered at the point of arrival after yet 
another virtual check by the agencies in the administrative centres of Beni or Butembo. 
In the “core” of the borderland, finally, a parallel, interconnected pattern develops across the 
river Lubiriha that divides Congo from Uganda. Particularly on market days, one can observe 
lines of people crossing the river either on foot or bathing through the water with various goods 
on their heads. These porters or ‘trafiquants’ offer the service of trafficking undeclared goods once 
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they have been unloaded on the other side in Mpondwe. After furtively crossing the river, they 
run to the ‘bombeurs’ who re-load the goods on a truck directed to a nearby Congolese town or 
transit centre. Given the nature of their job, the ability of these ‘trafiquants’ is to pass covertly 
(Swahili: ‘kofichika’) in order to make a living and avoid troubles with the Ugandan ‘Red Mamba’ 
(custom police) and Congolese police (during the COVID emergency, such Red Mamba ar-
guably have been replaced by army officials). In the border towns, this petty contraband trade is 
often the activity of female farmers and disabled men and women, who in this way supplement 
their daily incomes. Benefiting from their double (Congolese and Ugandan) ID-cards which 
immigration authorities are willing to deliver for a small bribe (kidogo kidogo), the function of these 
smugglers in the cross-border economy is crucial, as they literally outsource the risk associated 
with the illegal aspects of this transnational trade. Participants in the border economy refer to this 
risk as ‘la coop,’ ‘match,’ ‘la lutte,’ or ‘punguza’ (Swahili: to reduce, get one’s share). 
Rather than brushing aside such cross-border economic practices as yet another example of 
Africa’s “criminal” economies, a deeper social analysis of these activities may reveal a number of 
normative and social logics that go beyond legalistic interpretations. The commodity trade 
between Central Africa and the Far East shows how economic relationships flow through an 
organized system of relationships that is at once local, regional and global in character. Thanks 
to this system, for example, traders are able to connect important commercial nodes in China 
and South-East Asia to rural Africa. Once imported goods arrive in the border towns of Congo 
and Uganda, they continue their trajectories deep into Congolese territory on the backs of 
porters, (motor)cyclists and the occasional airplane that travels to the mining areas. As important 
as this complex economic infrastructure is for local and transboundary development, it depends 
on a fragile negotiation between public authority and private business that is nonetheless crucial 
for maintaining the relations of capitalist supply chains in balance in this transboundary context. 
The politics of scale 
One concept that becomes interesting to explain this process of constantly inverting power re-
lations at the border is that of geographical scale. The concept of scale, which is widely discussed 
among human geographers, indicates how social relations are themselves productive of geographic 
spaces; in other words, the scope, speed and reach of relational connections has an impact on the 
ways power materializes in space (for a discussion see Marston, 2000; Marston et al., 2005; Cox, 
2013; Jones et al., 2017). Some geographers use scale to highlight how power relations in con-
temporary capitalist supply chains has indeed become a highly contingent matter, as there exists no 
predefined pattern that determines how capital, resources and labour should flow from the centre 
to the periphery, from top to bottom, or from left to right. In a world where everything is 
connected permanently, the crux of the problem is not whether the local or the global has the-
oretical and empirical priority in shaping the conditions of daily life, but rather how the local, the 
global, and other relevant (although perpetually shifting) geographical scale levels are the result (the 
product of processes) of sociospatial change. In this sense, it is useful to distinguish between agents 
who remain fixated in place and others who are able to “jump” scales along such networked 
connections. Think, for example, of the transnational smugglers-traders and their simultaneous 
relations to multiple authorities in different geographic locations that I described in detail above. At 
the same time, the complex geography of their operations also hints at the immanence of political 
authority along such spatio-temporal scales. Paraphrasing Robert Cox, one could argue that the 
ultimate interest of participants in the borderland economy appears to lie in mobilizing centers of 
social power whose power is partially territorial in character, but whose goal is to control the 
actions and interactions of others“ through complex social relations (Cox, 1998, p. 23). 
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In the case of Congo-Uganda, the system of regulations that is constantly redefined and 
negotiated at the border has generated important scalar effects that go beyond a simple im-
position of global or national processes on local actors. Parallel to the concentric circles de-
scribed in the first section of this paper, it is illustrative to see the growing dependency of 
national centres of power on this transboundary complex of relations in terms of taxes and the 
control over cross-border populations. One can see clearly how the mediation of authority at 
the border is pushing forward a gradual transformation of regulatory norms pertaining to taxes, 
economic resources and national revenue at both sides of the territorial border. Starting with 
the inverted role of local administrative practice, to the “fabrication” of labels and doc-
umentation that are projected across regional flows, the border is able temporarily to reverse 
power relationships between the “national” state and various local agencies as they are per-
formed on a daily, localized basis. In this process, power is not univocally transferred from the 
state to its perceived anti-form (of anti-systemic resistance, of private agents or of social net-
works), but its successful mobilization depends on the tactical agency participants’ ability to 
develop in this constantly shifting network of relations. 
Authoritative power is to an important extent a social construction that is produced and 
transformed through everyday relations. This is not to say that power is completely independent 
of social hierarchies. Whenever state agents have tried to block transboundary trade, for whatever 
reason, on the Congo-Ugandan border, this invariably resulted in violent protests. Such happened 
in November-December 2007, for example, when an Ebola outbreak in the Ugandan district of 
Bundibugyo led custom authorities from Congo and Uganda temporarily to close the border 
crossing at Mpondwe-Kasindi. In protest, people (petty traders, peasants, angry businessmen, but 
also ‘déclarants’ and local customs officers) threatened to employ local rebel forces until the crossing 
was re-opened. They did this because, they explained, they depended on the border for their 
daily living (Raeymaekers, 2009). Rather than assuming a neat boundary between the state and 
‘social’ or ‘economic‘ actors, therefore, it makes more sense to investigate the social hegemony 
that emerges in the context of cross-border interaction, or the capacity of a dominant group to 
impose a series of practices that are to its advantage (Swyngedouw, 1997; Gramsci, 2007). One 
could argue that the process of negotiation between state and non-state, factual and official au-
thorities in the Congo-Ugandan borderland has itself become productive of a political order that is 
capable of imposing an ideology of capitalist development based on transboundary connectivities 
and of “making do” (for a deeper discussion see Raeymaekers, 2014). 
A future reflection on borderland economies as contingent power assemblages, I argue, 
therefore, can potentially reveal new modes to tackle their contribution to local development as 
outcomes of complex patterns of interaction among geographic scales, rather than linear his-
tories of either resistance or liberal self-reliance. One the one hand, this would require a 
thorough rethinking of the ways participants in such border economies are capable of nego-
tiating authority across complex relational geographies. On the other hand, it would require us 
to study more deeply the role of transboundary economies in brokering local authority and 
development. To focus exclusively on the supposedly resistant or liberal character of transna-
tional contraband trade, at least in the Central African context, has proven largely counter-
productive, because both perspectives gloss over the intricate relational geographies that set the 
terms of its regulation across geographic scales. Highlighting the scope, speed, and reach of 
these geographies instead has the potential to reveal how capitalist operations across borders 
continue to depend on active linkages among agencies, norms and institutions that may be 
ontologically depicted as standing in contrast and opposition, but as a matter of fact remain 




1 My definition of borderlands draws on Willem Van Schendel and Michiel Baud, who describe bor-
derlands as “broad scenes of intense interactions in which people from both sides work out everyday 
accommodations based on face-to-face relationships” (Baud and van Schendel, 1997, p. 216). 
2 One important factor that contributes to the weakness of customs agents is their lack of local em-
beddedness. Jostling their local political influence, important cross-border traders encourage customs 
agents to be “flexible” and “cooperative,” and they do not hesitate to threaten the latter in case of 
unproductive collaborations. Several agents I interviewed had received death threats during their 
career, and some decided to change jobs because of these. These dynamics show once again to what an 
extent cross-border entrepreneurs are able to maintain a certain regime of violence which at once 
ensures their central role as local capitalists, while keeping together a network of state and non-state 
agencies involved in cross-border fraud.  
3 That said, one must not underestimate the regional solidarities that arise from these daily interactions 
on the border as they take shape in partial opposition to centralizing states. Recent claims to greater 
autonomy in terms of local development have included demands for a more adequate partition of 
customs revenues. The issue of local development has also taken centre stage in ongoing debates about 
state decentralisation and democratic institutional reform – including debates about the role of “tra-
ditional” authorities such as the Rwenzururu Kingdom (Raeymaekers, 2009; Titeca and Fahey, 2016). 
With Paul Nugent, therefore, one could argue that such ethnic affiliations between Congolese and 
Ugandan communities increasingly serve to constitute power on the border, notably by working on 
state institutions, community relations, and basic concepts of political space (Nugent 2002, p. 232).  
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SMUGGLING AS A LEGITIMATE 
ACTIVITY? 
The OPEC Boys as social bandits in  
Northern Uganda 
Kristof Titeca   
Introduction 
The term smuggling often brings strongly negative connotations, and is often associated with 
criminality and violence. For example, the Wikipedia page1 on smuggling mostly focusses on 
the trafficking of adults, children and wildlife. Indeed, in discussing these phenomena, the page 
highlights how smugglers use coercive tactics such as ‘deception, fraud, intimidation, isolation, 
physical threats and use of force, debt bondage or even force-feeding drugs to control their 
victims.’2 Are smugglers always associated with these negative connotations, though – in 
particular by the communities in which they are embedded? 
In their influential edited volume on ‘illicit flows,’ Abraham and van Schendel (2005: 4) 
highlight the important differentiation between what states consider legitimate (‘legal’), and 
what people involved in these practices consider to be legitimate or ‘licit.’ In other words, 
smuggling – an illegal activity – can also be considered legitimate by the wider population. This 
chapter further unpacks the ways in which smuggling can be considered legitimate by the local 
communities. It does so by relying on three concepts and sets of literature: (i) of smugglers as 
‘social bandits’ (Hobsbawm 1959, 1981); (ii) of smuggling as a central concept in local social 
imaginaries (Taylor 2004; Grant 2014); and (iii) of smugglers as (un)civil society (Bayat 1997a, 
1997b). These three concept intersect and overlap, but each highlight a particular aspect in 
explaining their legitimacy. 
Empirically, these concepts will be illustrated by discussing smuggling activities in North- 
Western Uganda, in particular by focussing on the ‘OPEC boys,’ a group of smugglers active in 
the region, smuggling fuel into the country from the nearby Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and Southern Sudan. Importantly, these smuggling activities are considered socially 
legitimate in the wider region. In doing so, this case-study shows how smugglers can be seen as 
a politically, socially and economically legitimate: as actors who successfully emerge out of 
poverty and legitimately fend for themselves in a situation of state neglect. Moreover, they are 
also perceived to be acting in the interest of the population – for example by defending informal 
traders when threatened by the local government. 
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Social bandits, social imaginaries and uncivil society 
How do smugglers relate with the local population, and how are they understood by the latter? 
In order to answer this question – and understand the ways in which smuggling can be con-
sidered legitimate – it is useful to look outside of the smuggling literature stricto sensu. 
Strikingly similar questions have been asked by other sets of literature, discussing the (potential) 
legitimacy of illegal activities (which are broader than smuggling). The absolute starting point, 
and reference, in this literature is Eric Hobsbawm’s concept of ‘social banditry.’ 
Hobsbawm first coined the term social bandits in his 1959 book Primitive Rebels, in which he 
discussed ‘primitive’ or ‘archaic’ forms of organized social protest. One of the these was the 
‘social bandit,’ most famously known by its archetype such as Robin Hood in England or Diego 
Corrientes in Andalusia: bandits who are regarded as the champion of the poor, protected and 
idealized by them (Hobsbawm 1959: 13). The idea was further developed in his book Bandits, 
first published in 1969, and consequently republished in a series of other editions (such as  
Hobsbawm 1981). 
While social bandits are regarded as criminals by the state, the population regards them as 
‘heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in 
any case as men to be admired, helped and supported’ (Hobsbawm 1981: 17). This is what 
makes the bandits ‘social,’ the link they have with the general population. In this situation, the 
bandits are not only seen as the population’s champions, they are also idealised, and turned into 
a ‘myth’ or a ‘symbol’ (Hobsbawm 1959: 13; 1981: 127). They are associated with ‘freedom, 
heroism, and the dream of justice’ (Hobsbawm 1981: 132). Key is their invulnerability to 
authority, and their championing of the weak, oppressed and cheated. In doing so, social 
bandits aim to re-establish the social order to how it ‘should be:’ rights must be wronged and 
corrected, and cases of injustice must be avenged – particularly in relations between the rich and 
the poor, or the strong and the weak. Social banditry is therefore a form of self-help to correct 
perceived wrongs and cases of injustice (Hobsbawm 1981: 26). 
Those most prone to joining social banditry are those in a particular social position: male 
youth between puberty and marriage – when they do not have family responsibilities yet; or 
those who are not fully integrated into society yet, and are easily drawn into marginality or 
outlawry. They are ‘marginals, soldiers, deserters and ex-servicemen’ and are ‘natural material 
for banditry’ (Hobsbawm 1981: 31–34). 
According to Hobsbawm, social banditry is something of the past, which is no longer 
possible in (post) capitalist societies – the phenomenon being a product of traditional peasant 
societies (Hobsbawm 1981: 19–24). Nevertheless, the social bandits idea has been applied to 
contemporary cases such as the kidnapping of oil workers (Oriola 2013); street leaders in Seoul 
(Mobrand 2016); urban violence in Trinidad (Pawelz 2018); TV series (Sartore 2017); 
Colombian Bandits (Rehm 2016), and so on. 
The ‘social banditry’ concept is also useful to look at the ways smuggling is understood by 
various actors. Similar to social bandits, the idea of smuggling has been described as a ‘weapon 
of the weak’ – an economic and political act of resistance against colonial borders, against an 
exploitative state, and oppressive economic policies (Azarya and Chazan 1987; Titeca 2012). 
Smuggling constitutes an act of resistance and redistribution, acting in the defense of mar-
ginalized sections of society, the ‘powerless’ (Meagher 2003). This for example was influentially 
shown by Janet MacGaffey (1987), who showed how the second economy in Zaire was also a 
political option, allowing the population to ‘fend for itself’ in the light of a state which was both 
absent and oppressive. As argued above by Abraham and van Schendel (2005), it is necessary to 
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look beyond official statist discourses on smuggling (which are part of particular power 
configurations). 
These ideas– of smuggling as socially and politically ‘legitimate’ – do have significant overlap 
with the concept of social banditry. Yet, what is lacking in these perspectives is an explicit focus 
on particular actors – the social bandits themselves: how does the ‘myth’-making around them 
happen, and how do they relate with the surrounding community? 
In better understanding this, two further sets of literature are useful. First, underdeveloped in 
the idea of social bandits is that these are formed through profoundly moral understandings of 
what constitutes ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ 
Helpful here is the concept of ‘social imaginaries,’ which constitute a ‘collective moral 
orientation (Grant 2014: 413); a ‘largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our 
whole situation, within which particular features of our world show up for us in the sense they 
have’ (Taylor 2004: 25). Social imaginaries are not only a passive ‘background’ to particular 
situation, they also offer ‘detailed articulations of our own personal circumstances’ (Grant 2014: 
412). In doing so, they are the common understanding, a collective imagining, which allow 
collective practices to happen, and offer a ‘widely shared sense of legitimacy’ for these (political, 
social and economic) practices (Taylor 2002: 106; Grant 2014: 411). In other words, they 
explain practices – they offer a purpose and significance – and in doing so make these practices 
possible (Grant 2014: 412). These social imaginaries are widely shared among the population: 
they are “carried in images, stories and legends” (Taylor 2002: 106), and are further magnified, 
but also transformed, through social practices. In other words, social imaginaries are the 
background against which social bandits occur –the moral basis on which norms of legitimate 
behavior are evaluated and acted upon. To come back to van Schendel and Abraham’s re-
ference from the intro: illegal actions such as smuggling can be considered legitimate because 
they tap into particular social imaginaries – something which will be explored in the case study. 
Second, further deepening the understanding of the above issues is the literature on ‘uncivil 
society,’ and in particular the work of Ayad Bayat (1997a, 1997b). Whereas Hobsbawm’s social 
bandits clearly focusses on resistance in rural areas (Hobsbawm 1959: 23), Bayat’s idea of un- 
civil society is very much focused on similar processes urban areas. Ayad Bayat’s work argues 
how debates on ‘civil society,’ should not only focus on conventional associations, but also, or 
even particularly on what he calls ‘uninstitutionalised and hybrid social activities which have 
dominated urban politics in many developing countries’ (Bayat 1997a: 55). In doing so, he 
focusses on the urban poor, which largely live in informality, and are weary of formal pro-
cedures attempting to regulate their lives and the discipline which the state tries to enforce on 
their daily lives – such as formal bills and taxes (Bayat 1997a, 1997b). While they don’t have 
institutional power, they are able to take direct action. These actions are more than ‘Scottian’ 
forms of resistance, which are hidden, individual and defensive. Instead, they are also offensive, 
involving collective, open and highly visible actions (Bayat 1997a: 56, 1997b: 4–7). 
Autonomy and redistribution are key here, and are key aspects of the uncivil society: acting 
autonomously from the state, and in doing so obtaining public goods such as illegal land, or 
shelter, which are unable to be attained through legal and institutional mechanisms (Bayat 
1997a: 59–61). In these actions, particular sites – such as the street or illegal land – serve as the 
main ‘locus of collective expression’ for those who lack an institutional setting to express their 
voice (Bayat 1997a: 63). 
In the next section, we apply these perspectives to smuggling in Northwestern Uganda, in 
particular by looking at the OPEC boys. 
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Smuggling in Northwestern Uganda: the OPEC boys 
The West Nile region is located in north-western Uganda, and borders the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Southern Sudan. The region has characteristics similar to many 
other borderlands: borders which were introduced during colonial times, separating ethnic 
groups living on both sides of the borders; and located on the peripheries of their respective 
national states, with limited possibilities for economic development. In this context, smuggling 
is a popular source of livelihood, providing not only a livelihood for traders and their families, 
but also by supplying goods (food and non-food). Its importance therefore transcends the local, 
by not only providing goods for the border towns, but also at a national and regional level – on 
the different sides of the border. Studies from the Bank of Uganda for example show how this 
trade has strongly intensified, from USD 143.2 million in 2010 to USD 269.8 million in 2018.3 
The most visible and prominent actor within this field are the ‘OPEC boys,’ a group of fuel 
smugglers. From the mid-1980s onwards, the OPEC boys were selling smuggled fuel in jer-
rycans on street-corners in Arua, and in the wider region: there was a general shortage of petrol 
stations in the area, and their fuel was cheaper. The OPEC boys got their smuggled fuel in 
different ways: some smuggled it themselves from Congo, others used ‘transporters,’ which 
mostly were young(er) boys on bicycles, smuggling the fuel across the border on ‘panya roads’ 
(smuggler roads), avoiding security officials. Others bought their fuel from truck-drivers, who 
equally smuggled their fuel into Uganda (Titeca 2006; Lecoutere and Titeca 2007).4 
The OPEC boys were the most important supplier of fuel in the area until the late 2000s. 
Around this time, the increased number of fuel stations, and the changing tax regime in the DR 
Congo pushed many of them out of business. While they still exist, their activities are less 
prominent; contrary to earlier times, they no longer are present on (almost) every corner of the 
major urban centres in the region. 
Throughout their existence, their smuggling activities were generally tolerated by the state 
authorities; while occasional confiscations would take place, these were rather rare, and the 
smuggled fuel was sold openly. Why was this the case? In this section, we will unpack their 
activities, by drawing on the above conceptual toolbox. I start by showing how they are a 
central part of the social imaginary, to then show how they can be considered social bandits, and 
a central part of uncivil society. 
Field research among the OPEC boys was carried out from 2004 onwards, in Arua. The 
most intense period of field research was between 2004 and 2010, first as part of my PhD 
research, and later as part of my postdoctoral work, during which period I spent around a year 
in the town (Titeca 2006, 2008, 2012; Titeca et al. 2011). In the years after that, research was 
less intensive, but I kept following up on, and interacting with these actors (Titeca 2018a, 
2018b). The main research method was semi- or unstructured interviews and non-participant 
observation, not only with the OPEC boys, but also with other actors such as (informal) traders, 
civil society actors, local government representatives, customs officials, and a variety of actors 
active in the smuggling business (fixers, transporters, and so on). 
Before we discuss the OPEC boys, it is important to discuss the ‘background’ – the way in 
which smuggling is understood in the social imaginary in the region. After doing so, we are 
better able to understand the role of the OPEC boys as social bandits and uncivil society. 
Smuggling as an important social imaginary in West Nile 
In the region of West Nile, smuggling is very much looked at as a legitimate activity. A number 
of reasons account for this. First, smuggling in West Nile has long historical roots (Meagher 
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1990; Titeca 2009). When the colonial powers introduced colonial borders, these did not stop 
the interaction among ethnic groups. While members of the same ethnic group were now 
living on different sides of the (colonial) borders, and hence became subject to state regulation, 
untaxed trade – smuggling – continued being considered legitimate (Titeca and De Herdt 
2010). Second, smuggling has always been seen as a legitimate way of survival in circumstances 
in which the population felt marginalized at best, and oppressed at worst. For example, during 
the successive wars and rebellions affecting the region, many people fled into neighboring 
(southern) Sudan and Zaire. Smuggling constituted an important livelihood for many during 
these times (particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s). Moreover, smuggling acquired an 
explicitly political meaning when President Museveni came to power. The West Nile region 
feels marginalized by the Museveni regime. They feel that – contrary to earlier regimes – they 
are not allowed into positions of power, which (amongst other things) translates itself in limited 
services and infrastructure (Titeca and De Herdt 2010). This context gave rise to a number of 
rebel groups which were translating these grievances (Leopold 2005: 46). Smuggling has to be 
understood in this context: as a way of making ends meet, in circumstances beyond their 
control – war and displacement, or a regime which is marginalizing them. The following quotes 
are an illustration of these feelings: 
Smuggling really is the food of the people! Us, women, we have no jobs here. The 
only thing we can do is to get a small profit out of smuggling. And what we get across, 
really is for the family!5  
According to security officers, this argument is for example used upon arrest ‘When we arrest 
them, smugglers often say: but I’m not an idler, I’m a smuggler! What else do you want me to 
do? How should I find something to eat?’6 
In sum, smuggling acts as an important social imaginary in the West Nile region: In the light 
of a lack of limited socio-economic opportunities, smuggling is regarded as a legitimate 
employment. 
Adding to this social imaginary are different sets of stories and practices which are widely 
shared and recounted, and which further feed into the understanding that smuggling is the only 
way to survive. Among the OPEC boys, many share how smuggling was a way to finance their 
(secondary) school or university. Inversely, a number of unemployed university graduates are 
now working as OPEC boys. 
Particularly important is the story of the ‘Arua boys,’ which can be considered as the pre-
decessors to the OPEC boys. In brief, these are smugglers from – as their name suggests – Arua 
town, which emerged in the 1970s. They emerged in a time of conflict and displacement, and 
primarily engaged themselves in the trade of gold. They were able to smuggle it from Zaire, and 
sell it at a high profit in Kampala. They were known for their flashy clothes and extravagant 
lifestyles. As recounted by a market trader: 
The Arua boys, they used to dress smartly. They would have a tie. Or they would 
dress in jeans. American jeans were very popular! And they would have a saloon car, 
mostly a Sunny. If not a car, a motorcycle: Honda or Yamaha. And they would play 
loud Lingala Music. They used to be very extravagant. They were spending lots of 
money – because they were very rich, because of the gold trade. They were powerful 
financially. The Blue Room lodge [in Kampala] was famous these days. But they 
wouldn’t sleep there! They would just go in the morning with the plane, and come 
back in the evening.7 
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Similar variations were told by many other actors, but they are all variations on the above. 
Importantly, many of them have transformed over the years into influential businessmen in the 
region, which are still active in smuggling, but have expanded their activities, including real 
estate, transport, and so on. 
Magnified through these actors and stories, smuggling is seen as a local version of the 
‘American dream,’ the most important form of social mobility, a rags-to-riches, from-zero-to- 
hero story, present in the wider social imaginary of the border population in West Nile. As one 
trader summarized this: “From hero to zero: it’s not an American dream, it’s the Arua dream 
lived by the OPEC boys!”.8 An anecdotal, but telling, example of this is how a youngster 
explained an elaborated movie scenario about the Arua boys, portraying the Arua boys, as James 
Bond-style superheroes, going on adventures in Congo, smuggling goods across the border, and 
fighting villains of the custom authorities and the Ugandan government.9 A young Arua car-
toonist had a similar idea, and developed a movie poster along these lines, containing the same 
references – as depicted below (Figure 11.1). 
Striking here are the Arua, and OPEC boys, posing as successful personae, in aesthetics 
referring to successful US gangsta-rappers: cool clothes and names, and an even cooler car. The 
‘Life is a beautiful struggle’ quote refers to the ‘from-zero-to-hero’ mentality with which they 
are ascribed – being successful in the light of difficult circumstances. The OPEC boys need to 
be understood in this context: similar to the Arua boys, their activities are seen as way in which 
the marginalised population is able to survive. 
In sum, smuggling is a clear social imaginary, a collective moral orientation (Grant 2014) for 
the West Nile region, offering a ‘widely shared sense of legitimacy’ (Taylor 2002: 106; Grant 
2014: 411) to the activity – for those participating it, and for the wider community. This is 
shared through stories, which center around specific actors – such as for example the ways in 
which the Arua boys and the OPEC boys are acting, and narrated about. It also is reflected in 
the day-to-day usage of the term ‘smuggling.’ It is used literally, without negative connotations. 
In the words of a local analyst ‘different from the way many others use it. It is seen in a positive 
light, as a survival strategy.’10 
In the next sections, I will explain how the OPEC boys can be considered as social bandits, 
and ‘uncivil society.’ 
The OPEC boys as social bandits 
The historical roots of the OPEC boys can also found in a period of conflict and displacement. 
Much of the population was forced out of West Nile after the overthrow of the Amin regime 
(as Amin hailed from this region and had an important power base in it). People settled in 
Congo and Sudan in late 1979 and the early 1980s. During this time, a number of exiled young 
men tried gain an income by smuggling fuel. They did not stop doing so upon return to 
Uganda, and they started an organization which came to be known as the ‘OPEC boys.’ Many 
other young men returning to their home areas, with no education or assets, were easily drawn 
into his fuel business. They started attracting members from neighboring districts in West-Nile 
(such as Nebbi or Moyo), to which the OPEC boys from Arua supplied fuel. 
The OPEC boys were considered an important social-economic force, in a number of ways. 
First, and in line with the above, they were an important source of employment for young men. 
As one OPEC boy argued: ‘All of us are looking for survival! This is a marginalized area, and 
this [smuggling] is our only way of doing this.’11 In other words, the OPEC boys are very much 
a product of the above described context producing this particular imaginary, in which 
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smuggling is considered a source of livelihood, and legitimate. This would also be reflected in 
its relation with the local population – and the actions of the latter, which generally would 
support the OPEC boys in several ways. They would, for example, warn the smugglers in case 
security agencies were approaching to confiscate fuel, or if something would go wrong. 
The OPEC boys also tapped into this imaginary in a different way: they were not only 
providing employment for a particularly marginalized, and potentially dangerous group, i.e., 
former rebels and security officers. In the first ten years of group, it was estimated that 40% of 
the Opec Boys were ex-rebels from the many rebel movements which had been active in the 
area (UNRF, UNRFII, WNBF, FUNA, LRA) (Gersony 1997), while others were defected 
government soldiers (the Ugandan government army UPDF or the Local Defense Units, in 
which the government armed civilians against these rebel forces). After receiving amnesty, the 
ex-rebels, often without education, land or other assets, were easily drawn into the smuggling 
business. 
Figure 11.1 Poster of a (fictional) film on the Arua Boys smugglers’. 
Source: Edward Aikobua  
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This adds another layer to the OPEC boys: they were not only providing a source of 
survival, they also were providing employment to, and absorbing, a potentially dangerous 
group, hence providing stability. Certainly in the beginning of the movement, it seemed as this 
big group of low-skilled, landless, young men had two attractive choices: joining any of the 
rebel groups in the area12 or joining the informal economy by becoming an OPEC boy. As the 
Mayor of Arua town stated: ‘These Boys can be tough; they are former soldiers and rebels. 
They are dangerous and could go back to the bush if not treated carefully.’13 With few or no 
assets available, there would be few opportunity costs for the OPEC boys to join a rebellion. 
Moreover, many ex-combatants have not handed over their weapons to the authorities 
(CERFORD 2002), in an area in which decades of armed conflict already resulted in an 
abundance of available light weapons. 
In this situation, the OPEC boys very much fed into the social imaginary lined out above: 
they were seen as a source of survival and employment, which therefore was a legitimate source 
of livelihood. Interestingly, the agenda of the rebel groups which had been, and were active in 
the region also drew on this imagery of a region which was neglected by the state, and was 
fighting to undo this marginalization through violent means. Similarly, smuggling was per-
ceived as a way to protest this marginalization, but in providing more stability. 
The above shows how the OPEC boys very much fulfil the idea of social bandits: they are 
seen as ‘fighters for justice’ (Hobsbawm 1981: 17), finding an income and creating development 
in a region which feels abandoned by the national government. Similar to Hobsbawm’s ideas on 
social banditry, their activities are seen as highly legitimate, and as invulnerable to state authority 
– as they are able to conduct their activities more or less undisturbed. It also is a specific 
demographic which was part of Hobsbawm’s social bandits: young, unemployed men, among 
which many ex-rebels – which, as also Hobsbawm saw it – were ‘natural material for banditry’ 
(Hobsbawm 1981: 31–34). 
A last idea which deserves further illustration is the ‘social’ aspect of social bandits: the ways 
in which smugglers – in this case, the OPEC boys – are linked with the general population.  
Bayat’s (1997a, b) ideas on uncivil society are particularly useful in doing so. 
The OPEC boys as ‘uncivil society’ 
The OPEC boys would use their power to the defense of actors within the urban informal 
sector, such as market vendors or boys working in the transport sector (motorcycle taxi drivers 
and others). They would use their power to mediate with the government, or block particular 
governmental initiatives. Many examples illustrate how they would act as the (above described) 
‘uncivil society.’ For example, they intervened when law enforcement officers confiscated 
goods from roadside sellers refusing to pay tax (by taking back these goods and creating a riot). 
They intervened in instances where the urban authorities wanted to remove streetside kiosks, 
by blocking the roads, and staging protests – ultimately stopping this removal. They also in-
tervened on occasions when the local authorities tried to remove women who were cooking in 
the different markets in town (as they were accused of contributing to the spread of diseases 
such as cholera). When the municipal authorities came to remove the women by force, the 
OPEC boys intervened and made this intervention impossible. They also negotiated with the 
municipal authorities to find a solution, in which the women were allowed to stay in the end. 
While a number of factors contributed to this influence of the OPEC boys (such as the fact 
that they were particularly well-organized – in sub-groups, with a general leadership), it par-
ticularly was their potentially ‘rebellious’ character which played an important role in this. In 
the words of an OPEC boy ‘they come to us because we are aggressive, we don’t fear anyone 
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and are organized.’ Moreover, through their close contact and respect by other urban informal 
groups, they can easily organize protest and chaos within town. 
Interrelated with this, the OPEC boys were considered ‘political kingmakers.’ During a 
number of consequent elections, the OPEC boys actively campaigned for opposition candidates 
– all of which won the elections. Out of their ‘respected’ status, they have a strong impact on 
public opinion. Politicians confirm how they can easily spread messages about which politicians 
deserve popular support, or inversely, about which politician has been doing a bad job. They 
also act as a campaign force – driving in the rallies of the politicians. In return, politicians do 
provide several services to the OPEC boys. They have been linking them with donors or have 
helped them to write project proposals through which the OPEC boys have accessed additional 
funding, for example to start a savings and credit association. They also provide them with 
material assistance; many OPEC boys consult politicians in case of financial problems such as 
sickness or problems with school fees for their children. 
It is important not to romanticize the activities of the OPEC boys, in particular their use of 
violence. This was not only a passive background, i.e., a threat constituted by their existence as 
former rebels; it also played an active role. This was, for example, the case during riots against 
the governmental authorities, or when intimidating political opponents during electoral per-
iods. Most visibly, there also were instances in which it was used against informers: those caught 
with, or suspected of, leaking to the customs agents were beaten up seriously. In other words, 
the flip-side of a social imaginary legitimizing smuggling is that leaking this to the government 
is considered illegitimate. The OPEC boys did act upon this, often through the actual use of 
violence. 
In sum, the OPEC boys have clear links with the population (the ‘social’ in social bandits), 
by whom they are seen as fighters for social justice. In doing so, they function very much how  
Bayat (1997a, b) described ‘uncivil society,’ operating through direct, open and visible actions, 
using the city’s streets as their main locus to resist enforced state discipline, such as taxation or 
other forms regulation. Their actions are not institutionalized, but ad hoc, and in the interests of 
the urban poor. 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that since around 2010, the influence of the OPEC boys has 
reduced significantly. It wasn’t only that their economic significance declined. Through 
changing taxation policies, and an increasing number of petrol stations, smuggling fuel became 
less attractive, leading to a reduced number of OPEC boys. Also their political and social 
importance reduced. Before, they had quite a tight structure, with an overall leadership – 
including a charismatic leader, Kaku – and sub-divisions, which were based on street-corners 
(Titeca 2006). This allowed them to be tapped into the broader urban informal economy, as 
well as to act swiftly for social and political reasons – as illustrated above. Similar to smuggling 
activities worldwide, they had an ambiguous relation with government officials. While they had 
to fear confiscation by customs officials, they also collaborated with government officials in a 
number of ways. Individual officials (civil servants and/or politicians) would participate in 
smuggling activities (e.g., through financing it) and/or protect these activities, for example, 
against the actions of customs officials. Army officials played a particular role in this (again 
mirroring the important role of security officials in smuggling activities worldwide). After 2010, 
their reduced economic role also had a cascade effect in these other fields: they no longer had a 
tight structure or a charismatic leader, with a lesser social and political role – being reduced to 




For the law, anyone belonging to a group of men who attack and rob with violence is 
a bandit, from those who snatch payrolls at an urban street corner to organized in-
surgents or guerrillas who happen not to be officially recognized as such. Historians 
and sociologists cannot use so crude a definition. In this book we shall be dealing only 
with some kinds of robbers, namely those who are not regarded as simple criminals by 
public opinion. (Hobsbawm 1981: 17; emphasis in original)  
This is how Hobsbawm’s book Bandits starts: by introducing an important difference between 
how criminality and (il)legitimacy is looked at by the state, and how it is perceived by local 
conventions. While Hobsbawm brings in petty thieves and insurgents as examples of social 
bandits, this chapter aimed to show smugglers also can be added to this: while formally, 
smuggling is illegal and criminal, it is not regarded as such by local conventions. In unpacking 
this idea, the chapter first showed the importance of social imaginaries, which are more than 
‘myth-making:’ they lay out importance normative associations, constituting the ‘background’ 
in which actions are evaluated, but also authorising concrete actions. It showed how smuggling 
constitutes a rags-to-riches, from-zero-to-hero story in the region, inspiring many dreams of 
what is considered one of the few (or even only) form(s) of socio-economic mobility. 
The chapter then sets out to show how smuggling constitutes a form of social banditry, 
showing how smugglers – and in particular the OPEC boys – have important links with the 
local population: their actions are defending the local population in different ways. They are an 
important form of local employment, and they often intervene to the advantage of the poor. 
Different from Hobsbawm’s idea of social banditry, the OPEC boys largely operate in urban 
contexts. Further helping to unpack their ‘social’ character is Bayat’s (1997a, 1997b) idea of 
‘uncivil society:’ they can be considered an unconventional, uninstitutionalised, form of civil 
society. Through ad hoc, direct and sporadic action, they are an important form of collective 
action representing the interests of those working in the informal sector, against a state which is 
seen as neglecting the population at best, and harassing and attacking the population at worst. 
A critique on Hobsbawm’s idea of social bandits was that he was not relying as much on the 
actual deeds of the bandits or on what the relevant population thought them to be, but rather 
on how these were reproduced in myths (Chandler 1978: 241). In doing so, he was accused of 
exaggerating the link between peasants and bandits – the very link which makes banditry ‘social’ 
(Slatta 2004: 29). Also for the OPEC boys, attention should be given not to romanticise their 
actions. While they definitely performed these social functions, also their ‘darker’ side should be 
taken seriously: their passive and active use of the threat of violence. 
In sum, smuggling is not only something which is perceived as something negative, both in 
the functional and normative sense, i.e., as respectively an aberration and contravention of state 
rules, and something ‘bad,’ involving deception, fraud and intimidation – as the Wikipedia 
definition suggests. As this chapter has shown, smuggling can carry a very different meaning in 
local social contexts, where it can be perceived as a legitimate activity, and play a much- 
respected social role. 
The importance of these findings is not limited to West Nile, or the OPEC boys. It il-
lustrates the importance of taking local understandings of smuggling into account. This does not 
only help us understand the persistence of smuggling and its widespread nature, but also shows 
its profoundly social character – in the sense which Hobsbawm suggested: by having close links 
with the population. Smuggling should therefore be looked at as more than a strictly economic 
activity, but as a social, and also a political activity: as was demonstrated above, in local social 
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imaginaries, it is seen as an act of resistance, a way to fend for oneself in the light of an absent 
and oppressive government. Similar to bandits, smugglers such as the OPEC boys can be 
considered a ‘symbol’ (Hobsbawm 1981: 127) of this resistance. 
Lastly, while further research is needed on the exact conditions in which smuggling can be 
considered socially legitimate, this chapter brings a number of important pointers. In particular, 
it highlights the importance of the relation between smugglers and the broader population, and 
(interrelated with this) the relation between smugglers and the national state. Do smugglers 
defend the broader poor and/or offer opportunities for this latter group? Do they rather serve as 
an instrument for elites entrenching existing structural power inequalities? In other words, and 
linking with earlier (and abovementioned) debates on smuggling: does smuggling constitute a 
‘weapon of the weak’ or a ‘weapon of the strong’ (Titeca 2012)? It is unlikely that in the latter 
case, smuggling will be considered socially legitimate – instead being perceived as a manifes-
tation of the criminalization of the state, or a general warlord economy. In other words, un-
derstandings and analyses of the nature of smuggling – and in particular on its relation with the 
local population – are not only conceptual discussions, but also have important implications on 
the ways in which they are locally perceived and seen as socially legitimate. 
Notes  
1 Wikipedia, ‘Smuggling,’ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smuggling, consulted on 5 September 2020.  
2 Wikipedia, ‘Smuggling,’ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smuggling, consulted on 5 September 2020.  
3 The Bank of Uganda and Uganda Bureau of Statistics keep statistics on Informal Cross-Border Trade 
or smuggling. As explained elsewhere (Titeca 2020), these figures remain an underestimation.  
4 Concretely, the trucks come from Kenya (Mombasa), and are in theory destined for Congo or (South) 
Sudan: as they are on transit, they don’t have to pay taxes. Yet, the trucks either do not reach Congo or 
(South Sudan), or the fuel is immediately smuggled back into Uganda.  
5 Interview women smuggler, 3 February 2010.  
6 Interview security officer, 9 April 2007.  
7 Interview market trader, 11 April 2007  
8 Interview, trader, Arua, 14 October 2008.  
9 Interview, 15 October 2008, Arua.  
10 Interview analyst, 15 April 2021.  
11 Interview OPEC boy, 1 February 2010.  
12 The West Nile region has a long history of rebel groups (Leopold 2005); and although the rebel groups 
have ceased to exist, these ex-rebels still have deep-rooted feelings of marginalization. A factor which is 
enhanced by the fact that the government is not fulfilling its promises on the amnesty (in particular for 
the WNBF).  
13 Interview Mayor Arua 11-04-07. This view is confirmed by various other actors, such as the URA 
Customs Enforcement Unit officer 21-11-05, sub-county chairpersons 01-05-07, local trader 11-04-07 
and so on (cf. Titeca, 2006).  
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TALL TALES AND  
BORDERLINE CASES 
Narratives as meaningful contraband 
Mareike Schomerus and Lotje de Vries   
Introduction 
In the early hours of the morning of 24 May 2013, a group of South Sudanese vigilantes 
attacked the town of Obo in the Central African Republic (CAR), having covered the distance 
of 100 km from the South Sudan/CAR border to Obo on foot. An unprovoked international 
attack in violation of CAR’s sovereignty could be interpreted as an act of aggression under 
international law. At the least, one would expect subsequent diplomatic frostiness between the 
two countries. This attack, however, neither achieved the status of an international incident, 
nor did it lead to repercussions. Instead, what happened is remembered only as narratives – 
narratives about the attack and the motivations that drove a few dozen assailants to march on a 
foreign town. How events unfolded became subject to wild interpretation and mostly locally- 
anchored forms of meaning making. 
In many ways, interpretations of the attack and its aftermath mirror the three ways in which 
the border between South Sudan and CAR is marked. First, there is the only official de-
marcation of this international border: a border stone, positioned in the shrubs of the bushland, 
shown in Figure 12.1. The boundary marker is neither fixed to the ground and nor very heavy. 
Two people could lift it, making its reliability as official border demarcation questionable. 
Second, there is the border itself, which is marked primarily by its lack of definability: a vast 
area of bush and forest in which the exact location of the border is subject to speculation, 
moveable, and exists only in people’s minds. Where precisely the border is understood to run 
on any given day depends less on international boundary negotiations and more on the luck of 
hunters, who want to believe that they are still on home grounds – rather than having veered 
off into the neighbouring nation – whenever they manage to catch an antelope that can feed the 
family in addition to fetching some money on the market. 
Third, there are the 10 km of road that connect the villages of Ri Yubu on the South 
Sudanese side and Bambouti in CAR. While it is narrow, built by usage rather than road 
engineering, full of potholes and barely passable after rain, what is called ‘Route Nationale 2’ on 
a map of CAR is the sole officially-named road connection between the two countries. 
Travelling along it is the only option that offers certainty about moving from one country to 
the next in a linear way. The villages it connects are some way from the next bigger towns; 
South Sudan’s Tambura, a town of about 10.000 people, lies 40 km east of Ri Yubu, and 600 
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km from South Sudan’s capital Juba. If one were to travel by road, the trip from CAR’s 
Bambouti to the nearest bigger town of Obo (which is about the same size as Tambura) would 
cover 100 km westwards through unoccupied countryside. To reach CAR’s capital Bangui 
from here requires another drive of 1200 km. 
Three types of border marking, three characteristics that describe this border: an official 
border point that projects authority and definition, but does not live up to this solid promise; a 
non-descript area that captures vastness, changeability and ambiguity depending on needs and 
experiences; and a road that allows defining the border through hindsight as it affirms upon 
arrival in the next village that the border has been crossed. 
These three characteristics interact in different ways with three types of travellers that cross 
this border: people; goods; and stories. What turns any movement of people and goods into 
smuggling are legal frameworks, the mode of travel (in this case, often on the back of military 
trucks that are not subject to search or declaration on either side of the border), and the fact that 
the travelling goods or people change value as they cross a boundary, usually gaining in market 
price in comparison to the worth they had on the territory left behind. 
This chapter uses a case study of the particular violent incident of crossing this border to 
unpack how the three characteristics of the border – the official demarcation, the vast and 
Figure 12.1 The border stone that is the only official demarcation of the border between South Sudan 
and CAR.  
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ambiguous territory, and the road that passes through and offers certainty through hindsight – 
bestow upon stories, narratives and explanations the characteristics of smuggled goods. 
Considering how stories and narratives are shaped by crossing a border is new and crucial 
territory for scholarship on smuggling for two reasons: it highlights the importance of stories 
and narratives in how people experience and make sense of a situation; and, it embeds emerging 
research on the power of narratives on people’s behaviour within the broader discourse of 
socially constructed spaces. Borders, the crucial ingredient that smugglers need, are constructed 
sites of formality as well as informality. Both borders and how they create smuggled goods are 
great examples of how social construction develops meaning around particular sites or activities. 
Smuggling is also about the significance that is ascribed to a set of goods or people. Significance 
or meaning are always created through narratives and stories, so smuggling and meaning are 
inseparably intertwined. 
Contribution to the field: stories as smuggled goods 
The relationship between narratives and smuggling is bidirectional. Narratives help create the 
possibility of smuggling, while the notion of smuggling can form the characteristics of a nar-
rative. When stories travel across borders, stories, too, can become contraband. These borders, 
however, are often created in the first place through narratives. When on the road, tales, 
narratives, accounts or anecdotes display all the characteristics of smuggled goods. Their 
meaning and importance – in short, what they are worth – can be transformed by having 
crossed an international border. A narrative shape-shifts as it moves into a different value 
territory; its meaning and power are bestowed upon it by existing in the borderlands and its 
ability to traverse these. When stories cross borders, their characteristics and interpretations 
change along with the narrator’s position and how the narrator presents the actors in the story. 
Meaning and behaviour are altered due to real or imagined constraints or opportunities on 
either side of the border. 
Just as smuggled goods are held back until the market is right, information and rumours may 
increase or decrease in their valuation and impact depending on when they are deployed. 
However, what a story is worth will ultimately depend on the context of the border crossed. 
Even in borderlands where shifting sovereignties play a marginal role in people’s lives, how 
desirable a good or a story is on either side of a border remains separated by the border. The 
border thus acts as a modifier of the value of the story; it can amplify it. Borders can transform 
the story, and the story can make the borderlands – just like a border of active smuggling will be 
shaped by its smugglers. This is how the bidirectional relationship between borders and nar-
ratives continues to create the context in which smugglers operate. 
For smugglers, information from across the border is critical. It is the basis of their decisions 
on when to smuggle and at what price to sell their wares. How stories are shaped across borders 
is thus critical to a livelihood and the power to influence the shape of stories is akin to a 
smuggler’s hard currency. If they are able to transmit a story of scarcity across a border, they are 
able to increase the value of their goods and their reputation as service deliverers to counter 
shortages. 
There are other shared characteristics between goods and narratives. Just like smuggled 
objects that are hidden from plain sight or transported on packed motorbikes via backroads in 
the early morning hours, stories can be whispered, told only after dark, or under embargo. 
In fact, they are perfect material for smuggling as – unlike goods and people – there are no 
control mechanisms that could even attempt to control their movement. 
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Current scholarship mostly focuses on how borders are shaped by the goods and people that 
move across it licit and illicit ways; these are interpreted by assessing their intended economic, 
social or military purpose and how the border changes that purpose (Frahm, 2015, Schomerus 
et al., 2013, De Vries, 2011, Feyissa, 2010, Newman, 2010, Brunet-Jailly, 2005). The study of 
smuggling is currently rooted in a material approach, which emphasises perspectives on the 
value of goods and the value of power that actors derive from being in control of how particular 
exchanges of goods happen at the border. Such emphasis overlooks the role of borders as 
important transport carriers for sensemaking. In addition to understanding borders as socially- 
produced demarcations, the imagination of the existence of a border invites us to treat bor-
derlands as a space that shapes narratives and gives meaning to events. For the field of border 
studies and the attempts to understand the nature, role and impact of smuggling, viewing 
narratives as tradeable artefacts and part of how people experience the border is a departure 
from how borders are usually utilised as analytical tools. 
Borders are often presented or imagined as intensely securitised and governed spaces. In 
many cases, however, large swaths of borders are in reality non-existent because they are not 
governed as a border or marked as such. There can be different reasons for this. People living on 
either side of the border share the same language, culture and livelihoods, so they rarely ex-
perience a border as division. Another reason might be that a border area is just too under-
populated and thus offers little commercial incentive to gain control of the border (Dobler, 
2016). In such cases, states may take calculated risks in leaving border management to non-state 
actors (Schomerus and De Vries, 2014). Even in these seemingly uncontrolled and open spaces, 
however, stories exist about the meaning of the border – so even where a border does not in 
fact exist as a governed space, it does exist as a created and actively used concept to support 
whatever activity is important to the narrator of the border. In addition to circulating stories 
about the border, simply crossing the border can change a story, an identity, a narrative – or the 
value of any of these, just like the value of a good changes when it is smuggled across a line. 
A deeper understanding of the ‘mental landscape’ of border residents is currently a blind spot 
in the study of smuggling. A mental landscape perspective offers a deeper appreciation of the 
fact that all human sensemaking of everyday life is shaped by 
memories and narratives of incidents and history … Individual emotions, feelings, 
beliefs, cognitions, as well as the experience of success and disappointment, inter-
mingle with community experiences. The mental landscape also influences decisions 
and behaviour, highlighting that both are shaped by context. (Schomerus, 2021b, p. 1, 
see also Amanela et al., 2020b)  
People living near borders use them as perspective or interpretative devices to make sense of 
events they observe and to create narratives of their lives. Stories, ideologies and meaning are 
shaped by the presence of the border, often creating different interpretations on either side of it. 
Particularly in contexts of violent conflict, people, stories and ideas can thus take on the 
hallmarks of ‘smuggled’ objects. Narratives used to make sense of acts of violence, for instance, 
can become a story of ‘the other side’ when moving from one country to the next, particularly 
if those narratives include people that behave differently depending on if they are on their home 
turf or on foreign territory. 
Perceiving narratives as contraband helps in understanding the implications of the presence 
of a border to the people living in its vicinity or those operating it. It also offers a helpful reading 
of national dynamics as perceived from a nation’s borderlands. Stories and narratives as 
smuggled goods shift from seemingly factual accounts to tall tales or anything in between. The 
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presence of an international border – however vaguely enforced – adds an additional layer of 
meaning and complexity to stories that are told on both sides. The social act of remembering 
produces narratives that explain and shape the present in similar ways to how an economic act 
of illicit trading shapes markets. They create actions, behaviour, memories – and the next 
narrative. 
When the Arrow Boys crossed the border to march to Obo 
The border between Ri Yubu and Bambouti, between South Sudan and CAR, offers an 
insightful case study into how the border and the narratives that are carried across it change both 
a situation and the meaning ascribed to it. From 2008 onwards, this borderland had seen violent 
attacks by the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), dispersed after the Ugandan forces 
launched an airstrike on Congolese territory to punish the LRA for failed peacetalks 
(Schomerus, 2021a, Atkinson et al., 2012). The LRA spread across Western Equatoria State in 
South Sudan, Haut Mbomou prefecture in the CAR and the Haut Uélé Province in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Civilians across three countries suffered this insecurity, as 
well as further negative impacts from the intense army presence of an African Union (AU) 
Mission with the aim of finding the LRA leader Joseph Kony. The AU mission was manned by 
the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF), supported by military advisors from the United 
States (US), and to a lesser extent the national armies of the three countries (Rigterink and 
Schomerus, 2017, Rigterink et al., 2014). 
The presence of foreign armies offered little protection for civilians; instead it added its own 
strain to people’s perceptions about the LRA and those who said they came to find them 
(Schomerus, 2012). On the South Sudanese side, the situation led to the formation of an 
initially dispersed vigilante militia (Schomerus and Tumutegyereize, 2009). These ‘Arrow Boys’ 
patrolled the bush along the border, particularly when there were reports of possible movement 
of armed groups. This meant criss-crossing the unmarked borderline in pursuit of armed rebels, 
sometimes walking deep – 5 or 10 km – into the CAR. 
The Arrow Boys helped US forces with intelligence reports and were sought-after in-
formants by the nearby-stationed UN forces. These international interactions created both a 
feeling of being informally validated in their work as a protection force, while supporting a 
growing grievance about the lack of pay or any other form of official recognition (Schomerus 
and Rigterink, 2015). Years later, in 2020, after many turns of violence, shifting loyalties and 
betrayal in which the lack of recognition for the Arrow Boys had played a part, one former 
Arrow Boy was given the governor position for the area (Braak, 2020 (September 7). The 
broader fall-out from South Sudan’s civil war – which started in December 2013, just two years 
after South Sudan had gained independence – and the politicisation of the Arrow Boys was 
posing complex challenges to the reintegration of what had then become a collection of armed 
groups that were posing a danger to civilians and broader peace (McCrone, 2020). 
In May 2013, many of these events were still in the future, and the communities affected by 
insecurity in this border area experienced the Arrow Boys as their deeply-committed protec-
tors. They were seen to provide a service necessary for survival that the national and inter-
national armies had failed to deliver. The Arrow Boys carried the narrative of selfless and 
competent community protection with pride, particularly when they efficiently liaised with 
international forces and suffered hardship during challenging weeks of patrolling the bush. 
Across the border, some youth and hunters from Obo tried to replicate the Arrow Boys model 
by organizing into a local ‘auto-defense’ that, while offering security to the area’s residents, 
never achieved the widespread legitimacy that the Arrow Boys enjoyed in the early days. 
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And then, at 5.45 am on 24 May 2013, everything changed when the group of 40–80 Arrow 
Boys from South Sudan’s Tambura attacked Obo (Ndelet, 2013). The attackers were swiftly 
arrested by AU soldiers and the local authorities. Twenty-nine of the South Sudanese Arrow 
Boys were taken to the Obo Gendarmerie; seven of them did not survive the night behind the 
locked doors of the Gendarmerie. 
In the social act of remembering the attack of Tambura’s Arrow Boys on Obo, narratives 
emerged that explained the present and shaped the future in similar ways to how an economic 
act of illicit trading shapes markets. If we look at narratives as we would at tradable goods that 
are moving through transport corridors (with the ability to take on the same characteristics that 
smuggled goods can take on) the shift in value explains the mental landscape of border residents 
and broader security dynamics. It brings out the role of border crossing as an act of meaning- 
making, leaving constraints behind and pursuing opportunities. 
Official demarcations 
Why did the Arrow Boys march for days to use their make-shift weapons to attack a town in a 
foreign country, known to everyone to be full of armed soldiers from three armies? Moreover, 
why did seven of the assailants die that night? 
The various narratives that exist around this event offer vastly differing explanations, yet they 
all have two things in common. First, the role of the border and how it changes a person’s 
value, constraints, and opportunities as they cross it. Second, that it is impossible to establish and 
verify one indisputable, ground-truthed explanation. It may well be the case that there are 
official explanations on both sides of the border. It seems likely, however, that, similar to the 
movable boundary marker, the exact meaning of such official explanation shifts between the 
two national authorities and is as unreliable as an official border stone that can be hauled around 
by two people. Such authoritative narrative might explain what seems like an overly laborious 
expression of sheer hubris, naivety or criminal energy. This official narrative has not been 
shared by either South Sudanese or CAR authorities – despite the involvement of govern-
mental and non-governmental actors on either side of this border in the aftermath of the attack. 
That aftermath developed at least some resemblance to an official explanation in the ilk of a 
movable border-stone. A government delegation from Bangui came to talk to the Arrow Boys 
who were by then referred to as ‘the rebels.’ CAR authorities decided to skip formal inter-
national follow up and to ‘pardon everything,’ according to the head of the Gendarmerie in 
Obo.1 This move might have been driven by the hope that if CAR did not kick up a fuss about 
the attack, the South Sudanese authorities would not question further why seven of its citizens 
died in custody in the CAR. The national chapters of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross in CAR and South Sudan were charged with the repatriation of both survivors and 
bodies. 
This involvement of national authorities simply suggests the attempt at a narrative of the 
matter having been dealt with by the authorities, much like the border stone is an attempt of 
official demarcation. From there on, it gets complicated. Without an official or even logical 
explanation, the act of sensemaking and situating the story becomes the domain of whoever tells 
it. Much like smuggled goods, the value of that story and its rationalities differ vastly on both 
sides of the border, expanding the official demarcation of the story into its vast and ambiguous 
surrounding territory of bushland, just like the official borderstone sits in undefined territory as 
seen in Figure 12.2. 
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Vast and ambiguous territory: the many versions of  
the Arrow Boys attack on Obo 
That the Arrow Boys walked across an invisible line of shifting sovereignties with the purpose 
to attack a town across the border has been rationalized along the lines of three broad narrative 
characterisations. These built upon each other and are told in many variations: rewards and jobs; 
using territorial expansion to behave in ways that bring gain but are not possible at home; or the 
pursuit of power. 
The first narrative seems like the most rational one, but at the same time displays meaning- 
making as contraband: the promise of rewards and jobs. Versions of this explanation are that the 
Arrow Boys were seeking bounty by arresting the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony. Others 
claimed that they were guns for hire that had been brought into the interlaced conflict com-
plexities of the South Sudan and the CAR, with possible paymasters being CAR’s former 
president François Bozize, who had been removed from power by the Séléka rebels just a few 
months prior. Other paymasters on offer were then-Sudanese president Omar al Bashir, South 
Sudan’s president Salva Kiir or vice president Riek Machar respectively (as proxies for their 
own fight with each other). Some people in South Sudan’s Western Equatoria suggested that 
the Arrow Boys had been hired by South Sudan’s notorious National Security to capitalise on 
the Arrow Boys’ skills as spies, offering intel on the situation in the CAR as the country was just 
becoming embroiled in wide-spread conflict. Proxy wars across borders are common in this 
region where ‘the fluid geographical reach also highlights the blurred boundaries of ideology’ 
(Schomerus, 2021a). 
A second set of narratives also looks at material gain, but with a stronger emphasis on how 
crossing the border increased the possibility and agency of the Arrow Boys’ significance and 
identity. Their violent behaviour and pursuit of material gain would not have been possible 
within their own communities, so that they had to take their skills gained in serving their 
communities to get a reward elsewhere for being an Arrow Boy. This narrative suggests that 
they were fighting their own poverty or even seeking revenge against the various military forces 
Figure 12.2 The South Sudan/CAR borderstone in the vast bushland.  
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who had treated them with disrespect on their own South Sudanese territory or had not re-
numerated them for their intelligence services. Within Obo, too, the individual motivations of 
these young men were of lesser concern than the overall motivation of their collective action. 
Compared to explanations in South Sudan, all narratives circulating across the border were 
firmly situated in the context of Central African politics, which at that moment in time was in 
great turmoil. 
A third and final variation of narratives in which the border becomes an empowering 
connector is the explanation that the Arrow Boys were seeking to re-establish forcefully an 
Azande Kingdom that was to traverse the division of the Azande People created by colonial 
borders. This kingdom was only possibly with the support of the Azande community around 
Obo in the CAR; since this support for a South Sudanese-led kingdom was not forthcoming, 
they sought it by force (Schomerus and Rigterink, 2016, Schomerus, 2014). In Obo, too, some 
residents championed the idea of an independent Azande kingdom, while others hinted at the 
ambition to march the 1200 km towards Bangui to depose the Séléka rebels from their newly 
gained power. This narrative echoes arguments from scholarship on this part of Africa, that 
posits that land, identity and citizenship are inseparable (Laudati, 2011). As Pécaut argues, 
despite the fact that borders are a shared space, establishing ownership of it or across it remains 
important and is best achieved by narrating such ownership (Pécaut, 2000). 
The story about the deaths of seven men in custody created a separate and autonomous 
collection of rumours. In Obo the stories of what caused their deaths range from lack of oxygen 
in the police cell, internal fighting among the assailants, to poisoning by people in Obo (some 
accusing the Muslim community, others the Ugandan army as poisoners). While sensemaking 
in Obo revolved around community tensions and suspicion and the conflicts in the wider 
country, the rumours of the causes of death were also smuggled back across the vast and 
ambiguous territory, into South Sudan in ways that offered meaning to the relatives of those 
who lost their lives. 
The road that offers hindsight 
Narratives are virtuosos of retrofitting; they explain how people – in retrospect – rationalise or 
even justify their actions and their starting points. Structuration theory has broken down the 
seemingly bifurcated relationship between structure and agency (Giddens, 1984), while be-
havioural economists uncovered the decision-making mechanisms that people employ to make 
quick assessments of a situation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). In some sense, the concept of a 
narrative is itself retrofitted. ‘Narrative’ is often used as a catch-all term to lump together 
memory, beliefs, experience, sense-making, social norms or simply the stories that people tell 
each other about the world in which they live. The personal narrative, following McAdams and 
McLean, is an internal and evolving life story that integrates an individual’s reconstructed past 
and imagined future to provide life with some degree of unity and purpose (McAdams and 
McLean, 2013). The collective memory, or the shared pool of knowledge and information 
among members of a social group creates the emotional ‘deep story,’ as Hochschild calls it, that 
binds together a group (Hochschild, 2016, Talarico and Rubin, 2003, Bower et al., 1978). 
There does not exist one shared narrative of the border residents – or even amongst Arrow 
Boys who participated in the ill-fated raid – of why they did what they did. There are some 
collective semantic memories; these are facts, concepts, and knowledge. Nobody disputes that 
the raid happened, that the participants used their shared identity as Arrow Boys to attack, or 
that the Arrow Boys were taken into custody and that seven of them died. This semantic 
memory mixes with episodic memory – the mosaic of experiences or autobiographical events 
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everyone collects to create an individual or communal ‘deep story’ of meaning (Hochschild, 
2016), which covers the possibilities of motivations and reasons outlined above. 
Often, research can implicitly assume that people’s semantic, episodic and collective 
memories are a reliable source of information that is stable and consistent – or at least this can be 
projected too easily in findings. Such research seemingly offers clarity on causality, human 
behaviour and politics and how these all intersect – without taking into account its own limited 
framework that produced such clear knowledge (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kostić, 2017). 
Overconfident findings derived from using people’s narratives as hard data has been rightly 
challenged as continuing to simplify – sometimes with the best of intentions – situations that 
cannot be simplified (Perera, 2017) and to offer a single catchy image that suggests a linearity 
that does not exist (Schomerus, forthcoming). 
In many ways, stories that become vaguer the more one tries to clarify them have been one 
of the defining features of our research projects in the borderlands of South Sudan. Much like 
George Orwell’s account of how, as a colonial police officer in British Burma, he shot an 
elephant, there is never one story to tell about a scene of events. The meaning and inter-
pretations that can be ascribed to the observable facts irrevocably change depending on who 
narrates and from what perspective. ‘A story always sound clear enough at a distance, but the 
nearer you get to the scene of events the vaguer it becomes,’ Orwell observed in 1936 (Orwell, 
1968). There is a further complication to an already difficult factual landscape: Almost in-
evitably, research in contested geographical, political and identity spaces fails to express the 
ambiguities and changeability of the ‘mental landscape,’ which is the core of how all events are 
experienced and interpreted (Schomerus, forthcoming, Trogisch, 2021). 
Border studies have alerted us to the power of the border as an interpretative tool. The 
inconsistencies in sensemaking are amplified by the fluid environment that a border can provide 
and the power a border has to change the value of something that crosses it. The border offers 
also a guard rail – within the fluidity it provides, it structures how humans can make sense of 
their actions on either side of it. The narratives are deeply embedded in the geography of a 
borderscape that acts less as a physical, and more as a conceptual demarcation line between 
behaviour at home and behaviour abroad – which in this case means protection of civilians at 
home and attacks against them abroad. 
Different explanatory narratives for the event emerged and the difference can be explained 
by the exact role assigned to the border in the narrative. When the border is imagined as 
separating the Arrow Boys from their communities, it gives them permission to pursue material 
gain with violence in ways they would not employ at home. In other narratives of the event, 
the border is conceptualised as a connector that allows the Arrow Boys to walk away and across 
a border in order to reconnect to the bigger politics at their home. In this narrative, the Arrow 
Boys are said to have gone into CAR to attack Obo as guns for hire for Central African, 
Sudanese or South Sudanese politicians. The border in this version is akin to a stage, needed for 
a performance that offers a different meaning on either side of it (Walker et al., 2011). Playing 
out the narrative of guns for hire for big men could thus offer ‘a stage from which to be seen by 
others,’ as Lund argues in his description of ‘fruitful misunderstandings’ in the performance of 
research and presenting grievances (Lund, 2014). The narrative of leaving to influence forces 
back home allows the border to play an identifiable, if complex part. Crossing the border 
changes the value of the story from the Arrow Boys as an effective civilian protection militia 
that accepted being overlooked when it comes to receiving official recognition or payment as 
part of their service to community to a story of a transactional militia seeking rewards. 
Imagining the border as the gate to proxy wars and engagement means that this narrative 
combines the social construction of how the border is imagined and the social construction of 
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who the Arrow Boys are with the social act of remembering the specific event of the Arrow 
Boys attack on Obo. 
That these changes in meaning happen is perhaps not surprising. Moving from one familiar 
place to another unfamiliar one changes the mind, as Clark and Chalmers argue while estab-
lishing that the environment plays an ‘active role … in driving cognitive processes’ (Clark and 
Chalmers, 1998). In this interpretation, the border is a tool deployed to become part of the 
cognitive tools of sensemaking – an artifact that, as Heersmink outlines, can be used to create 
memories (Heersmink, 2018). These memories are shaped by the artifact on offer, which is 
deployed in a liminal space of change, where one environment is left behind before another is 
conquered (Thomas, 2020, 17 March). In that perspective, carrying a narrative across a border 
and letting it be changed by its environment and social remembering that then creates beha-
viour and people’s actions is not dissimilar to the way the economic act of illicit trading shapes 
markets on either side of a border. 
Narratives as contraband: a future research agenda 
With growing scholarship on the meaning of narratives and the influence of information on 
people’s decision-making and behaviour, the perspective of stories as contraband offers un-
tapped potential for understanding how geographical, social and political boundaries intersect 
with narratives and actions. Often, the analysis of narratives remains limited to perception 
surveys, which are used to gauge primarily if a policy or programme is perceived to be working. 
Integrating a lens that treats narratives as goods that can be altered by identifiable factors offers 
an additional analytical tool to understand human behaviour. 
The current material gaze that guides most scholarship on smuggling is too narrow in how it 
thinks about value, neglecting too easily that value is a social construct that can only be created 
through storytelling. There are challenges, however, in looking at narratives too myopically 
through the smuggling lens, always asking how crossing a border changes them. Analysis of the 
origin and dynamics of narratives is required also without a look across an imagined or de-
marcated line to understand how stories of value are created within communities and not just 
by stepping out of their origin context. 
This concern does not dampen the need for interdisciplinary research that combines con-
siderations of smuggling and narratives. As smuggling often happens in intensely securitised 
spaces, the stories of how, exactly, military presence influences people’s lives need to be told. 
The perspective on people’s lives requires a much deeper insight into how narratives are 
constructed and how they shape behaviour, which calls for tighter interdisciplinary work that 
combines storytelling with behavioural analysis (Amanela et al., 2020a). This is a challenging 
field, not just in its data collection and analysis, but also in how crossing the disciplinary 
boundaries to understand better how stories of boundary crossings influence people’s actions is 
communicated and utilised within academia and policy. A smuggling perspective on stories and 
a story perspective on smuggling potentially offer great insights once more work is done in this 
field. What it already offers now is the realisation that – just as with the many versions of the 
Arrow Boy attack on Obo – there is no single policy to recommend and no single story to tell. 
Note  
1 Interview with Commander of the Gendarmerie, March 17, 2015, Obo.  
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13 
GENDER AND SMUGGLING 
Caroline E. Schuster   
The dominant approach to gender and smuggling in criminological debates has been premised 
on the notion of women’s progressive “emancipation” from restrictive and patriarchal gender 
roles (Selmini, 2020; Siegel, 2014: 56). It was understood that feminist political struggles the 
world over would shatter glass ceilings and lead to gender parity, including parity in the illicit 
labour of smuggling and organised crime. Summarising this thinking, Siegel (2014: 56) writes 
that, according to this approach, the role of women in criminal families was previously limited 
to being a passive, obedient and silent wife, mother and sister whose task was to take care of the 
household, raise the children, participate in funerals and weddings and promote the image of 
the male family member as ‘men of honour.’ 
These social restrictions were expected to be erased by changing gender norms and women’s 
liberation. Early – and controversial – feminist theories (e.g., Adler, 1975; Simon, 1975) 
emerged from the Second Wave of Feminism in the 1970s and posited that patterns revealing 
women’s comparative absence from criminal activity would evolve once women were included 
as active and independent participants in the labour market and public sphere (Selmini, 
2020: 347). 
In the decades after feminist debates focused attention on women’s liberation – including 
gender parity when it came to criminal profits – the ‘emancipation’ hypothesis has been critically 
re-evaluated along two axes. First, feminist theory has taken a much more nuanced approach to 
gender justice, particularly through wider explorations of subjectivity (Bourgois, 1996;  
Hautzinger, 2007), gender relations (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005), and multiple intersecting 
forms of inequality (Thomas and Galemba, 2013). Second, the emancipation hypothesis was 
revealed to be a fallacy based on “a lack of in-depth historical research [that] has resulted in the 
misleading observation that in the past only very few women occupied top positions in organized 
crime” (Siegel, 2014: 63). The rejection of progressive narratives of women’s empowerment was 
paired with a burgeoning research agenda tracking the global flows of information, economic 
opportunity, media representations, and communication channels that position women in 
complex ways vis-à-vis illegal markets (Kleemans et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2007). 
Despite feminist scholarship challenging the traditional view and documenting women’s 
multifaceted role in illicit economies, both popular and scholarly accounts reproduce and 
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reinforce commonly held perceptions about crime generally: men are highly over-represented. 
As scholarship on masculinity and the drug trade attests, this perception is often held by people 
within illicit economies themselves: “these male representations reinforce, reproduce, and re-
construct masculinity. Like most masculinities, men are defined as powerful and competent, 
violent and bold; women as weak and inept,” even whilst male drug robbers rely on highly 
proficient female accomplices to shake down drug dealers (Contreras, 2009: 482). Two issues 
are at stake. First, there is an empirical question about whether women have been active 
participants all along, even while their work has been minimised or ignored. Second, there is a 
normative question about equality, and whether this could be achieved by empowering women 
to rise through the ranks of smuggling organisations. The focus of this chapter will be on the 
first question, while addressing the normative implications in the conclusion. 
This chapter unpacks gendered tropes that have shaped both popular and scholarly approaches 
to illicit economies, and their cultural associations with masculine bravado. Using an in-depth 
ethnographic analysis of the role of smuggling in everyday life, particularly in household provi-
sioning and the sexual division of labour within domestic settings, the chapter develops a broader 
feminist analysis of the household as a key nexus in contraband economies, and not simply a site of 
women’s oppression. Understanding that nexus offers a better understanding of contraband as it is 
experienced in everyday life, as well as novel understandings of the fundamental ways gender 
relations constitute smuggling economies. Focusing on gender in this chapter does not amount to 
denying that illicit markets are still largely controlled by and benefit men. However, this approach 
challenges us to rethink the pervasive stereotypes about gendered roles and economic practices by 
highlighting women’s complex positions in the smuggling trade. 
Unmarked categories of smuggling 
The scant literature on women and girls in smuggling economies is itself telling. As sociologist 
Sudhir Venkatesh noted in his classic essay on “Gender and Outlaw Capitalism,” the moniker 
girl gangs exposes the longstanding subordination of women’s experience in street gangs to that 
of men, such that “male deviant collectives have (unsurprisingly) been given the unmarked 
category ‘gang’” (Venkatesh, 1998: 683). There is a deeply held assumption that men are the 
agents of gangs, and that women are either epiphenomenal to the social structure of criminal 
groups, or their passive victims (cf Anderson, 2005 for a critique).1 This observation – that men 
occupy the unmarked category of smuggler, narco, gang, mafioso, and so on, while women’s 
participation must always be marked and qualified – applies for illicit economies more generally. 
An attempt to document women’s participation in smuggling economies also calls for a re- 
think of how we track illicit economies over the twentieth century. Scholars of globalization 
have noted a major shift since the 1980s, such that the retreat of the welfare state and dereg-
ulation of many industries has put an emphasis on flexible, entrepreneurial, and informal labour. 
Illicit economies have concomitantly boomed. Women have been considered relatively 
insulated from the effects of neoliberal restructuring and global shift towards economic precarity 
that has been associated with the rise of informal and illicit economies in the Global South 
(Sassen, 2007; Young, 2007). This is  
based on the common assumption that female identity is generally not as contested as 
male identity … [and] the notion that female identity is rooted almost entirely in the 
family and the family is somehow less volatile than economic institutions  
(Moore, 2007: 190)  
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These assumptions about female identity led to an overemphasis on women’s participation in 
informal but licit economies. The feminized attributes of flexibility and care towards the family 
have been the primary justification for the boom in both not-for-profit and commercial mi-
crofinance lending, which sought to harness these apparently “natural” traits and put them in 
service of micro-enterprises (Kar and Schuster, 2016; Schuster, 2014, 2015). Being able to 
absorb economic shocks and provide the intimate care work to protect the family from the 
retreat of welfare states and harsh reality of privatisation has been seen as a testament to women’s 
supposedly inherent ‘resilience’ (Fraser, 2009). While the effects of microfinance are subject to 
considerable debate, the findings of both advocates as well as critics cast doubt on the pre-
sumption that women are “naturally” bound to the home, and that their economic practices are 
relatively protected from global economic transformations. 
While women’s uptick in participation in informal economies has been well documented, 
evidence points to profound social dislocations for women as well as for men brought on by global 
political and economic shifts in the twentieth century. Feminist criminologists suggest that the 
less-well-studied phenomenon of women’s participation in illicit economies further challenges us 
to rethink women’s rootedness in the domestic sphere. Joan W. Moore’s research on female gangs 
suggests that migration further dislocates young women from intergenerational socialisation, such 
that each adolescent group “sets its own norms for sexuality, aggressiveness, and self-control vis-à- 
vis drug and alcohol use” (Moore, 2007: 192). There is a disconnect, then, between stereotyped 
portrayals of women as “victims of organized crime or as ‘mean girls,’ girlfriends, wives, lovers or 
brides of notorious gangsters and mobsters” (Hübschle, 2014: 31), and the wider (though too 
often invisible and ignored) reality of women’s participation in illicit markets. 
This disconnect can be attributed to some widely held beliefs – both among the wider public as 
well as gang members themselves – about the figures that populate the smuggling trade, whether 
contraband, organised crime, money laundering, the drug trade, and so on. As criminologist 
Annette Hübschle has noted in her review of women in organised crime in Southern Africa, 
women are often ignored because of broader assumptions about a clandestine criminal under-
world. This association with violent crime erases the fact that “politicians, law enforcement agents, 
government officials and businesspersons facilitate illegal market exchanges and collaborate with 
organized crime networks” (Hübschle, 2014: 33). The reality of everyday economic practices 
suggests that, while stereotyped representations of violent and powerful men prevail in the media 
and in criminology treatments of illegal markets, qualitative research indicates a complex inter-
penetration of licit and illicit economies (Chalfin, 2008; Roitman, 2005), sustained by a diversity 
of economic projects and livelihood aspirations. This work on the wider social landscapes of 
contraband challenges the presumption of professional hyper-macho underground gangsters 
preying on a passive feminized upper world (Hübschle, 2014: 33). 
One way to address these limitations is to rethink the familiar dichotomies that separate 
men’s roles from women’s roles. Feminist scholars denominate this a “relational approach” to 
gendered economic life that addresses the connections among social categories rather than 
focusing on each pole of the binary in isolation. For example, this has led some feminist scholars 
to suggest women have an important supporting role in apparently masculine illicit economies 
(Anderson, 2005). Cases such as ethnic Albanian women supporting their husbands while not 
acting as ‘independent bosses’ themselves (Arsovska and Begum, 2014), or the elevated position 
of women in the Italian mafia as groups become more professional and less homicidal (Selmini, 
2020), suggest that these supporting roles carry pervasive gendered expectations about care, 
kinship, and appropriate femininity, and that these are constituted within wider systems of 
gender and sexuality. I turn now to the gendered roles that shape both smuggling and domestic 
life at their intersection. 
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Smuggling and domestic provisioning 
What would a relational approach to gendered economic life look like if it were applied to 
households involved in the smuggling trade? While the market has usually been understood as 
public, and opposed to domestic family life, a closer inspection of gender relations requires a 
more nuanced methodology. These interconnections between market and home were the focus 
of my ethnographic research (2006–2017) on debt and development in Ciudad del Este, the 
prosperous ‘special customs zone’ and notorious contraband hub on the Paraguayan side of the 
Tri-Border Area (TBA) with Argentina and Brazil (Schuster, 2015). Famous in the region as a 
re-export bottleneck for both licit and illicit commodities, the city is widely stereotyped as the 
unplanned and chaotic apogee of freewheeling frontier capitalism, driven by the needs of 
commerce and speculation. Even illicit commodities are re-exported. This is not driven by the 
quest for lower tariffs, but rather to harness the logistics, transportation, and financing networks 
that animate all trade in the region. Tellingly, “local state actors actively foster spatial disorder 
and legal uncertainty as part of planning practice” (Tucker, 2017: 74) especially to encourage 
speculative deals that benefit elites. The initial planning for the city in the late 1950s proceeded 
along just such lines. Urban development was immediately outsourced to a private conglom-
erate led by a close associate and sometimes-business-partner of Paraguay’s longtime author-
itarian regime of President Alfredo Stroessner (1954–1989). For a city designed and developed 
to channel flows of dark finance, citizens’ prosperity and well-being was inextricably linked to 
the fortunes of commerce, and often bundled up in the smuggling trade. 
Since private commercial profits were the only robust social safety net in Ciudad del Este, 
my research with women who took on small-scale microcredit loans focused attention on their 
many complex investments. More often than not, seeking out credit from a variety of finance 
companies, including anti-poverty microcredit loans, was part of an ongoing effort to invest in 
deals that would buoy them along with the rising tide of commercial fortunes in the city. For 
poor women making do in the margins of Ciudad del Este’s commercial boom, their invest-
ments – and the social security they were hoped to engender – were most often fuelled by 
mounting debts (see Han, 2011, 2012). By the early 2000s, the economy sagged under pressure 
from Brazilian customs enforcement and the slow-moving effects of regularizing regional 
customs laws through the Mercosur Southern Common Market (Dent, 2017; Rabossi, 2012;  
Schuster, 2019a). Seeking social security through commercial windfalls was ever more un-
tenable for low-income families (Schuster, 2019b). The net effect was ever-more desperate 
investments linked to ever-more desperate loan payments. 
One of the most striking encounters with smuggling during my ethnographic fieldwork in 
Ciudad del Este occurred in a family home surrounded by chickens and pigs, not the glitzy 
shopping malls and hectic traffic that have made the Paraguayan city a famous contraband hub. 
We were in the poor peri-urban outskirts of the city, in a settlement at the end of a winding dirt 
road, sitting around a plastic card table on the front patio in front of a small weatherboard home 
painted a cheerful salmon pink. I had arrived with the financing team from Fundación 
Paraguaya, a non-profit microcredit organisation that offered small loans to unlock women’s 
“entrepreneurial potential.” We were at this particular house to negotiate the terms of a new 
line of credit. The three generations of women sitting at the negotiating table – grandmother, 
mother and daughter – were smugglers. Tellingly, nobody at the gathering was willing to 
disclose the goods involved. 
The disagreement with Josefina, the loan officer in charge of managing the family’s line of 
credit, had nothing to do with moral or legal qualms with the women’s dubious line of work. 
Rather, she was concerned about the paperwork. For the loan to be approved by her own 
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managers in the organisation’s head office, Josefina was required to provide some proof of 
income to guarantee the viability of the business venture, such as purchase orders, sales receipts, 
and so on. The office was under intense scrutiny due to the wider macrostructural issues: the 
year was 2009 and we were in the middle of the global financial crisis, and the crash of credit 
markets around the world. At the microsocial level this left Josefina with a problem. Her folio 
of documents only contained a contract with the exporter. The hastily prepared agreement 
contained scant information: the equivalent of a handshake agreement, which would not stand 
up to scrutiny at the head office. The women insisted that they were planning on traveling 
across the border between Paraguay and Argentina via Brazil to “do the deal” (hacer negocio), but 
that it simply was not possible to get a formal receipt. They added that their aunt did the same 
thing and had even introduced them to the smuggling network. Trying to sway Josefina, they 
argued that their aunt was even a client of Fundación Paraguaya. By their telling, their kins-
woman had presented exactly the same information to secure her own approval for a line of 
credit. However, the whole family business was emphatically off the books, as were so many in 
Ciudad del Este. Despite being fully aware of what that implied, Josefina was adamant. She 
wanted a receipt, “something to prove what [she] was buying, some way to demonstrate 
commercial movement (movimiento comercial).” 
In the end, the grandmother came to the rescue. She sold the smuggled merchandise at an 
informal shop in the city centre, and also had a side business selling Avon cosmetics through a 
multi-level marketing arrangement. While the cosmetics business was financed independently 
from the smuggling, she offered to use the sales receipts and purchase orders to collateralise the 
loan her daughter was negotiating with Josefina, which in turn would ensure her own sales 
venture remained viable. All parties to the deal were satisfied: Josefina understood that the loan 
would be repaid but was circumspect with her questions, the family secured its line of credit and 
provided some valid documents for the finance company, and the observing ethnographer got a 
brief glimpse into Ciudad del Este’s smuggling economy. 
At the time, I found the encounter quite confronting. I was taken aback with the micro-
finance organization’s cavalier treatment of smuggling. The loan officer appeared to be much 
more concerned with getting the proper documentation than with what I perceived to be the 
more obvious scandal whereby development monies were fuelling the contraband trade. As I 
came to appreciate later, the complex intermingling of domestic economies with smuggling 
suggested that contraband also sustained what I call an economy of gender. That is, the social 
categories and scripts available to actors working within the smuggling trade were also relations 
of gender. 
A framework based on an economy of gender is not satisfied with comparing men and 
women. Instead, we must ask deeper questions about what being a woman actually means in 
Paraguay’s smuggling economy, and how womanhood is shaped by illicit trade. Women drew 
on these gender relations resourcefully to make a living in Paraguay’s dangerous and lucrative 
borderland. The microcredit deal was only possible because the family laundered the loan 
contract through the perfectly acceptable and feminine Avon business, which offered a veneer 
of respectability to the endeavour. The reason that the whole thing was believable was that it fit 
neatly with the microcredit narrative of feminine economic behaviour. The deal was endorsed 
by the NGO because it sustained the image of “women entrepreneurs” – gender expectations 
that kept Josefina and the NGO in business. While the NGO clung to the pristine image of the 
independent businesswoman, actual gendered interdependencies such as intergenerational 
matriarchal kinship obligations were the life blood of Ciudad del Este’s smuggling trade, were 
minimized by the lender. All of these economic behaviours were organised around specific 
expressions of feminine subjectivity. Crucially, these specific gendered identities (grandmother, 
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“hard woman” smuggler (Schuster, 2015), efficient financial professional specialising in wo-
men’s loans) stuck together in the social network through which Ciudad del Este’s commercial 
monies flowed. It only ‘worked’ because of the specific gendered performances of its principal 
actors. 
In her research on the spatial logics of “accumulation by transgression” in Paraguay’s Tri- 
Border Area, urban studies scholar Jennifer Tucker (2020: 1465) suggests that a local term, 
blindaje,2 is used to assess the differential visibility of illicit economic practices in Ciudad del 
Este. Used as vernacular to describe mutually beneficial arrangements between judges and 
politicians in the merchant bloc, blindaje promises impunity in exchange for kickbacks. This 
contextual invisibility was powerfully at work in the negotiations between Josefina and the 
intergenerational family of women smugglers. It was what allowed innocuous and feminised 
Avon sales receipts situationally to conceal the family’s contraband business, and allowed the 
smugglers to fly under the radar of state surveillance at the border. Tucker suggests that these 
practices of obfuscation often benefit powerful elites, since investigative journalism and political 
inquests demand evidence connecting particular individuals to specific criminal acts (Tucker 
2020: 1466; see also Schuster 2019a). Notorious contraband kingpins such as former President 
Horacio Cartes, who sits at the apex of a multi-million-dollar cigarette smuggling empire, rely 
on this obfuscation. For the ex-President, “raced and gendered performances of (im)plausible 
deniability also hide accumulation by transgression … [embodying] the alchemy by which 
transgression transmutes into legitimised political authority” (Tucker, 2020: 1466). 
My ethnographic analysis of the economy of gender in Ciudad del Este’s marginal low- 
income neighbourhoods suggests that powerful modes of feminine concealment work alongside 
elite obfuscation through blindaje. Women smugglers are relatively disregarded both by scholars 
assessing smuggling economies as well as by local narratives valorising masculine success and 
profits in the contraband trade. This worked to their benefit, as they evaded detection and 
moved freely in spaces where men were subject to higher scrutiny. However, flipping the script 
and re-reading the encounter detailed above draws out some unexpected convergences be-
tween the position of the former President and the family of smugglers. For the women, 
powerful family ties exceed the domestic context and connect them to valuable networks of 
accomplices, savvy negotiations make use of local cultural frameworks of visibility and con-
cealment, and the home is reconceptualised as a key site for financial speculation: these are all 
economic practices that should make us question whether women are really passive subjects of 
smuggling. However, even while we centre women in Ciudad del Este’s smuggling economy, 
we must not lose sight of the double disadvantage of gender and poverty. Smuggling offered up 
a pathway for marginalised women to make ends meet, but not an opportunity for accumu-
lation. Their multiple forms of disadvantage call into question the normative empowerment 
framework that views women’s greater participation as a good thing. 
Gendered labour as opportunity and vulnerability 
The women smugglers I encountered in Ciudad del Este participated in a type of trade that is 
very common in border zones and contraband economies throughout Latin America. Often 
denominated “ant contraband” (contrabando de hormigas, comercio hormiga), borderlanders his-
torically moved small quantities of goods through repetitive small trips across a porous border 
(Galemba, 2017: 6; Schuster, 2015). In Ciudad del Este, locals smuggle household items like 
cooking oil, petrol, Tupperware, tomatoes, and frozen chickens in order to provision their 
domestic economies. Women also work for hire, moving small consumer electronics like cell 
phones and laptops for Brazilian and Argentinean buyers, often slipping these in between the 
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folds of blankets and clothing that are seen as more traditionally feminine purchases. Contrabando 
de hormigas works because women do not fit the expected template of a smuggler, and can thus 
slip past border guards and checkpoints. This is “everyday petty smuggling in which most local 
residents are implicated” (Ferradás, 2013: 266). As Rebecca Galemba has noted, based on her 
ethnography of contraband on the Guatemala-Mexico border, “most of these goods were 
considered illegal only because they used the unmonitored route to enter and exit the country; 
otherwise they were mundane items such as corn, coffee, and clothing” (Galemba, 2017: 15), 
belying the historic interconnection of border zones as well as the role of the border as a 
politico-legal phenomenon that creates smuggling (i.e., redefining local exchange networks and 
provisioning strategies as extra-legal). 
Scholars of Latin American border zones have noted that “local residents have long pursued 
illegal routes to acquire commodities for their households and workplaces” (Jusionyte, 2013: 
244, 2015a), and frequently justify their unlawful – but licit and locally sanctioned – exchanges 
by critiquing unfair trade regimes and laws emanating from a remote political centre, and 
benefitting elites (ibid; Schuster 2019a). Through an analysis of the economy of gender in the 
smuggling trade, it is apparent that phenomenon such as ‘ant contraband’ are key modes of 
smuggling, and deeply bound up with wider political and legal dynamics. I argue that a feminist 
analysis can recast the domestic and the household as key sites within contraband economies, 
and not simply a characteristic mode of oppression for women bound (and limited by) their 
reproductive function (Leacock, 1979; Yanagisako, 2015). 
Rethinking the domestic and its relation to smuggling economies opens up two further lines 
of inquiry. First, the interpenetration of intimate and domestic activities such as self-styling and 
consumption with the flows of global trade and travel, forces us to rethink the boundaries, 
composition, and scale of “the household.” This is particularly important as global manu-
facturing has moved South, and relies heavily on a feminine labour force. Second, the fact that 
in many settings women continue to be bound to household and family duties means that 
violence is especially likely to affect them when drugs and money move through domestic 
spaces. 
Carla Freeman’s classic work, “Is Local: Global as Feminine: Masculine? Rethinking the 
Gender of Globalization” (2001) tracks women who practice “higglering” (market inter-
mediaries) in the Caribbean. Historically, they moved agricultural commodities from the 
hinterlands, and in turn brought urban commodities back to the countryside. In the context of 
plantation slavery, “she also came to embody a figure of womanhood in which physical 
movement, travel, and business acumen were defining characteristics” (ibid: 1019). Today, 
women travel between Barbados and Miami to make overseas purchases, “reselling these in an 
active (and illegal) informal market at home” (Freeman, 2001: 1021). Denominated “suitcase 
traders” due to their iconic travel accoutrements, these women range from airline flight at-
tendants, to middle class women shopping for friends, to specialists who make a business in a 
particular niche market like baby clothes. Despite the state’s attempts to crack down on the 
“suitcase trade,” this practice of illegally importing goods remains an important supplement to 
the income of unemployed and low-wage workers across the region (see also Ulysse, 2007). 
The practice of higglering is especially important for the low-income informatics employees 
who work as data-entry specialists at multinational companies in the free trade zone. These 
women come to rely on smuggled fashion accessories as both a supplement to their income as 
well as a crucial class-marker that helps define their upward social mobility. Rather than a 
vocation, this involvement in the “suitcase trade” is a supplement to the low wages they earn in 
offshore informatics and a consequence of the globalised work they perform in the corporate 
workplace.3 Their desire for the expensive foreign brand-name fashions that mark their 
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‘workplace professionalism’ and compliance with the company dress code was reinforced by a 
system of productivity rewards for high-achieving employees that included travel vouchers on 
American Airlines, which was owned by the same parent company as the informatics firm. 
Women went to great lengths to “purchase new clothes and accessories that mark their non-
factory [pink collar] status,” (ibid: 2024) working as smugglers in order to be perceived as 
disciplined and productive in their informatics jobs. Their informatics work in turn provided 
the resources like travel vouchers and incentives like professional recognition, both of which 
fueled their suitcase trade. Their personal self-styling and domestic provisioning was part and 
parcel with their public professional ambitions, and both relied on and enabled illicit com-
mercial importation. 
Conversely, scholars studying the narco-economy suggest that the regional and transnational 
drug trade perforates the boundaries of the household and expose women to heightened 
vulnerabilities in intimate settings. Shaylih Muehlmann’s poignant and finely detailed study of 
the drug war on the US-Mexico border focuses on several interrelated feminine identity ca-
tegories that shape – and, importantly, constrain – women’s options for relating to the narco- 
economy. Through the figures of “narco-wives, beauty queens, and mother’s bribes,” she 
underscores the fact that while “media representations of the drug cartels and the war on drugs 
[focus] almost exclusively on men [and] chronicle the exploits of macho drug capos, hit men, 
and smugglers” (Muehlmann, 2013: 30), the templates for feminine comportment are con-
figured around women styled as either mothers or the beautiful and sexualised girlfriends of 
powerful men. Women feel powerfully attracted to the role of “narco-wife,” exemplified by 
one research participant’s story of love at first sight when she saw a local youth sporting 
alligator-skin boots (symbolically coded for success in the narco business) (see also Arsovska and 
Begum, 2014). The feminized role of the narco-wife accrues a certain symbolic status of its 
own, and is empowering for women who attain wealth and can evoke the power to bring 
punitive violence to bear against rivals. However, the status of narco-wife is even more vul-
nerable than their powerful macho husbands. Not only are they targets of violence, torture, and 
murder as vengeance or retaliation against their spouse, but furthermore, “while narcos are still 
narcos when imprisoned, the luxurious life of a narco-wife is compromised beyond recogni-
tion” (Muehlmann, 2013: 47). 
Women find themselves limited by the templates of appropriate femininity available within 
Mexico’s narco-economy. At the same time, many low-income women are rendered vul-
nerable by their husband’s or son’s work in narco-trafficking through their presence in the 
home. Muehlemann observes that, 
Because many women in rural Mexico work from home, they tend to be at greater 
risk of exposure. They are in the places where the police and military are most likely 
to search first. On the other hand, women’s position in their homes also makes them 
vulnerable to cartel coercion. It is not uncommon in the rural north to intimidate 
people into allowing their homes to serve as ‘stash houses’ for drugs between deliveries 
or sales. In this case, someone knocks on the door and asks the woman at home to take 
care of something, a package, a vehicle, a box. She knows from their clothes and 
vehicles they are driving that it would be unwise to refuse. (Muehlmann, 2013: 41)  
Thus, women are left with few options, since their implication in the narco-economy is hardly 
a choice aimed at profiting from the smuggling trade. Instead, it is a feature of the inter-
penetration of the home and the drug economy, effectively collapsing the distinction between 
domestic and public spheres (Comaroff, 1987; Helliwell, 2018). 
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Importantly, women are no less vulnerable when they seek legal and licit work outside of 
the home. Indeed, as Galemba argues, “The criminalization of contraband moralizes the limited 
options of the poor by blaming them for their own plight while allowing more powerful 
entities to claim and protect legitimate profits and determine who can sell and have access to 
goods” (Galemba, 2017: 20, 2012). This is powerfully illustrated by the role of maquiladora 
manufacturing in Mexican “special customs zones,” which demand women’s labour and ex-
plicitly are geared towards feminized workers who are stereotyped as having “nimble” hands 
and “docile” attitudes (Salzinger, 2004). Again, there is not a sharp divide between the legal 
domain of factory work and the illegal world of the drug trade. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which establishes the legal and economic basis for maquila 
manufacturing, is also implicated in the transnational financing flows whereby profits from the 
drug trade are absorbed by hedge funds in the United States: a process of “moving the money 
when the bank accounts get full” (Muehlmann, 2013: 134–151). 
So why wouldn’t women choose the licit option of working at the manufacturing plants 
rather than remaining at home, exposed to the vulnerabilities of the narco-economy? The short 
answer is that these are hardly safe themselves. 
The maquiladoras have been associated with another terrifying surge of violence that 
has specifically targeted women in the region. The femicide that since 2000 has 
claimed the lives of more than 3,800 women and girls particularly in and around 
Ciudad Juárez (with another 3,000 still reported missing. (Muehlmann, 2013: 49;  
Wright, 2001, 2011, 2013)  
Tellingly, investigation of the murders – or making any effort at all, for that matter, to find 
the perpetrators and establish their motives – was never pursued by police. The governor went 
so far as to declare that the murdering and dumping of dozens of young women was “normal” 
for a rapidly expanding and impoverished border city such as Ciudad Juárez, and assured 
Mexican families that “there was nothing to fear as long as they knew where their female family 
members were” (Wright, 2011: 713). Thus, rather than policing their violent attackers, the 
authorities preferred to police women’s behaviour, using patriarchal norms to suggest “private 
women safely at home had nothing to worry about” (ibid), and further insinuating that women 
and girls who had gone missing might have lived “double lives” a sex workers. The effort on 
the part of public officials to weaken public sympathy for victims led to a culture of impunity, 
such that victims were blamed for ‘transgressing’ norms of appropriate femininity. Despite 
growing activism from feminist organisations, femicide was rarely investigated. Thus, while 
women’s vulnerability to the narco-economy came about indirectly because of their work 
within the home, women were specifically targeted with violence for working within outside 
of the home in the maquila factories. The targeting of factory workers challenges the moral 
distinction between legal and illegal, and upends pervasive assumptions about the relatively 
safety or danger of legal “free trade” versus illegal work in the narco-economy. 
Conclusion 
Studies thematizing gender in illicit economies and criminal networks have commented 
pointedly on the “paucity in literature [and] limited number of cases available” (Anderson, 
2005: 92; see also Moore, 2007). This is due in part to challenges of taking quantitative ap-
proaches to studying smuggling, which provide only a very superficial view of secretive and 
clandestine practices. Stereotyped assumptions about masculinity, criminality, and violence 
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further contribute to the limited field of research. Women’s smuggling is doubly concealed, as it 
is invisible to our social science data and also relatively devalued compared to men’s work. 
A new research agenda focused on the “economy of gender” in smuggling has a number of 
advantages. Foremost is the empirical benefit of documenting a hitherto invisible and mis-
understood area of social life and economic practice. The ethnographic studies surveyed here 
are beginning to open a window into the dynamics of illicit economies as they are experienced 
in the everyday. However, localizing analyses of smuggling and providing a detailed account of 
women’s economic practices helps answer one set of problems while leaving another intact. 
That is, dominant theories of illicit economies as a transnational and macrosocial phenomenon 
still refer to unmarked categories to produce the guiding concepts and debates that drive 
scholarship on smuggling. As Carla Freeman warned us in her critique of globalization theory, 
this is a wider problem for feminist theories of capitalism: “the turn to gender on local terrain 
has inadvertently been the slippery slope on which the equation between local and feminine 
gets reinscribed” (Freeman, 2001: 1012). This equation has the consequence of eclipsing 
women/gender from macro-structural models of political economy. Not only does this limit 
our theory-building around smuggling, it has real effects on the professional advancement and 
scholarly accolades of researchers focused on economies of gender, as they find themselves shut 
out of making high-impact contributions to social theory (Driscoll and Schuster, 2018). 
Perversely, detailed and novel research on gender and smuggling can open significant new lines 
of research while also torpedoing a research career. 
Alternative avenues are available. In this chapter I advocate for a feminist re-
conceptualization of smuggling that repositions gendered practices not merely as local or 
particular effects but also as a constitutive element in these economic systems. We can begin to 
see how this might take shape in feminist retheorisation of the household as a complex, multi- 
scalar and thoroughly financialised cultural logic, rather than an innate or sub-social unit to 
which women are bound by their reproductive function (see e.g., MacCormack and Strathern, 
1980). Feminist social science across a number of disciplines has a vital role to play by bringing 
together new theoretical approached to smuggling with granular empirical study of specific 
contraband economies. 
Notes 
1 The considerable literature on human trafficking and modern slavery paints a different picture, sug-
gesting that in 30% of the countries that provided data to the United Nations global report on traf-
ficking in persons, women make up the largest proportion of traffickers. The report adds that “in some 
parts of the world, women trafficking women is the norm” (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crimes (UNDOC), 2009). My review of smuggling focuses on the production and circulation of illicit 
commodities rather than enslavement. For a feminist approach to human trafficking, see (Ticktin, 
2011; Tripp et al., 2013).  
2 The term has a double meaning deriving from its military usage to denote a protective screen. See also 
Jusionyte’s discussion of convivencia (co-existence and collaboration) as a local idiom on the 
Argentinean side of the border (Jusionyte, 2015b: 129).  
3 In Barbados, this was highly feminized work, where women between the ages of 18–35 entered 
electronic data from airlines, insurance claims, legal briefs, and so on. Freeman suggests that informatics 
employers directly encourage the smuggling trips through a matrix of strict dress codes, free airline 
tickets as a reward for productivity, and women’s own desire for fashions that support their self-image 
of professionalism (Freeman, 2001: 1023–1024).  
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Between geopolitics and domestic power struggles 
Angélica Durán-Martínez   
In 2016 the Government of Colombia signed a peace agreement that ended its 60-year con-
frontation with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), one of the world’s 
oldest insurgencies. The lengthy agreement, one of the most detailed peace agreements ever 
signed, included a chapter on the “Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs” detailing a plan to 
eliminate coca crops through an alternative development and crop substitution program, and 
the depenalization of the lowest level of the cocaine supply chain (coca cultivators). This 
proposal, though caught in contradictions driven by the idea that coca crops could be com-
pletely eliminated, provided a comprehensive plan to address the economic marginalization that 
underlies the coca economy in Colombia. Yet, four years after signing the agreement the 
implementation got stalled, constrained by domestic and international challenges. Domestically, 
budget limitations, lack of political support, the inability to address socio-economic challenges, 
and the persistence of armed actors undermined the plan’s implementation. Internationally, 
steady cocaine demand, pressures from the United States to fumigate coca crops, and pressures 
from criminal organizations to maintain cocaine flows, undermined the potential for weakening 
the illicit cocaine trade while providing sustainable incentives for coca farmers to move into 
other licit, but less profitable economies. These difficulties in implementing the coca crop 
substitution programs in Colombia highlight the interplay between local and domestic factors 
that characterizes cocaine smuggling, and that this chapter will analyze. 
The chapter first revisits the most notable power imbalance in the cocaine trade, the geo-
political one, determined by the power disparity between producers and consumers of cocaine, 
which has been well recognized in the literature. Then the chapter addresses other dimensions 
of power imbalance that have started to be more recognized recently, and that still lag behind in 
informing public policy. Lastly, the chapter explores transformations in cocaine supply chains in 
the twenty-first century and discusses how they have affected cocaine smuggling and the po-
licies aimed to control it. 
From coca to cocaine: the geopolitics of cocaine smuggling 
The history of cocaine is a just over a century old, yet the history of coca, the plant from which 
cocaine is extracted, dates back more than 4,000 years. The coca plant has ancestral ceremonial, 
ritual, and secular uses for indigenous tribes in the Andean region of Latin America, and its uses 
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and psychoactive potential are very different from cocaine, yet the modern regime of drug 
control created throughout the twentieth century has treated these substances as roughly the 
same. Important scholarship on the cocaine trade emerged in the 1980s, highlighting how 
foreign power imbalances and the US–Latin America relationship during and after the Cold 
War shaped cocaine trade and policies (Bagley 1988, Lee 1991), but this scholarship tended to 
be policy oriented and focused on material power considerations. Over the 2010s, the scho-
larship has expanded theoretically and connected a focus on material power with the analysis of 
discourses and ideas, exploring intricate power relationships back to colonial times when coca 
use first became known to the world, passing through the discovery of cocaine and the first 
efforts to regulate or diminish its use, to the more complicated politics emerging after the entire 
cocaine commodity chain became globally prohibited in 1961 (Durán-Martínez 2018,  
Gootenberg 2008). 
From colonial regulation of coca to restrictions on cocaine legal trade 
The power imbalances associated with coca leaf during colonial times mimic in some ways the 
disparities that characterize cocaine smuggling since the second half of the twentieth century. 
The Spanish empire used the stimulating effects of coca leaves to increase productivity in 
mineral exploitation, but relegated traditional forms of coca chewing and exchange, which 
were deemed immoral by the Catholic church. When cocaine was first synthesized in 1860, and 
a legal economy emerged, coca cultivation was concentrated in Peru, which developed a solid 
legal industry (Gootenberg 2008). Through the late 1800s and early 1900s regulations over the 
legal commerce tightened progressively, creating the initial opportunities for illicit markets to 
emerge. Before the legal cocaine trade was outlawed globally in 1961, power imbalances that 
demonized traditional indigenous practices had already motivated campaigns to eradicate coca 
crops, blurring the distinction between the plant and the synthetized drug. Such campaigns 
were promoted both by international crusaders and an array of domestic actors including 
doctors and lawyers who, without solid scientific evidence, blamed coca chewing for the ill-
nesses and difficulties faced by indigenous communities (Davis 2020). 
Cocaine smuggling networks appeared in the early twentieth century in the cracks of the 
initial quotas on legal commerce but were not as sharply characterized by geopolitical power 
imbalances, and emerged in response to a combination of temperance campaigns in the United 
States, and a growing, though still small, market for illegal recreational cocaine use. The ap-
pearance of evidence of addiction, and growing cocaine use in the underworld of the United 
States and some European nations, set the stage for attempts to limit the legal industry. This is 
turn generated opportunities of diversion from the legal market involving countries where 
pharmaceutical companies synthetized cocaine, such as Germany or the Netherlands, less 
known players such as Japan, which maintained coca plantations in Taiwan, and other countries 
which rivaled Andean coca production at the time, such as Java (Courtwright 2001, Farber 
2019, 15–30). World War II disrupted these networks, but then in the 1960s cocaine use started 
to grow again in the US, setting the stage for a new wave of smuggling. 
Historian Paul Gootenberg (2008) documents how as restrictions on the legal cocaine in-
dustry grew, the illegal market expanded responding to growing demand. By the 1950s, the 
oldest legal cocaine industry, Peru’s, had decreased in size first because there was competition 
from other producers in the world (such as Dutch Java) but then because restrictions on non- 
medical use, and then on medical use, grew, particularly in the United States. After World War 
II, cocaine use expanded and more sophisticated transnational smuggling networks emerged. 
These networks, involving mostly traffickers of Cuban and Chilean origin, were relocated to 
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other parts of South America and the United States after the 1959 Cuban Revolution and 
Augusto Pinochet’s 1973 military coup in Chile1 put pressure on dismantling these networks. 
The market was mostly seized in the 1970s by emerging Colombian drug trafficking organi-
zations, which became nodes of cocaine smuggling networks and of the war against them. 
These events shaped a geography of cocaine production that has persisted for decades, with 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru constituting the world’s major coca and cocaine producers, and 
North America, particularly the United States, remaining the largest cocaine consumer in the 
world. Compared to other illicit drugs (opioids, opiates and, cannabis), as of 2018, cocaine had 
the lowest reported prevalence rate for the world as a whole (0.38% of the population com-
pared to 3.86 for cannabis or 0.61 for opiates) (UNODC 2020) and consumption was con-
centrated in the Americas and Oceania, followed by Europe. While power asymmetries 
characterize all forms of smuggling, it is thus feasible to argue that the influence of the United 
States in cocaine policy and in its smuggling dynamics is stronger than for other drugs because it 
is tightly connected to the geopolitical power dynamic between Latin America and the United 
States. 
The US and the war against cocaine 
Some historians suggest that the analytical emphasis on the US War on Drugs sometimes 
overlooks how other superpowers contributed to shaping the international drug control system 
(Collins 2018). It is undeniable, however, that the United States’ influence made cocaine the 
subject of one of the most militarized antidrug campaigns in history (Andreas 2019). Unlike 
opioids, for example, legal cocaine trade is marginal and confined to small markets regulated 
domestically. As Bewley-Taylor (2016) argues, when the first international legal instruments of 
drug control emerged, the concern with regulating coca and cocaine was weaker compared to 
concern over opium. The 1912 Hague International Opium Convention, the first multilateral 
legal instrument for drug control, for example, only contains a minor mention of cocaine, and 
up to the late 1940s, neither Bolivia or Peru (the main producers of coca leaf at the time) nor 
countries with pharmaceutical interests in legal cocaine like Germany, supported an interna-
tional crusade against coca or cocaine. This changed after World War II, when the United 
States’ growing concern with cocaine use aligned more closely with government interests in 
Bolivia and Peru to eliminate “backward Indian behavior” materialized in coca chewing. 
Since mid-twentieth century, US interests have prevailed in coca and cocaine regulation, as 
reflected in the framing and enforcement of the three major international treaties that make up 
modern international drug control: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; the 1971 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs. In 1948, the Commission of Narcotic Drugs (CND), dominated by the United 
States during the early post-war years (Bewley-Taylor 2016), launched the Commission of 
Enquiry into the Coca Leaf, which with feeble scientific evidence declared that coca leaf was 
deleterious for health and equated it with cocaine. The US lobby was crucial for the framing of 
the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which equated coca and cocaine, did not 
recognize traditional, legal, and medical uses of coca leaves, and only included an exception that 
allowed Coca-Cola to procure raw materials for its popular drink. In the 1980s Peruvian and 
Bolivian delegations at the United Nations, motivated by changing domestic coalitions which 
now included indigenous groups, lobbied to include language recognizing traditional uses of 
coca in the 1988 Convention which complemented the 1961 treaty by expanding the policing 
and sanctions of illicit drug trade. The lobbying was partially successful, but did not change the 
spirit of the Convention, creating a gray area in the legal status of coca chewing and cultivation 
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for licit purposes. In 1995, US delegates prevented the publication of a study by the United 
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) which concluded that 
most coca leaf use had no negative health effects. In 2008 the United States delegation opposed 
a proposal by Bolivia to reform an article of the 1961 Convention that prohibited and aimed to 
abolish coca leaf chewing, on the grounds that coca leave production increased cocaine pro-
duction potential (Bewley-Taylor 2016). 
US influence in policing the international cocaine trade has also been manifested in the 
funding of, and pressure for, militarized campaigns against cocaine trafficking that have led to 
human rights violations and disproportional policing (Youngers and Rosin 2005). During the 
Cold War, such campaigns merged with, and reinforced anti-communist efforts, though in 
many cases the latter took precedence, as became evident in the infamous Iran-Contra scandal 
(Dale and Marshal 1991). After the end of the Cold War, the emphasis on militarized drug 
control expanded, with notable campaigns such as Plan Colombia, a controversial antinarcotics 
plan that since 2000 deployed US$10 billion in US assistance to combat cocaine production and 
reestablish security in Colombia. Plan Colombia is officially touted as a success story given an 
initial reduction of coca crops and an improvement in some security indicators, but it also 
caused human rights violations, extreme militarization, and ignored the expansion of para-
military groups (Tate 2015). Besides its cost in human lives, militarized campaigns have also 
been jeopardized when US domestic allies, often touted as drug control champions, engage in 
drug trafficking themselves, as occurred with the Chief of Intelligence in Peru in the 1990s, 
Vladimiro Montesinos (Rojas 2005). 
The focus of US-influenced policies has been the reduction of supply, rather than demand, 
which in turn, has put the burden of militarized drug control on drug-producing rather than 
drug-consuming countries. Yet within the US, cocaine policies have deeply impacted mar-
ginalized sectors of the US population, particularly African Americans. As Michelle Alexander 
argues, in the 1980s as crack use increased, the policies aimed to control it repressed and 
marginalized black populations, in what she terms The New Jim Crow, a form of maintaining 
racial segregation through mass incarceration (Alexander 2010). Both the trafficking and use of 
crack cocaine were concentrated among black populations, because crack provided an escape 
valve to lives of hardship, and the involvement in trafficking represented an avenue for eco-
nomic and cultural integration (Farber 2019, Reinarman and Levine 1997). Racialized patterns 
of use and trafficking fed exaggerated depictions of crack’s effects and its “contagious” potential, 
which were used to legitimize disproportional laws. In 1986, at the peak of the anti-crack 
euphoria the Reagan Administration introduced mandatory minimum sentences posing radi-
cally different penalties for cocaine and crack: a five-year minimum sentence was associated 
with possession of five grams of crack as opposed to 500 grams in the case of cocaine. The Anti- 
Drug laws of 1988 deepened this disproportionality by imposing high level trafficking sentences 
to any member of a drug trafficking conspiracy, regardless of the level of responsibility. 
Consequently, many low-level dealers lacking resources for private defense lawyers who can 
negotiate sentences, heavy users, and innocent people lacking legal protection, ended up with 
long sentences, feeding the mass incarceration problem of the United States. Zero-tolerance 
policies and sentencing procedures deepened racial biases and systemic inequalities, and hyper- 
policing also made the trafficking disputes more violent, constituting one factor behind the so- 
called crime epidemic in the United States between the 1970s and 1980s (Blumstein, Wallman 
and Farrington 2006, Goldstein et al. 1989). 
In sum, the influence of the United States in cocaine control efforts is evident. A focus on 
the geopolitics of cocaine, however, may have minimized the importance of domestic pro-
cesses, and other forms of power imbalance, which are explored next. 
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Domestic processes: state power, development, and violence 
Recent literature has recognized how complex domestic power dynamics shape cocaine 
smuggling as much as international forces (Durán-Martínez 2018, Gootenberg and Dávalos 
2018), though debates persist on whether domestic or international forces are more important. 
Methodological, theoretical, and empirical innovations emphasizing the importance of disen-
tangling micro-processes and the lived experience of all actors involved in smuggling and its 
policing in specific geographical spaces, have complemented and expanded an earlier focus of 
the literature on broad descriptions and archival analysis, partially rooted in the idea that 
qualitative studies of the illicit were impossible. I focus on three issues examined in recent 
literature illustrating crucial connections between domestic politics and cocaine markets. First, 
the variation in power and profits along the cocaine supply chain creates inequalities which are 
either downplayed or reinforced by drug policies. Second, differences in the organization of 
state power and in the business organization of cocaine trafficking, shape variations in violence 
associated with the cocaine trade. Lastly, complex relationships with developmental projects 
make cocaine smuggling both a result of state power, and a reflection of cracks within it, rather 
than just a simple result of state weakness. 
Supply chain divergence 
Iconic characters like Pablo Escobar, the infamous leader of the so-called Medellín cartel in 
Colombia, who has inspired numerous movies and TV shows, have dominated popular images 
of the cocaine trade. These images emphasize large profits and powerful organizations, but 
often ignore complicated realities and power imbalances between the lowest levels in the supply 
chain and powerful criminal leaders. 
Cocaine, like heroin, has a long supply chain, from production to distribution, and is 
characterized by disproportional profits among its stages, reflecting characteristics of the drug 
(the psychoactive potential of cocaine emerges through a complicated process that adds many 
chemicals to the coca leaf), the geography of the markets, and the policing of the illegal trade. 
All of which add large profits to the final product, and most importantly create incentives for 
criminal organizations to emerge to manage the international trade. For example, the farm gate 
value of the coca leaves required to produce a kilogram of cocaine in Colombia is less than 
US$1,000, but the typical retail price of one kilogram in the United States is about US$78,000 
(Reuter 2014). More importantly, the connections among individuals involved in the pro-
duction of raw material (coca growing), and those in the distribution level are tenuous. In 
Colombia for example, by 2017 the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime estimated that 
44% of coca growers transformed coca leaves into cocaine base, and then sold it to the orga-
nizations controlling exports and wholesale. The remaining farmers sell untransformed leaves, 
but even those selling cocaine base receive a relatively small profit (SIMCI-UNODC Sistema 
Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos – Oficina de Naciones Unidas contra las Drogas y 
el Crimen 2018, 17). 
Recent scholarship based on careful case studies shows how the operation of smuggling 
networks varies across and within countries (Kenney 2007). For instance, in Peru, drug traf-
ficking organizations are often decentralized and limited to intermediation in the distribution 
for export (Van Dun 2014). In Colombia, by contrast, various armed groups engage in different 
aspects of drug trafficking as discussed by Idler in this volume, and consequently, exert more 
control over lower production levels, although coca growers and distributors remain in-
dependent and rarely belong to a trafficking organization. Across the transit regions of the 
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Caribbean and Central America, many organizations participate in the cocaine trade. While 
Central American street gangs are increasingly seen as central actors in drug trafficking, and 
their involvement in the cocaine trade has increased over the years, it is not always direct or 
predominant, and varies across countries (Dudley 2010). In El Salvador, gangs profit more from 
extortion than from the drug trade, and remain independent from drug traffickers, whereas in 
Honduras drug trafficking organizations, colluded with elite politicians, are more powerful and 
capable of controlling gangs and engaging them in trafficking. In Guatemala, traditional drug 
trafficking families and organized crime networks engage more prominently in drug trafficking 
than gangs (Cruz et al. 2012). 
Drug policies often fail to recognize such diverse incentives, connections, organizations and 
profits along cocaine supply chains. For example, in Colombia and Peru in the 1980s and 
1990s, the communist guerrillas FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and 
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) taxed coca growing and acted as intermediaries of coca 
growers. Both national and US authorities interpreted this engagement as an attempt to control 
and profit from the international drug trade, ignoring that cocaine trade was a source of profits 
but also a strategy to create social support bases among coca farmers (Felbab-Brown 2009). As a 
result, policies that attacked crops to weaken insurgencies (such as forced eradication) backfired. 
In Peru, in the 1990s the government mounted a more effective campaign against the Shining 
Path precisely when it stopped focusing on coca eradication. 
Violence 
Cocaine markets are often depicted as extremely violent, minimizing the variation that exists 
within the cocaine trade (Angrist and Kugler 2008, Naim 2006). To be clear, violence is 
prominent, and a cursory comparison shows higher homicide rates across countries along the 
cocaine trafficking routes than in those along opiate trafficking routes (UNODC [United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime] 2016). Violence is also evident in prominent examples: 
the war that Pablo Escobar declared against the government to stop the extradition of 
Colombian nationals to the United States in the late 1980s; the extreme violence that between 
2007 and 2020 has caused more than 300,000 deaths in Mexico; or the role of cocaine traf-
ficking in funding non-state armed actors (paramilitaries and guerrillas) in the Colombian civil 
war. However, within and across cocaine producing and transit countries violence varies due to 
factors that the scholarship is only starting to explore, such as the nature of the organizations 
involved and the level of competition among them, the relations among state power, electoral 
competition, and criminal groups (Durán-Martínez 2018a, Trejo and Ley 2020) the design of 
enforcement policies (Lessing 2017), and the less explored civilian interactions with traffickers 
(Blume 2021). 
The violent consequences of transnational illicit markets like cocaine are thus mediated by 
local power dynamics. Violence tends to increase where competition among criminal groups is 
higher and declines whenever a group controls the market. The scale of the violence, however, 
also depends on the nature of the actors involved. Colombia experiences higher violence 
because more sophisticated trafficking groups participate in all the aspects of the supply chain 
and connect in intricate ways to a long-standing civil war. In Bolivia by contrast, most actors 
work in the initial links of the supply chain (cultivation and harvesting of coca leaves, and 
production of coca paste), thus reducing the economic stakes when market conflicts do emerge 
(Grisaffi 2019). Additionally, Bolivian cocaleros (coca cultivators) have mobilized through 
unions and indigenous communities to protect and advocate for legal and traditional uses of 
coca. As a result, violence in Bolivia is low, though, notably, cocaine fueled elite violence and 
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authoritarian rule in the 1950s and 1980s. In Peru, indigenous movements also exist but they 
are weaker and were delegitimized due to the connection between coca cultivation and the 
Shining Path guerrilla group in the 1980s. As a result, weaker grass roots mobilization may have 
made trafficking networks more prominent and organized than in Bolivia, but more fragmented 
and decentralized than in Colombia. In Colombia, indigenous traditions related to coca, and 
indigenous mobilization, are more limited than in Bolivia or Peru. In the 1990s, coca-growing 
peasants (campesinos cocaleros) mobilized in opposition to the government’s forced eradication 
and militarization policies (Ramírez 2011). The stigmatization and victimization derived from 
the engagement of armed groups and cocaine trafficking organizations made it difficult for these 
social movements to advocate for legal coca production. For example, in 1999 indigenous 
communities founded a company producing coca-derived products, but the institution reg-
ulating agricultural and food production prohibited commercialization outside of indigenous 
communities (Ramírez 2020). 
Scholarship on violence also highlights the significance of unpacking state power and its 
influence on the cocaine trade. States combat crime, but they can also protect and benefit from 
illicit trades, and changes in state power and in electoral dynamics have contributed to changing 
violence in cocaine markets. The history of Mexico since the mid-2000s illustrates this dy-
namic, as the breakdown of the hierarchical political structure created around the decades-old 
semi-authoritarian rule of the PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party) was crucial for the 
spiraling violence the country has experienced since 2007 (Durán-Martínez 2018a, Trejo and 
Ley 2020). As other contributions in this volume highlight, the relation between state power 
and smuggling is multifaceted, sometimes highlighting state absence and weakness and others 
making evident its power and centrality. Thus, rather than assuming unidirectional interactions 
between states and cocaine markets, the scholarship has advanced in uncovering how forms of 
organizing state power, and state policies, shape smuggling dynamics. This is also evident in 
recent studies of the relationship between cocaine smuggling and development (Gootenberg 
and Dávalos 2018). 
Coca, cocaine, and development 
The earnings of coca growers and low-level workers are often essential for survival in coca- 
growing communities and in marginalized distribution hubs with high poverty and limited 
infrastructure (Grisaffi and Ledebur 2016). The fact that most coca-producing regions are lo-
cated in poor areas reflects how state weakness, and sometimes absence, are key drivers of illegal 
economies. Studying the cocaine trade only through the lens of state weakness, however, 
obscures how state power shapes and even strengthens it, or how cocaine has created alternate 
paths to accessing state power and economic circuits. 
For example, state developmental projects have shaped the geography of cocaine.  
Gootenberg and Dávalos (2018) document how centers of coca production for the cocaine 
trade in the 1980s, in the Amazonian frontiers of Bolivia (the Chapare region), Colombia (the 
Putumayo region), and Peru (the Huallaga Valley), were the subject of state-promoted colo-
nization and agricultural expansion projects in the 1960s. These projects, aimed at expanding 
agricultural frontiers, attracted migrants with promises of land and employment, but when 
projects failed or were abandoned, an idle and impoverished work force found an alternative in 
the illicit cocaine trade (Paredes and Manrique 2021). The cocaine trade then became the main 
connection of these areas to capitalism; for example, according to UNODC, in 2017 the value 
of cocaine production in ten municipalities concentrating 44% of total coca crops in Colombia 
represented almost double the amount of the municipal budget (SIMCI-UNODC Sistema 
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Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos – Oficina de Naciones Unidas contra las Drogas y 
el Crimen 2018). In some regions, coca leaf trade provides the cash flow that drives local 
economies, creating complicated relationships between licit and illicit activities (Ramírez 2014). 
For coca cultivators, the differential profits between coca and other licit crops are not as high as 
sometimes assumed but are appealing because they are reliable even in difficult-to-access areas 
(Zevallos 2017). 
Understanding that illicit cocaine’s history can be traced to failed developmentalist projects 
adds complexity to the scholarly view of cocaine trade as resulting from state weakness and 
absence (Bunck and Fowler 2012, Thoumi 1992). Through its drug policies, failed devel-
opmentalist projects, and collusion with organized crime, state presence shapes the history of 
cocaine smuggling. This nuanced understanding of the relation among state, development, and 
the cocaine trade also provides crucial policy lessons. 
For decades, international organizations and governments have implemented alternative 
development projects aimed at providing sustainable livelihoods that can replace coca culti-
vation. These projects have more effectively reduced coca crops than other repression and 
forced eradication models, but they still show mixed results, among other things, because they 
fail to recognize how coca production and the cocaine trade transform communities, or how 
crop replacement needs to occur in tandem with the creation of reliable markets for alternative 
products. More importantly, alternative development often clashes with parallel repressive 
policies that make state presence ambivalent, while combining strong militarized operations 
with extremely weak social service provision and legitimacy. To come full circle, these local 
efforts are complicated by persistent transnational demand for cocaine, which given its illegality, 
is more profitable than other markets. These tensions are evident in the evolution of attempts to 
innovate cocaine-related policies, discussed below, which have partly derived from changing 
supply chains and geopolitical dynamics. 
Changing supply chains and geopolitics 
The literature on cocaine smuggling has recognized well how the power imbalances discussed 
so far, and the policies implemented to eliminate cocaine flows and routes, have shaped, rather 
than eliminated, cocaine flows (Clawson and Lee 1996, Eddy, Sabogal and Walden 1988,  
Zepeda and Rosen 2014). In the best cases, successful anti-narcotics operations have dispersed 
smuggling routes to many more locations across the Americas and Africa, and in the worst cases, 
they have increased levels of violence, as has occurred in Mexico since the government started a 
militarized campaign to dismantle drug trafficking organizations in 2006. Scholarly debates 
remain, however, and further research is still necessary to determine the extent to which new 
policies can emerge and reduce cocaine smuggling, or at least its most destabilizing con-
sequences. This section briefly discusses the connection between anti-narcotic policies and 
smuggling dynamics, and how, paradoxically, geographic changes partially brought up by anti- 
narcotic policies have created space for new policies. It also shows how the transformative 
potential of new policies is hindered by complex economic and social realities and the illegality 
of the trade. 
The distribution of coca and cocaine production among the three Andean countries has 
varied over time, partially in response to enforcement actions. In the early 1990s, offensives 
against coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia prompted crop surges in Colombia. According to 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2010, 2014), in 1990, Bolivia 
and Peru concentrated 87% of the cocaine production potential worldwide; by 2000, 
Colombia concentrated 79%. This pattern was again reversed between 2000 and 2012, when 
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the coca-cultivated area decreased by 52% in Colombia while it increased by 37% in Peru.2 
After 2014, cultivation increased rapidly in Colombia, reaching a historic high in 2017. In Peru 
and Bolivia, cultivation declined partially as a result of new policies to control coca cultivation, 
though both countries also experienced increases in 2016 and 2017, driven by multiple factors 
including an upward demand trend in the U.S, and a decline in gold prices, as illegal gold 
mining is an alternative economy to coca, especially in Colombia and Peru. 
Enforcement operations and changing market dynamics contributed to multiply cocaine 
transit points in the 2010s. While in the 1970s and 1980s, most cocaine transited into the 
United States via maritime routes in the Caribbean, in the new millennium smuggling routes 
included several inland points in Central America and Mexico, and complicated paths through 
West Africa into Europe. Countries in the Southern Cone of the Americas became more 
important, although still minor, transit points for trafficking routes bound for Europe; 
Venezuela and Brazil became transit points for cocaine routes through South and West Africa. 
Cocaine processing laboratories, and facilities for processing intermediate and low-quality forms 
of cocaine base aimed for intraregional markets, have appeared in new countries including 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela (UNODC 2020). The geography of cocaine flows 
in the 2010s was thus more diverse than in prior decades. 
Diversified cocaine supply chains are also linked to new consumption markets. By the late 
2010s, the cocaine market in Brazil became the world’s second largest, representing 18% of the 
global market in terms of users, mainly supplied by Bolivia. In the 2010s, local drug use became 
more widespread and noticeable to governments and citizens across the Americas, though it was 
not entirely new and often reflected prior inattention to complex long-term consumption 
trends. In 2015, UNODC estimated an annual cocaine prevalence rate of 0.8% for South 
America, higher than the 0.7 reported in 2004–2005, but lower than the 1.3% reported in 2013 
(UNODC [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime] 2016). Although increasing rates of 
cocaine use in countries that are traditionally seen as producing and transit countries have to be 
analyzed with caution – in no small part because of difficulties in finding reliable data – they 
indicate that supply chains have dispersed due to the effects of enforcement over cocaine transit 
routes and production nodes, and a growing cocaine use outside of the United States and 
Western Europe. The expansion of illicit activity portfolios by criminal groups, though not 
entirely new, also drives the diversification of cocaine supply chains, as some protagonists of the 
cocaine trade increasingly engage in other illicit markets, as occurs in Colombia, Mexico, and 
Venezuela. 
It seems appropriate to ask whether these changes can transform the geopolitical imbalance 
that has characterized policy making regarding cocaine control. This is a question that deserves 
to be more systematically researched, but an initial look suggests that the effect is mixed. On 
one hand, in the early 2010s, producing countries’ efforts to challenge the militarized war on 
cocaine, though not welcomed, were not completely boycotted by the United States, perhaps 
reflecting the political preferences of the Obama administration, and the policy priority given to 
the opioid epidemic, as cocaine use stabilized and became less of a concern for domestic security 
in the United States. On the other hand, the United States remains the world’s largest cocaine 
market, and the policy focus on cocaine supply reduction increased again as some statistics 
indicated growing cocaine use after 2014,3 and Donald Trump’s government reinforced more 
repressive drug control policies. Beyond the US, cocaine’s transnational markets and the dif-
ficulty of forging a consensus to reform international conventions, complicate the im-
plementation of alternative supply control policies, as evident in Bolivia and Colombia. 
This chapter highlighted that cocaine smuggling has been characterized by a power im-
balance between producers and consumers, which has translated into policy making, but at the 
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same time, policy making is still mediated locally. In Bolivia, for example the United States 
sponsored highly militarized drug operations such as the Triennial Plan, Operation Blast 
Furnace (1986), and Plan Dignidad (1997),4 and influenced the drafting of its main drug law – 
Law 1008 of 1988 (Grisaffi 2019). Some coca cultivation for legal purposes, however, has been 
allowed, and Presidents like Jaime Paz Zamora or Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, who were 
aligned with US interests, compensated growers for eradication or slowed down eradication 
campaigns. When Evo Morales, a former leader of the cocalero movement critical of the 
United States, was elected President in 2006, in a context of growing debate around drug policy 
and changing supply chains, Bolivia left the international drug conventions re-joining with an 
exception that excluded coca leaf chewing from the list of controlled substances. Morales also 
implemented a policy expanding the legal coca production limit set in 1988 from 12,000 to 
20,000 hectares, and authorizing legal cultivation in the Chapare, a region traditionally ex-
cluded from legal production quotas. To prevent diversion for illegal markets, the government 
set a cultivation limit of 1,600 square meters per family. The most interesting aspect of the 
policy, and the main reason for its success in controlling coca crops was that monitoring and 
implementation were responsibilities of grassroot organizations (Grisaffi 2019). 
Morales’ policies successfully reduced the hectares of coca cultivated5 and were dubbed by 
some analysts as the world’s first supply-side harm reduction approach (Farthing and Kohl 
2010). As Grisaffi (2019) has documented, success has been caught in contradictions that derive 
from the persistence and profitability of the international cocaine trade. Morales navigated 
conflicting demands among his supporters’ expectations that he could eliminate restrictions on 
coca cultivation, and international commitments to deter illegal cocaine. While Bolivia has a 
successful legal market, the illegal market still sustains the livelihoods of many campesinos who 
also despise the international restrictions imposed on a market where the demand is generated 
outside of their country. 
Similar contradictions have limited Colombia’s efforts to eliminate aerial fumigations of coca 
crops with toxic chemicals like glyphosate. Colombia has faithfully followed US-driven cocaine 
control policies, and is the only coca producing country that has allowed glyphosate use, fu-
migating over 1,800,000 hectares of coca between 1995 and 2015. Fumigations were suspended 
in 2015, in the midst of the peace negotiations with the FARC, and because of then President 
Juan Manuel Santos’ vocal support for drug policy reform. In 2008, the election of a new 
President who did not support the reforms proposed in the peace agreement, such as the crop 
substitution program, alongside increasing cocaine demand in the United States, and a spike in 
coca cultivation, led the Colombian and United States governments to demand the reactivation 
of aerial fumigation, using simplistic arguments that connected the growth in crops to the 
suspension of fumigation, and the growth in demand, to the growth in supply (Durán-Martínez 
2018a). While fumigations have not been re-initiated at the time of writing this chapter due to 
restrictions imposed by the Colombian Constitutional court, the crop substitution and vo-
luntary eradication programs have been undermined, reflecting both the persisting pressure 
coming from the United States, and the complex internal and external factors that make illicit 
cocaine smuggling a resilient market. 
Conclusion 
Cocaine smuggling has been shaped by sharp geopolitical power imbalances which are partially 
determined by the drug’s characteristics: it requires a long process of transformation from the 
raw material (coca leaf) to the synthetized alkaloid; the coca bush requires particular geographic 
conditions not widely available across the globe; and once synthetized, the ratio of weight to 
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profit is very high. These characteristics, however, cannot account fully for the particularities of 
cocaine history, and are not inevitable; for example, both in the late 1800s, when the legal 
cocaine commerce emerged, and in the twenty-first century, when the illegal cocaine supply 
chain diversified, the market’s geography was much more diverse. In any case, one distinct 
characteristic of cocaine smuggling, and its policing for most of the twentieth century, is the 
influence of the US, both as the largest consumer, and the largest enemy, of the drug. As in the 
case of other smuggled goods, local social, economic, and political dynamics, and a complex set 
of actors, perceptions, and ideas explain the evolution and changes of cocaine trade. 
As other chapters in this volume highlight, both the weakness of state services and the 
centrality of state power and actions, shape cocaine’s history. The 2010s brought changes to the 
global cocaine supply chain that opened opportunities to rethink cocaine control policies both 
at the supply and demand side. The effectiveness of those policies, though, is limited by the 
profitability and extension of cocaine demand in the context of an international drug control 
regime that restricts legal markets. The future of cocaine control and scholarship on cocaine 
smuggling require recognizing simultaneously the transnational connections that incentivize the 
market, and the localized politics that shape the lives of the actors involved in it, from coca 
cultivators to distributors and users, to law enforcement officials and politicians. This demands, 
among other things, greater dialogue among scholars of drug use, and those of drug production 
and trafficking. It also requires nuanced perspectives that question simplistic narratives such as 
those that exaggerate the dangers and analyze cocaine smuggling only through a security lens, or 
that alternatively fail to recognize practical and moral conundrums that surround its 
protagonists. 
Notes  
1 Not all trafficking networks from Chile disappeared, as those connected to sectors of military and 
government elites survived (Vergara 2017). 
2 The exact size of the changes remains controversial because the measurement of coca crops and co-
caine production potential varies over time and between institutions. Statistics can be politicized as 
reflected in assessments of cocaine production potential in Bolivia (Washington Office on Latin 
America 2012, Fox 2012).  
3 This increase, however, appears in some indicators of use (monthly prevalence, and cocaine deaths, 
especially those involving opioids) but not in others (overdoses and treatment admissions) (Kilmer and 
Midgette 2018).  
4 The Triennial Plan and Plan Dignidad focused on forced eradication and interdiction operations, and 
Blast Furnace provided military assistance and counterinsurgency training to search and destroy drug 
processing operations. These operations generated violence against communities that were vehemently 
opposed to them.  
5 This reduction is reported in UNODC statistics but not in statistics from the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy of the United States, which has not supported Morales’ approach.  
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SHARING THE LOAD1 
The distributive nature of the opium trade in, and 
from, Afghanistan 
David Mansfield   
1. Introduction 
Smuggling opium has distinct advantages. As a low-weight and relatively high value product it 
is more remunerative to smuggle opium than other drugs, like cannabis, and it presents fewer 
logistical challenges than the smuggling of bulky legal goods that are so often ferried across 
national borders in an attempt to bypass regulation and duties, such as fuel and consumer items. 
Once dried, it is also easier to transport than fresh or “wet” opium, with a lower weight and a 
notably less pungent smell, and therefore harder to detect by law enforcement. While clearly 
converting opium into morphine base, heroin base or heroin hydrochloride offers further fi-
nancial benefits, as well as additional advantages with regard to reduced weight-to-value ratio 
and detectability, this is not an activity that everyone can, or wishes to, pursue. The cost of 
inputs, and access to know-how, markets and official protection, as well as social mores, restrict 
the number of opium traders that make the move up the value chain into the processing of 
opiates (Mansfield, 1998, p. 21). 
Opium has long been smuggled from those nations where cultivation has been concentrated, 
such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Iran in south Asia, and Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand 
and Laos in Southeast Asia, to consumers within each region and further afield. Currently, the 
vast majority of opium seizures are made in Iran, marking Afghanistan’s primacy as producer of 
almost 90% of global opiates, the role Iran plays as a consumer nation of opium, and its position 
as a major conduit for opiates travelling to Europe, as well as to the efforts the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (GIRI) to stem the trade (UNODC, 2020a, pp. 9 & 12). For 
example, in 2018, GIRI seized 644 metric tons of opium, 91% of global opium seizures. It also 
interdicted 21 metric tons of morphine, and 25 metric tons of heroin, the equivalent of 53% of 
global opiate seizures once converted into common heroin equivalents (UNODC, 2020a, 
p. 13). After Afghanistan – whose authorities seized 27 metric tons of opium in 2018 – the next 
largest seizures were made in Pakistan where 19 metric tons of opium were seized the same 
year, almost 50% more than the seizures made by all other countries combined. As such, these 
three nations – Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan – constitute 98% of all opium seizures. 
Perhaps, it should be of little surprise given some of the risks to researcher and the researched that 
there has been little empirical work done directly with those that smuggle opium. Instead, much of 
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the scholarly work in this field focuses on the reports of drug control organizations, claims of what 
has been seized, and estimates of the revenues generated by the drug trafficking groups involved. 
For those of us who have spent some time conducting research in drug producing and transit 
countries, the kind of aggregate statistics and generalisations used to describe the drugs trade prove 
frustrating. Economic reductionist arguments about high prices and the insurmountable profit-
ability of opium poppy cultivation dominate policy discussions on the motivations for opium 
poppy growth in Afghanistan, and drug crop cultivation globally. These figures prove misleading, 
offering inaccurate estimates of the income earned from opium production, ignoring the cost of 
inputs, as well as the fact that different land tenure and credit arrangements significantly alter the 
net returns earned by a rural household growing poppy. By failing to document and understand 
the diverse livelihoods of those cultivating poppy – the different kind of crops grown, the role of 
livestock and the range of other incomes generated by the household – and how the income 
earned from opium poppy cultivation is distributed amongst the multiple actors involved, or-
ganisations like United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime grossly (UNODC) overestimate the 
amount earned by those cultivating opium poppy in Afghanistan. 
Consequently, either by design or default these estimates imply that those cultivating opium 
poppy earn significantly more than they do and argue that the most effective way to tackle 
production is through a limited set of drug control tools: (i) crop eradication as a way of 
increasing losses, compelling farmers to look for alternatives; and (ii) more restrictive rural 
development efforts known as “alternative development” that offer farmers inputs to cultivate a 
limited set of alternative legal crops. These are the very same policies advocated and im-
plemented by drug control organisations like UNODC, and the United States Government’s 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in the State Department (INL). 
We can see the very same broad-brush descriptions used when discussing “poppy farmers” 
in the narratives about opium smugglers and traders. Profit, and normative terms such as 
“greed” are implied in discussions about their motives, when outlining the price differentials as 
opiates move from one country to another or in discussions about gross profits. 
In fact, official and scholarly literature on illicit drugs is littered with statistics highlighting the 
high value of the trade. Estimates offered of the gross value of the trade typically register in the 
hundreds of billions, and the UNODC calculates that the value of the opiate trade alone stood 
at US$55 billion in 2009 (UNODC, 2012, p. 127). In the media and scholarly works, the 
narrative of the high value and profitability of the trade is often exemplified with a comparison 
of relative prices for a kilogram of heroin as it moves from one country to another, making its 
way from source in the global south from Afghanistan, through transit nations, and into what 
are seen as the consumer nations in the global north, in Europe and North America (Babor 
et al., 2010, p. 21). References are also made to the manifold increase between the price of 
opium purchased at the farmgate in Afghanistan and the equivalent weight of heroin sold in the 
streets of the United Kingdom (Inkster and Comolli, 2012, p. 19). None of these estimates, 
however, talk of profit – defined here in terms of total revenue minus total costs – of the drugs 
trade, or what the individuals involved get paid; the costs of doing business are not considered, 
and profit is only implied, not calculated. 
There is some more detailed analysis that offers calculations of the gross profits earned on 
trade in opiates, which, for example, differentiates by each of the countries involved in up-
stream trafficking along the Balkan route or through central Asia (Paoli et al., 2009, p. 278;  
UNODC, 2015). However, here again the costs of smuggling – transport, bribes, storage and 
investments in innovation – are not factored in; the only costs considered are the price of 
opiates at the point of purchase in one country and this is compared with the price when sold 
across the border. As such, we remain largely unsighted on the structure of the drugs trade in 
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the very countries where it is produced and smuggled, and how these gross profits are dis-
tributed amongst the population involved (OAS, 2012, p. 24; UNODC, 2020, p. 31). While 
some scholars like Barbor et al. (2010: 63) refer to “networks rather than organizations or 
firms,” suggesting “long chains of participants,“ and estimate that “heroin may be bought and 
sold ten times in the chain connecting opium production in Afghanistan to retail sales in 
Rome,” drug policy makers and analysts are often left wondering whether this is an accurate 
account of the number of actors involved in the chain. Other questions are “What are the 
benefits accrued by the different participants?” and ultimately, “How profitable is the trade in 
drugs to those directly involved – and therefore are the current policies of interdiction, arrest 
and imprisonment the most effective response?” The narratives of the “warlord,” the “drugs 
baron,” “the Taliban,” and other nomenclature denoting power and implying market dom-
inance thrive in this analytical vacuum. We have to look for more nuanced and detailed 
case studies on the smuggling of other goods – such as the ones discussed in this book – to 
understand better that “smugglers are ordinary people, not profit driven criminals, who hope to 
improve the quality of their lives and that of their families” (Weigand, 2020, p. 7). 
This chapter takes a closer look at those involved in the trade and smuggling of opiates in 
Afghanistan to understand just how embedded this economy is in local communities and their 
surroundings: how many people are employed; what costs they incur; how much they are paid; 
and how interdiction, conflict, and border infrastructure impact on those involved and the 
money they earn. The chapter consists of three further sections. The next section documents 
the trade and smuggling of opium with a particular focus on the border provinces of Nangarhar 
and Nimroz. It draws on in-depth interviews with 96 individuals directly involved in the 
opium trade and charts how traders, smugglers and others benefitting from the trade have 
responded to what have been quite dramatic changes in the environment for the purchase, 
transportation and sale of opium within and on the borders of Afghanistan. The third section 
distils the lessons learned from these case studies and provides an assessment of some of the 
wider economic effects of the trade in opium, including estimates of the incomes earned and 
levels of employment. Finally, there is a conclusion that argues that the business model in the 
opium trade in Afghanistan is one largely made up of loosely affiliated independent traders and 
service providers looking to make the most of one of the few remunerative income earning 
opportunities that exist. This model stands in stark contrast to the narratives of vertical in-
tegration, control and vast profits that often dominate discussions about the drugs trade in 
Afghanistan, its neighbours, and other nations where drugs are sourced. 
2. Smuggling opiates: the cost of doing business in Afghanistan 
This section examines the cost of smuggling opiates within and from Afghanistan. It draws on 
in-depth interviews with those directly involved in the purchase and smuggling of opium in 
two border provinces, Nimroz and Nangarhar, as well as a body of research conducted over 
more than two decades in other opium producing provinces of Afghanistan, including 
Badakhshan, Ghor, Helmand and Kandahar. Nangarhar and Nimroz are of particular interest 
because both provinces have a long history of opium production and cross-border smuggling 
in a range of different commodities besides drugs. Both have also experienced profound 
socio-economic and political change due to the Afghan reconstruction effort following the fall 
of the Taliban in 2001. However, while the eastern province of Nangarhar saw a concentrated 
international presence and high levels of reconstruction funding between 2001 and 2014, it is 
the once remote province of Nimroz that experienced the more dramatic change: it was 
transformed into a major gateway for international trade by investments from neighbouring Iran 
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and its trade partner, India. This section looks at how investments in both provinces and the 
conflict impacted the opium trade. In the context of this research, the term opium “trader” 
denotes the person that owns the opium, buying and selling it to other parties for an income; a 
“smuggler” or “transporter” refers to the person moving opium from one place to another for 
the trader, in return for an agreed fee, usually at a fixed price per weight. 
2.1 Coping with the increase in the cost and risk of cross-border smuggling in 
Nimroz 
The province of Nimroz lies in the southwest of Afghanistan and borders both Pakistan and 
Iran (see Figure 15.1). Levels of opium poppy cultivation have always been relatively low in 
Nimroz, particularly compared to other southern provinces like Helmand and Kandahar. With 
a harsh desert climate and salinated ground water, cultivation is limited to the more fertile 
district of Khash Rud bordering Bakwa in Farah Province. Instead, the comparative advantage 
of Nimroz lies in its location, situated between the primary opium growing provinces of the 
southwest and cross-border markets in Iran and Pakistan. 
Once a remote desert area with a relatively small population, the province has recently been 
transformed by two significant investments in infrastructure that have expanded and canalised 
the trade of licit commodities like fuel, construction material and other transit goods through 
the provincial capital of Ziranj and restructured and redirected the movement of illicit goods, 
including drugs. These important investments in physical infrastructure have been made largely 
by Iran and aimed at increasing the volumes of trade. For example, in 2005 the GIRI funded 
Figure 15.1 Map showing southwest Afghanistan and the province of Nimroz bordering Iran and 
Pakistan.  
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the building of the Pol-e Abrisham bridge across the Helmand river on the outskirts of Ziranj, 
thereby creating an official border crossing where none had existed before. Then between 2005 
and 2009, the Government of India (GoI) provided US$100 million for the construction of a 
highway from Ziranj to Delaram, connecting the border crossing at Ziranj to Highway One 
and onward to facilitate travel to Afghanistan’s major cities. Along with further construction 
within Iran, these infrastructural investments are part of the wider geopolitical rivalry between 
Pakistan and China on one hand, and India and Iran on the other, aimed at realigning trade 
away from Pakistan towards Iran’s deep seaport in Chabahar. Alongside those investments 
encouraging trade through Ziranj, there were further investments designed to reduce smug-
gling. The most significant investment was the GIRI’s improvements in its border infra-
structure, in particular the construction of a border fence along the length of the Iranian border 
with Afghanistan, and a wall five meters in height and 70 miles in length centred on the areas 
around Ziranj (see Figure 15.2). 
Prior to the start of this major construction project in 2007, the border between Afghanistan 
and Iran was bounded by a series of berms and ditches built in the late 1990s. While more 
restrictive than in the 1980s and 1990s when the Baloch people that straddle both sides of the 
border could move across the border relatively freely by foot, donkey and in some places by 
pickup, these barriers did little to deter the movement of people and goods. In fact, with limited 
agricultural land, the economic survival of many of the Afghan villages along the border de-
pended on their ability to trade across the border smuggling everything from diesel and elec-
trical goods to drugs and people. 
With the completion of the border wall in 2013, opportunities for smuggling were drama-
tically curtailed. The formalisation of cross-border movements, including visa requirements for 
Figure 15.2 Imagery of the Iranian border wall south of the provincial capital Ziranj, Nimroz.  
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Afghans, at a price of US$430 per person per trip, further limited who could move easily across 
the border and accrue the economic benefits of cross-border smuggling (Mansfield, 2020, p. 46). 
Moreover, along with the border fencing and wall, the GIRI also located military bases at regular 
intervals along the border. Mobile Units were also established in the Iranian Border Guards (IBG) 
Command. Typically, its personnel were not from the border area, or posted in a single location, 
so these mobile units were harder to bribe, and more likely to fire upon those trying to breach the 
border infrastructure. Some drug smugglers talked of how predictable the accommodations they 
reached with the more permanent local IBG were, but claimed senior officers and the mobile 
units would often press for arrests and seizures. One smuggler in Makaki, in the district of Kang, 
concluded that the mobile units had made smuggling “very dangerous work.” 
As such, the opportunities for small-scale decentralised smuggling diminished to such an 
extent that villages reported a significant outflow of the number of young men – some by up to 
70%. For example, villages like Kruki in Kang, once a major smuggling hub in the late 1990s/ 
early 2000s is now all but abandoned, in part due to flooding in 2004, but largely due to the 
Iranian border fortifications restricting the amount of smuggling (see Figure 15.3). Many other 
villages have suffered the same fate. 
The challenges and dangers drug traders and smugglers faced are put into even greater context 
when we consider the monies earned. On the face of it, gross profits per kilogram look relatively 
attractive. They could purchase a kilogram of opium in Bakwa in neighboring Farah for between 
US$50 and US$70, depending on quality, and sell it for anything from US$103 to US$121 in a 
village across the border in Iran, or for between US$155 and US$187 in more distant locations 
like Zabul or Zahedan. However, when the actual costs of smuggling are calculated, the net 
profits on drug smuggling are much less rewarding – around US$30 per kilogram. 
Figure 15.3 Imagery of the abandoned border village of Kruki in Kang district, Nimroz.  
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As Table 15.1 shows, the far greater part of the cost of smuggling, approximately two thirds, 
is absorbed by those paid to transport the opium, the smugglers themselves. “Bribes” to 
government officials and “taxes” to the Taliban represent a smaller part of the overall cost, 
absorbing the remaining one third. However, arrangements with law enforcement officials on 
both sides of the border can be rather precarious and involve multiple individuals. In the 
journey from Bakwa in Farah to the border with Iran, the Taliban, the Afghan Border Police 
(ABP) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) all take tribute. On the Iranian side of the border 
there are payments to be made to the IBG. While none of these payments are particularly high, 
each reduces the net profits of the opium trader requires time to arrange and are subject to 
renegotiation and vulnerable to breach. 
While the payments made to smugglers makes up the larger part of the costs of the drugs 
trade, costs remain relatively low within Afghanistan at between US$4.00 to US$6.5, depen- 
ding on the distance travelled. Payments mount for those responsible for transporting opium 
over the border. Here a smuggler from the Iranian side will receive around US$8 to take a 
kilogram of opium from the border crossing, and transport it to the Afghan trader’s nominated 
contact in a village in Iran, a potential distance of between 1 and 4 kilometers. Where these 
contacts are further afield, in places like Zahedan or Zabul, the smuggler will receive a higher 
level of payment, up to US$19 per kilogram for a journey that may be as far as 200 kilometers. 
As such, although transportation costs rise as the distance travelled increases, these costs can be 
offset by the higher price the trader will receive for their kilogram of opium. 
With many of these cross-border opium traders in Afghanistan reporting that they trade 
anything from 40 to 65 kilograms per month into Iran, net incomes can vary from US$1,200 to 
US$2,000 per month. However, many feel vulnerable and cite examples of friends or family 
members who have been arrested, and some cite the consequences. For example, one trader 
from Charburjak district talked of his brother who lived on the Iranian side of the border 
having been imprisoned for 11 years in Zahedan after being caught with 60 kilograms of 
opium. The trader talked of his own involvement in opium smuggling: “I do this work to find 
money to release my brother.” 
In the context of better management of both costs and risks, a number of traders report how 
susceptible their income is to fluctuations in the price of opium in Iran: so much so that a fall in 
the price of opium on the other side of the border will prompt Afghan traders to cease cross- 
border smuggling and store their opium, rather than take a loss. Fearful that an inventory leaves 
Table 15.1 Costs incurred by an opium trader of transporting 1 kg of opium from Bakwa to Iran        
Category of  
payment 
Recipient Low High   
USD/kg % of costs USD/kg % of costs  
“Tax” Taliban 0.18 1 0.18 0.5 
Fee Smuggler (Bakwa to Afghan 
Border) 
3.91 20.4 6.51 18 
Bribe Afghan Border Police 1.69 8.8 3.26 9 
Bribe Iranian Border Guard 3.18 16.6 4.56 12.6 
Fee Landowner 0.65 3.4 0.65 1.8 
Bribe Afghan National Police 1.73 9 2.21 6.1 
Fee Smuggler (cross-border 7.82 40.8 18.89 52.1 
Total  19.17 100 36.27 100    
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them even more vulnerable to arrest, seizures, and greater extortion by the authorities, some 
pay other villagers – those not known for their involvement in the trade – to store their opium 
at a flat rate of US$0.25 per kilogram. 
Since 2018, traders have adopted strategies to manage risks and reduce costs more effectively, 
including the building of large catapults, known locally as wolloks, to propel drugs over the 
Iranian border wall. Made of steel and rubber strapping left behind by “foreign military forces,” 
these catapults stand at around 1.5 meters in height, and can fire one kilogram between two 
hundred and three hundred meters. Bypassing the need to pay the IBG, as well as targeting the 
load directly at contacts across the border, this saves traders up to US$4.5 per kilogram in bribes 
as well as a fee of around US$ 4.00 per kilogram for those carrying the opium across the border. 
Traders report that on a “good night” six to eight people can propel 50 kilograms of opium 
across the border into Iran, resulting in a reduction of almost US$500 in costs. 
These developments show that with net profits of less than US$30 per kilogram, and sig-
nificant risk of arrest, injury and even death, opium smugglers have had to adapt or abandon 
their trade. Many smaller traders have chosen the latter, conscious that opportunities for 
smuggling have diminished dramatically with the fortification of the border, not just for opium, 
but also for the other commodities, including fuel and people. In the absence of the extra 
income household members earn from these goods across the border, livelihoods have proven 
unsustainable, hence the outmigration of family members, many moving across the border 
to Sistan and Baluchestan in Iran. Those that persist do so in the absence of other viable 
opportunities. Deprived of the chance of moving across the border without a passport and visa 
to find work, and in the face of a rapidly devaluing currency and fewer work opportunities in 
the construction trade in Iran, many find themselves on the border with little to do. 
Those that have remained have had to adapt to the new circumstances where the costs of 
smuggling have increased and net profits fallen. As such, volume has proven critical to prof-
itability. For those that remain, there is a limit to how much they can move, and many 
complain that the trade in opium has become concentrated amongst those with access to the 
necessary capital and patronage networks, especially those with links to government officials. 
Indeed, those looking to move more significant volumes across the border have looked at other 
ways than to scale the Iranian border structures, by either passing through the official crossing at 
Milak, drawing on more sophisticated concealments and the involvement of officials, or re-
routing their cargos south to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, and the town of Baramchar in 
Helmand. This latter route entails much larger shipments consisting of convoys of up to 16 cars: 
ten Toyota Landcruisers containing up to 600 kg of drugs each, and six Datsun pick-ups, four at 
the front two at the back, all carrying armed men. Carrying up to six tons of drugs, the cost of 
shipment via this kind of convoy is around US$15.00 per kilogram, cutting even further into 
net profits. 
2.2 The impact of violence and conflict on opium smuggling in Nangarhar, in 
eastern Afghanistan 
The eastern province of Nangarhar has long been one of the major opium growing areas in 
Afghanistan. Traditionally, cultivation has been concentrated in the mountainous districts to the 
south of the province bordering Pakistan; areas that have a long history of resisting the writ of 
the provincial authorities in Jalalabad and have periodically engaged in violent resistance to 
those that rule in Kabul (see Figure 15.4). These are the same areas in which cross-border 
smuggling of licit as well as illicit goods has been an economic mainstay and where heroin, and 
more recently, methamphetamine, processing is concentrated. 
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As in Nimroz, the gross profits on opium look relatively attractive with the price fluctuating 
between US$68 and US$78 per kilogram over much of the period between mid-2014 and late 
2018, when purchased fresh in the villages of Sherzad, selling in intermediate markets in 
Markikhel and Markho for a few dollars mark up, or for between US$103 to US$122 per 
kilogram on the mountain pass at Tabai or across the border in the Tirah valley. However, since 
2015 Nangarhar has seen some rather dramatic shifts in drug smuggling routes, largely due to 
the conflict that has beleaguered many of the southern districts in the Spinghar that have led to a 
rise in the cost of smuggling. The Afghan government’s efforts to ban opium cultivation in 
Nangarhar, as well as law enforcement interventions, have played some role in disrupting the 
flow of opiates through Nangarhar but only on a temporary basis. Far more enduring shifts have 
been a function of the conflict between the Afghan government and the US military, with – on 
occasion – the support of Taliban forces, and the Islamic State- Khorasan Province (ISKP), and 
subsequently the GoP building a border fence along much of its border with Nangarhar. 
ISKP moved into Achin in early 2015. Initially, these were thought to be just Orakzai 
families fleeing2 the fighting between Pakistani military forces and Tehrak i Taliban militants in 
the nearby Tirah valley in Pakistan. Within four months, however, these “guests” had declared 
themselves ISKP and overrun the strategic Mahmand valley in Achin, expelling the Taliban 
along with most of the residents who resisted their brutal rule (Mansfield, 2016, pp. 12–13). 
Upon taking control of the valley in July of 2015, ISKP banned cannabis cultivation and gave 
the drug traders in Shadal bazaar – a major trading hub for opiates and hashish in the province – 
one month to leave the area. The subsequent winter season opium poppy cultivation was also 
prohibited by ISKP in the upper parts of Achin. By late 2015, ISKP had gained further ground 
in Nangarhar, overpowering the Taliban in some of its strongholds in the southern districts of 
Figure 15.4 Map of Nangarhar, showing the main smuggling routes into Pakistan.  
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Nangarhar and subsequently penetrating parts of Shinwar and Khogiani. Fearful of ISKP 
gaining a dominant position in Nangarhar, an unlikely alliance formed among the forces of the 
Afghan government, the Taliban and the US. The campaign culminated in the USG dropping 
the Massive Ordinance Air Blast (MoAB) – or “Mother of All Bombs” – on the ISKP’s 
stronghold some 3 kilometers from Shadal bazaar in April 2017, and a significant US military 
presence in the area until as late as July 2020. 
The fighting across the Spinghar – but particularly in Achin – from July 2015 had a profound 
effect on drugs smuggling across the province and beyond. The well-trodden routes through 
the mountains that had been used by travellers and smugglers en route to Pakistan were no 
longer secure. In particular the bazaar in Shadal, a focal point of the fighting, had to be 
abandoned as the major entrepot for opiates and hashish en route to Tirah in Pakistan, first due 
to ISKP, then due to the presence of US and Afghan government forces. In response, the hub 
of the drugs trade in the eastern region moved to Markoh, in Shinwar, located on the main 
Jalalabad to Torkham highway. Although far less remote than Shadal, the move to Markoh was 
accompanied by a significant rise in the cost of smuggling drugs to Pakistan, particularly for 
those in the southwestern districts of Sherzad, Khogiani and Pachir wa Agam. Traders and 
transporters from these districts found themselves unable to take the direct route southeast 
through Khogiani, and Kot to Achin, and had to reroute north to the area around Jalalabad and 
along backroads to Markoh, where the drugs are sometimes stored before being handed off to 
other smugglers and routed through Tabai in Durbaba. 
This shift led to a significant increase in smuggling costs incurred by traders (see Table 15.2). 
For example, in early 2015, the direct route from Sherzad to Durbaba – although quite time 
consuming given the three to four day journey by mule – cost only US$3.40 per kilogram. 
However, by 2018, a more circuitous route via Markoh emerged, involving multiple vehicles 
and a journey by foot from Shinwar to the pass at Tabai in Durbaba, increasing the cost of 
transportation to US$13.10 per kilogram. There were further additional costs incurred as a 
result of storage in the area around Markoh (US$0.50/kg), where, as in the borders of Nimroz, 
villagers were asked to maintain the inventory of traders and smugglers fearful that the au-
thorities would raid their shops or homes around the main bazaar. Even those opium traders in 
Shinwar who did not need to reroute their opium due to the fighting across much of the 
Spinghar were subject to an increase in transport costs over this same period, from US$4.9 to 
US$8.1, due to prevailing levels of insecurity and uncertainty. 
If the rise in transport costs within Afghanistan were not significant enough, developments 
on the border with Pakistan further cut into trader net profits. As with Nimroz, smugglers in 
Nangarhar transport opium through areas where different armed actors demand a small pay-
ment. In return, they allow goods to pass and offer some protection against interdiction. These 
payments are made by the smugglers and passed on to the trader. While some of these payments 
may be to members of the ANP or ABP5 on the journey between Sherzad and Markoh – or to 
local Taliban commanders6 – they are relatively small, and do not appear to be part of a co-
herent system. On the other hand, payments to the Taliban in Shinwar district, the local au-
thorities in Durbaba, and the Amman Committee in Tirah are understood as “rules” that are 
paid by all those involved in the opium trade. 
Within Afghanistan, the payments to both the Taliban and the local authorities remained 
consistent between 2014 and 2018 despite the ensuing violence in Achin and across much of 
the Spinghar. However, the cross-border fee – the payment to the peace committee in Tirah, 
Pakistan – increased more than five-fold from US$1.52 to US$7.60 per kilogram. This rise in 
costs is directly attributed to the border fence built by the Government of Pakistan (GoP), to 
restrict the movement of fighters and drugs, as well as to demark Pakistan sovereignty over a 
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border that has been contested for centuries. As the Iranian border infrastructure redirected and 
restructured the drugs trade in Nimroz, so this border fence restructured the drugs business on 
Nangarhar’s border with Pakistan (Mansfield, 2020, pp. 44–45). Initially built along the 
Mohmand districts of Lalpur and Goshta, along Nangarhar’s northern border with Pakistan the 
GoP fence canalized trade through the official crossing at Torkham, and the smuggling routes in 
the southern district of Durbaba (see Figure 15.5). Creating a virtual monopoly route through 
Tirah, the Amman committee took the opportunity to charge greater amounts for those 
moving any goods – including opium – through their area of influence. 
The result is that, with opium prices at both the level of farmgate and trader in the east 
remaining relatively stable between 2014 and 2018, net profits on the cross-border trade in 
opium fell by as much as US$16 per kilogram, from between US$30 to US$40 per kilogram in 
2014 to between US$14 and US$22 per kilogram in 2018. As with Nimroz, with traders 
reporting sales of between 40 kilograms and 100 kilograms per month, incomes could be 
between US$560 to US$2,200 per month (the equivalent of between US$6,720 and US 
$26,400 per annum). While markedly higher than a national average income of the equivalent 
of US$500 per annum, with an average of 15 household members – significantly larger than the 
average household size of eight in Afghanistan – the daily income per person for those trading 
opium in Afghanistan could be as low as US$1.20 in 2018. While smugglers may receive as 
much as US$90 for their journey from Markoh to Tabai, and do this journey four times a 
month,7 that money is shared amongst an average household of 17 family members. As such, for 
both trader and smuggler, the opium business is a valuable source of income, but is not enough 
for a family to prosper; like for those that cultivate opium poppy, it is only one source of 
income in a much wider portfolio of activities. 
3. What do these case studies tell us about opium smuggling in and from 
Afghanistan? 
There are a number of salient points that can be drawn from this more detailed analysis of the 
changing conditions under which opium is traded and smuggled in Nangarhar and Nimroz, 
each of which have wider implications for the study of smuggling and the effects of prohibition 
more generally. 
The first is that while undoubtedly the smuggling and trade in opium offers higher levels of 
income than many other livelihood options, particularly given that the vast majority are 
Table 15.2 Costs incurred by an opium trader from transporting 1 kg of from Sherzad to Pakistan        
Category of  
payment 
Recipient 2014 2018   
USD/kg % of costs USD/kg % of costs  
Fee Smuggler (Sherzad to Tabai) 3.40 68.7   
Fee Smuggler (Sherzad to Markoh)   5.1 23.8  
(Tax to Taliban) 3 (0.51)  (0.49)   
(Bribe to Authorities) (1.52) 4  (1.47)  
Fee Storage Villager   0.5 2.4 
Fee Smuggler Markoh to Tabai   8.14 38.1 
Bribe Amman Committee, Tirah 1.52 30.9 7.6 35.7 
Total  4.90 100 21.2 100    
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illiterate and without other marketable skills,8 net profits are much lower than commonly 
assumed. As these provincial examples show, when the costs of the cross-border trade are 
included, net profits rarely exceed US$40 per kilogram of opium and are often considerably 
less. Earlier in-depth fieldwork on the production of heroin base and methamphetamine 
production indicate low net profit margins, at US$45 per kilogram and US$23 per kilogram, 
countering many of the more generalised claims about excess profits (Mansfield, 2019, p. 46;  
EMCDDA, 2020, p. 15). 
The reality is that the costs of smuggling opium are high. In contrast to the movement of 
legal goods across secure terrain, illicit drugs in Afghanistan are smuggled through conflict 
affected areas where a multitude of armed actors operate. In the context of Afghanistan, these 
armed actors do not just take the form of the state and its adversaries in the Taliban, but 
numerous other groups that may have loose affiliations with either or both sides, often oper-
ating somewhat independently. Often these groups are backed by the local population as well as 
having strong connections with criminal and political groups in neighbouring countries. 
Each of these entities typically will require a tribute for not interfering with the movement 
of drugs across their territories or for the security they provide in the area – “safe passage” – but 
do not have such a dominant position that they can close down the trade without experiencing 
significant pushback from the population. This suggests a relationship between armed actors– 
including state actors and insurgents – and the local population involved in the production and 
trade in opiates that is much more negotiated than current narratives argue. Violence, including 
efforts at interdiction or banning production, is often used as a bargaining mechanism, deployed 
to improve rent extraction, as well as performative, designed to show the key donors and 
Figure 15.5 Mapping of the border fence built by the GoP with an initial focus on the Mohmand tribal 
areas north of Torkham  
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international agencies that the authorities are “committed” to counternarcotics efforts – what  
Mansfield (2018) refers to as the “theater of counternarcotics” – rather than concerted attempts 
at prohibition. 
The case studies also show that the more a route is divided among different armed groups 
and the more fragmented these groups might be, the greater the costs incurred by traders en 
route. The conflict in the Spinghar region of Nangarhar, as well as the newly established border 
infrastructure along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border and Afghanistan/Iranian border, served 
further to segment these journeys bringing yet more actors – in the form of both smugglers and 
rent seekers – and further increase the costs for opium traders. 
When opium prices are rising, it might be possible for traders to absorb these extra costs, but 
the conflict in Achin and the construction of the border walls first by the GIRI and then by the 
GoP occurred at a time when opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was exceeding all 
previous records and opium prices were falling. The collapse of the Iranian rial due to the 
imposition of US sanctions not only lowered the prices Afghan traders received for their opium 
but dampened market demand in Iran. In fact, with repeated devaluations, and opium prices in 
Nimroz traditionally denominated in Iranian toman (the equivalent of ten rial), many Afghan 
traders were reluctant to be paid in a currency that was fast losing value and, erring on the side 
of caution, refrained from trade, and pressed to fix prices in US dollar equivalents (Mansfield, 
2018, pp. 12–13). 
The second salient point these case studies raise is related to the first, and it is just how critical 
effective risk management is in the opium economy given the low profit margins. In fact, some 
traders were found to limit their business interests to a small area; for example, trading only in 
Markikhel in Sherzad where they were familiar with the farmers, traders, and armed actors they 
transact with. These individuals worked at the very margins of the trade, buying opium at as 
low a price as possible, negotiating for more generous volumes and selling maybe one or two 
days later when prices might be higher. Without capital or contacts, these traders were unable 
to carry the challenges of delayed cash flow or the risk of being caught and having their drugs 
seized. Even with those that trade further afield, there is a distinct preference for working with 
those that are already known, and many traders and transporters look to purchase and sell opium 
and move it along routes where they are familiar with those that they encounter. They believe 
their ability to draw on familial connections or patronage networks important to negotiate 
reductions in “taxes,” “gifts” or “charity” and to avoid arrest and/or seizure (UNODC, 2020, 
p. 12). The segmentation of journeys into “familiar” routes allows traders and smugglers to 
manage risk even if it does increase costs. These examples further highlight how managing risk 
is more important to those involved in opium smuggling than maximising revenues, further 
countering the narratives that dominate discussions on transnational and organized crime that 
emanate from organizations like UNODC. 
The example of the multicar convoys operating out of Bakwa travelling to Baramchar in 
Helmand, highlights how those traders with more capital and powerful connections might be 
able to avoid the truncated nature of the journeys that other smaller and less influential opium 
traders engage in. No doubt similar examples could be found were it possible to obtain details 
from those smuggling large amounts of opiates through the official borders at Torkham or 
Ziranj, drawing on the support of officials. However, as the convoy example shows the cost 
implications are significant, with transport costs, and no doubt bribes and fees markedly higher, 
resulting in significantly lower profit margins per kilogram, and even greater emphasis on the 




The third salient point from these case studies is the large number of different actors involved 
in the movement of drugs from within Afghanistan and its borders, and how much employ-
ment and income it generates. The same can be seen with the smuggling of other commodities 
within Afghanistan with the trade in undeclared fuel, transit goods and minerals creating 
employment, income and rents for armed actors that is measured in the millions (Mansfield, 
OSDR and Alcis 2021). As the example for Nangarhar shows, the movement of a kilogram of 
opium from a farm in upper Sherzad to the Afghan border at Tabai can involve as many as three 
different smugglers and just as many traders buying and selling the crop. There are other 
payments to those who consider themselves service providers, the Taliban and the local au-
thorities, who offer security in return for the “taxes,” “gifts” and “bribes.” This journey within 
Afghanistan entails three separate journeys and payments to as many as nine different actors, of 
which seven are directly employed in the opium business, the other two extracting rent. A 
further journey from the pass in Tabai to the valley in Tirah entails payments to the Amman 
Committee. While the journey from Nimroz to Iran is not quite as segmented, it still entails 
payments to two smugglers, a possible fee for storage, and four further payments for the dif-
ferent armed actors en route. As such, both the Nangarhar and Nimroz cases highlight just how 
much Babor et al. (2010: 63) underestimated the number of transactions made, in their sug-
gestion that “heroin may be bought and sold ten times in the chain connecting opium pro-
duction in Afghanistan to retail sales in Rome;” in the case of Nangarhar, opium changes hands 
three times before it even leaves Afghanistan, four times if we are to include the farmer cul-
tivating it. 
It is of course difficult to put a precise figure on how many people overall might be involved 
in cross-border smuggling of opium in Afghanistan, but even if only half the amount of the 482 
metric tonnes UNODC (2018) estimate of opium grown in Nangarhar in 2018 were handled 
by the kind of opium traders and smugglers interviewed for this research – with the rest either 
processed into opiate derivatives, or transported through Torkham or other borders by more 
influential traders trading much larger amounts – then it is likely that the shipment would 
involve a minimum of 600 traders and smugglers and possibly more than 1,500 (see Table 15.3). 
It would also involve over US$250,000 in payments to the Taliban per annum and almost US 
$880,000 in fees to the local authorities. Along with those storing opium in their household 
compounds for a small fee, so that traders can minimise the risks of arrest and seizure, and other 
service providers such as guards, labourers and those purchasing opium at the farmgate for the 
trader – commissionkars – the opium trade is likely to employ thousands of people in Nangarhar 
alone, and possibly tens of thousands across the country. 
Table 15.3 Estimate of the number of traders and smugglers in Nangarhar         
District 
to Hub 8 
No. of Traders If 40 kg/ 
month 
223 No. of Traders If 100 kg/ 
month 
89 
No. of Smugglers If 30 kg/ 
month 
287 No of Smugglers If 80 kg/ 
month 
111 
Hub to Border No. of Traders If 40 kg/ 
month 
446 No. of Traders If 100 kg/ 
month 
178 
No. of Smugglers If 30 kg/ 
month 
594 No. of smugglers If 80 kg/ 
month 
223 
Total   1550   601    
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Combined with a labour-intensive opium crop, that is estimated to create jobs for hundreds 
of thousands of people, and in-country heroin production, as well as flourishing supply chains 
in both cannabis-hashish and now ephedra-ephedrine- methamphetamine, it is highly probable 
that the drugs economy is by far the largest employer in Afghanistan. Once the multiplier effect 
is also factored in, the economic effects of the drugs economy become almost impossible to 
ignore by development donors and International Monetary Institutions, like the World Bank. 
In fact, there is perhaps something to be said for the distributive nature of the opium trade in its 
current form. A more dominant vertically integrated business model – such the one found in 
the opium convoys from Bakwa, or across the official borders in places like Ziranj and Torkham 
– is likely to be much less distributive, supporting the accumulation of profit, wealth and 
influence in the hands of a few. As such, it is clear that tackling the opium trade cannot be 
simply a matter of law enforcement, but requires a sustained long-term development effort. 
4. Conclusion 
The current literature on the global drugs trade and trafficking offers little when it comes to 
how costs and benefits are distributed along the supply chain beyond generalised estimates of 
gross profits at a country level and the calculations that show the bulk of the revenue accrued is 
in the global north. There is an absence of data as to how these profits, estimated for different 
nations, are distributed amongst the various actors involved in drug producing and transit 
nations. We learn little to nothing of the structure of the trade within these countries where the 
opium economy is likely to make up the greatest proportion of its gross domestic product. 
In this analytical vacuum, the narratives that often dominate are those where it is the 
“warlords,” “drug barons,” “cartels” and other violent actors that exert control over the opium 
economy and absorb the bulk of the profits made. In Afghanistan, this has typically manifested 
in accounts in the media and official reports that it is the Taliban that profits most from the 
drugs trade, generating revenues measured in the hundreds of millions and controlling the 
supply chain from farm through to processing and final sale at the border (Brownfield cited in  
AFP, 2017; Department of Defense, 2017). 
This chapter has drawn on empirical evidence and documented the multiplicity of actors 
involved in the opium trade in two provinces of Afghanistan. It has shown the large number of 
actors and transactions involved in the purchase, transportation and sale of opium within 
Afghanistan and on its borders and has documented the more decentralised and negotiated 
nature of the trade, one in which armed actors like the Taliban, and those working for the 
government, are not controlling or directing the trade but are service providers, providing “safe 
passage” for a fee. It has shown just how embedded the trade and smuggling of opium is in the 
local economy of these two provinces, providing income and direct employment for a large 
number of people, as well as indirect jobs for a wide range of service providers. Alongside other 
smuggled goods such as the cross-border value chains in fuel, minerals and transit goods, these 
economies employ more people, and generate far greater income and rent for border com-
munities than any other industry. 
By drawing on the experiences of those directly involved in the drugs trade, this chapter has 
also documented the high costs associated with the segmented nature of the opium trade in 
Afghanistan, the low profit margins and the strategies adopted to manage risk and move large 
volumes. This chapter points to a business model for the opium trade that sits in contrast to 
narratives of vertical integration, control and vast profits, and points to a supply chain in 
Afghanistan that consists of loosely affiliated independent traders and service providers looking 
to make the most of one of the few remunerative income earning opportunities that exist. 
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Former drivers, mechanics, farmers and soldiers, residing in conflict affected areas where the 
cost of living is so high and the quality of welfare services so poor, engage in an illicit trade that 
is one of the only ways to make sufficient monies for them and their families to prosper. 
Notes  
1 This chapter draws on fieldwork funded by the UKRI Global Research Challenge Fund project 
“Drugs and (dis)order”, as well as research funded by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, 
Natural Resources Management project funded by the European Union. The work was conducted in 
partnership with the Organization of Sustainable Development & Research and Alcis Ltd.  
2 Initially, around 100 families from the Orakzai tribe arrived in the Mahmand valley from Pakistan in 
March 2015, fleeing the GoP’s counter insurgency initiatives targeting the TTP in the Tirah valley. 
These were joined by families from other parts of Pakistan. In July 2015 these refugees had taken 
control of the valley and raised a black ISIS flag at Shadal bazaar. For more details see David Mansfield, 
“The devil is in the detail: Nangarhar’s continued decline into insurgency, violence and widespread 
drug production” AREU, February 2016.  
3 Paid from the smugglers fee.  
4 Paid from the smugglers fee.  
5 These payments rarely exceeded US$1.20 – but often less than US$0.30 – per kilogram and were 
intermittent not regular.  
6 Payments to local Taliban commanders would be referred to as “komak,” [komak is usually translated 
as “help”] gifts, and be made of any one of wealth, not just opium traders. Commanders claimed that 
these payments were for food, clothes and other items for the commander and his soldiers, for their 
“jihad.” Requests for these payments would be sporadic, often timed after each agricultural season, and 
while demands would initially start at around US$500 to US$600, the amount ultimately paid by the 
opium trader would rarely exceed a total of US$120.  
7 This journey is initially by car and then a four hour walk to the border.  
8 Of the 96 interviewed, 69 (72%) were reported being illiterate, 10 (8%) claimed to have finished 
school up to 6th grade, 8 (8%) up to 9th grade, 4 (4%) up to 10th grade and 5 (5%) up to 12th grade.  
9 The District to Hub figure excludes a further 25% of the yield on the basis that the crop in districts 
such as Achin, Shinwar, Deh Bala and Kot will be transported directly to the border at Tabai and will 
not be first routed to Markoh.  
References 
Agence France Press, 2017. From Poppy to Heroin: Taliban Moves into Afghan Drug Production, 
8 August 2017.  http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/921189/from-poppy-to-heroin-taliban-moves-intoafghan- 
drug-production#ixzz54uADqs75 
Babor, T. et al., 2010. Drug Policy and the Public Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2020. Is Afghanistan Emerging as a Globally 
Important Supplier of ephedrine and methamphetamine, EU4MD Special Report, November.   
https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/13410/emcdda-methamphetamine-in- 
Afghanistan-report.pdf 
Inkster, N. and Comolli, V., 2012. Drugs, Insecurity and Failed States: The Problems of Prohibition. London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
Mansfield, D. 1998. The Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Coping Strategies of Opium 
Traders. Strategic Study #2, Final Report for UNDCP, October. 
Mansfield, D. 2016. The Devil Is in the Detail: Nangarhar’s Continued Decline into Insurgency, Violence 
and Widespread Drug Production, AREU, February.  https://areu.org.af/publication/1602/ 
Mansfield, D., 2018. Stirring up the Hornet’s Nest: How the Population of Rural Helmand View the 
Current Counterinsurgency Campaign, AREU, October.  https://areu.org.af/publication/1814/ 
Mansfield, D., 2018a. Bombing Heroin Labs in Afghanistan: The Latest Act in in the Theater of 
Counternarcotics, LSE International Drug Policy Unit, January.  https://www.lse.ac.uk/united-states/ 
Assets/Documents/Heroin-Labs-in-Afghanistan-Mansfield.pdf 
Sharing the load 
211 
Mansfield, D., 2019. Denying Revenue or Wasting Money? Assessing the impact of the Air Campaign 
against ‘Drugs Labs’ in Afghanistan, LSE International Drug Policy Unit, April  https://www.lse.ac.uk/ 
united-states/Assets/Documents/mansfield-april-update.pdf 
Mansfield, D., 2020. Mules, Pick-ups and Container Traffic: Cross-Border Production and the Shaping of 
the Political Economy of Nangarhar, AREU, June.  https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2020/ 
07/2008E-Mules-Pick-ups-and-Container-Traffic.pdf/ 
Mansfield, D., 2020. Catapults, Pick-Ups and Tankers: Cross-Border Production and the Shaping of the 
Political Economy of Nimroz, AREU, August.  https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/2 
013E-Catapults-Pickups-and-Tankers.pdf/ 
Mansfield, D., 2021. Managing Local Resources and Conflict: The Undeclared Economy-Value Chain 
Mapping and Visualisation of the Talc, Fuel, and Transit Trade in Afghanistan. An unpublished report 
for the Office of Transitional Initiatives, OTI, Kabul (forthcoming). 
Organization of American States, 2012. The Economics of Drug Trafficking, in The Drug Problem in the 
Americas: Studies, Washington DC: OAS. 
Paoli, L., Greenfield, V., and Reuter, P., 2009. The World Heroin Market: Can Supply be Cut? Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
UNODC, 2012. The World Drug Report. UNODC: Vienna. 
UNODC, 2015. Drug Money: The Illicit Proceeds of Opiates Trafficked on the Balkan Route, UNODC, 
Vienna. 
UNODC, 2018. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Production, November, UNODC, Kabul. 
UNODC, 2020. Voices of the Quchagbar - Understanding Opiate Trafficking in Afghanistan from the 
Perspective of Drug Traffickers. UNODC Research, AOTP Update, Special Edition, Vienna. 
UNODC, 2020a. World Drug Report: 3 Drug Supply. UNODC Research, Vienna. 
Weigand, F., 2020. Conflict and Transnational Crime: Borders, Bullets and Business in Southeast Asia. 





Nicholas Marsh and Lauren Pinson   
The primary significance of arms trafficking lies in the ability of a trafficker to increase the 
destructive potential of a recipient of illicit weapons.1,2 In contrast to illicit trades in com-
modities such as narcotics or counterfeit goods, arms trafficking usually involves comparatively 
little money and few individuals or groups are involved as purchasers or traffickers. 
Nevertheless, arms trafficking can have a profound political and societal impact when groups 
involved in political violence or organized crime obtain weapons. As has been shown again and 
again, massacres can be carried out by small groups or even individuals using powerful firearms. 
Various campaigning organizations have often presented what Bourne (2007) describes as 
the ‘amorphous image’ of easy access to illicit arms throughout the world, sometimes illustrated 
with tales of Kalashnikovs being traded for the price of a chicken (see also Chivers 2011, p. 381,  
Jackson 2010, Marsh 2015). This amorphous image is used by politicians and campaigning 
NGOs to draw attention to arms trafficking by presenting ’supermarkets for terrorists’ or 
criminals (Marsh 2017, p. 79). Empirical research on arms trafficking, however, paints a very 
different picture (Bourne 2007, Markowski et al. 2009, Karp et al. 2015, Marsh 2020). Instead, 
supply and demand for illicitly trafficked arms varies considerably geographically and tempo-
rally. Arms trafficking is usually local, and closely linked to regional economies of conflict or 
organized violence. 
The legal production, transfer, and possession of arms is controlled via a complex web of 
multi-level governance (Greene and Marsh 2012a). At the societal level, weapons are governed 
via norms, customs, and informal authority (Ashkenazi 2012, Buscemi 2019). Customs or 
traditional authority figures may dictate who is entitled to own and carry weapons, and under 
what circumstances they can be used. In areas where state authority is weak or non-existent 
(such as in borderlands) weapons are usually still governed via other forms of authority 
(Bartolucci and Kannewarff 2012, Buscemi 2019). Practices and networks can be more im-
portant than formal or informal institutions (Buscemi 2021). 
At the level of the state, a core function of governance is to regulate weapons present within 
a jurisdiction (Marsh 2018, Tar and Adejoh 2021). National governments regulate the pro-
duction, trade, and possession of weapons, though national laws differ (e.g., see Parker 2011a on 
firearm regulations). In most states, people can lawfully obtain firearms and other weapons used 
for recreation or hunting. Weapons designed for use by military forces are generally heavily 
restricted, with civilian possession usually limited to entities such as museums or film 
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production companies that own deactivated weapons.3 In particular, states typically have 
transfer control regulations which govern the international trade in arms. Normally, a party 
requires authorization from a government to export, transit, or import arms across borders. 
At the international level, regional organizations (such as the European Union or the 
Economic Community of West African States) and the UN Security Council play a role in 
regulating the arms trade. States have also negotiated agreements, in particular the Arms Trade 
Treaty. There is considerable interaction between these three levels of governance (Greene and 
Marsh 2012a), and rules formulated at one level may be unacceptable at another. Successful 
attempts to control illicit trafficking require concurrence at all three levels (Ashkenazi 2012). 
This chapter proceeds as follows: first, we illustrate the implicit scholarly debates on arms 
trafficking. Next, we detail the four categories of the arms trade. Then, we explain the supply 
and demand for illicit arms, the extent of arms trafficking, and the national pool of recirculating 
illicit arms. Finally, we elucidate state- and international-level responses to arms trafficking. We 
conclude with implications for the study of other types of smuggling. 
Academic debates 
While it is axiomatic that weapons play a vital role in conflict and violent crime, there has been 
little specifically academic research into illicit arms trafficking (Marsh 2020: 21–25). The 
substantial majority of scholarship has taken place outside of peer-reviewed journals, and mostly 
can be found in reports published by think tanks and research centres (such as Small Arms 
Survey), international organizations (especially various parts of the UN), NGOs (such as 
Amnesty International), and consultancy firms (such as Conflict Armament Research). 
Investigative journalism is another rich source of information. 
Research in academic journals similarly focuses upon describing specific illicit flows 
without engaging in theory building or wider academic debates, for example, McDougal 
et al. (2015) on total illicit firearm flows from the USA to Mexico, or McDougal et al. (2019) 
on detection of illicit military–civilian flows of ammunition in Haiti. The one larger body of 
academic work which engages with other fields is research on illicit arms markets in the 
United States (e.g., Zimring 1976, Moore 1981, Cook and Braga 2001), though given its 
unique level of lawful firearms availability and focus upon US gun control debates, research 
on the US has limited applicability elsewhere. Only a handful of authors have attempted to go 
beyond geographically limited case studies and descriptions of data collection in order to 
examine arms trafficking as a phenomenon (Kinsella 2006, Killicoat 2007, Markowski et al. 
2009, Marsh 2015). 
As such, the great majority of the existing research comprises disparate case studies and data 
collection that are fragmented geographically, temporally, and methodologically. This body of 
work is atheoretical and there has often been little engagement between researchers working on 
arms trafficking and relevant academic fields such as the micro-foundations of conflict. The lack 
of interest in arms trafficking can be explained partly by the general failure of arms researchers to 
go beyond case studies and produce datasets or theories that can be used readily by other social 
scientists (Marsh 2007, Greene and Marsh 2012b). Lacking engagement with experts, social 
scientists sometimes hold implicit assumptions about arms trafficking which preclude further 
examination of the subject. 
There are two notable areas of implicit theory concerning arms availability which can be 
found in academic research. Firstly, some scholars, many of whom wrote from the 1990s 
onwards about the so-called ‘New Wars’ (e.g., Kaldor 2013), have assumed that the world is 
awash with vast quantities of illicit arms (for summaries see Bourne 2007, pp. 34–39, Jackson 
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2010, pp. 133–137, Marsh 2012, pp. 23–24). This view, described by Bourne (2007) as an 
‘amorphous image’ of ubiquitous easy availability can be summed up by Klare (1999, p. 16) 
who writes that “the outbreak of conflict in weak and divided societies is fostered by an im-
mense worldwide abundance of small arms and light weapons.” The amorphous image, while 
drawing attention to arms trafficking, precludes further research. So long as availability is as-
sumed to be constant it cannot be used to explain variation in the outbreak or intensity of 
violence, nor is there any point in examining the relationship between violence and different 
means of illicit supply. The amorphous image has been explicitly challenged by scholars who 
emphasize that arms trafficking is usually local, and closely linked to regional economies of 
conflict or organized violence (see Bourne 2007, Jackson 2010, Marsh 2012). Many more 
scholars have implicitly criticized the amorphous image simply by describing the extent to 
which illicit arms are frequently scarce and the local nature of arms trafficking (e.g., Strazzari 
and Tholens 2010, Gilgen 2012, Schroeder 2013, Karp et al. 2015). 
An implicit consequence of the amorphous image is scholars who do not consider arms 
supply to be a factor worth considering. For example, Krause (2017, pp. 42, 70–73) lists three 
factors which he claims encompass the strength of all rebel movements: “members, wealth, and 
popular support,” and he explicitly excludes other forms of resources such as arms (2017, 
p. 353). Krause does not assume that rebels don’t need arms to fight, but that if they have 
enough people, money, and support they can get all the arms they need. Such an assumption 
implicitly assumes that resources are fungible (Hazen 2013, pp. 6–15). However, other scholars 
have argued that illicit arms and other conflict goods are not fungible. Rebels or organized 
crime groups that are well financed still need to expend considerable effort to develop sources 
of illicit arms supply (Bourne 2007, Marsh 2007, Hazen 2013). The ease or difficulty in ob-
taining arms varies considerably depending upon closeness to sources of supply (such as arms 
obtained from military depots after state collapse). There are logistical challenges even in areas 
where it is apparently easy for individuals to obtain military-style weapons. High intensity 
violence uses up vast quantities of ammunition that constantly need to be resupplied, something 
which is much more difficult if fighters are equipped with a wide variety of weapons. 
Secondly, scholars studying conflict or crime have often made two basic and usually implicit 
assumptions about arms which Bourne (2012) terms substantive or instrumentalist. The sub-
stantive view is that the presence of weapons determines social phenomena. For example, 
concerning trafficking, Greene and Macaspac Penetrante (2012, p. 142) summarize a “frame-
work of understanding” that a “malign synergy” of uncontrolled flows of weapons and the 
presence of armed groups will “drive the affected country down a spiral of decline toward state 
failure.” This view has been criticized by scholars who point out that societies are able to 
govern weapons use and inflows of illicit arms may not result in their use in acts of violence 
(see, e.g., Greene and Macaspac Penetrante 2012, pp. 154–159, Greene and Marsh 2012c, 
pp. 258–260, Sagawa 2010, 2018). Conversely, the instrumentalist assumptions view weapons 
as being irrelevant, something that can be summed up by the phrase made popular by advocacy 
groups such as the National Rifle Association: “Guns don’t kill people, people do.” Such an 
instrumentalist view can be found among scholars who assume that motivation to use violence 
is an adequate explanation for the incidence and intensity of violence. For example, Booth 
(2007, pp. 120–1) argues that “politically or racially motivated slaughter, regardless of the 
perpetrator, is committed with the technology at hand” and so crimes like genocide will still 
occur whether the perpetrator is armed with clubs or with high-tech weapons. Instead of the 
substantive or instrumentalist dualism, authors such as Marsh (2020) and Sislin and Pearson 




Arms trafficking is a usually unseen but necessary condition for armed conflict and organized 
crime. Scholars make assumptions about it even if they haven’t actively thought about arms 
trafficking or consulted the empirical research. It is therefore useful to provide a summary of 
how it usually occurs, something which can be found in the following sections. 
Types of illicit arms transfers 
Researchers and practitioners classify the forms of arms trafficking and drivers of illicit supply 
and demand. This provides a starting point for understanding how illicit arms markets operate. 
The arms trade can be divided into four categories4: 
1. The authorized trade in which transfers are fully in compliance with national and interna-
tional laws and regulations. 
The following three categories comprise different forms of illicit arms trafficking. 
2. The semi-legal trade in which different aspects of a transfer may be authorized or un-
authorized.5 For example, a transfer may involve an authorization from the exporting state, 
but not one from the importing state. Parties involved in arranging arms transfers which 
break national or international laws may be adept at exploiting loopholes to provide the 
appearance that their activities are lawful.  
3. The state-sanctioned illicit trade involves direct complicity of government officials who have 
political approval for their actions.6 State-sanctioned trafficking occurs when arms transfers 
are used as a foreign policy tool and usually involves transfers to non-state parties that have 
not been authorized to receive weapons by the state where they are located.  
4. In the wholly illicit trade, all aspects of an arms transfer are unlawful and unauthorized (such 
as if weapons were sold by one organized crime group to another). 
There are often blurred boundaries between the latter three categories. For example, the semi- 
legal trade and state-sanctioned illicit trade may at times use similar methods; the difference is 
the level of government complicity. Arms transfer regulations can be complex, and can be 
broken inadvertently by exporting companies. Even if they are involved in breaking national 
laws, military or intelligence personnel involved in state-sanctioned trafficking may not be 
prosecuted if doing so is not in the national interest (Marsh 2002). National laws and regulations 
may be unclear or non-existent in contexts of state collapse or where there is contested so-
vereignty between different sides involved in civil wars. 
In the absence of marketing and advertising, there is usually little price competition between 
illicit suppliers. Instead, in areas with effective law enforcement, weapons transfers are arranged 
through trusted networks (in general, see Morselli 2009, pp. 63–71, or for examples concerning 
arms trafficking see Duquet and Goris 2018). Such a reliance on networks limits the potential 
market for trafficked weapons. 
Supply and demand of illicitly trafficked arms 
The main sources of arms used by illicit traffickers include (Marsh 2018):  
• Illicit production of often low-quality firearms.  
• Theft or illicit sale from private firearm owners.  
• Theft or illicit sale from government stockpiles. 
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• Use of deception in the semi-legal trade to obtain arms from government stocks or from 
arms-producing firms.  
• Donations via the government-sanctioned trade, or from supporters. 
The limited illicit production of arms is one constraint on the supply of arms to illicit markets. 
Weapons need to be made to exacting specifications or they may malfunction and possibly 
injure the user. Due to economies of scale, mass producing weapons in factories is more ef-
ficient than craftsman individually making them to similar specifications in workshops. Arms 
that are illicitly trafficked were usually lawfully produced in a factory. 
Most trafficked weapons are diverted to the illicit market after they have been lawfully 
produced and transferred (Marsh and Dube 2014, Marsh 2019). Diversion occurs when au-
thorized holdings are transferred to unauthorized end users – for example, when weapons are 
stolen from a government stockpile. 
The most widely used sources of arms differ over time and across regions. In general, armed 
groups seek to diversify their sources of supply (Bourne 2007). Government stocks are most 
attractive as they contain large quantities and powerful weapons, but outside state collapse they 
can be a difficult source for an armed group to access (Marsh 2007, Jackson 2010). 
Simply put, people demand illicitly trafficked arms because they wish to obtain weapons that 
they could not easily obtain lawfully. Normally, users of trafficked arms lack the ability to use or 
maintain the most sophisticated arms. The only users of illicit fighter aircraft or warships are 
embargoed states, or quasi-states which may lack diplomatic recognition but control large 
territories, populations, and resources. The non-state groups and individuals who usually de-
mand trafficked weapons wish to obtain arms that are easy to use and maintain, and that can be 
transported and concealed from government forces. In practice, illicit arms trafficking usually 
involves what is known as small arms and light weapons, such as assault rifles, machine guns, 
grenades, and portable rocket launchers (Greene and Marsh 2012d). 
Trafficked arms offer the following three advantages. First, individuals who would otherwise 
be prohibited can obtain arms. In particular, national regulations may prevent lawful acquisition 
by people convicted of violent crimes or members of extremist groups. Second, people can 
obtain prohibited types of weapons, especially powerful arms designed for military use, such as 
grenades or fully automatic firearms. Third, illicitly trafficked arms may be difficult or im-
possible to trace by law enforcement officials. 
There are three basic forms of demand for illicitly trafficked arms: instrumental need; 
symbolic role; and collection (Marsh 2015). These are linked to the different forms of illicit 
trade which are described below. The first is instrumental – weapons may be needed for a 
specific task. For instance, a group planning a bank robbery will obtain arms used to subdue the 
staff and customers. Secondly, trafficked weapons may serve a symbolic role. As examples, the 
Kalashnikov has become a symbol of revolution globally, and groups may prize weapons 
captured from enemy government forces. Finally, in developed countries, some collectors have 
obtained significant quantities of illicit arms. While those arms may not have been purchased 
with aggressive intent, in some cases illicitly acquired collections can involve tens or even 
hundreds of weapons. 
Different forms of demand tie to the three forms of trafficking mentioned earlier. First, the 
semi-legal trade is typically used to supply larger groups that are involved in political violence or 
organized crime and often involves complex arrangements designed to obtain weapons under 
state control. Transaction costs are high and frequently involve rare skills such document 
forgery. Second, state-sanctioned illicit trade is a policy tool usually used to supply groups 
involved in political violence. Third, the wholly illicit trade is the most pervasive and can be 
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found in all countries. It most commonly involves demand by individuals or smaller groups 
(Marsh 2015). 
Violence drives most of the demand for illicit arms. In developed countries with low levels 
of internal violence, demand for illicit arms is limited to small numbers of criminal groups and 
some collectors. For example, in 2013, UK police officials stated that ballistic tests indicated that 
most gun crime could be traced back to fewer than 1,000 illicit firearms still in circulation (Fiola 
2013). In contrast, in the same year in Colombia – a country that experienced very high levels 
of organized violence – authorities reported the seizure of 38,236 guns (which were likely a 
small proportion of the pool of illicit arms in the country) (Karp et al. 2015). 
Development also interacts with supply and demand. Firstly, developed states usually have 
more effective law enforcement agencies and so are better able to prevent illicit trafficking. 
Secondly, partly as a result of better law enforcement, the most developed states almost always 
have low levels of lethal violence, resulting in lower demand (the United States is an excep-
tion). Finally, higher average incomes entail more resources that can be used to acquire illicit 
arms. Some middle-income states and some of the least-developed countries may have com-
parable levels of illicit trafficking. 
Extent of arms trafficking 
There are large differences in the scale of the different types of arms trafficking noted above. 
The semi-legal trade usually involves complex transactions involving several actors. Large 
quantities of arms may be transported under a veil of apparent legality; for example, shipments 
crossing borders facilitated by a mixture of forged and genuine documentation. The semi-legal 
trade has been featured in Hollywood movies such as Lord of War but in practice it is rare, and 
its heyday was in the 1990s and early 2000s. Then, it was possible for dealers and brokers to 
obtain large quantities of weapons from post-Soviet arsenals with few questions asked. Those 
practices have declined as stocks were sold off and countries improved their arms trade controls 
upon joining the EU and NATO. 
The largest single transactions can be found in the state-sanctioned trade. Ministries of 
defence can obtain arms from government stocks or procure them directly from companies. 
They can also obtain powerful sophisticated weapons such as guided anti-aircraft or anti-tank 
missiles that are usually difficult to source in illicit markets. Governments can ensure that 
customs and other officials ignore transfers that may not comply with regulations. The largest 
contemporary example of the state-sanctioned illicit trade was the CIA-led supply of arms and 
training to anti-Assad groups in Syria (‘Timber Sycamore’), lasting from 2013 to 2017.7 Precise 
details of the programme are not publicly stated, but it reportedly cost the US about USD 1 
billion per year (Miller and DeYoung 2015). In addition, Timber Sycamore also received 
financing and weapons from Saudi Arabia claimed to be worth billions of dollars (Mazzetti and 
Apuzzo 2016), along with further support from other states including Qatar and Turkey. 
Trafficking in the wholly illicit trade is usually small scale, moving small numbers of weapons 
(Marsh 2015). If traffickers cross borders, it is most commonly between neighbouring countries. 
Arms are bulky and heavy, so it is usually not feasible to try to traffic large quantities in areas 
where states have effective law enforcement agencies. A trafficker might be able to conceal five 
firearms in a car, but, in much of the world, they would find it difficult to secretly transport five 
thousand. 
Many small-scale transfers can add up to large numbers of weapons. The 1994 Zapatista 
uprising in the Mexican state of Chiapas popularized the term the ‘ant trade’ to describe 
how many individuals would purchase arms in the United States to smuggle over the border 
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(Ross 1995). Later, it was estimated that between 2010 and 2012 about 200,000 firearms had 
been trafficked over the US border into Mexico (McDougal et al. 2015). 
Differences between trafficking weapons and their ammunition become apparent when 
violence is more intense. Battlefields use up vast quantities of ammunition, and rebel armies 
constantly need to be resupplied, whereas they do not need significant numbers of new 
weapons every day. For less intense violence, a gun and its ammunition can be supplied 
together. 
Illicit prices 
Analysis of geographical and temporal differences in illicit prices has been used to describe arms 
trafficking (e.g., Killicoat 2007, Florquin 2014, McDougal et al. 2019). Recent research pro-
vides some insights into the nature of arms trafficking (Marsh 2020, Marsh and 
McDougal 2020):  
• Illicit arms are expensive. Globally, among 727 price observations, the average price of an 
illicit assault rifle in constant 2010 US dollars is USD1489 (Marsh 2020). When one 
considers that almost all conflicts are fought in low- or middle-income countries, pur-
chasing illicit arms constitutes a considerable investment for an individual fighter or group.  
• There is considerable variation in illicit prices, even in geographically close areas. For 
example, in 2004, the average reported price for an illicit assault rifle in Iraq was ap-
proximately USD160, while in Israel/Palestine it was approximately USD2200 
(Marsh 2020).  
• Arms prices tend to rise after increases in violence (Marsh 2020). Higher prices suggest that 
supply is not able to meet demand, and this may limit the intensity of violence and the 
ability of parties to achieve their aims.  
• Prices paid by governments in the authorized trade are usually much lower than illicit 
prices for similar weapons. Compared to the thousands often paid by insurgents, gov-
ernments could obtain new Kalashnikovs for about USD200 each, and used ones for as 
little as USD65 (Marsh 2020). 
Analysis of illicit prices suggests that illicit arms are a ‘partially tradable’ good (Killicoat 2007). 
Arms trafficking clearly occurs, but anti-trafficking measures by governments and international 
organizations are able to restrict the illicit trade in most places. Indeed, exceptionally low prices 
are associated with places where state authority has collapsed (most notably in Iraq during and 
after 2003). 
Recirculation of illicit arms 
Illicit arms are durable goods and can be transferred from one owner to another (in some 
circumstances guns may be rented out by the hour). If properly stored and maintained, weapons 
can remain in working order for decades, even hundreds of years. Ammunition has a shorter 
life, as explosives become unstable over time. In practice, though, arms will degrade me-
chanically if they are allowed to corrode, are damaged while in use, or are not properly 
maintained. In time, the number of working weapons will slowly decline unless losses due to 
attrition are replaced with new production. 
Because arms are durable and tradable goods, there is a pool of illicit weapons which can be 
drawn upon, as illustrated in Figure 16.1. As described later in this chapter, a key aim of 
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government and multilateral anti-trafficking measures is to shrink the size of the pool – by 
restricting inflows and extracting arms via seizures and amnesties. 
How states counter arms trafficking 
States must regulate the manufacture, transfer, state storage, civilian possession, and disposal of 
weapons in order to prevent the diversion of conventional arms to the national pool of illicit 
arms (see Figure 16.1). During manufacture and later transfers, marking the weapon can record 
unique information on its production and ownership and a serial number. Transfer controls 
require the authorization of the export, transit, and import of weapons. Having a mechanism 
for information exchange and using end-user certificates (designating the final recipient) helps 
mitigate the risk of weapon diversion. Export may also necessitate a risk assessment of diversion 
and/or violating international law. Robust controls on arms transfers also regulate brokering – 
when an intermediary links interested parties and facilitates the transaction. The government 
must also oversee the physical security and management of its own storage and stockpiles of law 
enforcement weapons and military weapons. Control of civilian weapons ownership varies 
extensively across states, partly due to the lack of international instruments addressing civilian 
possession. 
Due to resource constraints and prioritization, governments vary widely in their ability to 
effectively monitor and analyze illicit arms flows. Many governments – in both developed and 
developing countries – do not effectively collect and analyze data on firearms trafficking, and 
the least developed countries often lack the necessary capacity (Karp et al. 2015, Marsh 2015). 










































Figure 16.1 An illustration of the national pool of illicit arms  
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Without intelligence on illicit arms flows, in the short term, governments cannot develop 
sufficient policies and law enforcement responses, and, in the long term, governments may 
assume that in the absence of information there is no problem (Marsh 2015). 
There are two main political challenges in preventing arms trafficking. First, some states are 
simultaneously involved in promoting anti-trafficking measures and directly engaged in state- 
sanctioned arms trafficking (or at least allowing it to occur in their jurisdiction).8 Some states, 
especially permanent members of the UN Security Council, perceive arms trafficking as a useful 
foreign policy tool, and so undermine wider attempts to prevent illicit arms proliferation.9 
Second, attempts to prevent arms trafficking are frequently stymied by official inaction and 
indifference.10 Often, arms trafficking is ‘someone else’s problem.’ Law enforcement officers 
may correctly perceive that diversion occurred in another jurisdiction, but attempts to uncover 
traffickers will involve lengthy and perhaps fruitless attempts to cooperate with other agencies. 
States vary in both interest in countering arms trafficking and available financial and human 
resources. The transnational nature of illicit trafficking makes international cooperation im-
perative, since weak-link actors can otherwise allow arms trafficking to endure. With resources, 
technical ability, willingness, and international collaboration, a government can limit access to 
arms for criminals, terrorists, and actors involved in conflict. 
International assistance and cooperation to counter arms trafficking 
Many states are unwilling and/or lack the capacity to counter illicit arms trafficking; as a result, 
other states contribute international assistance to build capacity to control illicit arms. Anti- 
trafficking assistance includes aid to augment technical skills and resources, reduce corruption, 
and strengthen institutions. The provision of assistance to limit the movement of illicit arms uses 
several avenues, including:  
1. physical efforts (e.g., disarmament, destruction, stockpile security and surplus destruction, 
and law enforcement) that collect, destroy, secure, or detect arms on behalf of the state;  
2. legal efforts (e.g., writing legislation and training for customs and border control) to bolster 
state-level governance; and,  
3. social efforts (e.g., dialogue and public relations campaigns) that target the societal level of 
governance, aiming to construct norms of arms ownership and use.11 
Governments may have functional or political reasons to provide international assistance to 
counter arms trafficking – whether to limit illicit arms within their own borders or to help a 
foreign region of interest. As a result, access to international assistance is not equal across re-
gions. For instance, capacity-building to counter arms trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe 
is able to access significantly more donor resources and specialist implementing organizations 
compared with Latin America and the Caribbean, even though the latter region includes states 
dealing with significant violence carried out with illegal weapons. 
Effective international assistance requires matching a state’s needs to offers of assistance. In 
the best-case scenario, international assistance and cooperation involve providing resources 
alongside sharing technical assistance and other experience-informed solutions to common 
challenges. Complicating matters for donors, recipient governments sometimes have incentives 
to reject assistance projects, since receiving resources may entail more external oversight or 
additional transparency in a politically sensitive area (Pinson 2020). 
Several primarily Western states and regional organizations provide international assistance to 
help control the use and spread of illicit weapons. Major donor states include the United States, 
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the United Kingdom, Germany, and France (Pinson 2020). While some states provide bilateral 
assistance, states often supply assistance through regional organizations (e.g., EU or NATO) and 
specialist assistance programs (e.g., South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the 
Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons or Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction). 
Historically, donor states and organizations have focused the majority of their international 
assistance on destroying arms and ammunition, securing state stockpiles, and, to a lesser extent, 
funding disarmament campaigns. Destroying surplus and insecure weapons eliminates a po-
tential source of weapons to divert. If local law enforcement or military are trained in effective 
destruction techniques, it also builds local capacity to manage the state stockpile. Physical se-
curity and stockpile management measures help to secure state-owned weapons from being 
diverted to the illicit market. Successful civilian disarmament campaigns remove weapons held 
by the population. All of these capacity-building measures focus on helping limit the number of 
weapons that could potentially be diverted to the national pool of illicit arms through theft, 
corrupt sale, or donation. 
Donor states and organizations strategically provide such capacity-building assistance to states 
and regions as a result of spillover avoidance, responsibility ties, or acute need. First, states with 
stricter gun control sometimes try to avoid the consequences of illegal guns smuggled over their 
borders or disrupting regions of interest (spillover avoidance) by focusing assistance toward 
potential sources of illicit arms (Pinson 2020). For instance, partially in response to terrorist 
attacks in Western Europe perpetrated with illegal arms, some major donor states, including 
Germany and France, have shifted funding towards more dynamic aspects of illicit arms traf-
ficking in recent years, such as training for law enforcement and border patrols. Much of this 
assistance funds capacity building projects in Central and Eastern Europe, making the region a 
destination for more concentrated assistance even compared with areas experiencing immediate 
violence. Second, donor states tend to be more involved with former colonies or areas where 
they were directly involved in a conflict (responsibility ties), sometimes funding stockpile se-
curity, arms destruction, or disarmament. Third, though a recipient state’s acute need to control 
potential sources of illicit arms is sometimes matched with resources, donor states tend to target 
aid to reduce smuggling across their own borders, stabilize a region of interest, or have some 
historic responsibility (Pinson 2020). While the United States is a major donor state in this issue 
area, it rarely funds capacity-building measures to counter arms trafficking in its own region, 
tends to focus on physical security and stockpile management, and domestic political constraints 
somewhat limit the types of assistance provided. As noted above, some states may bargain over 
or reject offered assistance, reducing the amount of control held by a donor state or organi-
zation. Some of the international instruments discussed in the following section attempt to 
match needs with resources but often requests remain unfunded. 
International and regional agreements and regulations 
While international assistance provides resources and expertise aiming to build capacity at the 
national or regional level, limiting arms trafficking requires international coordination and 
agreements. International and various regional communities have attempted to set forth 
guidelines and commitments to capacity-building measures in order to counter arms trafficking. 
The main international instruments relevant to countering arms trafficking require different 
responsibilities from governments:  
1. Firearms Protocol – 2001: All State Parties of the Firearms Protocol12 that supplements the 
UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime have an obligation to implement 
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legislation to counter firearms trafficking, exchange information on legal and illegal par-
ticipants in the trade, and provide technical assistance to other states. While legally binding, 
several major arms-exporting states have not ratified the protocol (UN General 
Assembly 2001).  
2. UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) – 2001: All UN Member States are 
committed to enhance national SALW laws, import and export controls, and stockpile 
management, in addition to engage in cooperation and assistance to help meet those goals 
more broadly. The PoA lacks an enforcement mechanism, limiting its utility (United 
Nations 2001).13 
3. International Tracing Instrument (ITI) – 2005: The ITI supplements the PoA by estab-
lishing international standards on marking, record-keeping, and tracing for small arms and 
light weapons (UN General Assembly 2005).  
4. Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) – 2013: State Parties to the ATT seek to thwart and eliminate 
the illicit trade in conventional arms, pursuant to their national laws and regulations. 
The ATT regulates the legal conventional arms trade. However, several major arms- 
exporting and -importing states are not State Parties to the ATT (UN General Assembly 
2013).14  
5. UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Target 16.4 – 2015: In the SDGs, UN Member 
States made the commitment to significantly reduce illicit arms flows. Due to the clan-
destine nature of firearms trafficking, directly measuring these flows is not possible. As a 
result, SDG Indicator 16.4.2 focuses on how efficient the international community is in 
tracking origin of illicit firearms in a State (UN General Assembly 2015). 
These different international instruments include various provisions to control the legal trade 
while preventing, detecting, and countering the three variants of the illicit trade.15 In addition 
to state obligations and commitments to international instruments, many states have similar 
obligations under regional organizations of which they are members. 
While many of these international and regional agreements require national legislation, those 
laws are not always passed consistently. Often, international instruments provide general 
commitments but not specific guidelines to implement. The patchwork of laws, regulations, 
and enforcement globally provides loopholes and pathways that allow for trafficking. As a 
complex issue, challenges to enhancing arms controls include the outsized role of major pro-
ducers and exporters, norms of state sovereignty, and legitimate use of conventional arms for 
some purposes (Stohl 2017). 
Comparison to other types of smuggling 
Arms remain unique compared to many other smuggled items. As durable goods, weapons can 
be sold, trafficked, and used by multiple actors over decades. Ammunition is the one element 
which is rapidly consumed in an economic sense. At a global level, profits from arms trafficking 
are likely to be much lower than for other forms of smuggling described in this volume. Instead, 
weapons are often trafficked in order to facilitate other activities. Trafficked arms are needed by 
individuals or groups involved in committing crimes (including other forms of smuggling) or 
acts of political violence. Unlike other forms of smuggling, some governments actively traffic 




1 We use the terms arms and weapons interchangeably – defined here as specialized instruments which 
have been designed to cause injury or destruction. Unless explicitly stated, discussion on these terms 
also includes associated ammunition, parts, and accessories. 
The authorized trade and different forms of arms trafficking involve weapons transfers. A transfer 
occurs when there is a change in the possession or control of a weapon – through sale or donation – 
from one party to another. A transfer may involve arms crossing borders, or may occur within a state. 
This chapter does not cover improvised objects that may be used to injure, such as kitchen knives, 
or the trade in nuclear, chemical or biological (NBC) weapons. Fortunately, the illicit trade in finished 
NBC arms is very limited and potentially distinct from conventional arms trafficking, making it be-
yond the range of this chapter’s limited length.  
2 We use the terms trafficking and smuggling interchangeably, tending to use ‘trafficking’ more frequently 
as the term is used more often in the field.  
3 There is some blurring in the line between civilian and military weapons, particularly with some types 
of firearms that are not designed for fully automatic fire which may be used by both military forces and 
civilians (e.g., pistols and sniper rifles).  
4 This categorization builds upon Haug (2001) and Marsh (2002).  
5 This trade is elsewhere known as the ‘grey market’ (Marsh 2002).  
6 This form of trade is elsewhere known as ‘covert arms supplies.’ This term is not used here as such 
transfers are often carried out openly, and other forms of illicit trade are conducted covertly.  
7 However, one considers the ethics of the arms supplies, the shipments were not authorized by the 
government of Syria and so are included in the definition of illicit used in this chapter. 
8 Relatedly, Erickson (2015) shows commitment to the Arms Trade Treaty and similar policies is in-
fluenced by states’ concerns about upholding or improving their international reputation; yet, shifts to 
comply with international arms control policies and avoid exporting arms to states that violate human 
rights may be constrained to keep foreign policy autonomy and protect the defense industry.  
9 For a recent addition to the long list of works examining the use of arms transfers surrogates by great 
powers to proxies see Krieg and Rickli (2020).  
10 See Marsh (2015) on the widespread lack of capacity to monitor illicit trafficking. Comments on 
indifference are based upon authors’ conversations with officials in a large number of states and in-
ternational organizations.  
11 Pinson (2020), also see Maze and Parker (2006), Maze (2009), Parker (2011b), Parker and Green 
(2012) for in-depth assessments of types of assistance provision.  
12 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components 
and Ammunition.  
13 Various reports have assessed state progress in implementing the PoA, such as Parker and Green (2012).  
14 Garcia (2014) surveys the background and potential significance of the ATT. Reports such as Spano 
and Alpers (2017) detail recommendations on implementing the ATT and PoA. Stohl and Dick (2021) 
provide an overview of issues related to diversion in the ATT and a recent update on ATT initiatives.  
15 Parker (2016) gives more information on each of these instruments, along with a helpful map of where 
these instruments apply within the lifecycle of a firearm.  
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POLICIES FOR COMBATTING 
WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING AND 
PREVENTING ZOONOTIC 
PANDEMICS 
Vanda Felbab-Brown   
Introduction 
The planet is currently experiencing alarming levels of species loss caused in large part by 
intensified poaching, stimulated by a greatly expanding demand for animals, plants, and wildlife 
products. The rate of species extinction, now as much as 1000 times the historical average and the 
worst since the dinosaurs died out 65 million years ago, deserves to be seen, gravely exacerbated 
by climate change, as a global ecological catastrophe meriting high-level policy initiatives to 
address its human causes. In addition to irretrievable biodiversity loss, wildlife trafficking can also 
undermine human security of forest-dependent communities, cause local, national, and global 
economic losses, and even pose threats to national security (Felbab-Brown, 2017). 
As the coronavirus pandemic dramatically highlighted, poaching and wildlife trafficking – as 
well as unmonitored legal trade in wildlife – also pose enormous threats to public health and 
global economies. As of February 1, 2021, COVID-19 has claimed over 2.2 million lives globally 
and infected 103 million people (Felbab-Brown, 2021), a number that kept increasing cata-
strophically throughout the spring of 2021. Twenty years of poverty reduction efforts have been 
wiped out, with as many as 150 million people pushed into extreme poverty in 2021; both the 
disease and the economic effects persisted well into 2021 (“COVID-19 to Add as Many as,”  
2020). Since many have been forced to liquidate their human development assets, they and their 
children may not be able to recover economically for years or decades. Many have been pushed 
into participation in illegal economies and thrust into the hands of criminal actors and militants 
(Felbab-Brown, 2021). Thus, counterproductively, poaching and wildlife trafficking have 
been also exacerbated, as has deforestation. The cumulative devastation surpasses the scale of 
destruction many a regional war could inflict. 
Even prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, zoonotic diseases (including HIV/AIDS, Ebola, 
SARS, flu, yellow fever, and others) caused millions of human deaths and a billion cases of 
human illness per year (Karesh et al., 2012). Seventy-five percent of emerging diseases are 
zoonotic, the majority originating in wildlife (Taylor et al., 2001). 
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The loss of human life and economic destruction of pandemic zoonotic diseases, including 
those linked to poaching and wildlife trafficking, vastly surpass the harms the illegal drug trade 
(as well as policies to counter it) have generated. The level of resources and policy focus on 
countering illegal drug production and smuggling, however, dwarfs policy focus on countering 
poaching and wildlife trafficking. This is all the more inappropriate given that a potentially 
catastrophic impact of poaching and wildlife trafficking – irretrievable loss of species and 
biodiversity within a few years and zoonotic pandemics spread through wildlife trafficking in a 
few months – can be rapid. And unlike illegal drugs, which are non-depletable, wildlife is a 
quickly depletable commodity. 
The global public health and economic devastation caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) 
outbreak dramatically reinforces the urgent imperative to minimize the chances of another 
zoonotic pandemic. Reducing the likelihood of another viral spillover sweeping the world 
requires a fundamental change in how we interact with nature and how we produce food. 
COVID-19 is not an isolated, once in a century event. Between 2003 and 2020, a new 
zoonotic disease threatening at least an epidemic has been identified about once every three 
years. Reducing the extent of zoonotic disease emergence and spread requires minimizing 
human interface with wild animals and wild spaces and eliminating transmission points where 
the likelihood of viral spillover to humans is high, such as unhygienic commercial markets 
in wild animal meat and live animals. Also needed is better monitoring of the legal trade in 
wildlife, conservation of natural habitats, and diligent suppression of unsustainable trade in 
wildlife and the poaching and wildlife trafficking – the subject of this chapter. Moving toward such 
radical changes is difficult in both highly economically developed countries with voracious 
demands for wildlife, timber, agricultural products and minerals, and poorer countries where 
wildlife habitats face intense human pressures for land, requiring a radical rethinking of de-
velopment and global equity issues (Leach et al., 2021) as environmentally destructive policies 
of one country or even one actor can inflict a devastating pandemic on the entire world. 
Conservation policies to preserve species equally can undermine human security when they 
constrain the access of poor populations to the natural resources on which they depend for basic 
livelihoods. Thus, there is little consensus on what the best ways are to suppress wildlife traf-
ficking and what steps are necessary to maximize the prevention of zoonosis; i.e., the viral spiral 
from animals to humans. At least three schools of thought as to how deal with poaching and 
wildlife trafficking exist and their preferred policy recommendations are at times directly 
contradictory.  
• One school of thought, often embraced by many environmental NGOs but also some 
conservation biologists, argues for intensified, even militarized law enforcement, increased 
penalties for poachers, and bans on legal trade in wildlife.  
• Another school, comprising many economists of wildlife trade as well as some conservation 
biologists, maintains that bans will result in greater poaching and emphasizes allowing legal 
trade.  
• A third school of thought, those who promote so-called community based natural- 
resource management, maintains that local communities should be the authority to decide 
how local natural resources are treated, including whether animals are hunted and traded or 
protected. 
Their disagreements and contradictory approaches are all the more amplified by the COVID- 
19 pandemic and the inescapable imperative to respond to it and minimize the chances of 
another rapidly emerging zoonotic pandemic. 
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Apart from ideology and emotions, one of the reasons that these debates persist with great 
vehemence and without prospect for a quick resolution or consensus some 15 years into yet 
another intense poaching and wildlife trafficking wave is that the outcomes of each approach 
have been enormously varied, often with more failures than successes registered for each. What 
that crucially means is that, as uncomfortable as it is for each school of thought, policy ex-
perimentation, flexibility, and adjustments are fundamental. One policy approach does not 
fit all. 
The global poaching and wildlife trafficking crisis 
Elephants, rhinoceros, tigers, giraffes, parrots, jaguars, giant otters, snakes, reptiles, and many 
other animals are captured, slaughtered, and trafficked for trinkets, or for Traditional Chinese 
Medicine. Others are smuggled live for the global pet trade. In combination with habitat 
destruction and global warming, hunting and poaching might eliminate entire genera of species, 
further undermining remaining ecosystems. Although East Asian countries, particularly China, 
Vietnam, and Thailand, are some of the key consumption and demand markets, the United 
States is widely believed to be the country with the second largest consumer market for traf-
ficked wildlife (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020). Demand and supply 
markets also exist in Latin America; some are new, while others have existed for a long time. 
They include, for example, the illegal trade in parrots in Brazil and the illegal trade in reptile 
skins that supplies the affluent in Mexico who love boots made of exotic skins. Wildlife demand 
markets, both sustainable and environmentally-problematic, also exist in other places often 
ignored in the story of global poaching, including various East and West African countries, 
which are often characterized as merely source countries (Barnett, 2000). 
Poaching numbers are staggering and devastating. Between 2010 and 2012, almost 100,000 
elephants were killed for their tusks in Africa, out of an elephant population that is about 
435,000 today, but was 1.2 million in 1980 (“The Elephants Fight,” 2015; “Wildlife 
Slaughter,” 2015; Wasser et al., 2015; “World Wildlife Crime,” 2016).1 
Rhinos are faring even worse, with poaching dramatically increasing since 2007. In 2013, 
about 98% of Africa’s rhinos roamed free in four countries,  South Africa, Namibia, Kenya, and 
Zimbabwe, with over two thirds concentrated in South Africa. In South Africa alone, 1,215 
rhinos were killed for their horns in 2014, up from 13 in 2007. In 2014, a critical tipping point 
was reached in South Africa where the number of deaths was believed to surpass the number of 
births per year (a poaching rate that could wipe out all of Africa’s rhinos by 2022) (Halter, 
2013). Alarmingly consistent with this trend, the total number of poached rhinos in South 
Africa, where their numbers are largest, and those dying as a result of poaching (such as 
orphaned babies) was estimated between 1,160 and 1,500 in 2015 (Amin et al., 2006; “South 
African Group,” 2016). 
The northern white rhino subspecies has already gone almost extinct in the wild (Jones, 
2015), with only two females remaining. Other species of rhinos – the Indian, Sumatran, and 
Javan – exist in Asia, all critically endangered and poached. In India, 141 rhinoceros were killed 
by poachers between 2009 and 2014 (“Rhino Poaching,” 2018). The Indonesian subspecies of 
the Javan rhino was extirpated in 2010 when the presumed last specimen was shot for its horn in 
Vietnam in 2010 (Nuwar, 2013). Both rhino horn and ivory are highly valuable products. A 
kilo of rhino horn currently fetches some US$65,000 in China (Milliken & Shaw, 2012), and a 
kilo of ivory between US$3,000 and 6,000 (Nixon, 2015; “South African Group,” 2016). Ivory 
prices have doubled in recent years, both in demand and source counties (Orenstein, 2013;  
Wittemyer et al., 2011). One hundred and seventy-one tigers were poached in India between 
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2010 and 2015, while 19 very rare Siberian tigers were known to be killed in Russia between 
2012 and 2013 (Nowell, 2007; “WPSI’s Tiger,” 2021). This disastrous poaching has been 
taking place despite the commitment of more than US$100 million in five years by tiger range 
countries to reduce poaching and double tiger populations by 2020 (“Global Tiger,” 2012). 
These numbers may seem comparatively low, but given that the entire population number is in 
the low thousands, with perhaps hundreds for particular subspecies, such poaching rates are 
devastating and can drive the species to extinction. 
This global poaching crisis and illegal trade in wildlife coexist with a large and equally 
expanding legal trade in wildlife. Although sometimes the legal wildlife trade enables con-
servation of habitats and contributes to species recovery, at other times it facilitates illegal trade 
by enabling “laundering” of illegally-sourced wildlife and boosting demand for wildlife pro-
ducts, including illegal ones, as detailed below. 
The trafficking structures and patterns 
Understanding the structure of poaching and wildlife trafficking networks is critical for devising 
effective policy responses. Dominant narratives today often overemphasize organized crime as 
an aspect of wildlife trafficking and underemphasize the corruption of government institutions 
and the wildlife industry in many wildlife-supply countries. Equally, inadequate attention is 
given to the involvement of local communities in poaching, and the intersections among these 
communities and global organized wildlife trafficking. 
The most important characteristic of poaching and smuggling networks is their diversity. 
Some have become highly organized and vertically integrated. Other wildlife trafficking sup-
plying global demand is organized but dispersed, with no kingpins or top-level traffickers. 
Other illegal wildlife trade involves the extensive participation of local communities. 
Sometimes, communities poach merely for their own subsistence, while they also may sell 
illegally obtained wildlife products to local, regional, and, via middlemen, global markets. Local 
communities who interact with organized global poaching networks may join them to generate 
greater revenue, or because they are physically unable to resist them. At other times, they may 
try to oppose them. 
While recognizing these many variations, three basic types of interdependent actors can 
nonetheless be identified: consumers; suppliers; and middlemen. Each of them crucially 
structures the way that wildlife trade networks function. The dispersion or concentration of 
participants along these nodes; i.e., demand, supply, and transshipment, privileges different 
types of interdiction, alternative livelihoods, or community-based resource management ap-
proaches, as well as demand-reduction strategies (Felbab-Brown, 2017). 
Consumers 
Although China’s consumers dominate the global wildlife market, demand for wild plants and 
animals is increasing throughout Southeast and East Asia, exacerbated by the region’s growing 
population and its increasing affluence. What were previously mainly source and transshipment 
locales, such as Thailand and Vietnam, have rapidly become important consumer markets. East 
Asian diaspora communities, including in the United States, are also important consumers of 
wildlife products. 
Demand for wildlife products is present and increasing in other parts of the world as well, 
including Latin America and Africa. Some of these types of demand, such as for bushmeat in 
Africa, are traditional and go back centuries or millennia. Even the long presence of these 
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markets does not necessarily mean that they are sustainable. High population growth in some 
regions, such as West Africa, can lead to such an expansion of demand that it produces un-
sustainable rates of hunting. Other types of demand for wildlife, including in Africa and Latin 
America, are newer, emerging, and expanding as a result of the greater affluence and disposable 
income in those regions. 
Suppliers 
The primary motivating factor for poachers and traders is economic, ranging from small-scale 
subsistence needs for some, to major high-profit business for others. At the start of the 
smuggling chain, are the hunters of animals and collectors of plants and minerals. This group 
consists of both poor (often subsistence-level) hunters and professional hunters. Beyond need 
and greed, other motivations include the rejection of colonial or imposed international values, 
and a form of political rebellion against the imposition of norms that are seen as alien, dis-
criminatory, and against the basic interests of the community (Bell et al., 2007; von Essen and 
Allen, 2015). 
There is a more basic cause: hundreds of millions of people around the world are dependent 
on forest products for basic livelihoods. In India, for example, at least 50 million people living in 
and around forests depend on non-timber forest products (NTFPs) directly or indirectly for 
subsistence (Tejaswi, 2008). For some marginalized communities in Laos, Cambodia, and 
Myanmar (Burma), the dependence sometimes tops 70% of people’s income. 
Illegal wildlife trade can reshape traditional hunting and other forms of forest exploitation. 
Not all indigenous communities nowadays hunt purely for food, but increasingly for global 
poaching networks. Indeed, the increasingly commercialized trade in bushmeat is believed to be 
one of the main causes of unsustainable hunting (Bennett and Robinson, 2000). 
Sometimes marginalized communities can be pushed into hunting as a negative side effect of 
other policies, without their necessarily having previously hunted on such a problematic scale. 
For example, the suppression of poppy cultivation and heroin production in Myanmar bor-
derlands, along with expanding demand for wildlife products in China – drove some to switch 
to the illegal wildlife trade (Felbab-Brown, 2006). 
Professional hunters and middlemen 
The arrival of regional or international wildlife traders often triggers a community’s partici-
pation in wildlife trafficking. With the arrival of middlemen who facilitate marketing, prices for 
wildlife increase. Middlemen also stimulate the diversification of poaching. Thus, illegal col-
lection expands from orchids to insects, hunting from civets and bears to pangolins, and from 
langurs to salamanders, with an emptied forest left behind. 
As hunting empties forests, wildlife scarcity makes trapping more time consuming and re-
quires greater skills facilitated by sophisticated equipment. Thus, many less-skilled hunters drop 
out, and the remaining ones become professionalized (Christy, 2010). Highly skilled profes-
sional hunters are sought after by trafficking networks, who frequently facilitate their mobility 
within a country and at times even between countries. This second group of high-tech hunters 
also includes recreational hunters who violate hunting regulations. Both types are supported by 
local trackers, guides, and carriers. 
Middlemen are also crucial nodes in the international dimensions of the illegal wildlife trade. 
In addition to being able to organize local poaching, they are connected to global markets and 
top-level traffickers. Both middlemen and top traffickers can also exploit and exacerbate 
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corruption, such as among customs officials, and cultivate political patrons. Some cultivate 
political protection on the basis of preexisting patronage networks. Prominent political leaders 
exert pressure on park management and the courts to release apprehended poachers and 
traffickers. 
At the apex of the smuggling chain are sometimes big traders who facilitate wildlife traffic 
across the globe. One notorious trafficker with a global reach is Wong Keng Liang, better 
known as Anson Wong. A Malaysian, Wong first established himself in the illegal (and legal) 
trade in reptiles, selling anything from legal geckos to illegal Komodo dragons, Chinese alli-
gators, and Madagascar ploughshare tortoises, a critically endangered species with less than 100 
remaining in the wild (Christy, 2010). Another wildlife kingpin, Sansar Chand, gained no-
toriety for allegedly organizing the large-scale poaching of India’s tigers and sales of their 
products throughout Asia (“Sansar Chand,” 2014). The Poon family from Hong Kong has 
traded in ivory and shark fins for generations (Hastie et al., 2002). Perhaps Asia’s largest known 
wildlife trafficker has been the Laotian Vixay Keosavang, often dubbed the “Pablo Escobar of 
wildlife trafficking.” Vixay’s trading company, Xaysavang Trading, was implicated in the 
smuggling of ivory from Kenya and rhino horn from South Africa, and a myriad of other 
animals, including lizards, turtles, and snakes (Davies and Holmes, 2016). Many of these traf-
fickers did not diversify into the wildlife trade from other illegal markets, such as drugs. Many 
started their criminal careers in wildlife. 
That does not mean that contagion effects will not take place and that criminal groups do 
not learn from each other about business opportunities in other domains, such as wildlife 
trafficking. Such learning appears to have taken place already in the case of at least some 
Mexican criminal groups which now also seem to participate in totoaba bladder smuggling from 
the Gulf of California to China (Mejia Giraldo and Bargent, 2014). 
Few drug or wildlife smuggling organizations are tight-knit, hierarchical networks with a big 
trader at the apex. In Myanmar, one of the world’s poaching and smuggling hotspots, much 
poaching and smuggling is carried out by poor, low-level poachers and smugglers who sell 
poached animals in Mong La and Tachilek to both low-level traders and middlemen, and often 
directly to consumers. Similarly in Indonesia, many poachers in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and 
Ambon are unorganized, low-level opportunists, not wildlife kingpins with a global reach. 
Rhino horn smuggling into Yemen, for decades one of the most important markets for the 
product, was also highly decentralized. 
Indeed, the fact that the criminal boss or a particular criminal group rarely controls much of 
the illegal trade leads to erroneous policy assumptions: namely, that supposedly knock-out 
blows against key players are possible. Such recommendations vastly overestimate the extent to 
which such effects can be delivered and whether or not they have ever been effective in the 
drug trade, wildlife trade, or other illegal economies. 
As with other illegal economies, profit mark-ups grow significantly the further downstream 
the smuggling chain the product has moved and the more law enforcement it has had to 
overcome. Such mark-ups are not small even within a country. While a poor hunter in Tam 
Dao National Park, Vietnam, can earn perhaps a few hundred dollars a year, an owner of a 
restaurant in Tam Dao will be able to make US$1,000 to US$1,500 selling wildlife meat to 
tourists, while a medium-sized trader in Vinh Yen will earn more than US$15,000 a year 
(World Bank, 2005). In Hanoi, the trader’s income will be greater yet. In Kenya, a kilogram of 
rhino horn may fetch US$9,000, while in China it will bring upward of US$70,000 (“South 
African Group,” 2016). 
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Other actors and stakeholders 
As with drugs, timber, and gems, “laundering” within the wildlife trade is not only of profits, 
but also of actual animals and plants. Since captive-bred animals are exempted from CITES 
prohibitions on trade, breeding farms are used to launder poached animals. Public and private 
zoos also provide good cover for smugglers since a zoo can claim to have a breeding program 
for endangered animals, and thus explain the arrival of new animals. The laundering of animals 
and falsification of certificates have plagued controls on the ivory trade in China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, and Thailand, where supply, trade, and retail sales are legally permitted to a degree (Stiles, 
2009). Such laundering problems also occur with tiger products in China, where sellers claim 
that their tiger products come from animals raised on tiger farms, not from poached animals in 
India and Indonesia (Yang, 2010). 
Beyond zoos, corrupt wildlife industry officials tasked with issuing licenses and setting 
hunting quotas, corrupt veterinarians, or taxidermists who can fake a rhino horn trophy to mask 
illegal hunting for Asian markets are important players in the illegal trade. 
Ecolodges, private reserves and parks, and trophy-hunting outfits play critical roles not just 
in influencing whether the legal wildlife economy can generate enough income to suppress the 
temptation to poach, but also in disrupting or enabling actual poaching. 
Other stakeholders in the regulation of wildlife trade and conservation – who are thereby at 
least indirectly stakeholders in the development and implementation of responses to poaching 
and wildlife trafficking – include logging companies, agribusinesses, the fishing industry, local 
police and enforcement forces, private security forces, and governments. 
Local rangers, police, and wildlife law-enforcement officers frequently obtain only small 
salaries, little prestige, and limited chance of promotion by enforcing regulations against those 
involved in the wildlife trade. The pressures of corruption that they, as well as top government 
officials, face are high. 
Other private actors are increasingly hired to supplement wildlife law-enforcement authorities, 
such as private security companies, former soldiers, foreign trainers, intelligence units, technical 
operators, and anti-poaching militias. Standing militaries, both domestic and foreign, can also be 
mobilized to supplement wildlife law-enforcement forces, such as in Nepal or in various parts of 
Africa. They can provide vital anti-poaching or trafficking resistance. However, they have also 
been implicated in severe human rights abuses (Cavanagh et al., 2015; Devine, 2014; Massé and 
Lunstrum, 2016). 
The policy debates 
The struggles over elephant poaching and ivory policy and over trophy hunting are emblematic 
of a larger policy search for how to mitigate unsustainable hunting, design anti-poaching po-
licies, and suppress wildlife trafficking. 
Given the precipitous and irretrievable collapse of species, there is desperation in the con-
servation community to find policy silver bullets. As detailed in The Extinction Market (Felbab- 
Brown, 2017), the conservation community is increasingly looking at the successes and failures 
of decades of global drug policies, whether by demanding stronger and more resourced in-
terdiction and law enforcement approaches or arguing that banning wildlife trade is bound to 
fail, such as drug prohibition has failed. The debates remain highly polarized in wildlife field – as 
well as the drug field. 
Many environmental NGOs advocate strict bans and call for tougher law enforcement – 
indeed, this is the policy flavor du jour (“Bloody Ivory,” 2012; Duffy, 2013; “Inconvenient but 
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True,” 2007; Seguya et al., 2016; “Stop Stimulating,” 2013; Stiles, 2004; Thorson & Wold, 
2010). For some of them, no legal trade in wildlife, particularly if it involves killing wild 
animals, should be allowed. Others only oppose legal trade under specific circumstances and for 
specific wildlife commodities, such as rhino horn and ivory sales. Some conservation biologists 
support the calls for far tougher law enforcement. Law enforcement authorities often also 
support bans, not merely because that serves their budgets (as is sometimes alleged by opponents 
of bans), but because the existence of a legal trade alongside an illegal one significantly com-
plicates the law enforcement task of having to sort through what is legal and what is not, and 
because the legal trade provides loopholes for the illegal one to exploit. 
Total bans on legal wildlife trade and hunting are often pervaded by unrealistic expectations 
of how effective interdiction and law enforcement policies can be. Such approaches often also 
underestimate how easy it is to coerce willing participants in wildlife poaching, including poor 
marginalized local communities dependent on natural resource extraction, to abstain from 
hunting and embrace conservation. 
Characterizations of today’s poaching and wildlife trafficking often de-emphasize the role of 
poor communities and focus predominantly on organized criminal and militant groups. These 
views are usually accompanied by demands for much tougher legislation and penalties. These 
characterizations, however, are deeply flawed and easily can lead to counterproductive policies. 
Take, for example, the community-based nature conservancies in Kenya’s Laikipia region 
(Gettleman, 2017) that have long been heralded as some of Africa’s greatest conservation 
successes. The recent land invasions of these nature reserves by pastoralists unable to obtain 
fodder for their cattle elsewhere are demonstrating once again that poverty, scarcity, drought, 
and global warming are pitting some communities’ preferences against conservation. Notions 
long held throughout Africa that wildlife conservation is a white-man’s imposition on black 
Africans are being revived again (Carruthers, 1995; MacKenzie, 1988; Neumann, 2004;  
Ranger, 1999). Such sentiments are echoed throughout Asia and the Americas, where local 
populations often feel brutalized by conservation policies (Adams, 2004; Burnham, 2000). 
Many conservation biologists and conservation economists thus oppose bans and support 
market-based mechanisms to promote conservation. They point out that bans have often failed 
and that governments, businesses, and local communities need to be given material stakes in 
conservation or it will fail and species will be lost. Their adage is: wildlife stays if wildlife pays 
(Bulte & Damania, 2005; Moyle, 2003; Rabinovich, 2005; Seguya et al., 2016; Wright 
et al., 2001). 
Indeed, under some circumstances, permitting legal trade proved a highly effective con-
servation tool for a while. Even the recovery of the white rhino throughout the 1990s in 
southern Africa was crucially underpinned by such market mechanisms (Hutton & Webb, 
2003; Jenkins et al., 2006; Leader-Williams, 2003; ‘t Sas-Rolfes, 2000; ‘t Sas-Rolfes, 2012). 
Allowing legal trade has not always produced such desirable conservation outcomes. A legal 
trade can, and often does, allow for the laundering of poached animals, such as in the case of 
ivory in Thailand where ivory trade from domestic elephants is allowed, or through reptile 
breeding facilities in Indonesia. Moreover, permitting legal trade may also boost overall de-
mand, including demand for poached animals and their products. 
Many so-called critical conservationists may also oppose global bans, rejecting that outsiders, 
such as international institutions or influential global NGOs, should make policies without 
adequate input from local communities. In particular, however, the critical conservationists are 
opposed to conservation policies that hurt poor marginalized populations (Adams & Hulme, 
2001; Brockington et al, 2005; Moseley, 2001; Koziell, 2001; Roe, 2011; Roe et al., 2009;  
Swiderska, 2003; Western & Wright, 1994). Thus, they reject law-enforcement-heavy policies 
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and emphasize the historic injustice of colonial conservation policies that forcefully evicted 
native populations around the world. They lament what they see as the disproportionate and 
unfair power of international environmental NGOs who argue for bans and the establishment 
of protected areas which local communities are prohibited to access for resources while many 
local communities want to hunt, including for commercial reasons. They allege that en-
vironmental conservationism is swinging back to the inappropriate discriminatory exclusion, 
marginalization, and force-based approaches from which it sought to depart in the 1990s 
(Dressler et al., 2010). Not all critical conservationists endorse market-based mechanisms; i.e., 
legal trade, as an effective policy tools. Those of neo-Marxist or post-modernist persuasion see 
the market – as well as law enforcement – as another means of dispossession of local com-
munities (Duffy, 2014; Kelly & Ybarra, 2016; Loperena, 2016; Lunstrum, 2014; Peluso & 
Vandergeest, 2011; Peluso & Lund, 2011). Most critical conservationists, however – as well as 
some conservation biologists – call for “community based natural resource management” 
(CBNRM) approaches that give local communities the rights to local land and its wildlife and 
empower them to make their own decisions over local resources. 
These policy disputes are not only debates among different philosophies and ideologies or 
along North-South divisions. Different constituencies within a country – whether it is a supply, 
transshipment, or demand country – support and advocate different policies. Moreover, within 
the countries in the same part of the production and trade chain, there are differences. Kenya 
and South Africa are both supply countries for wildlife trafficking and both are experiencing 
massive poaching rates. They share colonial legacies of environmental conservation often re-
jected by local populations. Kenya, however, opposes legal trade in ivory and in 1977 banned 
all hunting in the country, making close to no exceptions, even for subsistence hunting and 
hunting as a mechanism of community-based natural resource management. South Africa, on 
the other hand, has repeatedly lobbied for allowing the sales of its ivory and rhino stocks and has 
made economic incentives for conservation, including trophy hunting and trade in wildlife, a 
key hallmark of its conservation policies. 
In the wildlife trade and conservation domain, the debates are over means. Are bans and 
enforcement, or the market and legal trade, the best mechanism to assure species survival and 
biodiversity? Is the state or are local communities the most effective locus of decision-making 
over environmental policy? 
These debates are also about values. For some environmental NGOs, killing animals is 
unacceptable. Many advocates of local communities hurt by conservation policies, however, 
point out that this sentiment puts animals ahead of people. Proponents of CBNRM efforts 
often argue that environmental conservation should not stand in contradiction to efforts to 
empower local communities and promote their economic development, and in fact that em-
powering local communities is the best mechanism of advancing environmental conservation. 
Sometimes that is the case, but at other times, a local community, just like the state and 
industries, may not have an interest in conservation. Local people and indigenous communities 
may want to make money as quickly as possible by participating in logging, conversion of 
forests into agriculture, or poaching and wildlife trafficking. Maximalist versions of CBNRM 
hold that even in these circumstances, an affected local community should not be merely one of 
the environmental policy stakeholders, but in fact the authority to decide how local natural 
resources are managed. Only in this way can it be assured that community security, well-being, 
and rights are not ignored by the preferences of globalist conservationists. 
It is thus not just that different participants in poaching and trafficking and different sta-
keholders in the conservation communities have different values and interests. Values and 
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interests among the same type of actor vary tremendously and can change over time. These 
different interests and values thus shape policy objectives and assessments of successes or failures. 
Policy outcomes 
The systematic policy outcomes of the various policy tools are discouraging. All strategies face 
structural and resource constraints, whether they be bans and interdiction, legalization and 
licensing, community-based natural resource management, demand reduction, or anti-money- 
laundering efforts. In addition to these limitations, the strategies also come with direct 
downsides. All have produced highly varied and inconsistent outcomes, confounding the search 
for the “right” policy. 
Bans and law enforcement 
Bans and intensified law enforcement can help in particular circumstances, depending on local 
cultural and institutional settings and the ecological requirements of the particular species. 
Wildlife policy enforcement efforts, whether enforcing bans or making sure that poached 
animals are not laundered through legal wildlife farms and the legal wildlife trade, are often 
inadequate. They are severely under-resourced and given low priority. A significant increase in 
the diligence and resources dedicated to the enforcement of wildlife regulations is certainly 
warranted. There are, however, limitations on how much even greatly intensified law en-
forcement can halt poaching and wildlife trafficking, create deterrence effects, and suppress 
supply in the absence of a dramatic reduction in demand. 
The objectives of prohibition and interdiction are to prevent or at least restrict illegal supply 
and discourage use by creating barriers to entry for both sellers and buyers, boosting prices, 
limiting commercialization, and creating a normative set of values against threats to vulnerable 
wildlife ecologies. Just because not every user and supplier is deterred by illegality does not 
mean that removing illegality will avoid increasing supply and consumption. Nonetheless, if 
consumption is driven by a desire to display status, power, and wealth, such as by wearing ivory 
bangles or coats made from endangered species, a ban that discourages such ostentatious display 
may well shrink demand and be highly valuable. Demand-suppression dynamics would be very 
different if illegal bushmeat were consumed not as an exotic luxury indulgence, but for sub-
sistence. In the latter case, without alternative protein sources being made available, demand 
may not go down at all. Thus, demand-suppression approaches need to be tailored in a granular 
way to particular wildlife products and demand markets and sometimes adapted over time. 
Implementing interdiction effectively is hard and very resource intensive. Effective inter-
diction designed not just to incapacitate poachers and traffickers but also to deter them requires 
knowing specific structures of particular wildlife smuggling networks. Analyses, though, at 
times exaggerate the extent to which poaching is undertaken by organized criminals and 
militant groups. While the latter may be involved, such cases often represent only a sliver of 
poaching activity. In fact, there is a large degree of variation in the structures of poaching and 
trafficking networks, and there are many atomized small-level traders and poor poachers also in 
the business. Exaggerated and simplistic characterizations also divert policy attention away from 
corrupt practices among legal actors, including licensing entities, ecolodges, and top environ-
mental officials. 
Poaching and trafficking networks are often far less vertically integrated than many inter-
diction advocates imagine. Moreover, even top traffickers and entire wildlife trafficking net-
works are easily replaceable as long as demand stays robust. Nonetheless, knowing what the 
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poaching and smuggling structures actually look like in a particular place, rather than imagining 
what they might be, is crucial for making law enforcement and other policy interventions 
effective in that locality. 
As laid out in extensive detail in The Extinction Market, there are many relevant lessons from 
the illegal drug trade and efforts to counter it (Felbab-Brown, 2017). Two decades of the 
author’s interviews and policy exchanges with law enforcement officials show, that even with a 
very large dedication of resources, rarely does drug interdiction surpass a 50% effectiveness rate, 
often remaining much lower. Such interdiction levels may be insufficient to prevent the col-
lapse of particular species. What crucially facilitates the effectiveness of interdiction, law en-
forcement, and bans is a reduction in the demand for a commodity – whether as the result of a 
ban, purposeful demand reduction strategies, or exogenous factors. Paradoxically, the more 
effective law enforcement becomes, the more the value of a smuggled animal or wildlife 
product goes up. Perceived scarcity – whether as a result of species depletion or more effective 
law enforcement – increases the financial benefits of smuggling. 
Drug traffickers expect large losses due to eradication of illegal crops and interdiction of 
smuggled drugs and often welcome them, for law enforcement boosts prices and makes 
stockpiles more profitable. At least some wildlife traffickers make similar calculations; traffickers 
of rare parrots from Indonesia, for example, fully expected a 90–95% mortality of the parrots 
they illegally collected as a result of their smuggling method. They stuffed the parrots into 
plastic bottles, threw them into the sea to retrieve them on open water later in order to avoid 
law enforcement (Felbab-Brown, 2013). The fact that less than 10% of the parrots survived was 
not a deterrent, as profits on the remaining specimens were more than sufficient. In fact, prices 
can be boosted by scarcity so much that absorbing huge losses and driving a species to ex-
tinction is highly profitable and attractive for traffickers. The rarer the species, the greater its 
value. As discussed earlier in the chapter, paradoxically, such “effective” interdiction that drives 
greater poaching in order to supply a stable market, or an even more pernicious rarity market 
where demand increases with rarity and price, can have devastating effects on species. Such 
seemingly effective interdiction is, in fact, not at all effective and outright counterproductive. 
Legal trade and licensing 
Allowing a legal supply of animals, plants, and wildlife products is equally fraught with di-
lemmas and imperfect outcomes. The arguments for legalizing drugs are substantially different 
from arguments for permitting legal trade in wildlife products. Critics of the war on drugs argue 
that since drugs cannot be eliminated from the world, criminalizing drugs overburdens law- 
enforcement and justice systems, empowers criminal groups, severely undermines human 
rights, compromises public health, and undermines anti-militancy efforts. Legalization ad-
vocates promise that legalization will bring resources to the state in the form of taxes and license 
fees, and that it will undo the above stated negative effects. Yet many critics of drug prohibition 
dispute whether drug legalization will in fact undo all of the negative effects, and they do not 
necessarily support outright legalization, preferring decriminalization and differently designed 
enforcement measures instead. The extent to which legalization will increase problematic use 
and addiction is also disputed. 
The regulatory arguments for permitting legal wildlife trade are fundamentally different. 
First, farming or ranching of protected species can take pressure off wild resources. Second, 
allowing some level of trade can give hunters, ranchers, and others close to traded wildlife 
resources a stake in preserving species and entire ecosystems, and managing them sustainably. 
Third, regulated trade can also raise money for conservation. 
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Just as with bans, the effectiveness of licensing, eco-labeling, and creating a legal supply of 
wildlife depends crucially on the capacity of law-enforcement bodies effectively to monitor and 
enforce the regulations and restrictions concerning legal trade in all the countries involved in it; 
additionally, it depends on consumers preferring legally and sustainably produced items, and on 
their having the capacity to distinguish genuine from fake labels. 
As with bans, many of the presumed or hoped for positive outcomes of legal trade do not 
always materialize fully in reality. A legal supply does not guarantee sustainability, nor does it 
necessarily take pressure off the wild supply. If a legal supply is expensive (because of heavy 
taxes to discourage demand) and difficult to produce (because breeding animals in captivity is 
hard), then poaching will likely persist. Captive-breeding and licensing schemes often do not 
prevent the leakage of illegally caught wildlife into the supposedly legal supply chain. 
Frequently, neither customers nor law-enforcement officials have the capacity or motivation to 
determine whether a wildlife product was obtained from the wild, from a captive-breeding 
facility, or from a legal supplier. Permitting a legal supply greatly increases the burden for law- 
enforcement bodies to differentiate between illegally and legally sourced products. However, 
while total bans on wildlife trade do away with the need for law-enforcement officials to 
distinguish between the legal and the illegal, they do not necessarily reduce the overall resource 
requirements. Legal supply can also reduce moral opprobrium surrounding the trade in par-
ticular species, thus inadvertently boosting demand for illegally sourced wildlife and white-
washing consumer consciousness. 
Moreover, the wildlife revenues from a legal supply – such as breeding facilities or trophy 
hunting – do not necessarily go to local stakeholders and communities. Other actors, including 
local or national elites, large eco-businesses, or distant breeding facilities can capture them 
through corruption, problematic regulatory redesign, or natural market dynamics. Local sta-
keholders may not benefit from conservation as a result. 
Despite current characterizations of poaching networks as highly organized criminal enterprises, 
many poachers are members of marginalized and desperately poor local communities. Sometimes 
their poaching activities are fully separate from wildlife trafficking. At other times, these local 
poachers supply global trafficking networks or work for them as hunters, carriers, trackers, and 
spotters, as corrupt park rangers also sometimes do. Focusing on finding legal livelihoods for them 
can be an important component of policies to reduce the illegal trade in wildlife and incentivize 
communities to resist wildlife trafficking. Although creating economic incentives for communities 
to support conservation does not address the problem of wildlife smugglers and organized criminal 
groups, it can simplify and focus law-enforcement efforts. It can encourage community co-
operation with law-enforcement bodies, enhance the political sustainability of restrictions on 
wildlife trade, and reduce political conflict. 
Involving local communities: alternative livelihoods and CBNRM 
Generating economic incentives for the poor to support conservation policies is also important 
normatively because the marginalized communities dependent on hunting for basic livelihoods 
have often suffered greatly as a result of environmental conservation. They have been forced off 
their land in areas designated as protected, and their livelihoods and human security have been 
compromised. Laws and regulations are easiest to enforce when the vast majority of people 
accept them as legitimate and internalize them. The devolution of decision-making power to 
those who have been poor, marginalized, and without rights may be not only politically and 
economically beneficial, it can also be psychologically rewarding and enabling. 
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As shown in great detail in The Extinction Market, many alternative livelihood schemes have 
not been effective (Felbab-Brown, 2017). While frequently prescribed as the mechanism for 
conservation, ecotourism has unfortunately failed to be a consistent remedy against poaching 
and wildlife trafficking or a reliable tool of economic growth. It rarely generates sufficient 
income and jobs as a result of both its own internal limitations and resource capture by elites. 
Thus, the crucial objective that communities at least earn enough to maintain prior subsistence 
levels, let alone achieve economic and social advancement, from ecotourism, other alternative 
livelihoods, or the limited hunting of wildlife, is often elusive. 
On the Indonesian island of Seram, for example, twenty poachers of rare parrots were 
converted (through the work of Profauna, one of Indonesia’s NGOs most determined to fight 
against the illegal wildlife trade) into rescue-center staff and wildlife guides for tourists. As a 
result of this alternative livelihoods effort, poaching dramatically declined. Success depended on 
a steady flow of eco-tourists whom the newly converted poachers could guide. For that, an 
international counterpart to the conservation effort helped recruit US birdwatchers to travel to 
Seram. When that international supply of eco-tourists fell off, the income from wildlife-guiding 
for the former poachers shrank and the pressure to resume illegal hunting to generate liveli-
hoods intensified once more (Felbab-Brown, 2013). 
The Seram story is a micro-example of the conditions on which successful alternative li-
velihoods depend. If poor poachers have an assured income from other sources, they are often 
willing to abandon illegal hunting, even though poaching often brings more money. Income 
from other sources needs to be steady and assured. The problem with many ecotourism al-
ternative livelihoods efforts is that the income fluctuates greatly and tends to be sporadic and 
seasonal. 
Often, for an area to draw a sufficient number of ecotourists to generate income, it needs to 
contain large mammals that can be seen fairly easily by tourists. Thus, eastern Africa’s savannahs 
tend to attract many more tourists than rainforest areas. Even there, income from ecotourism 
can be highly seasonal and lodges either have to build up financial reserves to pay the staff 
during the low season or else, as is frequently done, fire staff during a part of the year, thus 
incurring the wrath of the community.2 In addition to having relatively easily-visible animals, 
for ecotourism to generate sufficient revenues, parks need to have good infrastructure, such as 
airports, roads, and lodges, as well as good security. Banditry or presence of militant groups 
scare off tourists, as do other external shocks as such political instability in the country or 
economic downturns in tourists’ home countries. 
Moreover, the number of jobs available through ecotourism may be significantly lower than 
the potential pool of people who may be recruited as poachers. Even if all existing poachers get 
legal jobs, are there other poor people who may be recruited as poachers in the area or can 
move into the area, particularly, if the compensation for poaching rises? 
There is a large variation of outcomes concerning the effectiveness of alternative livelihoods 
and local community involvement in managing habitats and wildlife, some of which reveal the 
detrimental effects of allowing or not allowing local communities to exist in national parks. 
Many factors can affect these outcomes, including a community’s short-term versus long-term 
economic horizons, income and employment levels, their attitudes toward nature, community 
cohesion and leadership structures, and the enforcement of property rights. Alternative liveli-
hoods that address all of the structural drivers of illicit economies have the highest chance of 
being effective. 
CBNRM schemes often go beyond alternative livelihoods, ecotourism, compensation, or 
limited hunting. They seek to transfer rights to local communities and achieve three objectives: 
political empowerment; poverty alleviation; and environmental protection. They can be based 
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around trophy hunting, ecotourism, or other alternative livelihoods. Sometimes they have 
worked spectacularly well, but the outcomes have not been uniform. Beyond good im-
plementation, successes are dependent on a steady and large flow of tourists, trophy hunters, and 
customers, and sufficiently low densities of people compared to wildlife. In general, they have 
worked better in arid areas where agriculture is not profitable but where iconic wildlife species 
are present, rather than fertile areas where converting land to agriculture is profitable or tropical 
forests where animals are difficult to see and where industrial logging brings far greater revenues 
than ecotourism. In some cases, communities became richer as a result of CBRNM policies, 
but then intensified unsustainable hunting and logging to further augment their economic 
resources at the expense of environmental conservation. 
In short, there are no silver bullets, nor even universally appropriate ameliorants. Policy 
outcomes are highly context specific and contingent. All strategies face structural and resource 
constraints. In addition to these limitations, the strategies also come with direct downsides. Bans 
on hunting and local resource extraction can reduce sources of income and lower the standard 
of livelihood among poor local populations. The imposed relocation of communities and other 
coercive measures can generate deep resentment and a rejection of conservation, as has often 
happened in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Licensing legal trade, however, significantly 
complicates law enforcement and facilitates traffickers’ strategies of evasion. 
Bans or licensing can help in particular circumstances, depending on local cultural and in-
stitutional settings and the ecological requirements and circumstances of particular species. 
There are, however, limitations on how much even greatly intensified law enforcement can 
halt poaching and wildlife trafficking, create deterrence effects, and suppress supply in the 
absence of a dramatic reduction in demand. Licensing and regulating the hunting and wildlife 
trade only works under some circumstances. Sometimes it gives various participants a stake in 
conservation that would otherwise be absent, serving to protect not just a species but also its 
habitat and the broader ecosystem. At other times, a legal supply of a vulnerable species boosts 
overall demand, including for poached animals, complicates enforcement, and enables the 
laundering of illegally sourced products. CBNRM can significantly motivate local communities 
to support conservation and resist poaching and trafficking, but just as with other tools, the 
outcomes have varied widely. Going after consumer demand is crucial, but demand-reduction 
measures are complex and take time. Anti-money-laundering (AML) efforts provide an addi-
tional tool, but they will not bankrupt the illegal wildlife trade. 
Conclusions 
Poaching and wildlife trafficking patterns are highly diverse. In their core characteristics – 
increasing demand and consumers, poor suppliers (poachers) and layers of middlemen and top 
traffickers, corrupt government officials, and sometimes organized crime groups – the traf-
ficking networks share much with the illegal drug trade. Just like in the illegal drug trade, there 
is much diversity in organizational patterns of actual poaching and trafficking. 
Also like the drug trade, appropriate policies to counter poaching and wildlife trafficking are 
vigorously contested. Two of the three key conservation schools of thought described in this 
chapter have strong analogies in the drug policy debates. The policies advocated by the various 
schools of thought reflect different values and norms. They also highlight the large diversity of 
interests among participants in poaching and wildlife trafficking and the conservation policy 
community. Some of those values and order of preferences closely parallel the illegal drug trade. 
Many poor poachers, like many poor cultivators of drug crops, will say that whatever harm 
their activity generates pales in comparison to their need to feed starving families, especially if 
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alternative livelihoods are absent or failing, which is all too often the case in both the illegal 
drug and wildlife trade. 
There are, however, two fundamental differences between these illegal economies. Illicit 
drugs are a nondepletable resource – they can be produced over and over. Wildlife is rapidly 
depletable. Once a species is gone, it cannot be brought back; the loss of a set of species within 
an ecosystem can irreparably unravel the entire ecosystem. Thus, the timelines in countering 
poaching and wildlife trafficking are far tighter – on the order of a few years – than in the case of 
the illegal drug trade. 
A second big difference is the scale of destruction and harm that poaching and wildlife 
trafficking pose globally. When they unleash zoonotic pandemics, they bring death rates and 
global economic contractions that even the most severe illicit drug epidemics, such as the 
current US opioid epidemic (Felbab-Brown, 2020), cannot match. The magnitude of death and 
impoverishment is higher than that in the illicit drug trade. 
Devising effective policies for countering poaching and wildlife trafficking is compounded 
by another factor, perhaps the most important policy takeaway – namely, that we must expect 
huge variation in policy outcomes. The same holds true for drug policy. What works well for a 
species in one locale may not work well for the very same species in a neighboring locale. What 
works well in suppressing demand at a given time may not work ten years later. How much a 
legal or illegal market can be shaped or reduced through supply-and-demand measures depends 
on their elasticities, which can change over time, as well as a host of other factors, such as local 
institutional and cultural settings. Policy thus should allow for experimentation. 
For a detailed set of policy recommendations of how to counter poaching and wildlife 
trafficking and locale specificity considerations, see chapter 11 in Vanda Felbab-Brown’s The 
Extinction Market. For a discussion of how to address those issues as well as smarten up the legal 
trade in wildlife to prevent zoonotic pandemics, see Vanda Felbab-Brown “Preventing 
Zoonotic Pandemics through Biodiversity Conservation and Smart Wildlife Trade 
Regulations” (Felbab-Brown, “Preventing Zoonotic,” 2021). 
Notes  
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) puts the number of elephants poached during 
that period at 92,000.  
2 Author’s interviews with lodge owners, Tsavo National Park and Masai Mara, Kenya, May 2013 and 
Serengeti National Park and Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Tanzania, summer 2003.  
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Trends, taxes and big tobacco 
Max Gallien   
Introduction 
From prison cells to the frontlines of wars, from black market barter currency to luxury 
product, few licit goods are as intimately associated with smuggling in the popular imagination 
as cigarettes. Tobacco products were one of the central goods smuggled by the legendary 
French highwayman and smuggler Louis Mandrin in the eighteenth century (Kwass, 2014), and 
have provided the modern-day Algerian jihadi leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar with the nickname 
‘Mr Marlboro’ for the role that cigarette-smuggling played in funding his operations. Today, 
the smuggling of tobacco products is a global industry that spans all continents and can be found 
almost anywhere where borders separate states. Although estimations vary substantially, studies 
suggest that today over 11% of the global cigarette market is illicit, amounting to over 650 
billion cigarettes per year, and making it one of the most smuggled licit goods on the globe 
(Joossens et al., 2010). 
At first, this role of cigarettes in the global smuggling economy can appear somewhat 
surprising. Tobacco is not an illegal substance in most countries and legal trade routes exist 
alongside a highly capitalised industry with a substantial global trade infrastructure. Tobacco is 
not an essential commodity and its consumer market is smaller than that of gasoline, alcohol, or 
a huge variety of food products. Contrary to more criminalised narcotics such as cocaine or 
heroin or minerals such as gold or coltan, its monetary value relative to its size is limited, 
requiring the movement of larger quantities to secure a substantial profit. While it has fre-
quently been claimed that high levels of taxes and tariffs are driving cigarette smuggling, illicit 
trade in regions with higher average tax rates such as Europe has been lower in recent years 
compared to regions with lower average rates such as sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, to-
bacco products more broadly, and cigarettes in particular, provide an excellent case study of the 
drivers and dynamics of the smuggling of licit consumer goods in the modern global economy. 
After providing a brief introduction to the varieties of cigarette smuggling and sketching 
global trends and routes, this chapter focuses on two aspects of cigarette smuggling that are 
particularly instructive in illuminating the smuggling of licit goods more broadly. First, it 
surveys discussions on the drivers of cigarette smuggling, highlighting that while analyses fre-
quently have focused on prices, taxes and regulatory instruments, drivers are in fact more 
diverse, and taxes remain a highly effective policy tool in curbing the adverse health effects of 
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tobacco consumption (Chaloupka, Straif and Leon, 2011). Second, it examines the intersection 
between the global tobacco industry and tobacco smuggling networks, noting that the two are 
not as separate and adversarial as is frequently assumed, and how industry influence has shaped 
smuggling research and policy itself. The chapter concludes by highlighting key conclusions and 
relevant communalities with other smuggled goods discussed in this volume. 
The global illicit cigarette trade 
The global illicit trade in cigarettes can be sub-divided broadly into at least three categories. The 
first includes the illegal trade of genuine brand cigarettes such as Marlboro or Benson & Hedges. 
The second refers to the smuggling of counterfeits of these brand products, which are con-
sequently not only illegal to be traded, but illegal at the point of production, where they are 
manufactured without the consent of the brand owner. The third category refers to so-called 
‘cheap whites’ or ‘illicit whites’ – these are cigarettes that are manufactured legally in one 
country, but then smuggled into a market where they have no legal distribution, and typically 
are sold without paying tax.1 The latter are frequently produced in large bulk for this particular 
purpose – here, free trade zones on the Arabian Peninsula have received increasing attention in 
recent years. 
Cigarettes are the dominant, but not the only tobacco product that is smuggled. Of the total 
number of seizures of excisable goods globally by customs organisations in 2019, cigarettes 
made up 55%. Other products include chewing, dipping and waterpipe-tobacco (22%), and 
cigars and e-cigarettes (about 7%). It’s interesting to note, however, that the smuggling of 
tobacco products, at least by this rather limited metric, dwarfs the smuggling of alcohol pro-
ducts, which made up the remaining 16% (World Customs Organisation, 2019).2 While small- 
scale smuggling and bootlegging of limited quantities of cigarettes is familiar to many, they exist 
alongside a large-scale and wholesale trade of smuggled cigarettes. Consequently, many of these 
smuggling operations are not limited to one particular region or borderland, but operate in large 
international supply chains, and are closely interlinked both with the global infrastructure of the 
international trade system and its legal structures, featuring free trade zones and ‘in transit’ 
systems that allow for the suspension of taxes and duties while goods are passing through a 
defined customs area (FATF, 2012). 
Consequently, cigarette smuggling today does not provide a simple global division between 
production, transit, and consumption regions – it is prevalent across regions, with illegal trade 
corridors and markets for different products overlapping and intersecting. While Latin America 
likely has the largest illicit market share as a percentage of retail sales, Asia and the Pacific’s high 
total retail volume in all probability gives it by far the highest volume of illicit trade if measured 
in sticks of cigarettes (World Health Organization, no date). Broadly, it is worth noting that the 
illicit market share in low and middle income countries (12.1%) is estimated higher than in high 
income countries (9.8%), despite the typically higher price of legally traded cigarettes in the 
latter (Joossens et al., 2010). 
This has been accompanied by a global shift in cigarette consumption more broadly. While 
the prevalence of smoking in Europe, North America, and high-income countries as a group 
has dropped substantially and consistently across the past four decades, this pattern is less clear in 
many developing countries. As a result of simultaneous demographic changes, the total number 
of smokers in much of the developing world has expanded. Africa’s youth, in particular, appears 
overrepresented among new smokers (Ramanandraibe and Ouma, 2011; Blecher and Ross, 
2013; Vellios, Ross and Perucic, 2018). With this, the health challenges of smoking have also 
shifted – it has been projected that by 2030, 6.8 million out of a global total of 8.3 million 
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tobacco-related deaths will occur in low- and middle-income countries (Mathers and 
Loncar, 2006). 
This points to two interconnected aspects about cigarette smuggling that are worth 
highlighting. The first is that – like other frequently smuggled goods such as cocaine or 
heroin – tobacco has substantive negative health effects on those who consume it. 
Consequently, governments have an incentive to impose additional restrictions on the sale of 
tobacco products in order to limit negative health outcomes or account for their strain on 
national health systems. At the same time, unlike various other drugs, there exists a sub-
stantive, global and highly capitalised legal market for tobacco products. As the remainder of 
this chapter will highlight, those two aspects in combination have had a substantive impact on 
how cigarettes are sold, traded and smuggled, but, critically, also on how this smuggling has 
been studied, understood and reported. 
Smuggling of licit goods: beyond price and taxes 
As a good that is frequently smuggled despite the existence of legal channels for its production, 
trade and distribution, the search for the drivers of tobacco smuggling has typically begun with 
its price.3 More specifically, the common assumption is that cigarette smuggling is primarily 
driven by arbitrage that is based on the evasion of taxes, tariffs and similar restrictions on legal 
trade. In this, many discussions about cigarette smuggling are representative of an extremely 
prevalent way of thinking about the smuggling of licit goods, especially in economics. 
Traditional discussions on the welfare effects of smuggling in economic theory (Bhagwati and 
Hansen, 1975; Martin and Panagariya, 1984; Norton, 1988) primarily treat the smuggling of 
licit goods as tariff evasion. The World Custom’s Organisation’s Illicit Trade Report lists to-
bacco smuggling in a section entitled “Revenue” (World Customs Organisation, 2019). 
The logic underlying this is simple and reflects the intuitive fact that price differences and 
arbitrage opportunities have a direct effect on the bottom lines of smugglers of licit goods, and a 
particularly substantive one in the case of highly taxed goods such as tobacco products. The 
latter aspect, furthermore, makes this relationship particularly sensitive for goods, such as ci-
garettes, which carry substantive health effects. Taxes have been found to be the most effective 
policy tool to reduce overall smoking prevalence, reduce overall deaths caused by smoking, and 
raise funding to support health systems in combatting the health effects of smoking (Chaloupka, 
Straif and Leon, 2011). Consequently, if tax and hence price effects were the primary driver of 
cigarette smuggling, this would raise substantive questions about the overall welfare effects of 
taxing tobacco. 
Fortunately, however, even a cursory look at the global picture of cigarette smuggling 
suggests that prices are likely substantially overstated as a driver of tobacco smuggling. While 
high-income countries in Europe and North America have substantially higher cigarette prices, 
which are largely driven by substantially higher taxes, their illicit cigarette market share is 
smaller on average than in lower- and middle-income countries. Africa provides a fitting il-
lustration, as it features on average substantially lower cigarette prices and tax rates than Europe, 
but high levels of tobacco smuggling in various regions on the continent.4 
In recent years, an increasing body of research has supported the view that prices, tax and 
tariff rates may certainly affect the calculations of smugglers but should not be looked to as the 
sole or even dominant driver of tobacco smuggling. A recent global report by the World Bank 
concludes that “contrary to tobacco industry arguments, taxes and prices have only a limited 
impact on the illicit cigarette market share at country level” (Dutta, 2019). Illustrative case 
studies can be found across the globe. South Africa, for example, started to employ a deliberate 
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tobacco control policy in the 1990s, which included a large increase in excise taxes, raising the 
price of cigarettes. As a consequence, cigarette consumption per capita fell by more than 60% 
by the early 2000s (Walbeek and Shai, 2015). At the same time, however, the market share of 
smuggled cigarettes seems to have grown only marginally, despite the rapid increase in price 
(Blecher, 2010). 
Crucially, it does not appear to have undermined substantially the desired revenue and 
health effects of these tax increases. Using a synthetic control method to estimate tobacco 
consumption trends in South Africa, a 2017 study directly traces the substantial decrease in 
smoking to tax measures (Chelwa, Walbeek and Blecher, 2017). Even as the relative market 
share of smuggled cigarettes increased somewhat, actual consumption in both the licit and illicit 
market decreased. Notably, the tax revenue from higher excise taxes offset the tax losses caused 
by illicit trade (Blecher 2010). 
The United Kingdom in the 1990s at first seemed to illustrate a simplistic relationship 
between cigarette prices and smuggling. Seeking to reduce the smoking prevalence, the UK 
had implemented a series of substantive tax hikes. As the price of cigarettes increased, so did 
tobacco smuggling. Notably, a significant number of cigarettes smuggled were mainstream 
tobacco industry brands. Their smuggling and sale at a lower price in the UK undermined both 
the intended health benefit of the tax hike and the tax revenue itself. However, following this, 
the UK embarked on an ambitious tobacco control policy in the early 2000s, focusing on 
supply-side measures such as disrupting distribution chains and investing in new operational 
responses. In the following decade, the estimated illicit cigarette market share fell from 21% to 
9%, leading the UK to a new equilibrium of some of the highest cigarette prices in the world 
and comparatively lower levels of smuggling (ASH, 2012; Tessa Langley et al., 2019). 
As recent years have seen research on tobacco smuggling continuously highlight5 that price- 
level dynamics are not the only or perhaps the central factor in driving cigarette smuggling, this 
has two obvious corollaries. The first is an increasing consensus that high rates of taxation 
provide the most effective tool for combatting the health effects of tobacco consumption, and 
that it is not necessarily or automatically undermined by smuggling. Consequently, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) has been recognising the importance of tobacco taxation in 
Article 6 of its framework convention on tobacco control and recommending a minimum 75% 
tax share of the retail price of tobacco (World Health Organization, 2014). At the same time, 
smuggling control alongside taxation has increasingly become a key WHO issue, as reflected in 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control’s (FCTC) adoption of the Protocol to 
Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco in 2012. The second has been an increasing focus, both by 
researchers and policymakers, on the non-price drivers of tobacco smuggling, and in particular 
supply side dynamics. 
Diverse drivers and dynamics 
A wider view of different drivers and dynamics of cigarette smuggling points to at least three 
additional sets of – interacting – factors: regional cooperation; the involvement of state actors; 
and the effectiveness of supply-chain control. The first point is a rather simple addendum to the 
price debate, noting that the absolute price of cigarettes or their price in global comparison is 
not as crucial a factor as the price in comparison to a country’s immediate neighbours. Here, 
too, the same limits to the price argument noted above still apply, but this consideration has 
given rise to increasing efforts to coordinate regional-level agreements, for example among the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
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A larger set of factors relate to the involvement of state actors and can be grouped under the 
political and governance context of cigarette smuggling. On a basic level, arguments here have 
often been focused on the idea of corruption. Publications by the WHO and the World Bank 
have noted that standard corruption indicators by organisations such as Transparency 
International strongly correlate with levels of tobacco smuggling (The World Bank, 1999), 
and may indeed provide a stronger predictor of illicit trade than price or tax levels (Jha and 
Chaloupka, 2000). Needless to say, this represents a very broad relationship. However, the 
intuition behind it has remained prevalent in more recent indices that have tried to capture 
the vulnerability of states to organised crime and illicit trade such as the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s (EUI) ‘Illicit Trade Environment Index,’ 6 Frequently, the assumption 
here is that the ability of smugglers to ‘pay their way’ is a consequence of ‘petty corruption’ in 
customs agencies, created by poor pay of low-level bureaucrats, principal-agent problems or 
poor institutional design, reflecting a broader ‘crime-fragility rationale’ (Heuser, 2019) in 
much analysis on smuggling and states. Typical interventions here have included so-called 
‘anti-corruption trainings’ and new managerial techniques or surveillance methods in the 
interaction with customs agents. 
Ethnographic studies of illegal economies more widely, however, have for a long time 
questioned these rather simplistic assumptions in accounts of ‘corruption.’ As a full discussion of 
this literature – particularly well-developed in African borderland studies and highlighted in 
other entries in this volume – goes beyond this chapter, I focus on the observations most 
relevant to the drivers of smuggling. One frequent observation here has been that some political 
actors or state structures may tolerate cigarette smuggling for reasons other than simple 
monetary pay-offs that can be monitored, disincentivised or cracked down on. Distributive 
politics can play a crucial role in motivating states to tolerate and structure smuggling in order to 
provide incomes for politically relevant actors or otherwise economically marginalised regions 
(Gallien, 2020b). Both tobacco farmers and small-scale smugglers may represent potential 
constituencies for such arrangements. The connection of cigarette smuggling to war economies 
in the Sahel or the DRC have further complicated these dynamics (Titeca, Joossens and Raw, 
2011; Kehoe Down, Sawadogo and Stocks, 2021). At the same time, as Andreas (2009) has 
highlighted, more substantive controls on the trade infrastructure that large-scale smugglers 
utilise may also be politically undesirable if it simultaneously inconveniences other trade flows – 
both illicit and licit. 
The latter provides a further complication to a simplistic view of ‘corruption’ in this context. 
As will be discussed below, the past years have also seen extensive and not always transparent 
attempts by the formal global tobacco industry to influence, lobby and pressure governments, 
particularly in developing countries (Boseley, 2017). Consequently, a simple separation of the 
political influences of different actors within global cigarette supply chains into ‘corruption’ on 
the one hand and regular business-state relationships on the other, may be neither analytically 
simple nor politically meaningful. 
There is also a need to rethink where relevant instances of ‘corruption’ are located, and what 
they look like. Gallien and Weigand (2021) have noted that the types of interactions through 
which smugglers engage with state agents at borders include not only petty corruption and 
genuine enforcement, but a whole range of rather structured deals and informal agreements, 
from complete toleration to ‘flatrate’ payments that smugglers make to customs personnel on a 
regular basis. Notably, they highlight that the types of interactions that state structures offer 
smugglers is a central determinant of how smugglers choose their routes. Dobler (2016) makes a 
similar observation, noting that different types of cross-border traders prefer different en-
vironments and infrastructure depending on the nature of their trade, their capital, scope, 
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political and social connections. He distinguishes between the actors of the ‘green’ border that 
trade across the borderlands, the actors of the ‘grey’ border that trade through roads and border 
crossings, and the actors of the ‘blue’ border that trade through the large transport infrastructure 
of the global trade system. Given the nature of the global illicit cigarette market as described 
above, with a range of highly capitalised large-scale actors, it therefore appears that the parti-
cular corruptibility of low-level customs agents at border checkpoints that is frequently ima-
gined here frequently may not be a crucial factor. More important aspects may be the ability to 
gain access to large-scale trade infrastructure, the ability to navigate customs at more central 
nodes such as airports and ports, and the governance of free trade zones. 
All this directly connects to the third and perhaps most critical set of drivers here, which 
centres around supply-chain control. As highlighted in the section above, the effects of price or 
tax increases on smuggling have been found to be highly dependent on states’ ability to control 
and combat illicit supply chains into their territory. Returning to the example of South Africa 
provides a useful illustration here. While the illicit market share did not increase substantially 
during the introduction of higher tax rates, as discussed above, it did spike in the 2010s. Recent 
scholarship has attributed this to a simultaneous drop in the ability of the South African 
Revenue Services (SARS) to perform its central functions as a consequence of internal re-
structuring and the disbanding of specialised units (Vellios, Walbeek and Ross, 2020, p. 240). 
In line with the larger global structures of cigarette smuggling, the focus in thinking about 
supply chain control has shifted from a simplistic focus on border control and towards a larger 
and more holistic management of cigarette supply chains. This extends from production to 
import and distribution, transit and free trade zones. Modern supply chain control can be 
assisted through simple markers like excise stamps,7 however best practice increasingly points 
towards more expansive, consistent and comprehensive track and trace measures (Ross, 2017). 
It furthermore requires a sensibility to the political and social embeddedness of these streams. 
Critically, this necessarily includes both the licit and illicit supply chains, including specific 
measures against tobacco industry involvement in supplying illicit trade corridors (Joossens and 
Raw, 2008). Consequently, this brings supply chain control even more firmly in the sphere of 
interest of the global tobacco industry. 
As this section has noted, a more in-depth and holistic view of the underlying drivers and 
dynamics of tobacco smuggling beyond price and taxes brings the analysis of cigarette smug-
gling a little closer to those dynamics that are frequently highlighted for the smuggling of illicit 
goods as well: interactions with state structures, embeddedness in politics and the challenges in 
tracking complex international trade flows. It implies that the distinction between the dynamics 
of smuggling of ‘excisable’ goods and other goods often may be somewhat overstated. 
Crucially, however, the factors discussed here begin to point to an elephant in this chapter that 
needs to be addressed more systematically: the relationship between cigarette smuggling and the 
global – legal – tobacco industry. This stands at the heart of the following section. 
Industry influence and tobacco smuggling 
One of the most important insights from research on tobacco smuggling in recent decades is 
that limiting analyses to the moments and places where cigarettes are crossing borders illegally 
obscures more of the wider picture than it illuminates. Understanding the global illicit cigarette 
market requires the recognition that it is influenced critically by the existence, involvement, 
and interests of the global legal cigarette industry. The global legal tobacco industry is 
substantive and highly capitalised, totalling approximately US$800 billion (Euromonitor, 2014). 
While the market has become internationalised, control has increasingly consolidated, with the 
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vast majority of the market controlled by five transnational companies.8 Spanning vast globally 
integrated value chains from production to distribution, transnational bulk trade is a critical 
feature of the global tobacco industry. Alongside rules of trade, the tobacco industry has also 
become notorious for seeking to influence the legal context in which cigarettes are sold and 
priced, using a wide range of tactics from lobbying and campaign contributions to financing and 
influencing research (Yach and Bettcher, 2000; World Health Organization, 2009). The re-
mainder of this section focuses on three dynamics through which the tobacco industry affects 
tobacco smuggling: its direct involvement in illegal trade; its indirect involvement through 
affecting government policy; and its influence on research and academic discourse on 
smuggling. 
First, there has been extensive evidence that the global tobacco industry has actively par-
ticipated in or relied on the smuggling of its products. Smuggling can help cigarette companies 
evade taxes and tariffs, undermine control measures such as age limits and warning labels, or 
more cheaply establish its brand in a market before entering it legally. It is worth noting that 
today, the vast majority of seized smuggled cigarettes are not illicit whites or counterfeits, but 
recognised tobacco industry brands (Gallagher et al., 2019). Tobacco industry involvement in 
smuggling became a major public talking point in the early 2000s, when a Guardian exposé 
examined how British American Tobacco was benefitting from and exploiting the smuggling of 
its products to boost sales (Maguire and Campbell, 2000). “Smuggling, often organised in a 
furtive and clandestine manner, has been BAT company policy since the late 1960s” one of the 
reporters involved later testified in front of the Health Select Committee (TobaccoTactics, 
2020). In a reply to the allegations, BAT’s deputy chairman replied rather candidly, suggesting 
that legal tobacco firms also see their products as competing on the illicit market: 
Where any government is unwilling to act or their efforts are unsuccessful, we act, 
completely within the law, on the basis that our brands will be available alongside 
those of our competitors in the smuggled as well as the legitimate market. 
(Clarke, 2000)  
A few years prior, the smuggling of cigarettes from Andorra into Spain showed a similar dy-
namic. At the time, smuggling out of Andorra was a major supply channel for the illicit cigarette 
market across Europe. Particularly notable, however, was not just the smuggling trade out of 
Andorra, however, but the legal trade into it. Between 1993 and 1997, legal cigarette exports 
from Britain to Andorra increased by a factor of over 100, and reached a level that would have 
been sufficient to supply every citizen of Andorra with 60 British cigarettes per day (Joossens 
and Raw, 2000). Reducing cigarette smuggling into Spain therefore did not only depend on 
action at the border or on interdicting of street-level distribution, but both a wider approach to 
supply chains and legal changes within Andorra. Consequently, researchers highlighted that 
combatting tobacco smuggling and supply chain control need to focus more directly on the role 
of the legal tobacco industry in illicit trade – ‘turn off the tap,’ so to say (Joossens and 
Raw, 2008). 
The late 1990s and early 2000s saw an increasing focus on the industry’s role in smuggling by 
policy-makers, particularly in Europe. Following an investigation by the EU Commission 
regarding American contraband cigarettes on the European market, tobacco industry giants 
settled their cases in exchange for payments of US$1.25 billion (PMI), US$400 million (JTI), 
US$300 million (Imperial) and US$200 million (BAT) (Snyckers, 2020, 52). Despite these 
expensive settlements, there are numerous indicators that, in a wider global context, many of 
these same dynamics are still prevalent. For example, between 2008 and 2010, a group of 
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tobacco industry companies had to pay a total of US$1.7 billion in fines for their role in tobacco 
smuggling in Canada (Daudelin, Soiffer, and Willows, 2013). BAT has been fined repeatedly 
for a variety of inconsistencies around their book-keeping in South Africa (Snyckers, 2020, 39) 
and has been fined by HMRC for ‘oversupplying’ cigarettes to Belgium with a high risk of 
smuggling (BBC News, 2014). 
A particularly striking case study has been highlighted in a recent report by the Organised 
Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) on cigarette smuggling in West Africa. It 
highlights, like a range of recent scholarship has done, that profits from the expansion of ci-
garette smuggling have fuelled the violence in northern Mali by providing funds for armed 
groups. Critically, however, the report also points to the role of formal tobacco industry and 
state actors in this dynamic. It argues that British American Tobacco has closely monitored the 
situation and strategically over-supplied Mali with cigarettes, knowing that they would be 
traded and distributed by traffickers. At the same time, Malian authorities were found largely to 
turn a blind eye to these proceedings, overlooking obviously ‘impossible’ reports by BAT’s 
local distributor (Kehoe Down, Sawadogo and Stocks, 2021). 
Despite the continuation of these dynamics, the tobacco industry in recent years has sought 
to re-position itself as a victim rather than a perpetrator of cigarette smuggling – and, crucially, 
as a partner in fighting it. This has included a range of Memoranda of Understanding of tobacco 
industry players with customs agencies and international organisations as well as attempts to 
affect policy more concretely. One of the most critical aspects of this has been in the context of 
supply chain control. Both the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) 
and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (ITP) have pointed to track and 
trace systems as centrepieces to combatting the illicit cigarette trade. 
Controversially, however, large tobacco industry players have themselves begun to produce 
and provide track and trace technologies. Notably, PMI both developed and patented its 
‘Codentify’ system and then licenced it for free to its main competitors (Joossens and Gilmore, 
2014). Following this, the industry has increasingly pushed for the adoption of Codentify even 
though its ties to the tobacco industry are in clear contradiction of the terms of the ITP (Ross 
et al., 2018; Gilmore et al., 2019). Tobacco control scholars have expressed serious scepticism 
over the effectiveness of Codentify, noting its vulnerability to falsification, the absence of in-
dependent audits, its undermining of tax stamps, and its potential to move further control away 
from tax authorities and toward the tobacco industry itself (Joossens and Gilmore, 2014; Ross, 
Eads and Yates, 2018). 
Tobacco industry influence on cigarette smuggling has not only been limited to specific 
policy tools, but also affected how smuggling and counter-smuggling policy is discussed more 
broadly. Even though the connection between price and tobacco smuggling is not straight-
forward, as discussed above, the tobacco industry has systematically exploited the bogeyman of 
smuggling in order to argue against cigarette taxation and other tobacco control policies such as 
standardised packaging (Fooks, Peeters and Evans-Reeves, 2014; Gallien, 2020a). This has 
included not just targeted lobbying but also the creation of a policy discourse that simplifies the 
relationship between price and smuggling, overstates the amount of smuggling, overstates the 
role of ‘illicit whites,’ and underplays the involvement of the legal industry (Gallagher et al., 
2019). Industry players have sought to influence news coverage (Evans-Reeves et al., 2020) and 
have partnered with academics, think tanks, consultancies and research institutions such as the 
International Tax and Investment Center (ITIC), the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and 
KPMG to establish their perspective in respected fora.9 Especially with respect to tobacco 
taxation, there is some evidence that this has been successful – not only has the number of 
Max Gallien 
254 
countries that have implemented tobacco tax policy that follows the WHO best practices re-
mained below 20%, it has actually fallen since 2014 (Snyckers, 2020, 91). 
Critically for the purpose of this volume, these tactics have affected not only public discourse 
and policy-making on cigarette smuggling, but also the academic and scientific literature on the 
topic. In rarer cases, this has been through the direct funding of academic studies, such as PMI’s 
funding of research at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan and the University of 
Trento (Fooks, Peeters and Evans-Reeves, 2014). Likely more influential has been the funding 
of ‘grey literature,’ as well as in particular indices and data sources to drive discourse and be 
picked up by scholars. However, this has likely shaped the academic work on tobacco 
smuggling in more complex ways than might have been anticipated. Despite, and arguably in 
response to, industry influence, the academic community working on tobacco smuggling has 
developed research centres and initiatives focused in particular on the tactics of the tobacco 
industry (such as the Tobacco Control project at the University of Bath), on fact-checking its 
various studies, and consequently refining methodological approaches to studying cigarette 
smuggling. It has fostered extreme awareness of the ethics of research funding streams across a 
group of researchers, who, over the past two decades in particular, have produced one of the 
most well-developed literatures on the intersections between a legal industry and illegal trade. 
As the final section notes, this has provided critical contributions for our understanding of 
smuggling more widely. 
Conclusion: lessons from cigarette smuggling 
This chapter has noted that despite a frequent focus on prices and taxation, the drivers of 
cigarette smuggling globally are both highly diverse and tied into local politics and the wider 
infrastructure of globalised trade. Furthermore, it has discussed the role that the tobacco in-
dustry has had in influencing smuggling, anti-smuggling policy and even academic discussions 
on the issue. While cigarette smuggling has some dynamics that are particular to it, it also 
shares a variety of features with the smuggling of other goods, including some discussed in this 
volume. Parallels are particularly notable to the smuggling of other licit goods with inter-
nationalised industries, such as oil, and other goods with adverse health effects, such as al-
cohol, but not limited to these. Consequently, both from the discussions outlined here and 
the wider recent academic literature on cigarette smuggling emerge important contributions 
to our understanding of smuggling more widely. This chapter concludes by highlighting three 
particularly salient lessons. 
First, recent work on cigarette smuggling has highlighted that while much scholarship on 
smuggling, and particularly the smuggling of licit goods, has traditionally taken a cost-benefit- 
focused view on what drives smuggling and smugglers, a wider view at diverse drivers, actors 
and their interactions are necessary. This not only includes a broader analysis of both the local 
and transnational politics in which smuggling is embedded but also an unpacking of more 
simplistic assumptions around the role and logic of ‘corruption’ in illegal trade. With this have 
come clear implications for policy. Strategies that solely consider limiting smuggling through 
‘making it more expensive’ or bumping up customs enforcement, are likely both to over-estimate 
the role of prices themselves and under-estimate more complex cost-driven dynamics, such as 
costlier routes leading to the consolidation of monopolistic smuggling structures. Lessons from 
successful attempts to limit cigarette smuggling include the importance of both multi-pronged 
approaches and a consideration of the role of the legal industry (Ross, 2015). This connects 
directly to the following point. 
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Second, recent work on cigarette smuggling provides outstanding case studies on the in-
tersection between illegal trade and legal, highly capitalised global industries. They not only 
highlight this as a key area of study that is critically under-researched in the context of a range of 
other goods but also provide a range of tools that can be applied more broadly. These include 
methodological innovations and insights into an industry playbook of schemes and strategies 
that are unlikely to be limited to tobacco. In addition, they provide a reminder of the critical 
importance of ethics, transparency, and industry-independent funding in scholarship on 
smuggling today. This leads to a final point. 
Third, research on cigarette smuggling teaches a critical lesson on the importance for a field 
of study to examine its own histories, motivations, funding streams and, fundamentally, biases. 
This issue has been heightened in this area due to the aggressive attempts by the tobacco 
industry to influence the knowledge industry on cigarette smuggling and taxation, but this does 
not imply that it is entirely absent in research on the smuggling of other goods, although it may 
take different forms. Crucially, biases in a field may not only be introduced through outside 
intervention or funding streams but through political interests, methodological and geo-
graphical blind-spots or the dominance of research agendas set in the ‘global north.’ Solutions to 
this lie not just in rigorous research and funding ethics but also the critical self-examination of a 
field of study and the communication among different disciplines, methodologies, and areas of 
scholarship. This is a project to which both this chapter and this volume as a whole have sought 
to contribute. 
Notes  
1 For a more extensive discussion of ‘cheap white’ cigarettes, see Ross et al. (2016).  
2 This metric is calculated by analysing the number of customs seizure cases. This does not account for 
the quantity or price of the individual seizure, and is necessarily biased by the intensity of enforcement.  
3 While this section focuses on price and tax, a parallel set of discussions to the ones examined here exists 
for quantity restrictions on cigarette trade and other regulatory instruments such as warning labels.  
4 I will discuss the role of relative price differences within regions below, but it is worth noting that a 
focus on neighbouring countries risks understating the role of shipping and trade corridors between 
regions.  
5 For a more qualitative approach, see for example Titeca, Joossens and Raw (2011).  
6 Notably, this index has been created with the involvement of tobacco industry funding. I will return to 
this point below.  
7 Excise stamps are a form of stamp attached to excisable goods, such as cigarette packets, in order to 
indicate that the excise tax has been paid by the manufacturer.  
8 Namely the Chinese National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC), Phillip Morris International (PMI), 
British American Tobacco (BAT), Japan Tobacco Inc (JT), and Imperial Tobacco Group. Source:  
Euromonitor (2014).  
9 The website https://tobaccotactics.org/, hosted by the University of Bath, is not merely an invaluable 
resource on tobacco industry tactics but also contains updated lists of organisations that have received 
funding from the tobacco industry.  
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THEFT AND SMUGGLING OF 
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 
Tim Eaton   
The petroleum sector is highly complex. It produces a vast array of products, from cooking gas 
to heat homes and prepare food, to fuel for commercial vehicles and aviation fuels. Extensive 
expertise and infrastructure is required to extract, refine, move and store petroleum products. 
Internationally, the oil market is regulated: sellers not recognised by the international com-
munity and/or subject to restrictive measures are prohibited from dealing with buyers and 
traders, although they may find means to circumnavigate these measures. The sector involves a 
wide array of stakeholders, from politicians who pass legislation over the governance of the 
sector, to technocrats and engineers who are responsible for managing and running it, to 
security guards and truck drivers who may be responsible for safeguarding the products. 
The world consumes in the region of 34 billion barrels of petroleum products per annum. 
The market value of each barrel of crude oil has fluctuated significantly in recent years. At 2017 
prices, the market value was estimated to be $1.7 trillion (Oilprice.com: 2017). The size of the 
oil market creates significant economic incentives to profiteer illicitly from the sector, and such 
profiteering takes place at all levels of the supply chain. In 2016, illicit trading in oil via under- 
invoicing, theft, bunkering and corruption was believed to account for nearly $100 billion a 
year on the continent of Africa alone (African Development Bank: 2016: p. 7). In keeping with 
the theme of this handbook, this chapter will focus on the smuggling of petroleum products 
across national borders, but it necessarily will look at the means through which this is facilitated 
by factors at the national-level. It should be noted that the smuggling of these products is 
inextricably connected to theft (i.e., the products are diverted from the supply chain via theft 
and subsequently smuggled) particularly at the upstream and midstream level. Therefore, the 
modalities of that theft are also covered here. 
Drawing on a wide range of case studies in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the 
Americas, the chapter will address smuggling of both refined and unrefined products, by 
working through the levels of the supply chain, first examining how upstream elements, such as 
the laws and governance of the oil sector, can be used, or abused, to facilitate smuggling. Next, 
means of smuggling oil products will be explored – the midstream elements of the supply chain – 
beginning with the tapping and siphoning of unrefined oil. Diversion of refined products from 
the midstream and downstream elements of the supply chain will then be assessed, through 
bunkering and trucking. 
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Analysing the supply chain, the actors that are in control of each element, and the operating 
environment in which the activities take place, is an effective way of illustrating how different 
forms of oil and fuel smuggling function. Such an analysis can reveal much about the underlying 
power relations in the state in question, the capacities of its institutions and the reach of its 
capacities for enforcement. While it is helpful to identify when and how petroleum products are 
diverted from the supply chain and smuggled by identifying upstream, midstream and down-
stream phases, the reality is that smuggling dynamics tend to be fluid and may be present at all 
levels. This chapter consequently explores contemporary fuel smuggling dynamics in Libya to 
illustrate how smuggling can permeate the upstream, midstream and downstream elements of 
the fuel sector. See Box 19.1 for details of different modalities of fuel smuggling. 
The overall takeaway of this analysis is that the challenges associated with preventing 
smuggling become greater as the degree of penetration of the profiteers of up the supply chain 
increases. If, for example, smuggling networks have penetrated the governance of the petro-
leum sector upstream by cutting deals with officials in positions of authority to limit oversight 
or to actively facilitate smuggling, then ‘fixing’ the problem will depend on a more complex 
array of interventions than smuggling which is limited to activity in the downstream sector. 
Greasing the wheels: upstream governance of petroleum production 
The environment in which the petroleum sector operates has a critical impact over the nature 
and degree of fuel smuggling. While the term “upstream” is used within the oil and gas sector 
to refer to exploration and production, it is used more broadly here to refer to the governance 
of the petroleum sector (including the political system, the legal framework and the security 
situation). Actors present in the upstream level include state officials and legislators, and state 
and non-state enterprises. The ability of political and military representatives of the state to 
determine who can engage in oil smuggling allows them to profiteer from the smuggling of the 
state’s assets through kickbacks and to cut deals with local actors in return for looking the other 
way. Moreover, when governments are prevented from selling to formal international markets, 
fuel smuggling can be state sanctioned as a means of generating revenues through informal and 
illicit means. The connivance of such officials with smuggling and the failure to ensure robust 
and transparent governance of the oil sector is a major facilitator of smuggling. 
Some of these upstream dynamics are illustrated in Nigeria, where interests in the oil sector 
have become intimately connected to elite bargaining over political power. Nigeria is estimated 
to lose $3–8 billion a year from oil theft and smuggling (Katsouris & Sayne: 2013: p. 17). This is 
the equivalent of around 10–20% of the country’s annual production. Oil theft and smuggling 
in Nigeria developed in the 1970s and 1980s while the country remained under military rule. 
Oil theft allowed military officers to sustain themselves while also allowing others to engage in 
the practice as a form of rent, thereby ensuring stability. The return to civilian rule in the 2000s 
and subsequent steep global rise in oil prices stimulated greater competition over the sector. 
This led to the involvement by a broader array of actors, making the lucrative sector both a 
source of political deal making and a source of conflict (Katsouris & Sayne: 2013: pp. 5–6). 
Under the administrations of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007), Umaru Musa Yar’Adua 
(2007–2010) and Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2015), powerbrokers with close involvement in 
smuggling activities were benefactors of the presidents, who in turn shielded their benefactors 
from being held accountable for their smuggling activity (Burgis: 2015: pp. 73–79). This 
protection extended beyond the benefactors themselves to those in their networks: oil thieves 
and smugglers have been repeatedly protected from prosecution by the Nigerian authorities, 
(Katsouris & Sayne: 2013: pp. 5–6). Numerous modalities of smuggling exist, including the 
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tapping of oil pipelines and the illicit bunkering of ships, and then the subsequent smuggling of 
the oil. 
In areas of countries that the state is unable to control, local actors can be granted rights to 
smuggle oil products in return for security guarantees. For example, in the 2000s, the Ugandan 
government had limited control in some of its territory. In some of these areas where the 
government had limited influence, the so-called ‘Opec boys’ smuggled fuel from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo with the consent of local Ugandan politicians as part of an 
alliance between the two sets of actors that allowed the politicians to maintain stability and for 
the Opec boys to sooth their grievances, generate revenues and leverage their capacity to rebel 
(Lecoutere and Titeca: 2007: pp. 1–37). 
In other cases, there are incentives for political leaders to circumnavigate international 
regulations in order to profit from smuggling. Overland smuggling and maritime smuggling of 
crude oil in Iraq developed under the guidance of the regime of President Saddam Hussein in 
the 1990s. Starved of revenues from international oil sales as a result of the international 
sanctions regime and so-called “Oil for Food” measures, the regime actively found means of 
diverting crude to the black market to be trucked into neighbouring Jordan, Syria and Turkey 
(Eaton et al.: 2019: p. 13). This provided a significant revenue stream for Hussein’s regime. 
Other attempts by governments not recognised by the international community to smuggle oil 
have been less effective. Libya had two rival governments from 2014 to 2021. The government 
operating in the east of the country, unrecognised by the international community, sought to 
export crude oil repeatedly. These efforts, which effectively constitute large scale efforts to 
smuggle oil, have failed owing to the threat of violations of international law being levied at 
those who purchase the oil. 
Box 19.1 Modalities of oil and fuel theft 
Retailing: buying at a subsidised rate and selling at an unsubsidised rate, profiting from price 
differentials between different markets. 
Tapping: diverting supplies from oil pipelines and/or wellheads. There are two different types: 
“hot tapping” or “pressure tapping” is where small amounts are diverted from the pipelines without 
significantly reducing the pipeline’s high pressure. On the other hand, “cold tapping” involves 
disactivating part of a pipeline and then placing a new tap in while the pipeline is down. When the 
pipeline is brought back online the new tap is not noticeable. 
Siphoning: fuel is siphoned out and the supply is topped up with other products, such as 
kerosene or water to mask the missing amount. 
Adulteration: In cases where fuel is dyed for use by agricultural machinery, the fuel is 
adulterated by mixing in other products in order to change the colour. This allows the fuel to be 
sold at higher prices to the broader consumer market. Other more complex processes exist for 
removing isotope markers (used to identify where the fuel is rebated). 
Bunkering: illegally supplying ships with fuel to be sold on the black market or misrepresented 
on the formal market. 
Trucking: illegal trafficking of fuels in specialised vehicles such as oil tankers, pick-up trucks 
and specially modified cars with significantly expanded fuel tanks. 
Source: Adapted from  Ralby (2017) ‘Downstream Oil Theft: Culprits, Modalities, and Amounts’, 
Atlantic Council   
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Midstream diversion and smuggling of unrefined products 
For the purposes of this chapter, midstream activities include the processing, storing and 
transporting of unrefined petroleum products. The distinction between midstream and 
downstream smuggling, between refined and unrefined products, is an important one. This is 
because the oil must be refined – or “finished” – to fulfil its function; i.e., for the crude to 
become diesel or heating oil. As a result, unrefined products are of lesser monetary value, 
necessitating either the sale of the product to actors that have access to refining capacity or 
possession of that capacity – and expertise – within the smuggling network. 
The actors directly engaged in diversion of petroleum products midstream are those that 
have physical control over oil and gas infrastructure, the transportation network (usually pi-
pelines), or the territory through which the products must pass. These include corrupt officials, 
security actors and criminal networks. The two principal means of diversion from the supply 
chain and subsequent smuggling are the physical capture of oil and gas infrastructure and the 
tapping of oil pipelines. 
Control of oil and gas infrastructure and the sale of unrefined products 
Actors that control oil and gas infrastructure but lack the access to technical expertise and 
facilities to refine fuel face limitations over their ability to sell the product. Following its capture 
of oil infrastructure in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State of Syria and al-Sham (ISIS) was making 
significant profits from the running of oil fields and refineries, and subsequent smuggling of fuel 
to areas of Syria under the control of President Bashar al-Assad and also through pipelines to 
Turkey (Eaton et al.: 2019: p. 14). In response, the international coalition to counter the group 
decided to bomb the refineries under ISIS control. This led to the development of improvised 
methods to refining the fuel, such as digging a hole in the ground and flaring the oil to refine it 
in a rudimentary fashion. The fuel obtained through this process was of a significantly poorer 
quality and consequently sold for a much lower price (Eaton et al.: 2019: 52). 
Greater sophistication is noted in the Nigerian smuggling sector to navigate the challenges 
associated with the theft of unrefined products. In Nigeria, crude oil appears to have been 
transported to artisanal refineries both within and outside of the country in the Nile Delta. In 
2014, a refinery in Ghana was found to have produced five times its anticipated output of 
refined fuels due to the alleged input of smuggled Nigerian crude. The scheme required the 
complicity of actors associated with the Ghanaian production industry (Faucon: 2014), de-
monstrating the need for significant technical expertise for midstream smuggling. 
Access without full control: tapping of unrefined products 
For those actors who do not control fully territory that houses oil and gas infrastructure, the 
tapping of well-heads and pipelines is a means of large scale theft and subsequent smuggling. It 
can be done in two principal ways: “hot tapping” or “pressure tapping” involves fitting a tap to 
a high-pressure pipeline in order to divert a relatively small amount of the product. Some of 
these tapping operations, such as those that take place under water in Nigeria require significant 
expertise and are difficult to detect. The oil that is tapped either goes directly to artisanal 
refineries or so-called “mother ships” that may deliver the oil to other refineries, transfer it to 
other ships or unload it into storage (Ralby: 2017: 19). Perhaps as much as 10% of Nigeria’s 
exports are tapped per day (Ralby: 2017: 19), pointing towards the industrial scale of these 
activities. 
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A more rudimentary alternative, “cold tapping,” involves disabling or blowing up parts of 
pipelines and then fitting a tap as the pipelines are repaired, leaving the oil company unable to 
detect the tap. This approach has been used widely in Mexico, where the tapping and siphoning 
of pipelines carrying refined fuels of state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) is a major 
challenge for the authorities (Ralby: 2017: p. 20). Organised crime groups are reported to bribe 
and coerce PEMEX employees to gain access to facilities where they can fit taps above- and 
under-ground in order to access fuel for their own purposes and to sell, as the sector has 
increasingly become controlled by large cartels. The number of illicit taps increased from an 
estimated 132 in 2001 to 12,582 in 2018, according to Pemex (Jones and Sullivan: 2019: p. 7). 
The tactics of the cartels have ended in disaster on some occasions. In one incident, 135 people 
were killed in an explosion as a result of an illegal tap in Tlahuelilpan, Hidalgo (Jones and 
Sullivan: 2019: p. 7). In 2011, PEMEX sued 11 U.S. companies for buying up to $300 million 
of stolen fuel that it said was trucked across the U.S.-Mexico border (Rosenberg: 2011). 
Liquid cash: downstream smuggling of refined products 
Downstream smuggling refers to the smuggling of refined (finished) products, for the purposes 
of this chapter. As at the midstream, the actors directly engaged in diversion of petroleum 
products are those that have physical control over oil and gas infrastructure, the transportation 
network and/or access to the territory through which the products must pass. Unlike the 
midstream, however, there are fewer barriers to entry in downstream smuggling, which also 
allows for the participation of smaller networks of smugglers and individual smugglers, parti-
cularly in the movement and sale of the product. Unlike the institutional players (such as heads 
of companies, and leaders of organised criminal networks) who may be making significant 
profits, the actors actually moving and selling the product on the lowest echelons of the supply 
chain are likely to be dependent on smuggling for their survival. 
Refined products can be sold direct to the public or the private sector for consumption. The 
principal means of profiting from the sale of smuggled refined fuels is retailing, while profits can 
also be increased by adulterating smuggled low value products to imitate high value products. 
Price differentials: retailing 
Retailing does not necessitate theft. For smugglers who are retailing, profit is obtained by selling 
for a higher price than that at which they bought the fuel. The incentive to smuggle refined fuels 
such as gasoline across international borders is usually driven by the difference in prices between 
neighbouring states. Differentials between prices in neighbouring states are exacerbated by subsidy 
regimes. Large oil producing countries such as Venezuela, Nigeria and Libya use such subsidies to 
provide low-cost fuel to their populations, creating significant margins for those who move the 
subsidised fuels across the border. In 2018, it was reported that fuel smuggled into Colombia from 
Venezuela increased in value 37,000-fold as a result of Venezuela’s financial crisis and subsidy 
regime, generating profits of $3 million a day for organised crime groups (Insight Crime: 2018). 
The smuggling of gasoline from Libya to Tunisia in relatively small amounts via modified 
cars with oversized fuel tanks or via pickups carrying jerry cans of gasoline is long established, 
and the subject of informal regulation between Libyan and Tunisian counterparts (Gallien: 
2020). The subsidised rate of gasoline in Libya was much as seven times cheaper than gasoline at 
the pump in Tunisia in 2018, offering a significant margin to smugglers (Eaton: 2018: p. 14). 
Such margins create opportunities for an array of actors, from individual smugglers, and in-




After being smuggled across borders, low grade fuels are sometimes adulterated to imitate 
higher value products for onward sale to consumers to increase profits. This can be achieved by 
mixing other agents, such as ethanol into the fuel, or by mixing it with higher grade fuel. A 
prominent example of large-scale adulteration of fuel is found in Ireland. Irish fuel prices, 
particularly for agricultural grade diesel, made it highly profitable for criminal groups to 
adulterate the fuel and sell it across the border in Northern Ireland, with only very limited 
technical knowledge required. The practice was prevalent in the period following the 1998 
peace agreement between the governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland, when border 
controls were relaxed. In 2002, the United Kingdom’s Customs and Excise authority estimated 
that 450 of 700 petrol stations in Ireland were selling illicit fuel. Losses to the UK Treasury from 
fuel duty fraud were estimated at £450 million in 2000 (Irish Times: 2002). However, the 
margin obtained by the smugglers in the following decade was reduced significantly by the 
increase of fuel duties in Ireland and the reduction in the exchange rate from Euros, used in 
Ireland, to Sterling, used in the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland Assembly: 2012). 
Anatomy of the fuel smuggling sector in Libya: leaks at all levels in the supply chain 
While it is helpful to identify when and how petroleum products are diverted from the supply 
chain and smuggled by identifying upstream, midstream and downstream phases, the reality is 
that smuggling dynamics tend to be fluid and may be present at all levels. Contemporary 
dynamics in Libya illustrate how smuggling can permeate the upstream, midstream and 
downstream elements of the fuel sector. Since the overthrow of the regime of Muammar 
Gaddafi in 2011, the fuel smuggling sector has expanded from a cross-border activity to one 
that also determines the distribution of fuel in many areas within the country, as Libyans are less 
able to access state subsidised fuel. 
A series of upstream problems plague Libya’s fuel sector. State officials are likely to be 
profiting directly from smuggling through their official positions. A number of executives 
employed by state-owned entities also hold positions in private companies that profit from the 
fuel sector: a clear conflict of interest. In addition, a fractious security environment makes it 
nearly impossible for the authorities to enforce the law. The idiosyncrasies of the Gaddafi-era 
system of governance also make it difficult for state institutions to work together effectively. For 
example, the state electricity provider can requisition fuel from the state fuel company uni-
laterally, and payment for consumption is by no means ensured (Pack: 2021). Oversight is 
limited, as illustrated by the mechanism for calculating market demand, which is based upon the 
requirements submitted by sellers rather than data on market needs. Sellers are thus incentivised 
to inflate their requirements. Moreover, many of the sellers exist only on paper. When, in 2018, 
the National Oil Corporation spot-checked 105 new gasoline stations registered since 2010, it 
found that 83 of them did not exist (Eaton: 2019). These have come to be known as ‘ghost’ 
stations. 
These factors have driven a massive increase in the import of refined fuels (needed because 
Libya can meet only 20% of its fuel needs with its own refineries) since the revolution. Figures 
obtained from the Libyan National Oil Corporation indicate a 30% increase in the amount of 
gasoline being imported from 2010 to 2016. These increases are not explicable by market 
demand, indicating that demand was being exaggerated and the level of diversion in the system 
was on the rise. In 2017, the Libyan authorities assessed that around one-third of fuels such as 
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gasoline and diesel are diverted to the market each year (Libya Observer: 2017). This is around 
1.3 million tonnes, the equivalent of 178 Olympic-sized swimming pools (Eaton: 2019). In 
truth, though, the scale of diversion is unknown. Record keeping and public disclosure of 
statistics and figures is limited at best. 
The leaks extend into the mid- and downstream of the fuel sector. The largest refinery in 
Libya is in north-western Libya, in the city of Zawiya. At the time of writing, it remains 
controlled by an armed group that has its origins in Libya’s civil war. The Nasr Brigade, a 
revolutionary group, was transformed into a unit of the Libyan state’s Petroleum Facilities 
Guard in 2013, placed onto the state payroll, and officially put in control of the Zawiya re-
finery. The refinery is a centre of smuggling activity. False paperwork is provided to truck 
drivers to make shipments destined for the black market look legitimate (especially if the 
destination station is a ‘ghost’ station) and the absence of accurate production figures makes it 
very difficult to ascertain how much of the fuel is being diverted. The National Oil 
Corporation’s inability to control the territory its facilities are located in is a major problem. 
Similar issues exist at storage facilities, where officials and the armed groups guarding them can 
make significant profits from diverting the fuel to the black market. 
Moreover, in the downstream sector, even fuel that is destined for the formal market must 
be moved over ground, often through areas controlled by armed actors who may hijack or 
confiscate some or all of the shipment. This is a particular problem in the south of the country, 
where a checkpoint economy has developed and armed groups apply informal taxes for the 
movement of goods to bolster their income. 
The result of this activity is that Libyans are not benefitting from the fuel subsidies for which 
the state is paying in excess of $4 billion a year. In many areas of the country, particularly the 
south, it has become near impossible for locals to obtain fuel at subsidised rates, and they are 
instead forced to buy from the black market. Black market rates can be up to 15 times that of 
the official subsidised rates. “I filled my tank for 6.5 dinars (around $4.50) in Tripoli, 44 dinars 
($31) in Sebha (southern Libya), and when I reached Ubari (southern Libya) it cost me 75 
dinars ($53),” a driver told Chatham House researchers in August 2019 (Eaton: 2019). 
These internal Libyan dynamics have led to shifts in the patterns of cross-border smuggling 
of fuel. Prior to 2011, the cross-border smuggling of fuel to Tunisia was well established, while 
Libyan fuel is also smuggled across the eastern border to Egypt and across its southern border to 
Niger, Chad and Sudan. The changes in Libya’s smuggling has an impact on overland smug-
gling to Tunisia. Tunisian smugglers, who have to traverse the difficult operating environment 
in Libya, find it more difficult to obtain the fuel at low cost. Smugglers report having to deal 
with armed actors to obtain the fuel, and being charged inflated rates. Moreover, following the 
2015 attack on the Tunisian border town of Ben Guerdane, border security has been increased 
on the Tunisian side. This has made it more difficult for smugglers to move fuel across the 
border, especially via desert routes. The impact of these shifts has been illustrated in the market, 
where prices of Libyan fuel increased four-fold between 2015 and 2019 (Eaton: 2019). 
The smuggling of gasoil from Libya via maritime routes to Malta offers a greater margin than 
the aforementioned overland routes, expanding rapidly after the revolution. In 2015, Italy’s 
Guardia di Finanza initiated operation ‘Dirty Oil’ in Sicily, targeted at fuel smugglers (Trial 
International: 2020). The operation led to the arrest of suspects in Libya, Malta and Italy. In 
Libya, the smuggling network was headed by Fahmi Salim Ben Khalifa, a native of the town of 
Zuwara, until his arrest in 2017. Salim’s status in Zuwara was well known. Salim obtained his 
fuel from the aforementioned Zawiya refinery and then trucked the fuel to Zuwara (ap-
proximately 75km) and Abu Kammash (approximately 150 km) before using pumping stations 
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to bunker fuel to small fishing boats at sea. The use of the gasoil for the fishing boats’ motors 
presents a means of explaining why the gasoil is loaded onto the boats. Those fishing boats 
would then bunker the fuel to tankers at sea, mixing the Libyan fuel with the existing fuel on 
the boat. 
To evade detection, the boats undertook measures such as deactivating their GPS tracking 
(a legal requirement to keep active) and undertook complex manoeuvres to mask the pro-
ducts that they collected (Frattini: 2016). In the case of three shipments identified in in-
vestigative reports, the tankers were chartered by two Maltese businessmen and subsequently 
bunkered in Malta in storage tanks leased by a Swiss company. That Swiss company paid the 
Maltese businessmen for the fuel (Trial International: 2020). The Maltese businessmen in 
question are currently undergoing prosecution. The prosecutors in the case allege that the 
fuel was subsequently transported to Italy and adulterated. Approximately $35 million of 
gasoil has reportedly been identified in the shipments in question (Corriere del Mezzogiorno: 
2017). Increased surveillance and international attention on maritime smuggling of fuel has 
increased as a result of Operation Dirty Oil. Maritime smuggling from Libya seems subse-
quently to have reduced. 
The result of these dynamics is that smuggling dynamics are no longer dependent on cross 
border movements. Cross-border smuggling of fuel from Libya is likely to have reduced, but 
diversion from the local Libyan market has significantly increased. Cross-border smuggling was 
predicated on retailing and generating a margin from one side of the border to another; i.e., 
buying at the subsidised rate and selling at a profit on the other side of the border in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Chad, Sudan and Niger. Now, however, the profit is increasingly obtained from Libyans 
themselves, as more of the fuel is diverted from the supply chain owing to weaknesses at the 
upstream, midstream and downstream levels. This means that, despite the state’s buying greater 
amounts of fuel, less fuel is reaching the petrol pump at the official subsidised rates. This means 
that many Libyans are consequently forced to buy at higher, black market rates. 
Engaging with fuel smuggling: how to plug the leaks? 
The diversion and subsequent smuggling of petroleum products affects petroleum sectors across 
the world. There are a series of policies designed to combat it, ranging from attempts to reduce 
profitability, improve surveillance and transparency and rule-of-law centred efforts. 
Reduce the incentives 
Smugglers of oil products calculate the risk versus reward of their activities in part through the 
lens of profitability. One simple answer to reduce the prevalence of fuel smuggling is, therefore, 
to reduce that profitability. In countries with large subsidy regimes for fuels, this means cutting 
those subsidies. Iran has been implementing reforms to fuel subsidies since 2007. The price of 
gasoline was trebled by Iranian authorities through the removal of subsidies in 2019. This has 
concomitantly reduced the scale of smuggling. Studies assessing the price elasticity of gasoline 
prices in Iran also agree that the removal of subsidies will reduce the amount of gasoline that is 
smuggled across Iran’s borders (Ghoddusi and Rafizadeh: 2019: 1). 
The removal of subsidies is, however, not an economic silver bullet and can have negative 
impacts upon populations. Of course, price differentials can also be generated through other 
market variations, such as currency exchange rates. This is why the scale of the profits for 
smuggling fuel from Venezuela to Colombia was so high. Critics of Iran’s approach note that 
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hyperinflation in Iran’s currency as a result of international sanctions may soon recreate profit 
margins for fuel smugglers (Mohseni-Cheraghlou: 2019). 
There is also an important distinction to be made between those smugglers whose op-
erations are based solely on profiting from margins between different markets and those 
whose operations are predicated on theft. Those who are diverting oil products from the 
supply chain through theft will of course be impacted by reduced margins, but a margin is 
still present as a result of the lack of direct payment for the oil products that they obtain. 
Removing subsidies on Libyan fuels may even increase the margin available to those in the 
smuggling sector who are stealing from the supply chain as prices at the pump will increase 
significantly. 
Moreover, while it may stand to reason that those who are retailing fuel through buying it in 
one state and selling in another will reduce their activities if the margin is reduced, such a 
calculation also rests upon the assumption that they may have other means of income to adopt. 
Those operating at the lowest echelon of the smuggling supply chain, like the truckers, may 
depend on the business for survival. In Ghana, fuel smugglers have responded to diminishing 
returns by seeking to smuggle in greater volume (Ralby: 2017: 84). Others have diversified. In 
Iran, levels of diesel smuggling skyrocketed after price increases to gasoline were implemented 
(Voice of America: 2020). 
Improving the transparency of the sector: papering over the cracks 
Another key facilitator of oil and fuel smuggling is a lack of transparency within the oil sector of 
the states that suffer from the problem: poor reporting and entrenched corruption enable the 
activities of smugglers. 
Fuel marking, where isotopes are added to fuel to allow investigators to ascertain where the 
fuel was intended to be sold, has become an increasingly prominent countermeasure, and is 
now mandated by law in many countries (Ralby: 2017: p. 87). In Northern Ireland, the 2015 
addition of an isotope marker to fuel supplies allows authorities to understand quickly whether 
the fuel is rebated or unrebated. The standard ‘washing’ practices of the fuel smugglers do not 
remove the marker. UK authorities have observed a downward trend in the number of fuel 
laundering plants uncovered following its introduction. However, it is noteworthy that fuel 
smugglers have resorted to “sophisticated, and often dangerous” methods to defeat the marker 
that create toxic waste as a byproduct (Cross Border Organised Crime Threat Assessment: 2018: 
p. 16). Such waste has been dumped in remote locations, illustrating that the practice of fuel 
adulteration remains ongoing (Armaghi: 2018). Other contexts have reported successes from 
fuel marking. Mozambique’s authorities reported the recovery of $25 million in lost revenues 
and $650,000 in asset seizures in the first semester of implementation of its marking programme 
(Wilcox: 2020). 
Further strategies, such as GPS tracking of fuel trucks have been adopted to increase 
transparency in the system. Yet, such approaches have proven more open to manipulation by 
smugglers. In a particularly prominent illustration of this in Uganda, the trackers were given to 
another person on a motorcycle who would drive the route the truck was supposed to have 
taken to imitate the licit route. Meanwhile, the truck was diverted to the black market. In this 
case, the Ugandan regulators had become dependent on the data provided by a fuel company 
that was engaging in fuel smuggling. The chief executive of the company was arrested in 2016 
after being implicated following the arrest of a motorcyclist who was carrying a GPS tracker 
(Ralby: 2017: p. 89). 
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Enforcement, complicity and second-order effects 
Countries that have a greater capacity to enforce laws on the ground have demonstrated sig-
nificant successes in limiting smuggling practices. The aforementioned efforts by the UK to 
mark fuel, combined with reforms to regulations and stiffened sentencing guidelines have 
delivered results. The UK authorities estimate that the illicit diesel market share in Northern 
Ireland fell from an estimated 19% in 2005–2006 to 6% in 2016–2017 (Cross Border Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment: 2018: p. 16). As noted, however, fuel smugglers have resorted to 
more sophisticated approaches to maintain their operations, and analysts warn that an increase 
in arbitrage opportunities for retailing fuels across the Northern Irish-Ireland border following 
the exit of the UK from the European Union could lead to a resurgence in smuggling practices 
(TheConversation: 2019). 
The complicity of high-level officials, and sometimes their direct involvement in the 
smuggling of oil products can make countering the activities of smugglers an intractable pro-
blem for those committed to clamping down upon the practice. As noted, in countries such as 
Nigeria and Uganda, distribution of the rights to smuggle can be a key part of a political set-
tlement, and therefore a guarantor of stability. In Nigeria, the support of elites profiting from 
smuggling has been obtained by candidates for the presidency to support their campaigns and 
then to help them to maintain their authority following their election. In northern Uganda, the 
case of the Opec Boys illustrates how the authorities can turn a relatively blind eye to the 
operations of smugglers, provided they did not rebel against the government. Such develop-
ments can lead to the deliberate maintenance of loop holes and governance flaws that prevent 
enforcement of the law. 
Political leaders committed to reducing smuggling must contend with the limitations of 
their authority, particularly in conflict affected states. In operating environments such as Libya 
and Mexico, those seeking to disrupt fuel smuggling activities have a very difficult task. How 
can they contend with armed groups/sophisticated organised crime groups that have control 
of the territory they must operate within or move their goods through, in lieu of effective 
state forces? 
In Mexico, a sustained multi-faceted offensive to reduce fuel theft is ongoing at the time of 
writing. The administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador has shut down pipelines, made 
adjustments to the supply chain, arrested senior PEMEX executives, increased sentencing 
guidelines for fuel theft, deployed soldiers to guard infrastructure and unveiled a package of 
development spending to be targeted at the areas of the country where most pipeline theft is 
taking place. The Obrador Administration claims to have reduced pipeline theft by 90% as a 
result of the crack down, but analysts note that there are concerns over how long it can be 
sustained, arguing that organised crime groups are biding their time before striking back (Jones 
and Sullivan: 2019: pp. 14–15). 
Indeed, it should be noted that such forces have the ability to fight back. In Libya, attempts 
by the National Oil Corporation to oust the Nasr Brigade from the Zawiya refinery led only 
days later to a mysterious electricity blackout as the electricity generating plant in the city shut 
down, resulting in 900 km of Libya’s coastline being engulfed in darkness (Eaton: 2019). The 
commander of the Nasr Brigade is also subject to UN Sanctions for human trafficking, but he 
has retained his position. Here it is important to understand how the practice of fuel 
smuggling and rights to it operate in the context in question. Seeking to remove lucrative rent 
streams in the illicit economy without considering the responses of those who profit may 
stoke violence. 
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Conclusions 
The examples listed above illustrate that fuel smuggling is not simply a practice conducted by 
small actors at the end of the supply chain through the movement of jerry cans on the back of a 
pickup. While such practices obviously exist, fuel smuggling operations also comprise complicit 
international companies, high level representatives of the state – civilian and military – and can 
take place in tankers at significant scale. Analysis of fuel smuggling activities in different contexts 
reveals inextricable connections with theft and exposes a range of challenges, from market 
incentives, to flaws in the governance of the oil sector, limitations to the control of formal state 
forces, and complicity of state employees in smuggling operations. It also illustrates that, for 
some segments of populations – particularly those actors who are involved in the downstream 
elements of the supply chain – smuggling provides income where few alternatives may exist. 
The lessons from attempts to curb the smuggling of petroleum products to date indicate that 
a detailed assessment of the political economy of the sector must be undertaken to understand 
who profits and how, and to explore how they might respond. The higher the penetration of 
profiteers up the supply chain, the more complex the solutions become. 
Effective strategies therefore need to be multifaceted and sequenced with other policies – 
such as cash payments to populations in return for the removal of subsidies and private sector 
development opportunities – to offset the negative impacts of curbing of such activities on key 
actors and local communities. The latter must also avoid unduly rewarding illicit activity while 
also developing a pragmatic course of action that has a realistic chance of successful im-
plementation. Finally, the transnational nature of the smuggling networks indicates that there 
will always be limits to any country-level strategy. International collaboration, and collaboration 
with neighbouring states in particular, should be made a priority.  
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OLD ROUTES, NEW RULES 
Smuggling rice in the porous borders of the Sulu, 
Celebes, and South China Sea 
Eddie L. Quitoriano   
Introduction 
This chapter explains the persistent smuggling of rice in Southeast Asia despite continued efforts 
to strengthen regulation and cross-country cooperation in monitoring and policing the porous 
borders of the region, especially those in the Sulu and Celebes Seas.1 
Rice exchanges in the region preceded the creation of international borders and the for-
mation of modern states. It formed part of the economies of the Sulu Zone that divided the 
Philippines and Malaysia and the Malacca Strait that divided Indonesia from Singapore and 
Malaysia before the Dutch, British and Spanish colonizers began to impose controls on the 
movement of people and goods (Saleeby, 1908; Trocki, 1979, 1990; Warren, 1977). 
The historical background and the geographical connections among trading posts in the 
region partly explain why the unregulated trade in rice and other food products persisted even 
after the end of World War II when the modern states of Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia 
were formed and trade pacts were inked and national laws on tariffs and customs were enacted. 
However, this explanation is not enough. 
The chapter will show why rice smuggling continues to possess traction across the various 
entrepots in the region because of at least two important factors. 
One, rice is the staple food in the region and is therefore an important barometer of food 
security. A severe fluctuation in prices caused by sudden shifts in supply or perceptions of 
scarcity is a source of instability and pressure that induces governments to consider all means 
necessary to procure rice. The stability of supply and price of this staple food, or the lack of it 
can fuel popular unrest, including rioting and targeted attacks against certain ethnic groups who 
are perceived to be hoarding supplies or involved in price gouging. As a barometer of food 
security, rice access also becomes a potent signifier of political legitimacy and authority of the 
State in countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia 
Two, the unregulated trade and exchange in rice is a socially embedded economic practice 
that has persisted for generations across the South China Sea despite the precariousness of 
supplies and the presence of highly protected markets. 
Rice smuggling is shrouded by references to the longstanding practice of “barter trade,” and 
there are deep social ties (ethnicity, religion, or otherwise) that bind certain groups and 
identities across the region. These ties were fostered by a vibrant and robust trade that existed 
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long before modern states were formed and continues to exist as one of the few surviving 
historical relics of the trade in food and other prestige goods among East, Southeast, and 
South Asia. 
The study demonstrates how the smuggling of rice is a strategic tool in ensuring food se-
curity and political legitimacy that often compels state and society to engage in actions that 
place them in alternating positions of cooperation and contestation. For example, states and 
substates in the region will agree to leverage and prioritize the stopping of terrorist contagion or 
the illegal trade in narcotic drugs and weapons rather than impose hard rules on the trade of 
food commodities, such as rice, and other non-lethal goods. 
A nuanced approach is needed at the outset when describing rice trading and the people 
involved in it. The discourse on rice smuggling often paints informal cross-border trade as a site 
of illicit, illegal, underground, and criminal entrepreneurs (Donnan & Wilson, 19992; Bonnier 
& Bonnier, 20193; Centeno & Portes, 20064). In many ports where rice is shipped or traded, 
however, the absence or non-payment of formal duties or taxes is more commonplace than one 
would expect. 
These realities explain why the research looked at rice smuggling from the perspective of 
those directly involved in it – unearthing the distinct incentives and colorful narratives that lie 
beneath the often dour and dark explanations used to explain many shadow economies. 
This chapter used an institutional and economic sociological approach to explore and ex-
amine the formal and informal rule systems and social relationships that surround the trade in 
rice. It showed how rice smuggling is an “instituted economy,” or an economy embedded in 
social relations, where market prices do not constitute the sole determinant of the commodity’s 
production, consumption, and exchange processes (Polanyi, 1944/1957: 60). The notion that 
smuggling is merely a disruption of reigning institutions or rule-systems ignores the many 
political, social, and cultural aspects that shape and are shaped by rice markets in Southeast Asia. 
We begin with an assessment of an historically vibrant trade in rice across Southeast Asia, 
sourced from records and narratives of cross-border trade and the associated benefits, risks, and 
conflicts surrounding rice smuggling. A case study of cross-border trade between the provinces 
of Tawi-Tawi, Philippines and Sabah, Malaysia across the Sulu Sea is employed to train the 
spotlight on the impervious norms and practices that continue to shape the smuggling of food 
commodities such as rice across regional borders. 
The study utilized “trialogues” and in-depth interviews with both formal and shadow au-
thorities, together with scoping visits to various trading posts in the Sulu Sea.5 Empirical data is 
also drawn from extended conversations with consumers, traders, seafarers, financiers, local 
government officials and political elites, policemen and former rebels. 
Finally, the author went on maritime scoping visits to numerous ports on a kumpit vessel 
starting from Zamboanga and going to Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and finally Sabah and back, to observe 
both legal and illegal cross-border activities.6 These voyages provided the rich and graphic 
evidence that showed the impervious multi-layered exchanges and ties that stretched across the 
Muslim-dominated and rice-consuming entrepots of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia in 
Southeast Asia. 
Rice security as food security and political legitimacy 
Scarcities and price spikes promote images of hunger and impoverishment that put into 
question the government’s right to rule. States and societies have been in turmoil every time 
rice prices spike and domestic supplies dip. The African food riots in 2008 (affecting 
Mozambique, Egypt and Morocco) were a result of the 2007–2008 international rice price crisis 
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(Omar et al., 2019). The 1997–1998 food riots in Indonesia were a result of the decline in 
supply of rice (and soybeans) and debilitating impact of the financial crisis (Mukherjee and 
Koren, 2019). So too were the large-scale riots in Pakistan in 1986, 2001, 2002 and 
2007 (ibid.). 
In all these riots, food insecurity became a clarion call to question and resist the incumbent 
states’ right to rule. Governments would respond by quickly distributing reserves if these were 
available or by hastily importing rice. Sometimes the government would turn violent and find a 
scapegoat for the miseries facing their population. 
In 1998, the Suharto regime tried to deflect blame by scapegoating and helping fan Muslim 
hatred against the ethnic Chinese. He ultimately failed and fell, but not before instigating 
bloody attacks and reprisals against ethnic Chinese traders (Indonesia Alert, February 18, 
1998).7 In Pakistan, the Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf regimes responded with killings and arrests 
that rallied citizens to the opposition.8 In the Philippines, the price of rice has been found to be 
a significant determinant in presidential election results since the 1950s and well into the 2000s, 
and has led to the ejection of top government officials who were at the helm of agricultural 
bureaucracies when a rice crisis struck (Intal and Garcia, 2008). 
In sum, governments are fearful of the potential tensions and violent flashpoints that may 
occur if access to rice is hampered by supply shortages and the consequent spikes in prices. This 
dilemma underscores why the smuggling of rice may be considered politically feasible and 
expedient if a tightening of supplies emerges. 
The dynamics of rice supply and smuggling behavior 
Underlying the rhetoric of globalization and a borderless world are tensions and conflicts de-
rived from the rigidity of political borders despite the dynamism of economic cooperation and 
social interdependence, especially in staple food products such as rice that projects food security 
across the region.9 
The global rice market is a thin, segmented, and imperfect market with a limited number of 
buyers and sellers, with unpredictable levels and sources of demand, leading to instability and 
uncertainty (Roche, 1992: 1–2). There are an estimated 110 countries that produce rice, but 
only a few participate in the export market and only 6.3% of global rice production is traded 
internationally. 
Ninety percent of global supply is now produced and consumed in Asia (Hossain and 
Narciso, 2004). Southeast Asia stands at the center of the global rice economy, contributing 
39.9% of global exports in 2016 (Omar et al., 2019: 5). Exporters include Thailand, Vietnam, 
India, the United States, China, Pakistan, Australia, Italy, Uruguay, Argentina., Egypt and Spain 
and the first five control 75% of the market (Hossain and Narciso, 2004). Among the five, 
Thailand controls 30% of the market (ibid.). 
Critical studies about the fragility of supplies first emerged in 1992, when 98% of 354.46 
million Metric Tons (MT) of global supply was consumed in their respective countries of 
production. Only about 12.89 million MT (3.6%) was exported, while 12.34 million MT 
(3.4%) were imported (Roche, 1992: 148). 
With fragile supplies, the general tendency of rice-producing countries is to secure domestic 
output for their own populations and rely on imports to offset deficiencies in domestic supply. 
Herein lies the challenge: how can this strategy work in a market beset with uncertainty, 
complexity, and unbridled competition, and in a situation where global rice supplies are 
unreliable? 
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The challenge was underlined in the 2007–2008 rice crisis when only 7% of the 432.6 
million MT global output was traded in international markets (Manzano and Prado, 2014). The 
corresponding price shock saw global prices rising from US$335 to US$1,000 per MT between 
April 2007 and October 2008 (ibid.). It also induced the sort of “beggar thy neighbor policies” 
that permitted rice to be smuggled under the gaze of national states and substates. In some 
provinces of the southern Philippines, smuggled rice flooded local markets with very little state 
intervention and interdiction. In Sabah and other parts of Malaysia, rice that was imported from 
Vietnam and Thailand found its way into Philippine markets. 
The Philippines modified its policies on importation and allocated 200,000 MT for private 
sector importation from a total of 2.2 million MT imported (Briones and De la Pena, 2015). 
During the period, Philippine rice imports comprised 7% of the total supply traded in the 
international market. Meanwhile, Malaysia responded to the 2008 rice crisis with a knee-jerk 
reaction to increase the national stockpile threefold, from 92,000 MT to 292,000 MT, also by 
importation (Omar et al., 2019: 150). 
Malaysia and the Philippines are net importers of rice. They belong to the top ten countries 
that are dependent on imports. Their 2019 rice trade deficits were worth US$441.9 million and 
US$1 billion, respectively.10 Their import partners from Southeast Asia – Thailand, Vietnam, 
Myanmar and Cambodia – belong to the top ten highest rice export gainers during the same 
year.11 Thailand alone gained US$4.2 billion in rice export revenues during the year.12” 
A perennial problem on the Philippine side is rice smuggling, with milled rice being the top 
agricultural product being smuggled (Lantican & Ani, 2020). An estimated US$1.96 billion 
worth of milled rice was smuggled to the country between 1986 to 2009 (Alano, 1984). The 
phenomenon is not completely outside the law. Lantican & Ani (ibid.) show consistent dis-
crepancy of exporting country reports and reports of the Philippine Bureau of Customs 
averaging 23.3% underreporting during the 2004–2016 period. 
During the pre-election year rice crisis in 2018, the Philippine Secretary of Agriculture even 
proposed the “legalization of rice smugglers” to appease angry publics and recover foregone 
revenues in the form of “tara” (bribe money) to corrupt government officials (Business World 
Online, August 29, 2018). The “tara” referred to by the Secretary was generated from an 
estimated PHP 2 billion (roughly US$40 million) in avoided rice import tariffs in the maritime 
trade between southern Philippines and Sabah during the third quarter of 2018. 
The Philippines and Malaysia offer helpful comparisons in assessing the dynamics of rice 
supplies and how they shape smuggling behavior. Both countries are net importers of rice. 
Domestic output is traded in-country and supply is stabilized with strong control measures and 
devices. Exposure in the international rice market is mainly used to offset shortfalls in domestic 
supply and ensure availability of buffer stock. 
We also need to change our views about the so-called illegality of rice smuggling in this 
porous border. Traders do not perceive their actions as illegal. When rents are paid, these pay- 
offs land in the pockets of the same “law enforcers” or customs agents that are supposed to 
enforce trade laws. 
There is a legal loophole that allows customs officials to look the other way. The Philippine 
Anti-Agricultural Smuggling Act of 2016 declares large-scale smuggling as economic sabotage 
or a high crime. However, it is lenient on rice smuggling while harsh on other agricultural 
products. A smuggler of onions, sugar, corn, pork, poultry, carrots or fish could be considered a 
saboteur if the Customs valuation of the intercepted goods is PHP 1 million (US$19,700). One 
has to smuggle PHP 10 million worth of rice (US$197,055), or ten times as much, to be 
considered a saboteur. 
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Most of the traders involved are thousands of small women merchant-buyers who partake of 
the income and benefits to be derived from a coping or survival economy. The view that the 
smuggling of rice is violent and operates below the pale of the law is undermined in the porous 
borders of the Sulu Sea where rice smugglers often conduct their business aboveground and in 
an orderly and non-violent manner – under the noses of State regulators who partake of the 
“taxes” and “duties” paid to them.13 
These factors point to a critical yet seldom acknowledged fact; i.e., that the porous maritime 
borders of Southeast Asia represent a de-facto free trade zone in rice. 
Rice smuggling in regional and historical perspectives 
The maritime border between the Philippines and Malaysia used to be a robust international 
“free trade zone” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Warren, 1977; Warren, 2011). 
Various commodities were traded, including food products and prestige goods that extended as 
far as Indonesia, Thailand, China, and India. Goods were not “smuggled,” because no duties 
were expected to be paid for selling and buying rice. In fact, the unfettered traditional trade and 
exchange of goods across the Sulu Sea became bounded only in the post-colonial period when 
the legal and normative beginnings of the crime of “smuggling” became prominent between 
the Philippines, Sabah, and the bigger Federation of Malaya and Indonesia. 
In 1967, the Philippines and Malaysia signed an anti-smuggling pact specifically to regulate 
trade in rice and other commodities between the Philippines and Sabah.14 The agreement 
provided for the placement of Philippine customs stations in Sandakan, Semporna and Kota 
Kinabalu and free movement of people residing in border areas.15 The protocol to the 
agreement defined the border areas: the Sabah administrative districts of Sandakan, Lahad Datu, 
Semporna, Kudat and Tawau on the Malaysian side and the Province of Sulu and the Balabac 
Island Group including Palawan Province on the Philippine side.16 People living in the border 
areas could move freely for business, social visits and pleasure with the mere carriage of a two- 
week border pass and without need of a passport. 
However, cooperation against smuggling dwindled less than a year the signing of the anti- 
smuggling pact. Diplomatic relations between the two countries soured in 1968 when the 
Philippine government passed Republic Act No. 5446 that referred to Sabah as part of 
Philippine territory.17 
Nevertheless, the peoples of Sabah and southern Philippines continued to engage in trade 
and social visits. The salience of trust and the role of traditional social networks such as the 
Muslim clans and tribes on both sides of the maritime border, plus the free and robust 
movement of people and goods is manifest in the fact that cross-border trade in rice has always 
referred to the centuries-old practice of barter as reference. 
Barter as concealment of rice smuggling 
The maritime trade exchanges connecting Tawi-Tawi (Philippines) and Sabah (Malaysia) is one 
such arena where traditional norms governing the exchange of goods and ethnic ties were being 
reformed in the post-colonial period. The traditional exchange of goods was redefined as 
smuggling and the nurturing of ethnic ties as illegal immigration. Only the traditional and 
embedded practice of barter survived the changes in trade rules – remaining as a social practice 
that is mutually recognized by both the Philippines and Malaysia.18 
The practice of barter trade is context specific and geographically situated. In Sabah, rice 
exports to Southern Philippines used the language of barter even when it was enabled by the 
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trans-shipment of rice from Vietnam or Thailand. In short, the incoherence and inconsistency 
in rules governing barter trade facilitates the illicit trade in rice. The conclusion that one gets is 
that barter really constitutes just one of many transactions that masks the smuggling of rice into 
different borders. This thesis is buttressed too by the formidable requirements for regulating 
frontier areas governed by traditional rules and practices. 
The shared maritime borders among the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia are two ad-
jacent seas, the Celebes and Sulu seas, that encompass 210,000 square miles. It forms part of the 
global trade route. It is difficult to control not only because of its size, but also because of the 
thousands of ocean-going vessels plying the route.19 The eastern coast of Sabah, particularly, 
Sandakan, Lahad Datu, Semporna and Tawi – is a maze of coral reefs, sandbars, mudflats, shoals 
and submerged rocks that is more suitable for small craft of seafarers with local knowledge than 
large-scale amphibious operations (CIA, 1969). 
Although wooden-hull trading vessels are no longer registered for import trading and 
permitted to cross international waters, they continue to carry rice and other commodities 
across the Sulu Sea from the ports of Sandakan and Tawau (in Sabah) to the Chinese pier in 
Bongao and other island municipalities of Tawi-Tawi.20 Upon docking, Tausug crew watch 
over Sama laborers climbing up and down the wooden ladders to unload sacks of rice and boxes 
of cigarettes, cooking oil, sugar, kari noodles and other foodstuffs to the backsides of a row of 
apartments that double up as bodegas (small warehouses) and wholesale stores. Most of these are 
owned by Chinese merchants, for whom the pier is named. 
Alongside the trading vessels are passenger liners ready to load people and cargo for travel 
and distribution to the islands while hundreds of smaller boats carry, retail packs of rice, 
noodles, gasoline in family-size bottles of soft drinks, sugar, cooking oil and other stuffs for 
redistribution to retail stores on stilts or in the small islands nearby. On the other side of the 
piers are public markets where smaller stores and hawkers retail the same goods to consumers. 
Rice smuggling as an instituted economy21 
The rice economy is instituted with cultural symbols and embedded social networks and the 
smuggling of rice continues to be carried out using the language and practices of traditional 
barter traders in Sabah and Tawau in Malaysia, Tarakan in Indonesia, and Tawi-Tawi and Sulu 
in the southern Philippines. 
Transactions include reciprocal exchanges and redistributive arrangements, i.e., prices were 
not solely defined by supply and demand, and arrangements allowed discounts for the poor, the 
disabled, victims of natural and man-made calamities, and others. Barter trade helped to thicken 
social capital relations and nurture kinship ties across the seas. It helped establish life-long 
relationships especially between women traders who were unified by one religion despite their 
different nationalities and tribes. This agreement held the strongest traction in the case of rice. 
For example, the 40-member Karandahan Association of Tawi-Tawi is a group of Sama 
small traders who are directly involved in the import and retail of rice, oil, fuel, flour and sugar. 
Their ethnic configuration is designed to secure economic space for the Sama without clashing 
with the interests of big Tausug and Chinese traders. They helped lubricate the kinship relations 
of members with those in Sabah and Indonesia without completely isolating themselves from 
the wider economic field. 
Working more broadly with other economic actors motivated Karandahan to become part 
of the Filipino Muslim Traders Association and the wider and multi-ethnic BIZNET of the 
Tawi-Tawi Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The wider network enabled them to identity 
export markets in Sabah and Indonesia. A similar dynamic occurred across the sea in Sabah 
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where the traditional Tausug, Sama and Sabahan traders joined the formal groupings and in-
stitutions registered with the Sabah State Ministry of Finance. 
Many people from Sulu had relatives living and working in Sabah and other adjacent 
Malaysian and Indonesian provinces and vice-versa. Inter-marriages among Malaysians, 
Filipinos, and Indonesians were not uncommon, especially among merchants and traders. 
Kinship ties and traditions among the Tausug, Sama, and Bajau took root amidst the shared 
religion and practices of Islam, and especially in the pursuit of customs, celebrations, and fes-
tivals that were woven into the trade relationships that bound residents of multiple outposts. 
It was clear that the artificial territorial limitations that were imposed following the for-
mation of modern states modified the nature of traditional trading but did not end it. The effort 
to divide ethnic peoples into different nationalities did not likewise deter traditional links and 
relationships (Chouvy, 2013: 8, 10, 11). 
When Sabah was still part of the Sulu Sultanate, the Tausug and Sama Bajau who crisscrossed 
the Sulu Sea to barter or engage in various exchange of goods and the maintenance of social and 
ethnic ties did not consider themselves either Filipinos or Malaysians. Even today, the Bajau, 
largest ethnic group in Sabah, and the Sama Bajau of Southern Philippines pay no heed to the 
notion of national borders (Rabasa and Chalk, 2012: 1, 2). 
We can better understand the dynamics behind the legal and illegal cross-border trade in rice 
that is nested in practices and traditions by travelling from Tawi-Tawi to Sabah and back. 
Tawi-Tawi to Sabah and back: the cross-border trade in rice 
The smuggling of rice between Malaysia and southern Philippines is a mix of small-scale 
procurements of rice and other foodstuffs from Sabah by barter traders from Tawi-Tawi and 
Sulu and large-scale rice smuggling by Manila-based big firms. Like the Philippines, the pro-
minent role of Malaysia in rice exporting, despite the shared lack of rice surpluses is cause for 
serious attention. Both countries appear to function as the providers of international free ports 
and trans-shipment facilities that bigtime smugglers can use for their Southeast Asian rice 
trading operations. 
Traveling in the Sulu Sea to scope the legal and illegal transit of rice and other commodities 
gives any observer a front-row seat into the intricacies of the rice trade and an insight into the 
sophistication of its participants, especially the women-merchant traders coming from all the 
ports across the Sulu Sea. 
Behind the surge of large-scale smuggling and away from the headlines of news dailies is the 
regularity of cross-border trading between Tawi-Tawi and Sabah. While Zamboanga City 
serves as a conduit for large-scale smuggling and redistribution to the national capital, Bongao, 
the capital of Tawi-Tawi, serves as the nexus for the redistribution of smuggled rice into the 
islands, including those Malaysian islands close to Tawi-Tawi. 
Tawi-Tawi traders procure rice from registered barter traders in Sabah and procure supplies 
from the ports of Sandakan and Tawau. The smuggled rice is then brought to Bongao, which is 
the locus of a highly organized smuggling supply chain. From Bongao, rice is procured by 
merchant-traders, many of whom are women entrepreneurs who pool their capital to buy in 
the barter trade markets for immediate redistribution to local consumers. This system is different 
from that of large-scale smugglers using the same transhipment node, transferring the smuggled 
rice to private wharfs and warehouses in Zamboanga City before re-transporting them to large 
markets in the National Capital Region. 
Rice is brought to Tawi-Tawi, not hidden in containers nor mixed with other goods; it is 
out in the open or brought in with fake invoices. Everyone knows that the legal documents are 
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flawed and that the data on rice volumes and prices are all faked, but everyone joins in per-
forming a charade where people know each other, yet engage each other as if they were 
strangers in serious negotiation with state officials. The entire scene looked serious enough to 
secure a sense of formality, but in the end, you knew that each one has done this regularly, 
like buying and selling rice and other food stuffs next door, as they had done for centuries. 
Some traders sign the Informal Import Declaration and Entry Form22 and pay nominal fees 
while most others do not. No government agency in Tawi-Tawi is monitoring the volume and 
value of rice imports. 
Cross-border rice trading between Sabah and Tawi-Tawi is really about the importation of 
rice from Sabah, and the export of a few commodities from the Philippines. Other com-
modities, such as copra, seaweed and fishes are rarely on the list because both ports produce 
ample supplies of each. Although both are deficient in rice production, Sabah is a beneficiary of 
leaked trans-shipped rice from Vietnam and Thailand, which in turn is re-exported and 
smuggled into the Philippines.23 
As has been in the past, rice insufficiency is a key driver in the cross-border importation to 
Tawi-Tawi. The nearest and most practical source is Sabah. A trialogue with three smugglers 
and a discussion with other traders revealed that there were at least 300 wooden-hull vessels 
operating in the Zamboanga, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi areas.24 Currently, there are 15 trading 
vessels operating from Bongao, the capital town of the province that are owned by traders who 
acquired knowledge and expertise from their parents and the parents before them.25 The vessel 
count does not include wooden-hull vessels of lower tonnage that ferry passengers and cargoes 
of dried seaweed and dried fish between islands. 
Wooden-hull boats from Bongao are engaged in passenger line operations to major islands of 
the province and tramp line freight operations in cross-border trade with Sabah.26 Traders- 
shippers from Bongao enter into contractual agreement with barter traders-suppliers in Sabah. 
Before the Malaysian ban on rice transhipment in late 2018, a hundred boats take off from 
Sabah each month, exporting rice worth RM 600,000 (roughly, US$140,000) and other 
supplies such as sugar, flour and cigarettes worth RM 300,000 (roughly US$70,000) per boat 
(Borneo Post, January 6, 2019).27 Bongao traders usually mobilize PHP 10 to 12 million of 
capital (roughly, US$200,000–240,000) for each trading run of break-bulk cargo consisting of 
rice, noodles, cooking oil, cigarettes and other stuffs. 
Cross-border trading is a pooled endeavor involving the vessel owner and his crew, plus the 
politicians, policemen, teachers, entrepreneurs, and other stakeholders that are either on board 
the vessel or invested heavily in its cargo. Capital is raised among interested parties who can put 
up at least PHP 40,000 to PHP 50,000 per trip, for a total of at least PHP3–5 million per trip. 
Purchase capital is electronically transmitted in advance by pawnshops doubling as remittance 
centers in Bongao in close coordination with remittance centers in Sabah. 
The entire enterprise relies on high levels of trust – in the safety of the vessel, the protection 
of its passengers, and the guaranteed return on investments. Actual trading is highly capitalized 
and the risks are shared by everyone on board, in varying scales, according to each one’s 
capacity and resources. Passengers on the vessel are joined by rice resellers in wholesale markets, 
other small boat owners, and a few port loaders. 
All smuggled goods are declared as “barter” goods. In addition to bulk cargo on wooden- 
hulled freight vessels, small-scale smuggled goods are brought back by passengers on liner vessels 
or by small traders from outlying islands nearest to Sabah such as Sitangkai and Sibutu (closest to 
Semporna, Lahad Datu and Tawau) or Cagayan de Sulu (closest to Sandakan). Landed costs and 
domestic retail prices are low because of avoided tariffs while boat owners and trip organizers 
shield the “investors” from administrative costs and rents accruing to customs officials. 
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The entire trip is a chance to witness the longstanding ethnic ties between the Bajaus, largest 
ethnic group in Sabah, and the Sama Bajau of the Southern Philippines who both pay little heed 
to national borders. According to a Sama Bajau trader interviewed on board the vessel, the 
Sama Bajau in the eastern parts of Indonesia, Eastern Sabah and Southern Philippines are really 
engrossed with rice because it is seen as the most important agricultural crop.28 Buwas kuning 
(yellow rice29) is an indispensable part of the pag-omboh (giving food to dead ancestors) and mag- 
omboh (annual rice ritual), which are mandatory and believed to be the means of protecting 
families from curses (Hussin, 2019). The preparation of buwas kuning itself is socially significant 
and is often accompanied by deeds of sharing and family reunions. 
It was also a chance to recognize the unifying force of a single religious identity in the 
dominant Islamic religion of citizens in both Tawi-Tawi and Sabah. Like other Muslims, the 
abject conditions brought by natural or man-made calamities, where the hoarding of goods and 
the monopoly of scarce resources is a kneejerk response, was universally scorned by all the 
respondents aboard the ship. They claimed that the admonitions in the Qu’ran and the Hadith 
prevented that kind of behavior. They are jovial and generous and each one partakes of one 
another’s food. 
There is indeed some symmetry in the practices of Asian peoples where rice is not only a 
cereal for basic sustenance but is also woven into social, religious, and cultural fabric of life. In 
one conversation the author heard of the many different ways to cook and process rice, in-
cluding the rituals and festivals that accompanied these processes. Rice also played a prominent 
role in marriage ceremonies in both Sabah and Tawi-Tawi. Finally, for the Ibans of Sarawak, 
rice is central to their ancestors, and the author was fortunate to have joined a weeklong rice 
festival when communities from other Rumahs joined the celebration. 
Conclusion 
The smuggling of rice persists despite continued efforts to strengthen regulation and cross- 
country cooperation in monitoring and policing the porous borders of the Sulu Sea, because of 
the convergence of economic and social incentives and motivations among those involved in 
smuggling – whether as perpetrators or regulators. Rice smuggling, as we have seen, is com-
munity driven and founded upon a long-standing tradition of barter trade and reciprocal food 
security, ring-fenced from criminal activity and contributive to political and economic stability. 
Rice smuggling is not only an informal economy, but also an economic arrangement that 
straddles different sets of institutions: legal and illegal; formal and informal; aboveground and 
underground. Across the porous borders of Southeast Asia where rice is traded, we see actors 
wearing different hats – as enforcers and facilitators or as formal and shadow authorities who 
possess legitimacy and authority. 
Illicit cross-border trade of rice and other goods between the Tawi-Tawi, Philippines and 
Sabah, Malaysia has persisted because it is protected from coercive strategies by multiple layers 
of stakeholders that benefit from the trade. They include the extended families, clans, and tribes 
that are settled in the various ports across the Sulu Sea, the women trader-entrepreneurs who 
travel regularly to Sabah and vice-versa to buy supplies that they can sell, the shadowy au-
thorities involved in the importation and exportation of other illicit goods that can be shipped 
and disguised as rice shipments, the formal authorities who collect the rents in numerous 
tollgates, and the armed groups and terror networks, engaged in kidnap-for-ransom and human 
trafficking, that are able to wreak havoc in this loosely monitored and unguarded part of 
Southeast Asia. 
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Finally, there are the traders themselves who want to prevent the same racist idioms and 
targeted attacks waged by various publics against their families and enterprises in times of rice 
scarcity and price instability. Food rioting is a frightening experience that has occurred in both 
Indonesia and Malaysia, and the attacks and looting of granaries are a particular phenomenon in 
the Philippines. In all these cases, the indigenous Chinese traders have borne the brunt of 
attacks on their lives and properties. 
This continued smuggling of rice is anchored on a paradox: it is a staple food in Malaysia and 
the Philippines. While both countries have an incentive to ensure stable supplies and the ab-
sence of severe price fluctuations, the same rice smuggling can lead to prices that can disrupt 
incentives for producers in both countries to produce rice sufficiently. This interaction will 
create perpetual tensions and place both the state and social forces into situations where they 
will alternately collide or cooperate to avoid a prolonged food crisis where “rice nationalism” 
may emerge and threaten food security over the long term. 
This chapter presented counter-intuitive findings that broke some myths about how this 
informal economy is viewed. The social networks that operate beneath the radar to sustain 
smuggling activities underscore the rule-systems that people find important in an economy 
embedded in their traditions and social relations. 
We have seen how food security is a legitimate social aspiration that cannot be barred by 
restrictions, legal or otherwise. It is crucial for the legitimacy, authority, and the longevity of an 
existing regime, and will remain an overarching objective that needs to be fulfilled. 
We have also seen the impervious nature of the barter system as the language of compromise 
between rice smugglers and legal authorities on both sides of the Sulu Sea. When barter is 
evoked, everything falls in place – the tolerance, the higgling and haggling, the settlement, and 
finally, the payments that illustrate the huge revenues that are lost from government coffers. 
Because of this institutionalized process, the BIMP-EAGA aim to formalize the barter trade will 
not work.30 
In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that the reigning frameworks used in the conduct 
of informal economy studies must shift from the formal–informal and legal–illegal dichotomies 
into a new framework that illustrates and reveals the seamlessness between two systems that 
interact regularly. Rice smuggling is, after all, an economic, social, and political arrangement 
that straddles different sets of institutions: legal and illegal; formal and informal; and above-
ground and underground. 
Notes  
1 The Sulu and Celebes seas are on the southern tip of the Philippines flanking the Sulu Archipelago on 
the southwest and southeast. Both seas were the sites of the seventeenth–eighteenth-century robust 
international trade in what Warren (1977, 2011) called the Sulu Zone. They served as borderless 
maritime bridges among peoples in the Celebes islands, coastal zones of North Borneo and Sulu 
Archipelago, engendering evolution of economic, social and political institutions until disrupted by the 
colonial projects of the Dutch and Portuguese in Indonesia, the British in North Borneo and the 
Spanish and Americans in the Philippines. Henceforward, new borders were created during the for-
mation of the Malaysian, Indonesian and Philippine states after World War II.  
2 Donnan and Wilson (199) argue that smuggling is an act of subversion that defy borders and, therefore, 
the state.  
3 Literature specific to rice smuggling is scarce. Bonnier and Bonnier (2019) cite that organized crime 
plays a major role in the illicit trade of agri-food products (in general) and that the same trade de-
stabilizes food security, subsidizes wider criminal activity and threaten political and economic stability.  
4 Centeno and Portes (2006) argue that the relationship between the state and informal economy actors 
is theoretically and inevitably conflictive given state assertion of monopoly of authority and, on the 
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other, propensity of informal economy actors to subvert that authority. However, within that an-
tithesis of state power and informality is the practical devolution of such conflict into various forms of 
accommodation. 
5 Trialogues are mediated dialogues where a third-party participates in an in-depth interview or con-
versation to build trust and mediate the discussion of delicate and controversial issues that may surface. 
These are often used in interview sessions where the presence of a third-party trusted by the re-
spondent enables the sharing of confidential information.  
6 The kumpit is a seagoing trading vessel that can carry about 500 metric tons of rice and other 
commodities across the Sulu Sea to various ports in Malaysia and Indonesia.  
7 The move echoes the anti-Chinese riots in 1965 when the Indonesian military accused ethnic Chinese 
as the fifth column of the Chinese Communist Party (Indonesia Alert, ibid.).  
8 It is estimated that 1600–2000 people were killed and 15,000 arrested during the violent response of 
the Zia ul-Haq regime in 1986 (Mukherjee and Koren, 2019).  
9 See Hurrell (2003). International Law and the Making and Unmaking of Boundaries, in Moore, M. 
and A. Buchanan. (eds.). (2003). States, Nations and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p, 287.  
10 See: http://www.worldstopexports.com/rice-exports-country/  
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid.  
13 In her study on smuggling along the border of Cameroon and Nigeria, Niger-Thomas (2001) found 
that women traders perceived their activities as legitimate even though they recognized that they were 
still taking risks.  
14 Agreement on anti-smuggling cooperation between the government of Malaysia and the government of 
the Republic of the Philippines, September 1, 1967; from https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1967/09/ 
01/the-philippine-claim-to-a-portion-of-north-borneo-agreement-on-anti-smuggling-cooperation-be-
tween-the-government-of-malaysia-and-the-government-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines/.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Protocol to the agreement on anti-smuggling cooperation between the government of Malaysia and 




17 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, An Act to Amend Section One of Republic Act 1346, entitled: “An 
Act to define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines”. From: https:// 
www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1968/09/18/republic-act-no-5446/.  
18 Barter is very similar to what Bevan & Wengrow (2010:22) described as a bazaar economy where 
transactions involve mobilization of personal networks of loyalty and affiliation.  
19 See: Rabasa, A. and Chalk, P. (2012). Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in 
the Tri-border Area of Southeast Asia: The Coast Watch System of the Philippines. Sta. Monica, CA: 
Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_ 
OP372.pdf. From December 2010 to July 2011, 55,368 vessels were monitored.  
20 Under Philippine Maritime Industry rules (MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 73, series of 1993), 
wooden-hull vessels below 500 Gross Registered Tons may be given Temporary Special Permit on 
condition that owners also procure Manning Certificate, Cargo Ship Safety Equipment Certificate, 
Radio Station License and International Loadline Certificate (Maritime Industry Authority, 1993). 
The Maritime Industry Authority has, since 2007, suspended registration of newly acquired and newly 
built wooden-hulled ships. All ships plying overseas should be made of steel (Maritime Industry 
Authority, 2007).  
21 An instituted economy according to Polanyi (1944/1957, 60, 62,64) refers to the human economy as 
an instituted process, embedded and enmeshed in institutions or rules that may be economic or non- 
economic. Rice is an instituted economy because it is an enterprise embedded in more than just simple 
market exchanges, but also norms, motives, and values.  
22 This is the Bureau of Customs (BOC) Import Entry and Import Declaration and Entry Form 177 for 
barter traders. They cannot sign BOC Form 236 (Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration 
Form) because this form is only for registered steel-hulled vessels.  
23 In the aftermath of Philippine interception of smuggled rice from Sabah in June 2018, the Malaysian 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agri-based Industry banned transhipment in July 2018. The ban has been 
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extended since January 1, 2019 (http://www.olgn.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/7.-OL-USA- 
industry-news.pdf). In a statement to the Malaysian Parliament on 19 March 2020, Chan Foong Hin 
(MP for Kota Kinabalu) called for the lifting of the ban on the ground that not all rice transhipment 
involves smuggling (“No to total ban of rice transhipment in Sabah,” https://dapmalaysia.org/statements/2 
019/03/19/28383/). Earlier the BIMP-EAGA Business Council also lobbied for the lifting of the ban 
(https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2018/08/13/council-lift-rice-transhipment-ban/).  
24 See Nikko Fabian, “Plea to allow Kumpits when barter trade resumes,” Daily Express, July 21, 2019. 
Retrieved from: http://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news/138163/plea-to-allow-kumpits-when- 
barter-resumes/.  
25 Interview with a local trader based in Bongao, Tawi-Tawi (17 June 2020). Name and location 
withheld.  
26 See Austria, M. (2002). Philippine Domestic Shipping Industry: State of Competition and Market 
Structure, PASCN Discussion Paper No. 2002-04. Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 
Makati City. http://pascn.pids.gov.ph/DiscList/d02/s02-04.pdf. The domestic shipping transport 
industry consists of three sectors: liner, tramp and industrial carriage. New regulations prescribe that 
vessels used for international shipping should be steel-hulled, among other requirements.  
27 Roughly US$138,000 or PHP 6.9 million worth of rice based on US$ to RM and US $ to PHP 
exchange rate on 22 March 2020.  
28 Name and date withheld.  
29 White rice becomes yellow rice when mixed with dulaw (turmeric) during cooking. The practice is 
also common among Maranaw and Maguindanao Muslims in the Philippines.  
30 BIMP-EAGA stands for Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines, an ASEAN sub-regional 
cooperation system that started in 1994 and encompasses the whole of Brunei Darussalam, the provinces of 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and West Papua in Indonesia, the states of Sabah, Sarawak and federal 
territory of Labuan in Malaysia and Mindanao and the province of Palawan in the Philippines. One of the 
agendas of the sub-regional cooperation system is the revival and formalization of barter trade.  
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21 
THE INTERSECTIONS OF 
SMUGGLING FLOWS 
Annette Idler   
Introduction 
Across the world, trafficking routes are used for multiple types of goods in various directions. 
In Libya, people, arms, drugs, and contraband are smuggled on the same routes, in Myanmar, 
both human trafficking and drug trafficking takes place across the border to Thailand and 
China at the same crossings, and in Colombia, cocaine is shipped abroad via Venezuela and 
on that same route gasoline is smuggled from Venezuela into Colombia. To account for this 
interconnectedness, this chapter conceptualizes smuggling flows as illicit supply chain net-
works. These networks comprise multiple interconnected forms of transnational organized 
crime, ranging from the illicit drug trade through arms, human, and wildlife trafficking, to 
financial flows stemming from money laundering essential to all these forms of organized 
crime. Of course, not all forms of transnational organized crime have the same underlying 
logics. In the case of human trafficking, for example, the victims of the crime are not only 
those who may be forced to help traffickers, or those who are targeted because they are in the 
traffickers’ way, but also the very people that are being trafficked (see, e.g., Chapkis 2003). 
Similarly, the dimension of illegality varies. Gasoline or oil, for example, in themselves are not 
illegal, but the practice of smuggling them is. Cocaine, on the other hand, unless for medical 
use, is illegal in most circumstances already – regardless of whether it is trafficked across 
borders or not. Still, across these different logics, the networked character largely remains the 
same: it connects victimless with other types of transnational organized crime, smuggling 
flows of household goods with those of illicitly used goods, or of people, and local petty 
smugglers with large-scale global trafficking rings. 
The networks include strategic trafficking nodes, that is, illicit business hubs and starting 
points of international trafficking routes where various illicit flows converge. These intersec-
tions are the places where unscrupulous entrepreneurs, such as criminals, rebels, or corrupt 
military officials, meet to strike business deals. Rivalry over economic profit among these actors 
entails selective violence against potential and actual betrayers. Demonstrating the relevance of 
these trafficking nodes in the context of four analytical dimensions of illicit supply chain net-
works – the input-output structure, the institutional context, territoriality, and the governance 
structure – this chapter calls for moving beyond the study of individual flows in isolation. It 
suggests focusing both scholarly and policy attention on the interconnectedness of legally and 
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illegally used routes in order to grasp the social, economic, and political repercussions on the 
localities in which the flows are embedded and the people who inhabit them. 
In what follows, I briefly contextualize the interconnectedness of illicit flows historically. 
Subsequently, I conceptualize illicit supply chain networks and demonstrate how and why 
analyzing the intersections of trafficking flows is important to enhance our overall under-
standing of the illicit economy and its link to instability. 
The interconnectedness of illicit flows in historical perspective 
Illegal economic cross-border movements are historic (Friman and Andreas 1999, 1). According 
to Manuel Castells (2010, 172), “Crime is as old as humankind. Indeed, in the biblical account 
of our origins, our plight began with the illegal traffic of apples.” State formation goes back to 
illicit flows, as Charles Tilly (1985) showed on European states, and Peter Andreas (2014) on 
the United States, the “smuggler nation.” Likewise, the interconnectedness and multi- 
directional nature of illicit flows is nothing new. Syria, for example, has long been a transit 
point for drugs originating from Europe, Turkey, and Lebanon and destined for Jordan, Iraq, 
and the Persian Gulf. Local cross-border tribes and groups have engaged in trafficking livestock 
and consumer goods (and to a limited extent, drugs) between Syria and its neighbours since the 
inception of the state after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The region also features a long- 
standing tradition of looting and antiquity smuggling from archaeological sites. 
Nonetheless, the interconnectedness of illicit flows, that is, “flows of illicitly used goods or 
money, or of trafficked people” (Idler 2020, 336),1 has taken on new forms, characterized by a 
global network of transactions and exchanges that occur in an ever accelerating speed. 
How did we get there? The end of the Cold War entailed a proliferation of states with 
highly fragile regions and of what some considered “failed states” – convenient hubs for traf-
fickers to operate from (Naím 2007, 26). In countries where state capacities are weak, especially 
at the geographical margins, borders are hard to control and officials are easily corrupted (Naím 
2007, 29). These locations thus become destinations or starting points of individual flows and – 
especially if they are geostrategically significant – hubs connecting various flows that both enter 
and leave the country. Nigeria, for example, has turned into a trading hub for heroin from the 
Middle East to Europe and North America, as well as for ivory and rhino horn trafficking. 
Similarly, Haiti has become a major transit zone for cocaine trafficked from South America into 
the US, while also witnessing human trafficking from Haiti into the Dominican Republic. 
The Cold War’s end, together with the acceleration of globalization in the 1990s, also 
brought about important changes in the global economy. When the Iron Curtain fell in 1991, 
both licit and illicit trade expanded across states formerly belonging to the East and West blocs 
respectively. These economic activities benefitted from more interdependent and expanded 
markets, fewer border checks, and the privatization of state property in the former East bloc, 
including military hardware. Economic liberalization and increased financial mobility in an 
increasingly globalized world further consolidated the interconnectedness of different illicit 
flows (Andreas 2003; see also Lexico Oxford Dictionary 2020). Enhanced communication and 
information technologies as well as transportation infrastructures in the 1990s expanded the 
networks of flows that came to span entire continents. Global illicit networks transformed into 
less centralized webs of transactions (Naím 2007, 227): just as in the global licit economy, 
where companies source, formulate, and assemble globally, smugglers exchange and enhance 
illicit products globally. Financial liberalization allowed smugglers to make their transactions less 
traceable than ever before. Smugglers can break down large cashless financial flows into 
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different parts with different networks financing each part, sometimes without knowing who 
else is involved. 
In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the pace at which information spreads 
accelerated further, which contributed, in part, to three trends that favour the inter-
connectedness of illicit flows. First, violent non-state groups have proliferated with more new 
groups having formed in the past ten years or so than over the past six decades together. Second, 
these groups operate increasingly transnationally. At its height, the so-called Islamic State (IS), 
for example, declared provinces in ten different countries. Third, relatively easy and instant 
access to information has changed patterns of mobilization, propaganda, and recruitment with 
social media quickly reaching individuals far away from the physical location of the respective 
group. These trends have boosted the interconnectedness of illicit flows because they facilitate 
dynamic links among groups: in Syria and neighbouring countries, those labelled terrorists such 
as IS engage in spot sales with arms or ammunition dealers (Solomon 2015); in the Central 
Mediterranean, human smugglers work with Libyan militias (Micallef and Reitano 2017); in 
South America, left-wing guerrillas cooperate with Mexican drug cartels (Idler 2019); and, 
globally, organized criminals subcontract hackers (EUROPOL 2018, 15–24). Overall, through 
these developments, the scope of the activities belonging to the “Other Side of Globalization” 
(Abraham and Schendel 2005, 4) has expanded: global networks supersede local smugglers, 
common criminals join transnational terrorists, and chains of illegal drug, human, or weapons 
trafficking expand past regions to extend across continents (Deville 2013, 63). 
State regulation, law enforcement, and political awareness of illegal economic cross-border 
activities have changed also (Andreas 2009, 15). Realists stress borders’ function of delineating 
territorial sovereignty, and globalists argue that growing global interdependence has made 
borders progressively less relevant due to a continuing de-territorialization (Brenner 1999, 
60–67) that has led to a “borderless world” (Ōmae 1990). Accordingly, globalization would 
have transformed borders into “bridges for commercial transactions rather than economic 
barriers and fortified military lines” (Andreas 2003, 83). However, analyzing the inter-
connectedness of illicit flows confirms that, rather, “geopolitics is transformed, not trans-
cended” (Andreas 2003, 108). As Clunan and Trinkunas (2010, 9) put it, “asymmetries in states’ 
taxation and regulation in a world of globalized demand create the incentives for engaging in 
‘jurisdictional arbitrage’ in the form of smuggling and trafficking." While border controls have 
become stricter through sophisticated intelligence and surveillance technologies, these same 
technologies enable those who evade the law to circumvent controls and adapt to changing 
market conditions. More border control to curb such activities may be counterproductive: the 
greater the risk associated with the illegal enterprise, the higher the profits and hence the 
incentives to engage in it (Schendel 2005, 59). 
Against this backdrop, illicit entrepreneurs take advantage of the bureaucratic constraints, if 
not inertia, of law enforcement authorities to benefit from new technologies. They quietly 
expand and consolidate global illicit supply chain networks that slowly pervade the entire in-
ternational system, comprising both state and non-state actors such as non-governmental or-
ganizations or the private sector with the international community hardly noticing it. The 
transformative power of online illicit marketplaces, also called cryptomarkets, illustrates this 
well. The now defunct Silk Road for example, a website that operated on an encrypted part of 
the internet, the TOR network, also known as the “Dark Net” or “Dark Web,” used to 
facilitate the illicit trade of drugs (Martin 2014; see also Lusthaus 2013). Both buyers and sellers 
benefitted from anonymity provided by this “cyber-assisted” crime.2 By facilitating direct 
online exchange, global networks become more efficient and harder to trace as intermediaries 
and traffickers at times become superfluous. These are the actors that may resort to violence to 
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achieve their ends, hence the decrease in physical transactions can also lower the chance of 
spectacular violence. While this may seem a positive “side-effect,” the consequence is also 
concerning: being increasingly managed and controlled in non-physical space, these illicit 
supply chain networks have the potential to erode the international system from within by 
penetrating its structures without triggering violent conflict that would alert the system’s de-
fenders (Idler 2017). 
The complexity of these illicit operations makes them less noticeable to the international 
community than large geopolitical shocks, but in no way less significant. From the corruption 
of state officials and others due to the lack of control mechanisms to the alienation of com-
munities from central states as a result, the possibility of shifting operations to cyberspace has 
opened opportunities to actors involved in interconnected illicit flows that we are only be-
ginning to understand. 
Illicit supply chain networks – the intersections of illicit flows 
Drawing on Idler (2020, 339–42), I now conceptualize interconnected illicit flows as illicit 
supply chain networks (Deville 2013, 65).3 A “supply chain, a complex network of organi-
zations and facilities which are mostly settled in a vast geographical area or even the globe, 
synchronizes a series of interrelated activities through the network” (Govindan, Fattahi, and 
Keyvanshokooh 2017, 119; see also Christopher 1998). Supply chain networks are commonly 
analyzed along four dimensions: (i) input-output structure; (ii) territoriality; (iii) institutional 
context; and (iii) governance structure (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Bair 2005). As I show 
with examples from across the globe, analyzing illicit supply chain networks along these four 
dimensions sheds light on the nature and implications of the intersections of illicit flows. 
i Input-output structure 
Illicit supply chain networks that concern goods that need to be processed (as opposed to flows 
of people for example) can be analyzed according to their input-output structure. “A [supply 
chain] network converts raw materials into final products and then delivers them to customers. 
It includes various types of facilities, and each type plays a specific task in the network” 
(Govindan, Fattahi, and Keyvanshokooh 2017, 112). Given that various illicit supply chains are 
interconnected, this process manifests a networked character.4 
In the illicit supply chain networks of cocaine or heroin, for example, the main supply chain 
begins with production activities: resource extraction (that is, coca or opium poppy cultivation 
and harvesting), and the processing of the raw material into the final product (processing coca 
leaves into coca paste and coca paste into cocaine, or processing opium poppy into opium, then 
morphine, and then heroin). The supply chain continues with three further interrelated ac-
tivities: the actors involved transport the good domestically, traffic it internationally, and dis-
tribute it in markets. This supply chain intersects with supply chains of goods that are added to 
process the raw material into the final product, including gasoline (in the case of cocaine 
production) and chemical precursors (such as acetic anhydride to process morphine into heroin) 
(European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol 2019). 
The flow of cocaine, heroin, or any other illicitly produced good intersects with flows of 
other goods. Illicitly used drugs are, for example, exchanged in as drugs-for-arms deals. Such 
barter agreements have included small and light arms but also advanced military-grade weapons 
such as surface-to-air missiles (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and 
Europol 2019). Other types of barter agreements involve ammunitions, counterfeit medicines, 
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or humans; for example, kidnapped hostages or trafficked people may be exchanged for illicit 
goods through barter agreements. Criminals and other violent non-state groups often strike 
such business deals via intermediaries. These illicit flows intersects with flows of money (profits 
from sales of the illicitly produced goods) that the groups launder to redirect it into the licit 
economy (see e.g., Abraham and Schendel, 2005; Deville 2013). These intersections form the 
nodes of the trafficking routes. On the market side, international traffickers typically liaise with 
local dealers who distribute the illicit good among consumers or other types of clients. 
Figure 21.1 illustrates the illicit supply chain networks. 
Analyzing illicit supply chain networks in line with their input-output structure sheds light 
on the expertise that is necessary to coordinate and connect various flows. The police com-
mander of a Colombian town in a region highly affected by cocaine trafficking and inter-
connected flows of gasoline, arms, people, and chemical precursors described this the following 
way to me during one of my fieldwork trips to the region: 
We often hear about the term “route.” Delinquents even sell routes. In the criminal 
sphere, when they say that the Rastrojos [a Colombian right-wing violent non-state 
group] sell a route, what they really sell is the logistics chain of the business. This 
includes the know-know, information on how it works, and who is involved. They 
say: ‘Look, I know who is producing, who has land to produce coca. I know how the 
precursors enter this sector and I have the contact. I know where the laboratories are 
and who is able to process the coca leaves into coca base and then the coca base into 
cocaine. It includes the entire procedure. I know where we can store the cocaine. I 
know with whom and where we can take it out of the country and what means of 
transport we can use, and I know who will receive it abroad, in Spain or in the US, or 
in other export countries. And I know how we can transport the money because I 
have the necessary contacts for that.’ This is a route.5  
Understanding and, ultimately, addressing intersecting smuggling flows, thus starts with 
grasping the expertise involved in this illicit enterprise, rather than only tracing its physical 
expressions. The same expertise is often used for various types of flows that operate on the same 
routes. In the Colombian context, cocaine, gasoline, chemical precursors, money, weapons, 
and people are linked to the same input-output structure; in Libya, drugs, arms, people, and 
contraband share the same routes; and in Mali, flows of cigarettes, arms, and drugs interlink. 
Figure 21.1 Illicit supply chain networks  
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Such routes are not limited to single countries or regions. In 2018, a case spanning South 
America, Europe, and West Africa made headlines: a Colombian broker, facilitating cocaine 
trafficking from South America to the European Union via West Africa, intended to exchange 
the drugs in a barter agreement with advanced military-grade weapons, including surface-to-air 
missiles. These weapons were supposedly destined for the militant Islamic group Ansar al-Dine 
operating in Mali. Given Ansar al-Dine’s links with al-Qaeda, this should have allowed the 
Colombians to use routes passing through al-Qaeda controlled territory in the Sahara Desert. 
The cocaine-weapons exchange was planned to occur in Croatia. This is not unusual: 
Colombian traffickers are known to buy protection for their drug shipments from armed actors 
who control the land routes from West Africa to Europe in the form of drugs, money, or 
weapons (The Investigative Project on Terrorism 2018; European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol 2019, 42; Katersky 2019). 
ii Territoriality 
The spatial distribution of supply chain networks entails its territoriality.6 Each locality has a 
specific function, or role, within the networks. For example, coca or opium poppy cultivation 
and laboratories are located on production sites of these illicit supply chain networks. Illicit 
flows intersect and converge in strategic towns, villages, or harbours. These localities function as 
strategic trafficking nodes, where physical transactions take place or where these transactions are 
coordinated in logistic centers. They also include starting points of international trafficking 
routes. 
Understanding historical legal trading patterns helps identify the locations where illicit flows 
intersect. Often, trafficking nodes or starting points of international trafficking routes have been, 
or still are, trade hubs for legal commerce due to their strategic location. In Libya for example, 
arms and drugs are trafficked via routes that have been used historically for transporting legal 
products. Consider Libya’s regional capital of Sebha, located in the south west of the country, 
and known for its historical function in trans-Saharan trade as a strategic node. Three historic 
trade routes converge in Sebha: first, the route that starts in Algeria and continues to the East; 
second, the route that begins in Niger and extends to the south; and third, the route that begins 
in Libya’s southern neighbour Chad. It is also located near the Sharara oil field, which further 
adds economic importance to the town. This position makes it prone to being a hub where 
illicit trade routes connect too and hence violent non-state groups, such as the Misuratan 
militias, take interest in controlling the town (Reitano and Shaw 2017). 
Geostrategic locations can also impede legal commerce when illicit flows are historic and 
precede appropriate institutional state presence. The towns of Tumaco and Buenaventura at 
Colombia’s Pacific coast, for instance, are important starting points of international trafficking 
routes. In Tumaco, numerous different violent non-state groups are present, aiming to get a 
share of the profit made from cocaine trafficking, gasoline smuggling, and related forms of 
trafficking. These groups have ranged from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia- 
People’s Army (FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) as well as the FARC- 
EP’s successor groups, to paramilitary groups and their successors, and Mexican drug cartels 
(Idler 2019, 180–194). Even though both Tumaco and Buenaventura have the potential to be 
important legal trading hubs because of their location, the lack of state infrastructure, high 
militarization, and endemic corruption pose severe obstacles to fulfilling this potential. 
These examples – Sebha, Tumaco, and Buenaventura – are trafficking nodes of intersecting 
flows at the local level, but, due to their geostrategic location, also entire regions are prone to 
being hubs of various types of illicit flows. Referring to flows of illicitly used drugs, Philip  
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Robins (2021) calls this “narco-geography.” The Middle East, for example, is a recipient of 
Afghan heroin via Pakistan or Iran; cocaine from the Andean region enters via Brazil; and 
tramadol (non-medical use of pharmaceutical opioids) comes from China and India (UNODC 
2018). Understanding how these flows converge in a single region and where routes – not only 
in the physical sense, but also in terms of the necessary expertise as discussed above – are shared 
is an important first step to disrupt them. 
Even though over longer periods illicit supply chain networks may shift geographically, from 
a short-term perspective, the locations for most of the supply chain functions prior to inter-
national trafficking are relatively exogenous if they involve natural resources. Coca or opium 
poppy cultivation, for example, requires adequate climatic conditions, and other raw materials 
such as gold, diamonds, or coltan are only found in certain regions. Thus, resource extraction 
sites are relatively fixed. Likewise, laboratories used to process raw materials into the final 
product are predominantly located in proximity to cultivation or extraction sites.7 Domestic 
transport depends on adequate transport infrastructure such as fluvial systems or roads. To some 
extent, the locations of strategic nodes are also exogenous. Starting points of international routes 
are located in harbours, or border towns, where illicit goods are shipped abroad. 
Intersecting flows of chemical precursors, for instance, typically come from countries where 
these products are cheaper; weapon flows connect with countries suffering armed conflict or 
other forms of instability since these weapons sustain the fighting of (non-state) armed groups. 
Money flows connect with countries whose currency is convenient for money laundering. This 
is exemplified by money flows from Colombia deriving from the cocaine industry into the 
dollarized Ecuadorian economy. These last two examples indicate the relevance of demand or 
convenience in determining the market end of illicit flows; that is, their direction, as part of the 
territoriality of illicit supply chain networks. The existence of consumers who can afford re-
latively pricey drugs such as cocaine, as is the case in the United States and in Western Europe, 
likewise influence the direction of drug flows. 
Drug policies and local cultures also inform the territoriality of illicit supply chain networks, 
including the transit countries. A common cocaine route from South America to Europe 
transits West Africa, where corruption of state officials facilitates the business. Impunity and 
inefficient drug policies have also led to a situation in which the region is increasingly becoming 
a consumption market, in addition to its function as transit zone (Pokoo and Aning 2021). A 
similar dynamic can be observed in North Africa (27–33 Herbert and Gallien 2020). Flows of 
human smuggling typically lead from unstable regions into more industrialized regions, whereas 
illicit flows of, for instance, toxic waste can be traced in the opposite direction: from waste- 
producing industrialized countries into unstable regions with weak state governance where the 
waste can be dumped while those in charge remain in impunity (Hägerdal 2019; Andreatta and 
Favarin 2020). 
Illicit supply chain networks operate in physical and non-physical spaces concurrently, with 
the latter gaining traction. If in the “upperworld,” novel technologies have shrunk geography 
by making the world more connected, in the “underworld,” they have allowed illegal actors to 
side-line geography entirely. In the process of globalization, way stations along trafficking 
routes have partly moved into cyberspace (Naím 2007), complicating the territoriality of illicit 
supply chain networks. Warehouses often exist online, which reduces risks because participants 
in the illicit chains do not meet each other. Internet-based spot sales and barter agreements of 
drugs, slaves, or weapons, to name just a few “products” in places such as the Dark Web, as 
mentioned above, and remotely controlled shipments are examples where it may be difficult to 
determine the territoriality of these flows. Services like TOR do not exist in any particular 
physical location and yet enable transactions across the globe. As a side-effect of the ability of 
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decentralized networked actors to circumvent laws and regulations, these actors can enhance 
their comparative advantage of being flexible and resilient to external shocks even more in the 
non-physical space, while those abiding by the rules are likely, increasingly, to lag behind. At 
the same time, transactions in cyberspace also help expand and foster territorial, physical net-
works of flows across borders (Prince 2016). The territorial aspect in physical space thus remains 
significant and has important social, economic, and political implications, especially in the 
trafficking nodes where various flows intersect. 
iii Institutional context 
Typically, weak state governance systems characterize the institutional context of illicit supply 
chain networks.8 In many marginalized areas in unstable regions, state representatives are ab-
sent. In such contexts, local populations have few legal economic opportunities to sustain their 
livelihoods. The income that people can gain thanks to various intersecting illicit flows in these 
regions would not be available otherwise. Even though most of the time, generating income 
this way is illegal, local community members consider it legitimate. People’s involvement can 
take various forms. First, they participate directly in forms of smuggling. This includes “survival 
smuggling” of essentials such as food on the one hand, and of illicit commodities on the other 
(United Nations and World Bank 2018, 70). Survival smuggling is practiced across the globe, 
ranging from nomadic communities in the Sahel to the indigenous Wayúu across the 
Colombia-Venezuela border. These forms are typically unconnected from other types of il-
licit flows. 
Second, local community members smuggle goods that are used for daily consumption and 
are part of illicit supply chain networks. Take the gasoline smuggling across the Colombia- 
Venezuela border. Given that the Venezuelan government used to subsidize gasoline, 
Colombians and Venezuelans had been smuggling gasoline from Venezuela into Colombia for 
decades to sell it openly on the streets. Local law enforcement authorities were aware of the 
illicit practice, but since it was so wide-spread – and alternative economic opportunities were 
lacking – efforts to tackle it were sparse. At least until the early 2010s, before Venezuela further 
descended into a downward spiral of political and socio-economic crisis,9 three types of 
smuggling were common: the small-scale one of a few litres; the medium one that fills car tanks; 
and the large-scale one in which entire trucks were filled with gasoline (Idler 2019, 169–174). 
This third type directly connected with cocaine trafficking in two ways. First, the gasoline was 
used to process coca leaves into cocaine, as part of the input-output structure. Second, it formed 
part of gasoline-drugs deals: the same trucks that transported gasoline from Venezuela to 
Colombia transported cocaine in the opposite direction. As in other smuggling hotspots around 
the world (see, e.g., Gallien 2020), such deals were highly regulated through informal ar-
rangements, involving the local population. In places such as La Paz, in the Colombian Cesar 
department, where the gasoline was taken off the trucks, locals for example were (ab)used to 
help with storage. They had to give their houses or garages, for example, to stockpile the 
gasoline. They were paid in return, and hence this practice helped them feed their families, but, 
at the same time, denying their service exposed them to threats of violence and the im-
plementation thereof, as a report by the local Ombudsman’s Office confirms (SAT, Sistema de 
Alertas Tempranas. Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia 2012). Furthermore, the small-, 
medium-, and large-scale types of smuggling were closely interlinked. Even if small-scale 
smugglers, so-called pimpineros, were not directly involved in large-scale forms of trafficking, 
they typically had to pay “taxes” to the violent non-state group that controlled the route for the 
purpose of large-scale trafficking. This put these smugglers into an extremely vulnerable 
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position: they suffered abuse by the armed actors yet could not turn to the local authorities for 
help as they themselves were involved in an illegal business. 
Gasoline smuggling across the Ecuador-Colombia border is another case in point. Local 
community members used to smuggle gasoline from Ecuador to Colombia for their vehicles 
and boats. Even though illegal, they considered smuggling legitimate because alternative li-
velihood options were scarce. When the Ecuadorian authorities imposed stricter rules and 
limited the volume of gasoline that can be trafficked per day, the income of many contra-
bandists no longer sufficed to cover their daily expenses. Furthermore, it led to human rights 
abuses against those small-scale traffickers by the local authorities while large-scale traffickers 
linked to the cocaine industry continued business as usual (Idler 2021). As shown in these 
examples, addressing the links among different types of illicit flows needs to be based on 
analyzing the transnational political economy of a region, and indeed its moral economy (Arias 
and Grisaffi 2021). 
Syria’s oil smuggling business is a similar example. Syrian rebels used to sell a barrel of oil for 
up to 22 US dollars. Those involved in refining earned 30 cents for each litre of gasoline that 
was sold. Just as the community members in La Paz that were connected to gasoline smuggling 
by helping stockpile the product, in Syria, community members were also involved in related 
forms of business. This included transport and services, such as repairing engines damaged by 
the fuel of low quality, offering food, fuel, and other goods to smugglers along the road, or 
helping truckers fit large tanks to their vehicles (Steenkamp 2017). Likewise, one can distin-
guish among different forms of smuggling. On the one hand, the small-scale form originates in 
small oil fields controlled by local tribal chiefs who control extraction. The oil is then trans-
ported across territories controlled by local militias who charge taxes or protect – against 
payment – basic refineries. On the other hand, large-scale smuggling has been controlled by 
more powerful and violent non-state groups, especially IS. The group controlled around 8% of 
Syria’s oil fields and sold the oil in Syria and Iraq via brokers to local and international buyers 
(Steenkamp 2017). 
In situations like the gasoline-cocaine flows across the borders that Colombia shares with 
Venezuela and Ecuador respectively, or the oil smuggling and interlinked businesses in Syria 
and across the border to Iraq, the side effects can be severe if the state engages in crackdowns 
against large-scale traffickers. Given the interconnectedness of flows, these measures may also 
interrupt survival smuggling or put small-scale smugglers at risk if they are stigmatized as 
whistle-blowers. Likewise, blocking (physical) routes through border closures, not only di-
verges (rather than disrupts) large-scale transnational organized criminal operations, but also 
disrupts local contraband, which is often rooted in the absence of legal livelihood options. As a 
result, local populations may develop or increase grievances against the state and feel more 
alienated from it while being drawn to the illicit armed actors because they may provide 
protection. 
A common institutional context of illicit supply chain networks also includes strong state 
presence but little accountability; for example, when state officials are corrupt and hence decide 
to be selectively absent by turning a blind eye to the illicit business, or to participate in the illicit 
business themselves. States participate in illicit supply chain networks in various ways. Jonathan  
Kelman (2015) distinguishes among four types of participation: direct revenue generation; 
indirect revenue generation; procurement; and territorial control. With a slightly different 
emphasis, Gallien and Weigand (2021), distinguish among six types of relationships between 
states and smugglers, ranging from genuine enforcement to petty corruption. With the very 
authority designed to curb these flows in many cases becoming their promoter, the effectiveness 
and resilience of these networks becomes greatly enhanced. In this sense, the territorial state 
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defined by state borders preconditions the institutional context in which illicit supply chain 
networks are most thriving. 
Linked to the role of state officials in facilitating illicit supply chain networks is Williams and 
Godson (2002)’s argument that at least four political moments are conducive to the prosperity of 
these networks. The first political moment is when states with strong capacities become weaker 
because such a weakening process facilitates the corruption of the older elite. The second one 
concerns the transition from a command economy to a free market: in such cases, criminals in 
charge of illicit flows easily can gain control over parts of the licit economy, such as banks, as well, 
and thus operate in a grey zone between the underworld and the upperworld, with both licit and 
illicit flows operating on the same routes. A third moment are periods of armed conflict or when 
groups engage in terrorist attacks, armed actors use their expertise as entrepreneurs of violence for 
criminal ends, contributing to the illicit business. Fourth, after the signing of a ceasefire or a peace 
agreement, former (state and non-state) military leaders may aim to maintain power via con-
trolling (parts of) illicit supply chain networks, or those armed groups that remain outside the 
agreement may strive to expand their income basis in the illicit economy. 
iv Governance structure 
The relationships of the actors involved shapes the governance structure of illicit supply chain 
networks. One or several (violent) groups – including both state and non-state actors – carry 
out or control each network activity (e.g., protection of production sites, domestic transport). 
In many cases, this division of labour yields territorial segmentation (Deville 2013, 65; see also  
Govindan, Fattahi, and Keyvanshokooh 2017, 112).10 The groups typically respect territorial 
limits of influence, within which each group exerts economic, social, and/or political control.11 
Their presence is relatively localized in a particular place or node. This specialization maximizes 
profits from each supply chain step. These steps are interlinked through the relationships that 
these groups have with each other. They are also linked through little-known middlemen, so- 
called financiers, or more powerful brokers. In the case of natural resource extraction, financiers 
may buy the raw, or only minimally processed, material from the farmers or workers and ensure 
it reaches laboratories, where it is processed further. Especially in contexts of armed conflict, as 
is the case with the cocaine business in Colombia, or the heroin and opium business in 
Afghanistan and Myanmar, they operate where one group, for example an insurgent group, 
controls cultivation on its own, or where such a group subordinates others and engages at the 
“fringes” of that territory in stable arrangements with other groups, including state actors 
(Chouvy 2010; Mansfield 2016; Idler 2019). Powerful brokers negotiate among the parties, 
including over the final product. 
The relatively clear division of labour that characterizes most elements of illicit supply chain 
networks does not hold at the intersections of trafficking flows. Here, economic interests of 
various non-state groups converge, but there is also competition, especially if more than two 
groups are present, or if one non-state group and the state, or state actors, compete. Even 
though, generally, they mistrust each other as rivals, on these particular occasions they reduce 
mistrust to be able to strike business deals such as drugs-for-arms barter agreements; they forge 
short-term arrangements. General mistrust persists however, so trafficking nodes are typically 
rife with selective violence targeted against actual and potential cheaters and betrayers. Often, 
the local population gets caught in the crossfire. 
Brokers serve to strike deals in the case of more regular transactions. Brokers are perceived to 
be trustworthy and reliable by all groups involved, and they have networks across sectors in 
society: typically, they are connected with local political and economic elites, civil society, and 
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armed actors. Examples of such brokers include alias Megateo, a former rebel leader who 
became the main intermediary of illicit supply chain networks centered on cocaine in 
Colombia. Heading the remaining faction of the otherwise demobilized Popular Liberation 
Army (EPL), he had links with the left-wing FARC-EP and ELN rebels, but also with right- 
wing groups. Local community members considered him a role model, as he was originally 
from the region and was considered to care for the locals. He connected the various links of the 
supply chain. After the Colombian state forces killed him in 2015, a power struggle around his 
replacement broke out. Filling that void took rather long because of the unique characteristics 
such an individual needs to possess (Idler 2020). Some of these brokers resemble a war lord, as 
did Megateo. Others resemble more closely an entrepreneur, for instance Victor Bout, im-
prisoned in the United States (Roth 2010, 150). He is known as a Russian arms dealer, sup-
plying among others, multiple rebel groups in Africa and the Colombian FARC rebels with 
weapons. He is also known to have been involved in money laundering operations and in sales 
of aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. In brief, he connected various types of illicit flows and thus 
facilitated the smooth operating of illicit supply chain networks (Farah 2012; Farah and 
Braun 2010). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of analyzing the interconnectedness of illicit 
flows rather than studying them individually in order to better understand how they operate, 
what their social, economic, and political implications are, and to identify possible entry points 
to tackle them. Conceptualizing the intersections of smuggling flows as trafficking nodes that 
form part of illicit supply chain networks shows their unique role in terms of the input-output 
structure, the institutional context, the territoriality, and the governance structure of these 
networks. They hold these networks together and, while bringing livelihood opportunities for 
local communities in locations that function as trafficking nodes, they also make these com-
munities extremely vulnerable to abuse by both non-state and state actors. 
The implications for the study of unstable regions where illicit flows intersect and of the 
illicit economy more broadly are clear. First, this chapter shows the need to challenge state- 
centric concepts to study the intersections of illicit flows because these flows reach across 
borders. Academic studies still tend to be organized as country (comparative) case studies, rather 
than as studies across borders. Considering transnational borderlands as starting points for re-
search rather than adopting national perspectives on smuggling flows is crucial to overcome this 
bias. This has methodological implications. Students of smuggling face asymmetries in state- 
centric data sources, such as national statistics. Those who adopt an ethnographic approach 
across borders, for example through multi-sited fieldwork, deal with further complications, 
such as securing support networks, visa, and research permits across borders. Future work needs 
to address both the conceptual shift and discuss ways to address these methodological chal-
lenges.12 Second, we must map the interconnectedness of illicit supply chain networks to 
identify disruptors rather than focus on individual supply chain links. This includes centering 
scholarly attention on the mechanisms that link different supply chain networks instead of 
focusing on individual flows in isolation. Scholarship to date has mostly focused on the most 
salient or most lucrative type of smuggling in a given region, thereby neglecting how less 
profitable, or less sensational interconnected flows drive the overall network. Conceptualizing 
smuggling flows as illicit supply chain networks in which multiple flows of different types of 
goods are interconnected helps address this issue. For example, rather than focusing on cocaine 
trafficking only in South America, enhancing understanding of the flows of chemical precursors 
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that are used to process coca leaves into cocaine is an important entry point to grasp the 
extension and functioning of the overall cocaine supply chain network. Third, we need to study 
the moral economy of illicit supply chain networks, not just the political economy to understand 
the role that these networks have for people’s daily lives. Where legal livelihood opportunities 
are scarce, what is legitimate does not necessarily map on to what is legal. This has consequences 
for entire interrelated legal and illegal, and formal and informal markets. 
These implications for the study of intersecting smuggling flows yield important practical 
considerations. “State solutions” may not necessarily work. Scrutinizing local perceptions and 
experiences of people living in locations of trafficking nodes demonstrates that a law enforcement 
approach may not only be ineffective, it can also put people at risk. This does not mean that 
hierarchical state bureaucracies are necessarily ill-equipped to counter illicit cross-border net-
worked organizations that are embedded in local communities. Rather, these characteristics need 
to be accounted for (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008). We need to anticipate the implica-
tions of disruptions for the moral economy. As the analysis with a view to the institutional context 
of illicit supply chain networks shows, measures to thwart illicit interlinked networks may un-
dermine people’s licit livelihood strategies: discouraging the trafficking of illicit goods via such 
routes must come along with protecting and promoting legal commerce in order not to jeo-
pardize people’s economic and food security. Ultimately, any investment needs to be holistic and 
inclusive of local communities to drain the support to illicit networks. 
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Notes  
1 For an overview of various different illicit flows, see Nellemann et al. (2018).  
2 For the distinction between cyber-assisted, cyber-enabled, and cyber-dependent crime see Wall 
(2017, 1081).  
3 I borrow from the global commodity chain literature (see, e.g., Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Bair 
2005). For discussions of supply chain networks in the licit economy see for example Govindan, 
Fattahi, and Keyvanshokooh (2017); Klibi and Martel (2012); Snyder et al. (2006).  
4 For interconnectedness see Dicken et al. (2001, 91).  
5 Interview by the author with the police commander of a remote, violence-affected town in 
Colombia, 2012.  
6 For the role of locality and place in supply chains see Bair (2005, 159).  
7 There is some flexibility, as the existence of mobile cocaine processing laboratories, for instance, 
demonstrates (Idler 2019, 261).  
8 This is not necessarily the case for money laundering and for transactions that take place in cyberspace.  
9 Smuggling dynamics have since reversed: it became more common for gasoline to be smuggled from 
Colombia into Venezuela.  
10 In the case of the cocaine industry, in the 1980s and 1990s this spatial division of labour concerned 
even countries: Bolivia and Peru hosted the cultivation and harvesting of coca leaves, and their 
processing into coca paste; Colombia hosted further processing, trafficking, and the starting points for 
international export (Gootenberg 2012, 169).  
11 Markers such as graffiti, pamphlets, or flags, or practices such as charging protection money define 
these limits. The operational territories of violent non-state groups often coincide with an urban–rural 
divide. See Tickner, García, and Arrezea (2011); Laverde and Tapia (2009).  
12 See Idler (2019, Appendix A) for ways to address some of these challenges.  
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IN A TIME OF RESTRICTING AND 
CRIMINALIZING MOBILITY 
Ilse van Liempt   
Introduction 
If we are to win the fight against the smugglers, Europe needs to be ready to take 
action in order to seize the boats, destroy them and arrest the smugglers and bring 
them to justice. 
European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris 
Avramopoulos, 23 April 2015  
On 23 April 2015, the European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, 
Dimitris Avramopoulos, and the EU Council expressed their determination to come to grips 
with people smuggling in the Mediterranean. It is nothing new to blame smugglers for 
the increase of unexpected arrivals of migrants, but in the current refugee ‘crisis,’ the issue 
of migrant smuggling has become very much the center of attention. Fighting against 
smuggling is most often proposed as the ‘solution’ to the refugee ‘crisis’ by politicians in the 
public arena. 
In principle, there are two main reasons why states may be willing to counter human 
smuggling. The first reason has to do with the fact that smuggling is linked to irregular im-
migration: although it should be clear that not all smuggled migrants are irregular in the proper 
sense (many of them being refugees and asylum seekers), smuggling is nonetheless one of the 
most eye-catching ways (at least for the mass media) by which irregular immigration takes place; 
fighting it can thus be a way of fighting irregular immigration itself. This line of reasoning fits in 
the criminological framing that is linked to an increasing demand for migration in poorer parts 
of the world (van Liempt & Sersli 2012). Smugglers are in this frame referred to as the ‘dark side’ 
or the ‘underbelly’ of globalization (Moises 2005) who facilitate irregular migration. Smuggled 
migrants are given an unclear role under this approach: while, on the one hand, they are not 
necessarily to be criminalized for the mere fact of having been smuggled, on the other hand, it is 
clear that their rights and needs are not what states are fighting for when they adopt this 
perspective. 
The second reason states may be concerned with human smuggling stems, instead, from the 
need to protect the migrants themselves from the many risks they may face if smuggled: 
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economic exploitation; deception; degrading treatment along the way; and even death. Under 
this approach, smuggled migrants are perceived as victims of the smugglers who thrive on their 
aspiration to go abroad. An important assumption behind this logic is that stopping smugglers 
will result in such pain and misery for irregular migrants that news will get back to potential 
migrants and they will stop coming. Smugglers are seen as having created migration possibilities 
for those immigrants that states have defined as unwanted. This is also the logic behind 
the British government’s refusal to support large-scale rescue of irregular migrants in the 
Mediterranean (Collyer 2016). 
The paradox between this ‘control and care’ reasoning is illustrated very well if we look at 
how the UN approach to human smuggling differs from the EU approach. Even though it does 
not formally qualify smuggled migrants as victims, the protection of their rights is among the UN 
Protocol’s main concerns, as is explicitly stated, for example, in Art. 2: “The purpose of this 
Protocol is to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants, as well as to promote cooperation 
among states Parties to that end, while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants.” The EU 
Facilitation Directive, however, describes the role of the smuggled migrant by using verbs 
(“assisting someone to enter,” “to transit,” “to stay”), thus revealing that the person is seen as 
someone actively contributing to the whole deed. The UN Protocol, on the contrary, uses – at 
least in Art. 3(a) – a noun (“procuring the entry of someone”), thus describing the migrant’s 
position more as the result of another person’s action than as an action itself. 
Regardless of these differences in how smuggled migrants are seen, in both the UN Protocol 
and the Facilitation Directive the smuggler’s conduct is recognized to have a wrongness of its 
own: a wrongness that is not a mere reflection of irregular migration, but derives directly from 
its being a commodification of human beings, an exploitation of the migrant’s vulnerability as a 
source of enrichment, of money-making. 
In the sideline of both the Protocol as well as the Directive it is mentioned that it excludes 
from the scope of the criminalisation “the activities of those who provided support to migrants 
for humanitarian reasons or on the basis of close family ties.” In this chapter, we will focus on 
this broader perspective on human smuggling. Even though the assumption inherent in many 
of the policy initiatives around fighting human smuggling and studies around human smuggling 
is that organized crime is involved (van Liempt & Sersli 2012, Baird & van Liempt 2015), it is 
equally important to bear in mind that smuggling is not perceived as a crime everywhere, 
always, and by everybody. Academic literature on human smuggling points to evidence that it 
likely has existed as long as borders have, as there have always been people who, for all sorts of 
reasons, were unable to travel via ordinary legal routes (Fittko 2000, Siener 2008, Mar 2010). 
This chapter puts a broader perspective on human smuggling to illustrate the various reasons 
migrants might need smugglers and the different ways smuggling can evolve. The category of 
the ‘humanitarian smuggler’ is put central in this chapter to challenge the purely criminological 
discourse around human smuggling that is dominant, and to provide a more complex, diverse 
picture of the practice. 
What do we know about the facilitators behind human smuggling? 
The earliest academic conceptualization of human smuggling comes from Salt and Stein (1997), 
who framed human smuggling as a ‘business.’ As geographers, they made important distinctions 
among the various types of services offered in countries of origin, in transit, and at the desti-
nation, as well as the interconnections among these places. They also differentiated between 
legitimate and illegitimate markets in which actors pursue profit and commercial gain around 
human smuggling, which has been important in understanding its embeddedness. Despite these 
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nuances, human smuggling was tied directly and solely into questions of organized crime, 
which has been central to discussions of migrant smuggling from early studies until now (Salt 
and Stein 1997, Chin 1999, Lazcko and Thompson 2000, Salt 2000). Defining the exact role of 
organised crime in human smuggling organizations generated a lasting debate in smuggling 
studies (Heckmann 2004, Neske 2006, Colucello and Massey 2007, Kaizen and Nonneman 
2007, Kyle and Koslowski 2011, Soudijn and Kleemans 2009, UNODC 2011). 
It is not surprising that when the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, 
Air and Sea came into being in 2000, migrant smuggling was officially included in the defi-
nition of organized crime. This event marked the framing of human smuggling as a global 
criminal business (Gallagher and David 2014). In 2000, the strengthening of the penal fra-
mework of smuggling was also put high on the European Council’s agenda. Its delegations, 
however, had very different views on the various types of smuggling that exist and what 
constitutes ‘humanitarian’ grounds for the smuggling of asylum seekers. 
The discussion on a continuum of types of smuggling links to a whole field of academic 
research that shows that the criminal discourse is helpful for understanding different actors 
involved in the process of human smuggling and the stages of the process, but it lacks a wider 
perspective. By following a narrow track dictated by a purely economic perspective, the 
complexity behind human smuggling is denied. It, for example, does not give any indication 
of the reasons smuggling begins or continues in a certain context other than making profit 
(Kyle 2011, van Liempt 2007, Spener 2009; Kyle and Dale 2001) and underestimates the role of 
personal networks in the migration process (Staring 2004, Herman, 2006). 
Studies that take a wider perspectives show that it is often local people living in border 
regions involved in the smuggling business for whom profiting from smuggling goods and/or 
people is a low-profile way of making a living without necessarily being connected to inter-
national organized criminal organisations (Chin 1999, Icduygu and Toktas 2000, Mabrouk 
2003, Spener 2009, Missbach 2015, Sanchez 2015). These studies also show the complexity 
around the fact that smuggling is sometimes organized by family members of migrants, who 
may profit from and exploit relatives, but who are also inclined to act out of humanitarian 
reasons (Koser 1997, Staring 2004, Buchen, 2014). 
Smuggling through social networks 
The role of personal networks has been underestimated in the human smuggling process (Herman 
2006) and research on the transnational scope of familial networks has added an important theo-
retical dimension to the study of human smuggling (Staring 2004). One of the main findings of 
studies that look into the role of networks is that smuggling depends on unique network char-
acteristics coupled with individual agency, and that trust plays a key role (Koser 2008). Herman 
(2006) argues for incorporating ‘the social non-profit factor’ into the study of human smuggling to 
bring the role of personal and familial ties into the foreground (Herman 2006: 217). 
Stefan Buchen (2014) followed a case in Essen (Germany) where in January 2013 ‘an 
international people-smuggling gang’ was identified as part of a Europe-wide operation. It was 
reported that suspects were arrested in 37 places across Germany and some arrests were made in 
Greece and Poland. The ‘head of the gang’ was a 58-year-old Syrian man from Essen. The 
authorities estimated that he had made a €300,000 profit out of smuggling activities, although 
they did not find any cash. Buchen discovered the ‘head of the gang’ was not a professional 
smuggler but an engineer who went to work every day and had not smuggled anything or 
anyone before the war broke out in Syria. He turned out to be part of a group of Syrians who 
came together at the beginning of the war to help Syrian refugees escape their country. None of 
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their ‘customers’ had felt threatened, poorly treated, or exploited, and relatively small amounts 
of money had been paid for the services. This example stands for many smuggling cases and 
shows that the smuggling market is complex, with highly differentiated services (Icduygu and 
Toktas 2000, Zhang and Chin 2002, Sanchez 2015). Some earn substantial amounts of money, 
but many individuals in the smuggling process receive little or no compensation for their 
services (Kyle and Dale, 2001, 50). 
Smuggled migrants’ perspectives 
Only few studies have centered around smuggled migrants’ perspectives (Koser 1997, Efionayi- 
Mader et al. 2001, Bilger et al. 2006, van Liempt 2007, Spener 2009). These studies add an 
interesting dimension to the debate by pointing out that there is often remarkably little stigma 
attached to the smuggling business from migrants’ points of view. Migrants who have used the 
services of smugglers rarely view them as dangerous criminals who should be imprisoned, but 
often describe them as ‘the people who most helped them’ (Sharma 2003, 60), as life savers, or 
as a necessary evil in a world with many restrictions on mobility (van Liempt 2007). The fact 
that there are few migrants willing to testify against their smugglers supports this view of 
smugglers as helpers. Nevertheless, the prices charged can be very high, and some suffer from 
exploitation or poor treatment. The important context of helping people escape war, poverty, 
and misery makes smugglers necessary. 
In a quantitative survey carried out with migrants who had enlisted the services of smugglers to 
cross from Mexico into the USA, 75% of the 655 interviewees declared that they were satisfied 
with the service provided by their smuggler, and 45% would recommend their smuggler to a 
family member or a friend (Slack and Martínez 2018, p. 162). An additional important reason not 
to testify against smugglers is that friends/family members who are still back home might one day 
need these services too. Labeling human smugglers as evil is too simple and does not take into 
account the political reality that people need to cross borders to find protection. 
Smuggling for humanitarian reasons under current EU Law 
Activities of those who provided support to migrants for humanitarian reasons or on the basis of 
close family ties were previously excluded from the scope of criminalization. The EU 
Facilitation Directive also has an optional safeguard known as the humanitarian clause which 
provides EU Member States with the possibility to exempt cases of smuggling from crim-
inalization. Both the UN Protocol and the EU Facilitation Directive risk suppressing genuinely 
humanitarian acts of assistance, as they give states discretion to criminalize a broad range of acts 
of assistance to irregular migrants. Carrera and Guild (2016) argue that the Facilitative Directive 
suffers from an implementation gap in several areas, including the threshold of what constitutes 
an act of smuggling and the possibility of a humanitarian defense. 
The decision to include an optional ‘humanitarian clause’ was not without discussion and 
internal disagreements within the EU. Its wording is ultimately the product of a compromise 
amongst the drafters put forth by the Swedish presidency (Council of the European Union 
2001). For example, Austria was entirely opposed to Article 1.2 (the optional humanitarian 
clause) and the UK submitted several reservations (Council of the European Union 2001). By 
contrast, Germany proposed that the humanitarian clause should be ‘compulsory’ (Council of 
the European Union 2001). Whilst the product of compromise, the optional humanitarian 
exemption ultimately permits the criminalization of humanitarian acts of smuggling because the 
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Directive does not oblige EU member states to impose sanctions when humanitarian motives 
are involved in smuggling. 
As such, countries have varied in how they have transposed this Directive into national legal 
frameworks. According to Art. 1 (2), 
Any member state may decide not to impose sanctions with regard to the behavior 
defined in paragraph 1 (a) by applying its national law and practice for cases where the 
aim of the behavior is to provide humanitarian assistance to the person concerned.  
Behind this provision lies a clue to the fact that humanitarian concerns are not a key worry for 
EU laws against smuggling. The meaning of Art. 1 (2) is, indeed, that member states are not 
obliged, but merely permitted to grant ‘facilitators’ a humanitarian defense for their conduct, 
which unavoidably makes helping immigrants more risky for potential helpers, thereby in-
directly impinging upon the chances migrants have to be helped when they find themselves in 
need of humanitarian assistance. Currently, facilitating irregular entry is punished in all 28 EU 
member states and the EU Actions to fight against smuggling have run in parallel with an 
incremental use of sanctions in the EU against individuals directly or indirectly involved in 
helping and/or providing humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants. 
A recent report by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (Fundamental Rights Agency FRA 
2014) reveals that only a quarter of member states “have national legislation that reflects, at least 
in some form, the safeguards in Article 1 (2), allowing states not to impose sanctions when 
irregular entry is facilitated for humanitarian purposes.” The optional humanitarian clause had 
been explicitly transposed at the national level in only eight Member States. The same FRA 
report similarly notes that “more than a quarter of member states fail in their national legislation 
to exempt non-profit acts or humanitarian assistance from the rules of facilitation of stay” 
(Fundamental Rights Agency FRA 2014). In the autumn of 2015, during which substantial 
numbers of refugees in desperate situations travelled through both EU and Schengen states, 
some of the EU’s measures against facilitation of irregular migration were instrumentalised by 
some political leaders to warn their citizens and the citizens of neighbouring states against 
assisting refugees on the move. EU law, of course, does not disregard completely the rights of 
smuggled migrants; it could not do so, since many of these rights are either recognised in the 
EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights or are the object of international obligations for the 
member states. Two examples. According to Art. 1(2), 
Any member state may decide not to impose sanctions with regard to the behaviour 
defined in paragraph 1(a) by applying its national law and practice for cases where the 
aim of the behaviour is to provide humanitarian assistance to the person concerned.  
The meaning of Art. 1(2) is that member states are not obliged, but merely permitted to grant 
“facilitators” a humanitarian defence for their conduct, which unavoidably makes helping 
immigrants more risky for potential helpers, thereby indirectly impinging upon the chances 
migrants have to be helped when they find themselves in need of humanitarian assistance. 
Examples of humanitarian smuggling 
Apart from refugees involved in smuggling countrymen who are in need of help to escape war 
tarn countries, civil society in Europe has also increasingly become involved in helping refugees 
with their often difficult border crossing processes. One famous recent example is that of Salam 
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Aldeen who helped save lives in the Agean Sea, but was later accused of human smuggling. 
Aldeen, a 34-year-old man from Denmark, was never trained as a lifeguard but when he saw an 
overcrowded dinghy sinking off the coast of the Greek island of Lesbos in the summer of 2016 
he started to rescue the people. The boat came from Turkey and was haphazardly constructed. 
It had lasted most of the short (10 kilometer) journey across the Agean Sea but the motor began 
to dislodge only a few hundred meters off the coast of Lesbos. As the boat started to sank Salam 
told the people to get off, hold onto the boat and paddle to shore. He helped them push and 
steer the boat from the back. There were women and children on board and a picture of Salam 
holding a baby made it all over the news. Back in Denmark, Salam Aldeen decided to go back 
to Lesbos and see if he could help. He started Team Humanity in September 2015 and he 
became an ‘island legend.’ As an almost native Arabic speaker (his father is originally from Iraq) 
he rescued many migrants. Aldeen had responded to distress calls from more than 200 boats 
with an estimated total of more than 10,000 refugees on board, seeking to uphold the duty to 
rescue at sea. 
In January 2016 Aldeen was arrested on charges of human smuggling. As the driver and 
owner of the boat, Aldeen faced harsher punishment than the other rescuers. Four rescuers 
were given a bail set at 5000 Euros, while Aldeen’s bail was set at 10,000 Euros. He faced up to 
ten years in prison. Also, Aldeen was barred from leaving the country, whereas the others were 
not. He has to check into a police station every week and is not allowed to leave Greece, just 
like so many immigrants today who are stuck in Greece. He continued his charity work helping 
refugees stuck on the Greek islands despite the charges. In May 2018 he faced the Geek court 
with four co-volunteers and was cleared of charges of bringing migrants into Greece illegally. 
Large organizations like Save the Children and Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) recently also 
have been accused of collaborating with human smugglers with their rescue operations in the 
Central as well as Eastern Mediterranean sea. It is important to contextualize these accusations. 
The Mare Nostrum Operation, which was initiated after the large shipwreck in 2014 off the 
coast of Lampedusa, was framed in the discourse of humanitarianism. In late 2014, because of a 
lack of support from the European Union the Italian state retreated from their Mare Nostrum 
Operation, leaving thousands to die at sea; it was criticized for a nine-fold increase in deaths 
between 2014 and 2015.1 NGOs such as MSF then stepped in to fill this gap as a response to 
this danger to life (Pallister-Wilkins 2018). MSF launched its own SAR operations in 2015, 
initially by providing medical assistance on-board the MOAS’ (Migrant Offshore Aid Station) 
boat. Soon MSF was running boats of its own: the Bourbon Argos; the Dignity 1; and lately the 
Prudence, while also joining forces with SOS Mediterranean on their the Aquarius (Pallister- 
Wilkins 2018). MSF’s objective is to save human lives in full respect of its independent mandate as 
a medical humanitarian organization. SAR efforts produce a mobile humanitarianism that cannot 
be fixed easily in time or space. It occurs where rescue is needed. The types of care that can be 
offered and the conditions under which the care is offered depend hugely on politics. 
Some politicians and officials in EU member states (for example Italy, Belgium and Austria) 
now claim that by providing SAR service Mare Nostrum and NGOs have made the journey safer 
and easier, thereby encouraging migrants and refugees to make the journey, acting thus as a pull 
factor for migration, or a bridge to Europe, and increasing the numbers. These are claims that are 
not substantiated with data. A recent assessment compared the before, during and after the Mare 
Nostrum period showed that the number of arrivals (and deaths) was higher before Mare Nostrum 
was introduced and during the period that involved NGOs.2 By only focusing on who provides 
the border crossing, the important discussion of why people need to cross borders is left aside, and 
the complexities involved in migration are overlooked. Human smuggling is increasingly framed 
as a threat to the state rather than a reaction to restrictions imposed by states (see also Kyle and 
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Dale 2001, Kyle and Siracusa 2005). This narrow focus results in a narrow understanding of what 
human smuggling is, and has an impact on how it is ‘combatted.’ 
Conclusion 
On the European Agenda on Migration the “fight against smugglers and traffickers” has been 
identified as a key priority. In particular, the Agenda has called for improvements to the current 
EU legal framework “to tackle migrant smuggling and those who profit from it.” However, in 
the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling adopted in May 2015, the European 
Commission notes that appropriate criminal sanctions should be in place while avoiding the 
risks of criminalising those who provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in distress, thus 
implicitly acknowledging the inherent tension between the criminalisation of smugglers on the 
one hand and of those providing humanitarian assistance on the other, through a range of 
behaviours that cover facilitation of not only irregular entry and transit, but also irregular 
residence and stay. 
At present, the overall numbers of investigations and prosecutions leading to effective 
convictions of migrant smugglers across the entire European Union is low. Several studies have 
been conducted regarding EU member states’ national transposition and implementation of the 
Facilitators’ Package, or more generally, on policies and programmes focused on smuggling 
across the EU and in cooperation with third countries and the characteristics of the phe-
nomenon. A significant gap exists, however, concerning the actual effects that these laws have 
on those working at the front line of providing humanitarian assistance, public services and 
fundamental human rights to irregular migrants, in particular, civil society organisations. What 
we witness at the borders is that the criminalization of smuggling has affected the willingness of 
small professional shipmasters to come to the rescue of migrants in distress. Moreover, court 
cases of convicted individuals have a wider impact on future possible helpers. Suppressing 
assistance of refugees very well may be the primary aim of criminalization; it is not so much 
about prosecuting people but much more about warning others not to do this. Criminalization 
of humanitarian forms of smuggling may thus impact people’s willingness to help refugees 
because it makes helping migrants riskier and indirectly impinges on the chances migrants have 
to be helped when they find themselves in need of humanitarian assistance. 
For the past decade, service providers across several member states have raised concerns that 
the hardening stance on migrant smuggling at the political level could impact the day-to-day 
service provision of humanitarian actors. It has been feared that renewed efforts to combat the 
smuggling of migrants and refugees could affect irregular migrants’ access to their fundamental 
rights, including healthcare, education and housing. As such, it undermines the support for 
more humane solutions to the refugee crisis. 
Protecting the fundamental rights of irregular migrants requires differentiating between 
smugglers and those providing humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants. This is particularly 
true as civil societies – NGOs as well as individuals – are often the ones that cover the basic 
needs of migrants. It is paramount to ensure that those helping migrants are given the legal 
certainty that they will not be prosecuted for their assistance. It must be acknowledged that 
family members and friends helping people escape war situations should not be criminalized. 
More debate is required regarding the significant differences between a citizen’s or an NGO’s 
perspective of facilitating irregular entry and transit, and the perspective of the state. 
The plight of refugees in dreadful situations has inspired many people in the past and today 
to reach out and help. Many of these actions could be treated as crimes, under current national 
rules of the EU against irregular migration. The criminalization of humanitarian acts is evolving 
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without much discussion. Getting a humanitarian exemption clause put in the Facilitation 
Directive could be a way to solve this dilemma. The clause is currently optional and not used by 
most EU states. The number of states using it is, in fact, decreasing. A humanitarian exemption 
has proven not to be sufficient. Humanitarian acts in this context must be more narrowly 
defined, either by making more explicit the meaning of “humanitarian,” or defining more 
clearly the criminal element. A more explicit definition of what constitutes humanitarian here is 
needed in order not to put ‘helpers’ at risk. 
Narrowing the smuggling definition to acts of facilitation where the smuggler is doing harm, 
or risk of harm to the individual could also be an option, as Landry (2016) suggests. In the 
absence of legal pathways, let us not forget that smuggling is usually essential to the ability of 
most refugees to claim their right under the Refugee Convention, and that criminalization of 
smuggling will do more harm to refugees than good. Smuggling is often the only means to 
enjoy fundamental rights, such as living in unity with one’s family or escaping violence. The 
‘fight’ against smuggling will only be successful when it is part of a broader set of measures 
including more promising attempts for conflict resolution and development in regions of origin. 
It is difficult to challenge the dominant representation of smuggling at a time when many 
people die as a result of dangerous border crossings, but it is necessary to stress that crim-
inalization of smuggling will not improve migrant’s access to protection at a time when mo-
bility is restricted by governments. 
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MIGRANT SMUGGLING AND 
THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF 
CROSS-BORDER MOBILITY 
Luca Raineri   
Introducing migrant smuggling: inaccurate framings, wrong approaches,  
self-fulfilling prophecies 
Although the phenomenon of migrant smuggling has a long history (Wokeck, 1999), the lack 
of conceptual clarity and methodological rigour have long inhibited the emergence of a sci-
entific field of inquiry on the subject. Since its inception, the criminological perspective has 
remained dominant (Van Liempt and Sersli, 2012). The theoretical assumptions and normative 
concerns of law enforcement have shaped the conceptualisations of, and responses to, migrant 
smuggling. The tendency to look at migrant smuggling more as a pathology than as a social 
phenomenon has thus long influenced the foundational research questions – and answers – of 
migrant smuggling research, including about the identities of smugglers and smuggled in-
dividuals, their modes of organisation, the drivers of their actions, and the most appropriate 
policy responses. 
This chapter engages in a brief reconstruction of this genealogy. It contrasts early con-
ceptualisations and related popular beliefs on migrant smuggling with recent approaches and 
findings, which offer a more nuanced and complex view of the phenomenon. It argues that the 
growing availability of rigorous and empirically-rich studies has contributed to questioning the 
analytical purchase of institutionalist and neo-institutionalist perspectives on migrant smuggling 
and crime (Kleemans, 2014), highlighting instead the explanatory value of the network theory, 
with its emphasis on social capital and ties. Policy approaches built on unconfirmed assumptions 
may have contributed to rehabilitating past views, making the criminalisation of migrant 
smuggling a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The predominance of law enforcement concerns and criminological lenses in the appre-
hension of migrant smuggling transpires from the early studies on the phenomenon commis-
sioned by international organisations (IOM, 1994; UNODC, 2011a) to the more recent 
iterations of a so-called “crisis” of migrant smuggling and irregular migration in Europe 
(EUROPOL, 2016). Seminal studies have struggled to disentangle migrant smuggling and its 
distinctive features from other forms of irregular migration, including most notably human 
trafficking (ILO, 1975; Salt, 2000; Kyle and Koslowski, 2001; Tailby, 2001). The adoption of 
the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air – commonly referred to as 
the Smuggling of Migrants Protocol – supplementing the 2000 UN Convention against 
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Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC), has supplied an authoritative and clear-cut de-
finition of migrant smuggling, enabling the comparative analysis of a phenomenon that by its 
very nature straddles national borders. It has also contributed, however, to framing, from the 
outset, migrant smuggling as a matter of law enforcement, associated with transnational or-
ganised crime. 
As a result, policy and scholarly discourses on migrant smuggling have an in-built tendency 
to reiterate the analytical grids and normative standpoint of criminological perspectives. This 
stands out clearly in at least two domains, which the chapter investigates critically: the economic 
analogy of migrant smuggling’s drivers and modes of organisation; and the security emphasis of 
response strategies. 
Migrant smuggling is often framed as an economic activity (a “business,” “market,” or 
“industry”) where the lack of legal protection enables smugglers to resort to exploitative and 
predatory practices (Salt and Stein, 1997; Aronowitz, 2001; Schloenhardt, 2002). This stands in 
contrast with the posited passivity and victimhood of migrants. The neoliberal analogy between 
transnational smuggling networks and transnational corporations operating in the legal 
economy has reinforced the understanding that migrant smuggling is carried out by centralised 
organisations exercising a hierarchical command and control over a variety of profit-making 
criminal activities, including the trafficking of women, weapons and drugs. Studies informed by 
this intellectual scaffolding often strive to obtain accurate figures of the cash flows of the 
criminal organisations allegedly implicated in migrant smuggling, with a view to dissecting their 
“business model” (Salt and Stein, 1997; UNODC, 2011a; Reitano and Tinti, 2015). This 
endeavour somehow reproduces the ambition to attach “memorable numbers” to the estimated 
profits of criminal organisations, so as to catalyse media attention and political action (Andreas, 
2010). Engaging in this direction, a comprehensive retrospective report by UNODC (2011a) 
cited – without much distancing – the figures of migrant smuggling’s estimated profits put 
forward by early scholarship (all of them reported in Salt and Stein, 1997), ranging from $3 
billion along the China – US route, to a global annual income of $5-7 billion. Were this 
economic power converted into political influence and military might, the standard argument 
goes, criminal organisations emboldened by smuggling profits, including those of migration, 
could pose an unprecedented challenge to international stability (Naim, 2012). 
The sensation of the imminence of a threat has thus contributed to justifying the mobili-
sation of considerable resources to stem irregular migration and smuggling. With organised 
crime depicted as the new Evil Empire, the post-Cold war transition from a warfare to a 
crimefare posture by Western countries (for the US: see Andreas and Price, 2001; for the EU: 
see Stambol, 2019) has paved the way to the militarisation of the response to migrant smug-
gling. Illustrations of this are not in short supply, whether at the US-Mexico border (Nuñez- 
Neto, Siskin and Viña, 2005), in Australia (Schloenhardt, 2003; Weber and Grewcock, 2011), 
or in the EU (Lutterbeck, 2006; Akkerman, 2017). Fuelling the oft-noticed securitisation of 
migration and smuggling (Buzan, 1991; Galemba, 2018), declarations of a war against migrant 
smuggling (Raineri and Strazzari, 2021) have been accompanied by the deployment of the 
arsenal previously tested on the war on drugs (Horwood, 2019), with its focus on enhanced 
border controls, law enforcement cooperation, and supply eradication. 
In the last years, however, the proliferation of critical perspectives, scientific research designs 
and empirically-rich studies on migrant smuggling increasingly has questioned the underlying 
assumptions of the criminological approach, leading to the conclusion that the alleged link 
between migrant smuggling and organised criminal syndicates is poorly substantiated. The 
subsequent sections of the chapter build on these research developments to show that the 
prevailing mode of organisation of irregular cross-border mobility is characterised less by 
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hierarchical top-down arrangements, than by loose horizontal networks, in which criminal 
syndicates typically play a marginal role. This leads us to interrogate the conditions that enable 
the coordination of migrants and smugglers, in the absence of an over-arching regulation and 
enforcement: mitigating the behaviouralist over-emphasis on profit-maximisation, the network 
theory highlights that social capital, social ties and social embeddedness help explain the tra-
jectories and choices of the actors involved in migrant smuggling. In this framework, law 
enforcement measures and securitised approaches appear more effective in reshaping than in 
disrupting migrant smuggling: by severing cross-border social networks, they paradoxically 
incentivise the provision of protection by criminal organisations. This observation has led 
scholars to argue that the criminalisation of migrant smuggling may be seen as a iatrongenic 
effect of misguided militarised responses. 
Emerging evidence on migrant smuggling worldwide: from centralised 
syndicates to horizontal networks 
Focusing on a variety of geographic areas and investigating different smuggling networks, an 
increasing amount of literature is putting forward the idea that the organisation of migrant 
smuggling is, in the largest majority of the cases, less akin to a top-down hierarchical pyramid 
than to a horizontal network characterised by loose and opportunistic affiliations. Rather than 
orchestrated by a criminal mastermind pulling the strings behind the scenes, as (neo-) 
institutionalist criminological approaches would have it, migrant smuggling appears to be the 
result of the complex interactions of large numbers of smaller, flexible actors efficient at or-
ganising piecemeal and ad hoc activities while retaining a relative degree of independence and 
proactiveness (Baird and Van Liempt, 2016). Within this context, solidarity and trust emerge as 
key features of the relationship between smugglers and smuggled migrants much more often 
than previously imagined. An overview of the recent findings of migrant smuggling research 
across the world contributes to corroborating this view. 
Migrant smuggling from China to the US has been associated regularly with organised crime 
and the traditional triad societies (Robertson, 1977). In recent years, however, the growing 
availability of fine-grained, multi-sited ethnography has enabled a much more granular un-
derstanding, suggesting that migrant smuggling from China to the US is largely dominated by 
small groups of freelance entrepreneurs who build their own networks independently, often on 
the basis of their previous social interactions. This has prompted the conclusion that Chinese 
migrant smuggling organisations “are made up of decentralized associations of criminals of 
diverse backgrounds, and the relationships among core members are mostly horizontal” (Zhang 
and Chin, 2002, p. 759), with no single organization monopolising or centralising the sector 
(Chin, 1999; Zhang, 2008; Zhang and Chin, 2003). 
Studies looking at the smuggling of migrants into the US from the Mexican border has led to 
very similar conclusions. Spener (2009) has noted that local smugglers are poorly organised, 
with no evidence of market monopolisation by a single group. Sanchez reiterates the same 
observation, arguing that there is no evidence of “the existence of a single, centralised, power 
providing operational or logistical support in any of the smuggling groups identified” (Sanchez, 
2015, p. 44). Izcara Palacios (2014) has highlighted that the resort to violence is infrequent 
among competing smuggling groups. This may be seen as the result of kinship ties and links of 
reciprocity shaping the migrant smuggling “market” (Sanchez, 2017). 
The research findings about the organisation of migrant smuggling to the EU are consistent 
with this picture. Examining the role of Chinese organisations in the smuggling of migrants via 
the Netherlands, Soudijn (2006) and Kleemans (2007; see also Soudijn and Kleemans, 2009) 
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have found no evidence of a centralised organisation, and argue that a plurality of actors coexist, 
while competition among them is regulated less by the resort to violence than by reputation- 
building measures. Looking at Belgium, Kaizen and Nonneman (2007) have recognised the 
importance of kinship and ethnic ties in the articulation of migrant smuggling, arguing that 
smugglers operate in small groups characterised by cellular structures and opportunistic business 
partnerships. In Poland, Okolski (2000) has noted that migrant smuggling operations exhibit 
limited engagement by the Russian mafia. 
Studies focusing on migrant smuggling across the Middle East, and especially Turkey, have 
led to similar observations. Demir, Sever and Kahya (2017) note the absence of an “interna-
tional umbrella organization” with “branches in several countries,” arguing instead that migrant 
smuggling is based on “loosely connected” groups with limited if any internal hierarchy, that 
“communicate and cooperate […] horizontally” across the different stages of the process 
(Demir Sever and Kahya, 2017, pp. 384–385; see also Campana, 2020). Case studies focusing 
on Turkey-based organisations smuggling migrants from Syria (Achilli, 2018), Iran and Iraq 
(Içduygu and Toktas, 2002; Içduygu, 2018) corroborate the same findings, noting that 
smugglers operate independently along a small part of a larger chain with no centralised or-
ganisation or oversight. 
Studies focusing on Africa, too, have further confirmed the emerging general conclusion 
that small-scale coordination on a case-by-case basis, rather than central oversight by hier-
archical criminal syndicates, is the prevalent mode of organisation of transnational migrant 
smuggling. In Libya, this was the case during the Gaddafi regime (Pastore, Monzini and 
Sciortino, 2006). Interestingly, the fall of the authoritarian ruler and the rise of a patchwork of 
armed groups and militias does not appear to have changed the picture radically (Campana, 
2018; Sanchez, 2020). “The presence of kingpins who can exert monopolistic control over a 
certain route,” while frequently aired in media and policy discourses, remains strongly disputed 
and poorly corroborated by convincing evidence (Campana, 2018, p. 493). In a similar vein, 
researches on West Africa have noted that in this region, too, migrant smuggling is fragmented, 
and depends more on individual initiatives, ‘homespun’ organisational arrangements, and small- 
scale negotiations than on an integrated chain of professional services deployed internationally 
and centralised vertically (UNODC, 2011b; Benattia, Armitano and Robinson, 2015). In 
Niger, where migratory flows directed to Libya and Europe have soared considerably since 
2014, smuggling remains dominated by “small-scale low-investment activities” featuring “ra-
ther fragmented and uncoordinated chains of actors” (Brachet, 2018, p. 29), while the dynamics 
of market competition – essentially non-violent in nature – witness to the absence of a con-
solidated criminal monopoly (Raineri, 2018). 
The migratory route from the Horn of Africa may represent a possible exception to this 
trend. Here, studies commissioned or carried out by think tanks, international organisations and 
law enforcement agencies contend that hierarchically structured criminal cartels are able to 
coordinate the shipping of migrants from Eritrea to Europe via Libya (Sahan/IGAD, 2016;  
UNHCR, 2019). Recent scholarly work, however, has questioned this view. Emerging evi-
dence from ethnographic immersion (Ayalew Mengiste, 2018) and social network analysis 
(Campana, 2018) suggests that the modus operandi of migrant smuggling from the Horn of 
Africa to Europe remains highly fragmented. The resort to sophisticated organisational ar-
rangements, which has also been noted, coexists with a high degree of social embeddedness and 
permeability of smuggling networks operating along this route. 
One could be tempted to argue that the over-reliance on bottom-up research designs may 
have contributed to distorting these findings. After all, ethnographic methods generally provide 
access to the perceptions of smuggled migrants and low-level smugglers who, even if 
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well-intentioned and transparent, may be simply unaware of the functioning of the higher, 
more secretive echelons of the organisations that empower and shape their activities (a similar 
position surfaces, for instance, in Malakooti, 2016). The reality seems to be exactly the opposite 
though. Data access limitations have concurred to cement the hegemony of the criminological 
approach to the study of migrant smuggling. As a result of the difficulties in observing, mea-
suring, and gathering reliable data on an inherently opaque activity (Koser, 2009; McAuliffe and 
Laczko, 2016), studies on migrant smuggling have long been shaped by law enforcement who 
(claim to) have first-hand information, as UNODC has also recognized (UNODC, 2011a). 
Ethnographic research on migrant smuggling has contributed to eroding this informational bias. 
Interestingly, subsequent studies drawing on alternative, non-ethnographic methods of data 
collection and analysis – such as judicial sources, regression analysis of wiretapping metadata, 
content analysis of wiretapping records and social network analysis (SNA) – have corroborated 
the same conclusions (Soudijn and Kleemans, 2009; Webb and Burrows, 2009; Leman and 
Janssens, 2011; Demir, Sever and Kahya, 2017; Campana, 2018). This proliferation points to an 
emerging consensus that the involvement of hierarchically structured criminal syndicates in the 
organisation of migrant smuggling is tenuous at best. 
Scholars have put forward a plausible explanation of this seeming anomaly. Arguably, tra-
ditional criminal organisations excel at those racketeering activities in which territorial control 
can be exploited, such as gambling, prostitution and protection (Paoli, 2003). Being geo-
graphically constrained in their own turf, however, they are ill-equipped to meet the fluid 
demands of a multi-sited, transnational market, such as migrant smuggling. This is what Zhang 
and Chin (2002, 2003) call the structural deficiency of traditional criminal cartels. Nevertheless, 
as the subsequent sections suggest, law enforcement measures to curtail (the supply side of) 
human smuggling can incentivise the demand for the protection of informal transactions, 
thereby creating a fertile ground for organised criminal groups to step back in. 
Migrant smuggling and network theory 
Building on the above, it is safe to conclude that research findings do not uphold the narrative 
of migrant smuggling as organised by tentacular crime syndicates structured hierarchically and 
able to generate (criminal) economies of scale by ensuring central oversight to the transnational 
shipping of migrants from their home village to their countries of destination. To the contrary, 
migrant smuggling is typically facilitated by networks organised horizontally, featuring multiple 
affiliations and limited geographic reach. Migrants typically negotiate their shipment through 
every single leg of their journey with a variety of different providers of smuggling services, who 
generally act as freelance entrepreneurs and do not report to a higher-level hierarchy belonging 
to a single, unitary, criminal organisation. This is not to imply that all social organisation and 
hierarchy is entirely absent from migrant smuggling. Proponents of the network theory ac-
knowledge that smugglers do retain different levels of influence, but this is more the result of 
their capacity to connect a variety of networks and bridge a diversity of social environments 
than of any pre-given organisational hierarchy (Kleemans, 2007; Campana, 2018). In other 
words, it is less a matter of top-down dominance from a vertical perspective, than of central 
strategic positioning from a horizontal perspective. 
Within this framework, the network theory opens up the questions of how migrants and 
smugglers establish connections, and negotiate their agreements. On the one hand, in fact, the 
availability of a plurality of providers of smuggling opportunities, rather than of a single violent 
monopolist, enables migrants to exercise a much greater degree of autonomy and agency (Van 
Liempt and Doomernik, 2006; Sanchez, 2020). It becomes apparent that in many cases migrants 
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choose their own smugglers, building on the feedback collected from common acquaintances 
or online (Campana, 2020). While the exploitation of naivety and need make scams far from 
infrequent, increasing access to social media technology contributes to reducing informational 
asymmetry. On the other hand, trust between migrants and smugglers is of extreme importance 
(Kleemans, 2007; Golovko, 2018; Sanchez, 2018). This is in line with the findings of an 
emerging ethnographic literature on criminal networks in general (Nordstrom, 2007), and 
contributes to questioning the standard assumption held by an influential tradition of political 
science – from Hobbes to Weber – arguing that transactions taking place beyond state reg-
ulation are bound to generate anarchy, violence and ultimately social disintegration. The ob-
servation, often reported, that migrants typically trust smugglers more than the law enforcement 
apparatuses tasked with fighting them (see for instance Golovko, 2018) highlights that this may 
not be always the case. In other words, the network theory shifts the focus away from the 
overemphasis on economic capital – whether that spent by migrants or raised by profit-seeking 
criminal organisations – to the social capital as a key variable to explain the trajectories, dy-
namics and organisation of migrant smuggling. 
From this perspective, pre-existing bonds between smugglers and migrants often provide an 
asset to leverage social capital and minimise uncertainty and risk. The literature offers ample 
illustration of how family networks account for a key enabler of migration, including irregular 
migration and smuggling (Staring, 2004; Bilger, Hofmann and Jandl, 2006; Zhang, 2008). 
Increasingly, available scholarship has highlighted that migrant smugglers frequently share the 
same social and ethnic background as the migrants being smuggled (Neske, 2006; Soudijn, 
2006; Majidi, 2018; Stone-Cadena and Álvarez Velasco 2018). Coming from impoverished 
communities, smugglers choose their “career” less out of greed than lack of alternatives, with 
migrant smuggling often complementing other sources of income (Sanchez, 2020). As a result, 
smugglers often share the same milieu and concerns as the migrants, leading to a blurring of the 
lines between the two categories. 
The focus on the motivations and the recognition of the common social and moral 
standpoint that often ties smugglers and migrants together has also helped debunk the myth of a 
normative polarisation between, respectively, ruthless predators and naïve victims. To be sure, 
abuses and scams are not uncommon in migrant smuggling, but their exhibition and media 
overemphasis – often with sensationalistic tones – has all too often led us to overlook the 
positive interactions that are frequent between migrants and smugglers. There is no shortage of 
reports highlighting the “morality” of smugglers, who can come to be seen as “saviours” by 
migrants left with few alternatives (Pastore, Monzini and Sciortino, 2006; Van Liempt, 2007;  
Tinti and Reitano, 2016; Achilli, 2018; Ayalew Mengiste, 2018). At the same time, smugglers 
often see themselves as honest providers of a service that meets an exogenously given social 
demand of mobility, which is constrained by legislations widely held as unjust and unfair 
(Golovko, 2018; Mannocchi, 2019). Altruistic motivations often compound profit-seeking, 
making the interactions between smugglers and migrants irreducible to an economic rationality 
calculus. As Sanchez (2020, p. 22) has observed, “[smuggling] fees are often dependent of 
negotiations, community obligations, moral duty and other forms of reciprocity that go beyond 
financial values or returns, and are hardly ever the same, even for migrants traveling together or 
following the same trajectory.” 
These observations highlight that the research on migrant smuggling is in line with the 
overall conceptualisation of the ‘criminal’ world that is emerging from recent studies; i.e., that 
crime is not separate from, but deeply interwoven into the texture of ordinary social life and 
entangled in everyday intercourses, where criminal contacts intermesh with habitual social 
patterns (Kleemans and Van de Bunt, 1999; Hudson, 2014; Baird and Van Liempt, 2016). In 
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the same vein, smugglers are in most cases more accurately described as ordinary citizens 
partially engaging in extralegal activities, than as professional gangsters segregated in a secretive 
criminal underworld. 
Anti-smuggling policies: the iatrogenic effects of disrupting networks 
The concept of “criminal iatrogenesis” was introduced to describe cases in which anti-criminal 
policies ended up fuelling, rather than curbing, criminal activities and organisations, prompting 
the observation that the cure prescribed to fight crime proved worse than the disease (Cohen, 
1988; see also Brenner, 2021, in this volume). In its early iterations, criminal iatrogenesis re-
ferred mostly to the ‘unintended consequences’ or ‘collateral damage’ produced by the US “war 
on drugs.” The questionable results of the latter have not prevented the revamping of some of 
its measures in the framework of an emerging war on migrant smuggling (Horwood, 2019), 
including an almost exclusive focus on (the curtailment of) the supply side of smuggling ac-
tivities. Concurring with this view, scholars have highlighted the iatrogenic effects of the 
policies designed to fight migrant smuggling in Australia (Weber and Grewcock, 2011) and 
Europe (Stambol, 2019), spilling over to, respectively, south-east Asia and Africa. 
Across a multiplicity of different country cases, in fact, common features emerge from the 
analysis of the strategies, policies and measures adopted to respond to, and fight against, migrant 
smuggling. These typically include: a restriction of the visa regime for unregulated border 
crossing; a criminalisation of migrant smuggling, including the adoption of harsh penalties for 
smuggling-related offences; enhanced border protection, often with the use of military assets; 
the externalisation of border controls to countries of origin and transit of migratory flows, 
including the creation of buffer zones; the use of transit camps and off-shore processing; the 
declaration of a war against migrant smuggling and trafficking (often conflated), framed as part 
of a broader fight against terrorism and transnational organised crime; and the strengthening of 
law enforcement cooperation with countries of transit and origin of migrants (Weber and 
Grewcock, 2011). 
The extent to which these measures have proved successful in curbing migrant smuggling 
worldwide remains highly questionable. At the same time, evidence from different regions is 
piling up to suggest that such anti-smuggling policies have often resulted in the organisational 
restructuring of migrant smuggling, prompting a progressive replacement of small-scale, 
‘homespun’ networks with larger, more sophisticated criminal organisations (UNODC 
2011a, 2018). The latter are in fact better equipped for circumventing stricter border controls 
and forging the high-level partnerships required to condone illicit activities, owing to their 
greater economic resources and skilful use of organised violence. The rising entry barrier in the 
illegal(-ised) market of migrant smuggling is therefore credited for pushing towards greater 
criminal professionalisation while at the same time driving smaller operators out of the market. 
Furthermore, the disruption of small-scale migrant smuggling networks that is prompted by 
anti-smuggling law enforcement measures contributes to severing the “chain of trust” and 
personalised ties that make the infrastructure of cross-border mobility (Van Liempt, 2007). This 
can fuel a demand for the protection and enforcement (armed, if need be) of risky but profitable 
extralegal transactions, which mafia-like organisations present in the territory may be eager to 
meet with a view to expanding their protection rackets. Key brokers of transnational smuggling 
networks are thus absorbed, more or less willingly, within organised criminal structures con-
solidating beyond borders and confined localities (Morselli, 2009). 
There is no shortage of reports documenting these dynamics. The rising stakes of well- 
structured criminal and armed groups in the organisation and protection of migrant smuggling 
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has been noted in a variety of contexts, including the Caribbean (Kyle and Scarcelli, 2009), 
Libya (Stocker, 2017; Campana, 2018), and Sudan (Tubiana, Warin and Saeneen 2018), to 
name but a few. As this phenomenon appears correlated to the strengthening of transnational 
law enforcement efforts against migrant smuggling, critical observers have argued that anti- 
smuggling policies have counterintuitively contributed to “manufacturing smugglers” 
(Brachet, 2018). 
These observations, however, should not lead one to overlook the important analytical 
distinction between smuggling and protection providers. Drawing on the ideal-types in-
troduced by Tilly’s (1985) historical sociology, smugglers refer to the actors that facilitate the 
cross-border clandestine shipment of people and goods to make profit. Protection providers, 
instead, are seldom involved in the actual delivery of smuggling services, and limit themselves to 
controlling the territory where migrant smuggling takes place. In exchange, they extract (or 
extort) a cut of the revenues from smugglers operating in ‘their’ territory – which may be 
substantial, as Sanchez (2020) suggests. The relationships between smugglers and criminal or-
ganisations engaged in the protection of criminal activities can range from cooperation to 
rivalry. Smugglers can benefit from the weak territorial control that criminal organisations 
contribute to, but they can also resent a situation of unpredictability and unwanted attention. In 
some cases, “organised crime groups involved in protection might recruit former smugglers to 
help them levy the protection tax because of their knowledge of the routes, and their ability to 
detect other smugglers” (Campana, 2020). In other cases, criminal protectors can coerce 
smugglers into partnerships through extortion, for instance, by kidnapping migrants in transit 
and asking a ransom to the smugglers for their liberation, as observed in Libya, Mali and Mexico 
(Spener, 2009; Izcara Palacios, 2014; Malakooti, 2019). 
The entrance of armed criminal organisations into the migrant smuggling “business” fre-
quently leads to an escalation of exploitation and abusive practices vis-à-vis migrants. Numerous 
reports by UN agencies and NGOs provide ample illustration of this (UNSMIL and OHCHR, 
2016; Testa, 2019; UNHCR, 2019). The borders between migrant smuggling and trafficking 
are thus subject to erosion (Reitano et al. 2018). On the one hand, this further highlights the 
iatrogenesis of policies that are often designed, at least on paper, to serve humanitarian purposes 
such as “saving lives”: this was, for instance, the stated priority number one of the EU Agenda 
on Migration issued in the aftermath of the shipwreck off the shore of the island of Lampedusa 
that killed more than 800 people. On the other hand, there is a surprising – and somewhat 
disturbing – lack of evidence that safety and risk concerns, even if backed by reliable in-
formation, significantly can influence the preferences of migrants and prospective migrants 
resorting to smuggling. Recent reports (Raineri and Golovko, 2019) note that migrants often 
leave their countries of origin in spite of being reportedly aware of the risks that await them on 
the road, suggesting that, with the disruption of smuggling networks and “chains of trust,” 
accessibility, affordability and (poor) law enforcement have become the key determinants of 
irregular migration’s routes, modalities and destinations. 
Conclusion 
The criminalisation of migrant smuggling may be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The concept 
of migrant smuggling was immediately incorporated in the semantic field of organised crime 
when it was originally disentangled from the cognate notions of human trafficking and irregular 
migration. The growing availability of scholarly works and empirically-informed studies, 
however, has contributed to dispelling the early image of migrant smuggling as organised by 
tentacular crime syndicates structured vertically and stretched transnationally. A different theory 
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has progressively made its way, one that investigates migrant smuggling by stressing the sig-
nificance of ad-hoc partnerships over rigid affiliations, of social capital over economic capital, of 
agency over coercion, of social embeddedness over seclusion, of normality over exceptionality, 
and most importantly, of horizontal networks over top-down hierarchies. 
However, the transnational diffusion of measures to combat migrant smuggling has con-
tributed to prompting a transformation of the phenomenon. By disrupting of the “chain of 
trust” that typically provides the infrastructure of migrant smuggling, unscrupulous law en-
forcement measures have in many cases paved the way to the entrance of criminal syndicates in 
a sector where they used to be marginal. The iatrogenic effect of anti-smuggling policies thus 
turns the arrow of causality between “threat” and response on its head, making organised crime 
infiltration less the cause of anti-smuggling law enforcement measures, than the consequence. 
This should not lead one to underwrite the conflation of migrant smuggling and organised 
crime, that media and policy discourses tend to depict. Criminal and armed cartels are only 
infrequently involved in the actual organisation of migrants’ cross-border journeys. More often, 
they prey on smugglers and migrants alike by upholding a protection racket of migrant 
smuggling unfolding in ‘their’ territories. 
For all these reasons, it seems fair to conclude that – in the field of migration – the very 
notion of “smuggler” is problematic and calls for some degree of critical distancing. Its con-
notation has become too politically charged to claim a degree of neutrality suitable for scientific 
investigation. At the same time, its denotation runs the risk of being empirically empty. 
Ethnographic research has demonstrated that one can hardly encounter “smugglers” on the 
ground, as both migrants and the facilitators of migrant smuggling use a variety of different 
concepts, such as “passeurs” in francophone West Africa (Brachet, 2018), “connection men” in 
anglophone Africa (Lucht, 2012), “snakeheads” in China (Chin, 1999; Zhang, 2008), “coyotes” 
in Latin America (Spener, 2009; Stone-Cadena and Álvarez Velasco, 2018), as well as other 
terms depending on the context. This proliferation points to a research agenda that, aware of its 
own positioning in a field of struggle, avoids oversimplifying the reality with conceptual 
shortcuts that are potentially misleading, and engages instead in a careful, detailed, fine-grained 
mapping of a social phenomenon characterised by a huge degree of variation that it would be 
unscrupulous to gloss over.  
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HUMAN SMUGGLING, GENDER 
AND LABOUR CIRCULATION IN 
THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
Priya Deshingkar   
Introduction 
Irregular1 migration2 facilitation, or human smuggling, has been made hyper-visible in the 
context of tightening border controls in Europe, North America and other prosperous parts of 
the world. The focus of this discourse is predominantly on South-North clandestine journeys, 
especially from Africa in the case of Europe (ENACT 2020), based on data on interceptions in 
the Mediterranean. This narrative has eclipsed South-South human smuggling, which is equally 
if not more significant in terms of the numbers it involves; however, research on it remains thin 
(see for example Ayalew et al. (2018), Lindquist (2012), Lindquist et al. (2012) and Afsar 
(2009)). South-South smuggling may involve being smuggled across a border between two 
neighbouring countries or to a distant country. Every day, millions of irregular border crossings 
take place between countries in the Global South that share borders, such as Myanmar and 
Thailand or Bangladesh and India. 
There are also clear “corridors” of smuggling among non-contiguous countries, some se-
parated by considerable distances and on separate continents, such as Bangladesh and South 
Africa (Momen unpublished), Myanmar and Malaysia (Deshingkar et al., 2019), and Ethiopia 
and Saudi Arabia (Adugna et al., 2021). These corridors have evolved with the emergence of 
relatively lucrative work options in manufacturing and processing, care work and a variety of 
jobs in cities. Corridors are strengthened as transnational networks of migration are established, 
leading to further migration to particular destinations where migrants can draw on the support 
of their networks in integrating and making a life for themselves. 
Irregularity in migration encompasses a range of scenarios – overstaying visas (Momen and  
Deshingkar et al., 2019), delinking from tied work permits (Deshingkar et al., 2019; Jureidini, 
2017), irregular border crossings (Ayalew et al., 2018; Triandafyllidou 2020; Triandafyllidou 
and Bartolini, 2020), rejected asylum seekers and the children of undocumented parents 
(Triandafyllidou and Bartolini, 2020). Here we are concerned mainly with the actors and 
processes involved in irregular border crossings which involve entering a country without 
complying with the necessary requirements for legal entry, such as possessing a valid visa, work 
permit or health certificate, or entering at points not designated as ports of entry. 
Smuggling processes in West Africa are deeply connected to the geopolitics of migration 
management, as many of the policies that shape it are driven by interests in the North. In South 
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and South East Asia, they are shaped by the immigration regimes and labour circulation policies 
in receiving countries, but in different ways, as discussed in the following pages. 
In order to provide a thick account of smuggling operations on the ground, only three 
contrasting countries are discussed in detail below, namely Ghana, Bangladesh and Myanmar.3 
They share similarities – all have more than 70% of the population depending on agriculture 
and between 68% and 77% living in rural areas.4 They also have key differences which provide 
fertile opportunities for exploring how the intersection between culture, the geopolitics of 
migration control, globalised patterns of labour circulation, and the state, shape human 
smuggling patterns. 
In the three countries under consideration, migration for low-paid and informal work is 
most common and as such, the focus of this chapter is on smuggling as it relates to the broad 
category of labour migration. While labour circulation from poor countries towards rich 
countries has now become an established part of key sectors including care work and con-
struction work, restrictions on mobility are also mounting at the same time. For many, being 
smuggled across borders is often the only realistic option to access remunerative work op-
portunities. Even this, though, has become difficult and expensive since the act of human 
smuggling itself was criminalised with the launch of the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime in 2000 and its Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air, which came into force in 2004. Its sister Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children was introduced at the same time. 
Smuggling always involves crossing a border and may be voluntary, whereas trafficking can 
occur in the same country and always involves the exploitation of a person for profit.5 
Southern countries in irregular migration “hot spots” have taken a range of steps to im-
plement the Protocol and limit human smuggling, often with the aid of rich countries in the 
North that seek to contain migrants before they reach their shores. These measures include 
imprisoning and fining smugglers, awareness creation campaigns about the costs and risks of 
irregular migration and smuggling, and physical policing along known routes (Ayalew 
Mengiste, 2018; Ayalew et al., 2018; Carling, 2016; Sanchez, 2017). The justification for the 
increased policing of smuggling activities is to protect migrants, who are characterised as gullible 
and vulnerable, against smugglers, who are constructed as unscrupulous criminals and traders in 
human beings (Adugna et al., 2019; Sanchez, 2018). The process of smuggling is constructed in 
this imagination as beginning with an unsuspecting migrant entering the process voluntarily, 
only to be subjected to physical torture, execution and extortion further along the journey 
(Aronowitz, 2001). These messages are repeatedly reinforced through international media 
agencies such as AFP and Reuters (Adugna et al., 2021). While such outcomes are seen in a few 
cases, growing empirical evidence shows they are not representative of the experience of all 
migrants who use the services of smugglers. 
Smuggling and gendered circuits of labour circulation 
The extant literature indicates that there are often diverse infrastructures of human smuggling in 
the same geographical location for different kinds of destinations, occupations, and often quite 
separate infrastructures for men and women. For example, there are separate smuggling net-
works for feminised occupations and for those that are typically the reserve of men: in Ghana 
(Awumbila et al., 2019b, 2019a); Bangladesh (Abrar et al., 2017; Afsar, 2009; Rahman, 2020); 
Indonesia (Lindquist, 2012); and Myanmar (Franck et al., 2018). 
Gender plays out in other ways in landscapes of smuggling. Women in patriarchal societies 
are subjected to additional barriers to mobility as they are seen as the weaker sex in need of 
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protection, especially if they choose to migrate with the help of a smuggler. Here the UN 
Protocol on Human Trafficking with its explicit emphasis on ‘women and children’ is often 
invoked, ostensibly to protect women who are regarded as more vulnerable to abuse. 
Developing country governments are under intense pressure to comply with this international 
agenda through the influential US government’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report (Palmary 
and de Gruchy, 2016). 
There are also moral anxieties in many cultures about the sexual encounters that female 
migrants may have which pose a threat to their purity and the honour of the family. Traditional 
notions of masculinity in many societies construct the risks and dangers of migration experi-
enced by men as strengthening of their character and making them into brave adult men. The 
opposite is true in these discourses on female migration, as women are seen as inherently more 
vulnerable and in need of constant surveillance, accompaniment and protection by men or the 
state (Deshingkar, 2021; Huijsmans, 2014; Platt et al., 2018) Consequently, female migrants 
have been subjected to migration bans in several countries – Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Myanmar, Bangladesh and Indonesia. This includes bans on certain kinds of feminised mi-
gration and low-paid work or bans on migration to certain destinations or both, some of which 
are discussed under the case studies below. 
A deeper look at the intersections between human smuggling, global restrictions on mo-
bility, immigration regimes and particular gendered occupations, yields important insights into 
how the state, smuggling networks, and employers in destination countries relate to each other. 
The analysis in the remainder of the chapter unpicks the dynamics of smuggling related to 
construction work and domestic work that are two of the most accessible occupations for 
migrants all over the world. Both are highly gendered occupations due to cultural notions and 
gendered stereotypes in both sending and receiving countries about the inherent capabilities of 
men and women and the work that is appropriate for them (Deshingkar and Zeitlyn, 2015;  
Zeitlyn et al., 2014). Domestic work is feminised and employs mainly women along certain 
migration corridors such as Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka to the Middle East 
(Fernandez, 2019; Gamburd, 2000). Additionally, domestic work is also racialised, wherein 
women from certain nationalities and ethnic groups are constructed as suited to servitude in the 
home based on their appearance and skin colour (Anderson and Anderson, 2000). Domestic 
and care work is important for female migrants with few formal qualifications. ILO estimates 
suggest that there are roughly 67 million domestic workers over the age of 15 worldwide, 80% 
of whom are women. Migrants are heavily represented in ‘‘global care chains,” of domestic and 
care work with workers drawn mainly from poorer countries in the Global South (Parreñas, 
2015; Yeates, 2012), into rich countries where more women are entering the workforce and 
the social reproduction of the family is passed on to domestic workers (Fong et al., 2020). 
Construction work is an accessible source of employment for male migrants (BWI, 2006), 
employing nearly 110 million people worldwide (ILO, 2001). Globally, the construction sector 
is heavily dependent on migrant labour (Buckley et al., 2016) and it is also a sector where 
irregular migrants are concentrated. 
While the demand for migrant construction and domestic workers has grown, immigration 
regimes in receiving countries have become more exclusionary with complicated bureaucratic 
processes that are difficult for those who are located in remote locations away from government 
offices and the numerous agencies that provide health certificates and identity documents. 
Smugglers have become more important in migration for both occupations, for example, for 
the migration of domestic workers from Ethiopia to the Middle East (Fernandez, 2013) which 
is an important destination for migrants smuggled in for domestic work (Mahdavi, 2013). 
Similarly, Large numbers of Rohingya and other impoverished or persecuted people are 
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smuggled into Malaysia for work in a range of informal labouring jobs, including construction 
(Wahab, 2018). 
There are important differences in the way that smuggling for construction work and do-
mestic work are organised; this depends on the policy context in both sending and receiving 
countries, the economic circumstances of the family, gendered policies, and norms within the 
family and wider society. Entangled with these structural factors are processes related to the 
financing of smuggling and the materialities of travel such as documents and transport vehicles. 
Not just at the border 
A key observation of this chapter is that human smuggling cannot be seen as a process that 
happens only at the border. Rather, it is shaped by a variety of spatially dispersed actors who 
fulfil different but complementary functions. This is especially characteristic of brokerage and 
smuggling, which are linked to placement at destination. In such instances, there is usually a 
continuum from the first point of contact between a migrant and a local broker to the end 
destination which is facilitated by interconnected intermediaries, including the actual border 
smugglers (Awumbila et al., 2019b; Deshingkar et al., 2019). Village level brokers in the mi-
grant’s own community may have established relations with recruitment agents in towns and 
cities who in turn are linked to travel operators, passport authorities, passport photo units, 
health testing centres, immigration officials and border police, and smugglers at the border, then 
finally placement agencies in the destination country. However, this is not the case for all forms 
of human smuggling and in some corridors where policing is intense, there is no discernible 
chain or network. Here smugglers and other intermediaries may come together more oppor-
tunistically as they have to navigate new controls and chart different pathways to overcome 
those. An example of this is human smuggling through Niger, where new and different 
smuggling routes around Agadez, an important hub for irregular migration in West Africa 
(Molenaar, 2017), are in a constant state of flux (Bredeloup and Pliez, 2011). A similar situation 
is seen in clandestine journeys between Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia, where smugglers are ex-
ploring new routes and linking up with new intermediaries all the time (Adugna et al., 2021). 
In both kinds of scenarios, the village-level broker is often a key figure in remote and poorly 
connected societies, as they are critical for brokering contacts with the outside world and 
providing up-to-date intelligence on the best destination, modes of transport, official proce-
dures and the required documentation. Brokers are either ex-migrants belonging to the same 
community or people with connections, knowledge of the outside world and the ability to 
communicate across different worlds and social rules (Abrar et al., 2017; Lindquist, 2012). Such 
is the cultural and linguistic divide between migrants and city-based officials and bureaucrats, 
that a broker is needed to interpret and communicate between the two parties. Brokers are also 
well connected beyond the villages that they operate in and are able to access key personnel and 
negotiate on behalf of the migrant to obtain documents and permissions. 
Therefore, in order to understand the workings of human smuggling and the ways in which 
it shapes migration and labour markets, it is important to consider it in its entirety, and not just 
at the border. Smugglers can be conceptualised as one part of the broader infrastructure that 
facilitates irregular migration. Xiang and Lindquist’s (2012) concept of the “infrastructures of 
migration” that emerged from their research on low-skilled migration from China and 
Indonesia examines the interconnected actors, technologies and institutions that together fa-
cilitate mobility, offers a useful framework of analysis. They argue that all of these components 
must be considered together with intersectionality as an operational logic to understand how 
they work together to make migration happen. The concept of migration infrastructures lends 
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itself well to analysing human smuggling and irregular migration for low-paid occupations as it 
dwells on both the social aspects of human smuggling as well as is materialities, including 
documents, physical barriers at border crossings, makeshift accommodation structures, boats, 
desert vehicles and mobile phones. It provides the tools to interrogate how gender, immigration 
regimes, transport networks and the structure of employment intersect in different ways. I use it 
below to reveal the everyday manifestations of globalised labour circulation that depend on 
cheap foreign labour and the range of actors, and institutions that mediate it. 
A socially embedded process 
While considering the breadth of different actors and institutions involved in smuggling, it is 
also important to note that smuggling processes are deeply rooted within communities at 
points of origin and transit. These communities are comprised of actors with diverse interests 
whose search for work and business and social relations with migrants and smugglers con-
tinuously shapes and constitutes the spaces of brokerage and smuggling (Adugna et al., 2019;  
Bredeloup and Pliez, 2011; Deshingkar, 2021; Huijsmans, 2014). In poor communities with 
few sources of paid work, smuggling offers a critical source of income, albeit a modest one. 
These kickbacks from smuggling and the visible improvement in the standard of living of 
migrants’ families has earned smugglers a reputation akin to that of heroes (Adugna et al., 
2019). In fact, smugglers are able to operate precisely because local communities endorse their 
operations and perceive them as bringing benefits to everyone and not just the migrants and 
their families. In southern Ethiopia, where irregular migration to South Africa is widespread, 
those who facilitate it are called Berri Kefach or door openers (Adugna et al., 2019). These 
findings are corroborated in the wider literature; extended immersive research by Osella 
(Osella, 2014) among migrant communities in Kerala travelling to the Gulf, as well as research 
by Akesson and Alpes in Cape Verde and Cameroon (Åkesson and Alpes, 2019; Alpes, 2017) 
juxtapose the perceptions of local communities of brokers as critical to realising their mi-
gration project, notwithstanding their criminalisation by the state. Such narratives of smug-
glers being benefactors should not detract from the extremely high risk faced by migrants 
embarking on long and dangerous clandestine journeys, such as over-land crossings through 
the Sahara. The likelihood of coming to serious harm is very real; whether and to what extent 
they are able to escape and overcome adverse experiences to achieve their ultimate goal 
depends on a host of factors that are unpicked through empirical evidence of smuggling in the 
three countries under consideration. 
Against this backdrop, the chapter draws attention to two implications of human smuggling. 
First, it shows how human smuggling and irregular migrants are critical to sustaining circuits of 
labour circulation of cheap and disposable workers. Heavily restricted immigration regimes 
such as the Kafala system in the Middle East6 create ideal conditions for human smuggling and 
irregularity. In turn, the irregular status of migrants allows employers and placement agencies to 
exploit them, with fewer obligations to protect their rights. Migrant construction workers and 
domestic workers are thus placed in a hyperprecarious situation (Lewis et al., 2015) that 
governments in receiving countries are complicit in producing. Second, the examples discussed 
below illustrate that human smuggling can open up opportunities for people from poor and 
marginalised backgrounds by enabling them to access work that holds the potential for making 
life-changing investments back home. The objective of the chapter is to draw attention to the 
complexity of the phenomenon and provide a nuanced understanding of South-South human 




Ghana has a long history of migration within the country and internationally (Akyeampong, 
2000) and is now an important source country for irregular migrants in the Libyan construction 
industry (Kandilige and Hamidou, 2011). Migration to Libya began in the 1990s when Gaddafi 
actively wooed sub-Saharan migrants (Bredeloup and Pliez, 2011). In recent years the country 
has been less welcoming to migrants both because of growing anti-migration sentiment in the 
context of a deteriorating economy and also introduction of the EU-Libya Migration treaty 
which sought to limit migration into Europe and targeted West African migrants in particular 
(Tonah and Codjoe, 2020). 
Libya is the chosen destination here, not because migrants are unable to travel to Europe but 
because the Libyan labour market offers relatively high earning opportunities, albeit full of risk 
and uncertainty. In the current geopolitical context of ever-increasing controls on mobility and 
shrinking opportunities for legal migration, being smuggled across several countries northwards 
towards Libya has become the norm (Awumbila et al., 2019b; Kandilige and Hamidou, 2019). 
Nkoranza in the Brong Ahafo region and the border towns of Bawku and Tamale in Northern 
Ghana and are key points of origin and crossing the border out of Ghana. Policy barriers to 
movement within West Africa combined with differences in currency and language among the 
countries make the assistance of smugglers critical, especially for organising long and trea-
cherous journeys through the Sahara Desert, traversing several international borders. 
This kind of high risk and dangerous migration is male dominated due to cultural norms and 
the place of migration in men’s strategies to achieve wealth and prove their manhood. Male 
migration in Ghanaian society is embedded in traditional notions of masculinity; among young 
men it is inextricably linked to establishing themselves as ‘independent, respectable and mar-
riageable adults’ (Kleist, 2017), while older men migrate to provide for their families and invest 
in land, housing and business (Awumbila et al., 2019b). International migrants or “Borgas” as 
they are known locally, are admired for their material wealth, lifestyle, and ability to support 
their family members (Kleist, 2017). Women’s migration from this area for low-paid work to 
Libya is rare, as there are fewer manual jobs for women there, so it is assumed that any woman 
who migrates, for sex work; this stigmatisation impacts on her marriage chances back home 
(Darkwah et al., 2019). However, migration for domestic work to the Gulf states is on the rise 
from the capital city and its adjacent areas, as discussed below. 
Nkoranza in Brong Ahafo is well known for its “connection men” who facilitate journeys to 
Libya as well as European destinations. They have connections in the transit towns of Bawku, 
Niamey, and Agadez whom they can recommend to the migrant or communicate with 
themselves if they deem it necessary. Connection men are preferred over legal channels because 
they are more accessible, deals with them can be struck up immediately without paperwork, 
and they offer the promise of delivering the migrant to Libya, as they have successfully orga-
nised numerous irregular crossings before. They offer a package at one service point: organising 
the trip through the desert; and obtaining passports and other documents without the need for 
official documents (Awumbila et al., 2019b; Lucht, 2013). 
Returned and deported migrants recount harrowing details of journeys by road in a variety 
of overcrowded trucks, buses and pick up vans through Togo, Benin and Niger all the way up 
to Libya with the constant threat of being robbed, beaten and imprisoned or deported 
(Awumbila et al., 2019b). 
A majority of male migrants who have been smuggled into Libya are employed in con-
struction as well as other artisanal jobs, such as electricians and tailors (Tonah and Codjoe, 
2020). Irregular migrants are preferred by small construction companies as they are cheaper to 
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employ and more exploitable. Propelling this stream of irregular migration from rural Ghana 
was the desire to earn better among those who wanted more than agriculture could offer. The 
average cost of being smuggled into Libya in 2017 was around $6000, and only those who 
could sell assets or borrow to finance the journey were able to migrate (Awumbila and 
Torvikeh, 2018; Teye et al., 2015). The high cost did not guarantee a smooth journey and most 
migrants recounted horrific accounts being robbed at gunpoint, seeing other migrants die on 
the way, and being beaten. The suffering did not end after entering Libya either; migrants 
recalled being randomly robbed by militias, and being kept in overcrowded illegal detention 
without clean drinking water or washing facilities until they were bailed out by a relative. 
Deportations were common where migrants lost everything, including their money and their 
reputation as successful men back home. 
Libya, nonetheless, continued to be seen as a place where money could be made, and lives 
could be transformed. Returned migrants mentioned that if they managed to stay in Libya 
without being deported for two years, the earnings from construction work there would be 
more than they would earn back home in a decade and this allowed them to buy land, pay off 
debts and invest in small businesses. This was one reason for deported and returned migrants 
planning to remigrate to Libya once again. Another reason for men’s remigration was to rescue 
their masculine identity of being family providers (Kleist, 2017). 
For women, the routes to international migration and finding work in achieving such 
transformations are more complex. Ghana passed the 2005 Human Trafficking Act, amended in 
2009, which criminalized sex and labour trafficking. Well-known brokers, trusted by com-
munities, were arrested and imprisoned, leaving smuggling to less accountable fly by night 
operators (Deshingkar, 2018). Women aspiring to leave the country for low paid work in the 
Gulf must negotiate social structures at home to depart culturally ascribed life trajectories and 
structural factors at destination. These propel them towards certain feminised niches in the job 
market. Domestic work is an important avenue of employment for women and girls from poor 
backgrounds within Ghana; some may attempt international migration after gaining experience 
and saving enough to pay brokers. 
Ghana is a relatively new entrant to the globalised circuits of labour that supply domestic and 
care workers to the Gulf countries. Ghanaians are now found in significant numbers in the 
UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia together with workers from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya 
and Nigeria (Bisong, 2021). The number of Ghanaians seems to be on the rise and Saudi Arabia 
is the most popular destination (GAATW, undated) despite a ban on migration to the Gulf 
countries for domestic work in 2017. The ban was introduced to safeguard women against 
abuse after there were reports of abuse at the hands of brokers and employers (GAATW, 
undated). 
While the ban halted the operations of licensed recruitment agencies, informal brokers and 
smugglers continued to operate and facilitated the migration of Ghanaians to the Gulf States 
through neighbouring countries (Deshingkar, 2018). The Accra-Tema area has become a hub 
for the recruitment and irregular migration of women to the Gulf and is known for connection 
men who have “successfully” sent women abroad. Prior to the ban the Ghanaian Labour 
Department arranged exit permits, pre-departure preparation and monitoring of workers after 
they had reached their destination. During the ban, none of these processes was followed, as 
most of the migration for domestic work to the Gulf was irregular (GAATW, undated). 
Awumbila’s (Awumbila et al., 2019b) study was able to reach a very small number of female 
returnees from the Gulf who had all come back before expected, as they found the work too 
demanding and the behaviour of the employers unacceptable. Both in this study and the re-
search reported in the GAATW report, it was mainly women who were not married or 
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supported by a husband who decided to migrate. It is not clear how many of the women who 
migrate from Ghana are remaining in the Gulf for extended periods of time as research is scarce, 
but the numbers quoted by GAATW suggest that more and more women are deciding to 
migrate there: smugglers are key to enabling them to fulfil their aspirations. 
Myanmar 
Myanmar is now the largest exporter of low-skilled labour in Southeast Asia (Testaverde et al., 
2017). Decades of chronic underdevelopment and conflict, as well as the long border 
with Thailand, have created opportunities for human smuggling and irregular migration. There 
are an estimated five million Myanmar migrants in Thailand, with many entering through 
migrant smugglers (Carden, 2014). In fact, irregular migrants are a critical component of the 
profit model of Thai firms that is based on cheap and exploitable labour (Pearson and 
Kusakabe, 2012). 
A significant proportion of this cheap labour is from the bordering states of Mon and Kayin 
(Deshingkar et al., 2019). For young men and women, migration to Thailand has become an 
important way of repaying family debts and supporting younger siblings. 
Notwithstanding the proximity of Mon and Kayin to Thailand, the journey is nearly 
always undertaken with the help of transport providers known as “Carry” who smuggle them 
across the border. There are several reasons for this, includinghigh costs and complicated and 
time-consuming migrant registration processes in Thailand (Buckley et al., 2016). In addition, 
migrants prefer to remain irregular, as this gives them more options for staying in the country 
longer and switching employers (Deshingkar et al., 2019). Another reason is that migrants say 
they feel better protected by a smuggler, who handles all the bribes and complicated transport 
arrangements along the way (Deshingkar et al., 2019). It is seen that even highly experienced 
migrants who have been migrating to Thailand for several years use the services of Carry to 
enter Thailand either through the dedicated ports of the Three Pagoda pass or along other 
points in the porous border. On average, migrants from Mon paid 30,000 kyat in 2018 
(1 USD = 1000 kyat) to village-level brokers who linked with their Carry to cross the border 
to Thailand and then another 1,200 baht (1 USD = 30 Thai baht) for onward journeys that 
were paid to local transporters and informal placement agencies. These costs were usually 
financed through borrowing from relatives and paid off gradually after finding work. Nearly 
all crossed the border illegally without any documents, but then regularised their status after a 
period of time. In fact, despite a series of measures introduced by the Thai government to 
control irregular migration and the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding, nearly all 
migration from Myanmar to Thailand is irregular (Balcaite, 2019; Thu and Ko, 2015). 
The cultural context of irregular migration and human smuggling for construction work is 
altogether different in Myanmar compared with Bangladesh and Ghana. Those migrating from 
Mon and Kayin are young, often in their early 20s, with low levels of education and belonging 
to very poor families (Deshingkar et al., 2019). Masculinities and femininities play out in this 
smuggling landscape too, but in a less polarised way, perhaps because the migration is over a 
shorter distance and involves fewer risks compared to trans-Sahara migration in West Africa. 
While women are still socially constructed as the weaker sex and in need of protection and their 
identities constructed as daughters, wives and mothers, changing attitudes to migration have 
meant there are now options for them to travel abroad and work in a sector that is male 
dominated in other parts of the world. Female migrant construction workers were mainly from 
the poorest families without older male siblings who could migrate to support the family. Many 
women in the study by (Deshingkar et al., 2019) provided culturally accepted reasons for their 
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migration and justified it as a way of fulfilling their duty to provide for their parents in their old 
age, their younger sibling’s education, or monk ceremonies. 
Kayin is known for the migration of domestic workers to Thailand, and this pattern has 
resulted from social networks and established migration streams. As was seen in the case of Mon 
construction workers, the prevalence of informal brokers and Carry was widespread in this kind 
of migration. The journeys of female domestic workers were much longer and far more ha-
zardous than those of male construction workers because most of them were being delivered all 
the way to the homes of informal brokers in the heart of Bangkok. One respondent in  
Deshingkar et al. (2019) study said the 500 km journey from her home to Bangkok took ten 
days with several stops in hideouts along the way. Although none of the women reported sexual 
harassment or abuse by the brokers, deception and physical confinement was common. 
While the exploitation and deceit experienced by migrants travelling with the assistance of a 
Carry have been documented by Meyer et al. (2015), there is insufficient discussion in the 
literature on the other aspects of the relationship between migrants and smugglers. Those 
travelling to construction sites just across the border in Thailand were unequivocal in saying 
that migrating with Carry was the easiest and surest way of reaching their destination, if a bit 
expensive. Many said they felt protected by the brokers and Carry, in contrast to the policy 
discourse on smugglers, which portrays them as ruthless criminals (Deshingkar et al., 2019). 
Women migrating for domestic work also felt it was best to migrate with the help of known 
smugglers, in spite of the difficulties they experienced, as they understood that the steps they 
took were necessary to evade detection at the border. They preferred the Carry to handle 
everything, paying border officials and other brokers, instead of negotiating their passage with 
unknown people all by themselves. 
The poorest families, who were not able to finance the migration of their daughters, entered 
debt-migration, which is widespread in domestic work across Asia (Deshingkar, 2021; Platt 
et al., 2017). In Myanmar it was encountered more frequently in the poorest families where 
aspiring migrants could not mobilise capital to finance the migration (Griffiths and Ito, 2016). 
The costs of migration (transport, obtaining papers, permits and visas) and job placement are 
borne by the broker and/or employer, and the migrant repays through salary deductions over a 
period ranging from four months to a year. The interviews carried out by (Deshingkar et al., 
2019) suggested that migrants were remitting substantial amounts of money back to their fa-
milies; this corroborates the findings of (Kusakabe and Pearson, 2015). 
Bangladesh 
There are multiple circuits of transnational irregular migration originating in Bangladesh, with 
smuggling networks extending across the globe all the way to Libya in the West (Siddiqui and 
Bhuiyan, 2013) and Malaysia in the east (Rahman, 2020). Bangladesh has emerged as an im-
portant source country for irregular migrants who are employed in construction labour in the 
Gulf countries, as well as rich countries in Southeast Asia. Such workers are critical to the 
success of construction projects such as the FIFA stadium in Qatar, and smuggling and 
brokerage is intertwined with entering the country and finding work under the Kafala system 
(Renkiewicz, 2016). The infrastructure of smuggling stretches all the way from the villages of 
migrants right up to companies in the destination country. It encompasses a range of formal and 
informal institutions and individuals, including village-level brokers, recruitment agencies, 
travel agents, medical testing centres, training centres, border officials and airline staff (Abrar 
et al., 2017; Deshingkar et al., 2019). 
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Village-level brokers fulfil several functions; they may act as a guarantor for money lenders 
so that migrants can obtain loans to finance their migration (Rahman, 2012), which are offered 
at usurious interest rates of between 30–60% (Jureidini, 2014). Others borrow from relatives or 
sell family assets. Brokers may also help the migrant choose an appropriate destination based on 
their market intelligence. Abrar et al.’s (2017) research shows that brokers also select and 
channel migrants into particular jobs and help them choose a “bhalo” or good visa which could 
be an irregular “azad” or free visa. An Azad visa is one that is bought from a legally registered 
kafeel, or sponsor, by a broker to sell on to a migrant, their family, or another intermediary. 
Such a visa allows a migrant to enter the country as a worker tied to this particular kafeel, but in 
practice they can work for anybody. Such kafeels can include companies in Qatar that have 
unused visas which they sell to agents. There are an estimated 400,000 irregular Bangladeshi 
migrants in Qatar, and most have entered the country on these so called azad or free visas 
(Momen and Deshingkar, 2020; Jureidini, 2014: 87). 
The free visa system is widespread in the Qatari construction industry. The process of re-
cruiting workers starts with the village-level dalal or broker who takes a large lump sum from 
the migrant and offers them a “package.” This consists of help with obtaining a passport, 
checking the authenticity of the visa, helping them to mobilise any other documents that are 
needed, and linking them up to their chosen registered recruitment agency (RA) in a major city 
like Dhaka. Brokers play a role in both official migration as well as irregular migration. In the 
former, they help the migrant to complete the formalities, and in the latter they manage the 
process with an azad visa, which involves linking up known RAs who have bribed contacts in 
key institutions like medical testing centres and passport offices as well as aviation personnel and 
border officials. The average price of a free visa in 2017 was QAR 25,000 (about USD 6867). 
The context of female irregular migration in Bangladesh is similar to Ghana and Myanmar: 
the country had introduced a series of restrictions on women’s migration, but these were 
progressively relaxed, resulting in an increase in the number of female migrants. However, 
women’s ability to migrate internationally continues to be shaped by numerous religious, 
cultural and political barriers that they must negotiate, and this can explain why their numbers 
have remained low (Belanger and Rahman, 2013). Afsar’s study among Gulf returnees in 
Bangladesh noted that there were no female migrants from the conservative Noakhali and 
Sylhet areas. Like Ghana, international migration among women is higher in the capital city of 
Dhaka and its surrounding areas where gender norms are more relaxed (Afsar, 2009; Siddiqui, 
2002). Migration to the Gulf is an important route out of a socially constrained situation for 
divorced, separated and widowed women. In Afsar’s sample, half the women were divorced, 
abandoned or widowed. Others belonged to extremely poor families with no cultivable land 
and were migrating to escape debt and domestic abuse. 
Even there are no restrictions on women’s migration, there is evidence of irregular border 
crossings and the prevalence of the azad visa system in this kind of migration too. Up to 45,000 
Bangladeshi women had migrated to the Gulf countries between 1998 and 2011 (Rahman, 
2012). Nasra Shah and Lubna Al-Kazi’s research on irregular migration in Kuwait shows that 
relatives can buy azad visas from Kafeels and send them directly to women in Bangladesh (Shah 
and Al-Kazi, 2017). Another route was fake or “gala kata” visas (Afsar, 2009). In Afsar’s study of 
brokerage in Bangladesh, a majority of women used the services of brokers to complete travel 
formalities (e.g., medical check-up, visa processing and flight arrangements). The broker would 
procure “gala kata” visas and forged passports with the help of local government officials and 
printing machine operators. Passage for the migrant in possession of the fake documents would 
be assured through the broker’s network with airline staff both in Bangladesh and the desti-
nation country (Afsar, 2009). 
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There is no doubt that the Kafala system was important in creating the conditions for 
smuggling and irregularity to flourish. However, there is also evidence of irregularity being 
mobilised by migrants for their own ends. Some of the women in Shah and Al-Kazi’s study did 
not renew their work permits and remained irregularly in Kuwait for years, even decades. 
During their stay, they remitted significant sums back to dependents in Bangladesh, and some 
succeeded in paying for the higher education of their children (Shah and Al-Kazi, 2017). 
Conclusion 
The research synthesised in this chapter shows that smuggling arrangements are far more 
complex than policy narratives suggest. A multitude of arrangements can exist even in the same 
geographical region: often there are separate infrastructures of smuggling for men and women 
because they are heading to different destinations and occupations. Human smugglers offer a 
wide range of services for migrants including advice on routes and destinations, protection 
during the journey, documentation and transportation across borders. 
The hardship that migrants experience while being smuggled needs to be understood with 
an appreciation of their goals for the advancement of their families and themselves. Smuggled 
migrants can and do remit significant amounts of money which is critical for improving the 
family’s standard of living, educating siblings, investing in durable assets and repaying family 
debts. 
In today’s globalised world, interconnected by new technologies and modes of travel, the 
demand for cheap labour in rich countries has drawn migrants from poor countries with limited 
opportunities. These globalised labour regimes intersect with infrastructures of smuggling 
which perpetuate power asymmetries and gender inequalities by channeling particular ethni-
cities and nationalities into certain kinds of work. These processes contribute to the production 
of highly gendered and racialised patterns of migration and labour circulation. 
Conversely, the infrastructures of smuggling help to expand migrant agency by giving 
people more choices. However, the process remains arbitrary, as there is an unpredictable mix 
of how “good” the smuggler is, how bribeable the border officials and police are, how much 
money the migrant can mobilise and, crucially, luck and chance. As human smuggling is by 
definition outside the purview of the law, there is no way of enforcing standards related to the 
treatment of migrants, costs, modes of transport, housing of migrants along the way and their 
reception in destination countries. In such a lawless and arbitrary process where migrants are 
away from their usual support networks, the smuggler has a great degree of power over 
migrants. 
The experiences described here show that migrants’ relationship with smugglers is complex. 
Smugglers play an ambiguous role as they are embedded in processes that reproduce structural 
inequalities such as the employment of undocumented migrants in highly exploitative work; at 
the same time, they are instrumental in opening up opportunities for marginalised communities 
who would otherwise have no access to international labour markets and higher wages that can 
be transformative for the individuals involved and the families left behind. It must be borne in 
mind, however, that common to all scenarios was the prevalence of informal employment 
arrangements without official contracts. Furthermore, the combination of state policies to 
combat human smuggling, trafficking and irregular migration with the constant threat of 
criminalisation and deportation creates insecure working and living conditions where migrant 
workers must accept exploitative work in order to survive, save and remit money. 
In sum, this chapter provides a much-needed nuanced picture of what migration actually 
involves for millions of people who have been denied the right to legal and free mobility within 
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the developing world. Smugglers transcend political borders and provide a critical link that 
connects those who have been excluded by global development with some of its gains, albeit in 
a highly unequal fashion. These studies on South-South smuggling are important for gaining an 
understanding of the relationship between poverty and the ability to migrate. Smugglers can 
make migration a possibility even for the very poor and those without formal educational 
qualifications, and help them to access international migration which is usually the preserve of 
the rich. 
Notes  
1 Migration becomes “undocumented” or “irregular” in policy parlance, when it occurs outside the 
legal and regulatory frameworks of the sending, transit, and destination countries. Irregular migration 
includes other possibilities such as remaining in the country without a visa; working in contravention 
of work restrictions and remaining in the country after the visa expires. Human smuggling facilitates 
one form of irregular migration which is crossing a border illegally with the use of falsified documents 
or without documents or entering a country at points other than officially sanctioned ports of entry. 
The term smuggling as it is used here encompasses processes that enable the illegal crossing of borders 
including the use of clandestine routes, bribing border officials and the falsification of travel and 
identity documents.  
2 I use the term “migration” as an all-encompassing term to indicate mixed migration flows including 
economic migrants, refugees and other categories of forced migrants as their journeys may change from 
one form to another over the course of the journey.  
3 The material is drawn heavily from research carried out under the DFID funded Migrating out of 
Poverty Consortium (MOOP), a ten-year programme of multidisciplinary research across Asia, Africa 







5 For other differences please refer to https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/tip-and-som/module-11/key- 
issues/differences-and-commonalities.html.  
6 The Kafala system is now being reformed but the effects of that were not evident at the time of data 
collection.  
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HUMAN SMUGGLING IN THE 
TIME OF COVID-19 
Lessons from a pandemic 
Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo   
Introduction 
The unprecedented restrictions on human movement imposed around the world to curb the 
spread of COVID-19 in the spring of 2020 posed new challenges and protection risks for 
migrants and refugees. They also cast into sharp relief the impacts of responses to irregular 
migration, and human smuggling, that are centred on border control, particularly on the 
protection risks faced by migrants and refugees on their journeys. 
Political discourse construing the fight against COVID-19 as a ‘war’ quickly gained sig-
nificant momentum. Restricting or halting human movement – COVID-19’s key transmission 
‘tactic’ – became a key part of the ‘battle,’ with epidemiological contact tracing another crucial 
‘weapon.’ Irregular and clandestine movement erodes the efficacy of these measures, making it 
difficult to establish a comprehensive picture of exposure or contain the spread of the virus. 
In this context, it is no surprise that the military was quickly deployed in many countries to 
restrict the domestic movement of individuals and strengthen border controls. Migration policy 
and discourse, shaped by the need to control an unprecedented global pandemic, increasingly 
became framed through the lens of national security, accelerating pre-existing trends. In line 
with this, untracked human movement became the enemy of states fighting this public health 
disaster. 
Exploring how pandemic response measures have shaped the human smuggling industry, 
and consequent migrant protection risks, offers an unparalleled opportunity to scrutinise the 
unintended consequences of responses to irregular migration and human smuggling, which are 
principally based on border control and interdiction of smugglers. In the wake of the most 
significant global shock experienced for decades, it also presents a unique chance to move away 
from extant response paradigms. 
‘Shocks,’ or ‘critical junctures’ (often significant economic or political crises), can expand the 
‘reform space’ available to policy-makers, enabling adoption of innovative approaches, and 
offering an opportunity to ‘do things differently’ (Capoccia, 2016; Fritz, Levy, Ort, 2014). The 
COVID-19 pandemic presents a shock of unprecedented geographic scope and scale, triggering 
calls by political commentators for policy-makers ‘not [to] let a good crisis go to waste’ 
(Marquette, 2020). 
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In the context of human smuggling, a rethink is certainly required. While human smuggling 
has been a policy priority across states of transit and destination since the turn of the century, the 
global response remains fragmented and of questionable effectiveness (Bird, 2019). The re-
sponses to human smuggling available and implemented by policy-makers have stagnated; 
COVID-19 could create space for innovation. 
At the time of writing, this opportunity had not been acted upon. Instead, responses to 
human smuggling in the context of the pandemic have largely constituted an acceleration of 
pre-existing approaches which seek to block movement through the militarisation of borders, 
and reduce the supply of smugglers through interdiction. 
Prior to the pandemic, the growing securitisation of the migration landscape was shown to 
drive migrants’ reliance on smuggling networks and increase protection risks on the migrant 
trail. Evidence collected across 2020 points to the exacerbation of these trends by COVID-19- 
driven shifts in policy.1 
The pandemic has deepened economic strain in many regions, increasing drivers for mi-
gration, while the parallel closure of legal migration routes has ensured a growing proportion of 
migration is irregular, and smuggler facilitated. In order to understand why, it is key to delineate 
accurately the mechanics underpinning the smuggling market. Human smuggling is best un-
derstood as a services industry, where smugglers are service providers who, for a fee, help 
migrants to cross boundaries and overcome barriers, which may be geographic, political or 
cultural.2 The harder an obstacle in migration journeys is to cross independently, the greater the 
demand for human smugglers. As borders became newly securitised, and human movement 
further restricted due to COVID-19, smugglers become yet more essential. 
The COVID-19 crisis also looks set to have long-term consequences for both the perception 
of and protections afforded to migrants. Migrants have been stigmatised in some areas as po-
tential carriers of the virus, with some communities actively opposing their presence. Such 
stigmatisation could harden into longer-lasting antipathy towards migrants that persists beyond 
the end of the COVID-19 crisis, potentially eroding the raft of protections afforded to migrants 
and refugees under international and domestic laws. 
This chapter explores the impacts of COVID-19 responses on the human smuggling market, 
including on the vulnerabilities of migrants and refugees. This underscores the medium-term 
consequences for those on the move, but also shines a spotlight on the flaws in current response 
frameworks, and analyses whether a shift away from the blanket application of criminal justice 
approaches is needed. 
The closure of legal migration pathways 
Between March and September 2020 an unprecedented number of countries around the world 
sought to close, or partially close, their borders to the entry of non-nationals, rendering all 
cross-border human movement illegal (with narrow exceptions, in some states, for movement 
deemed ‘essential’). Pursuant to the Pew Research Centre, as of 1 April, 91% of the global 
population lived in states with restrictions on international arrivals, 39% with completely closed 
borders (Connor, 2020). 
Countries around the world, ranging from Algeria to Greece, and El Salvador to the United 
States, funnelled further resources into border control, enhancing the hardware and official, 
often military, patrolling of borders (Snow, 2020). The widespread deployment of military to 
prevent irregular border crossings further militarised the broader migration landscape, as well as 
COVID-19 emergency responses, which in some cases arguably breached extant humanitarian 
practises and international law. The closure of Maltese and Italian ports to irregular arrivals, 
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including to NGO vessels (Reidi, 2020; Reuters, 2020), and Malaysia’s turning away boats of 
Rohingya refugees are merely two of many such incidents (Loy, 2020). 
State imposed restrictions, together with widespread fear of infection, made migrant and 
refugee journeys far more difficult, including for the vast numbers seeking to return home – a 
response tracked in previous pandemics, including Ebola (Betancourt et al., 2016). Where 
border closures prevented migrants and refugees returning home independently, many used the 
services of smugglers. Zimbabwe, among other countries, experienced a significant influx of 
irregular migrants seeking to return to their home countries after losing their livelihoods in 
South Africa due to the pandemic (Kavhu, 2020). 
Restrictions on domestic and cross-border movement temporarily depressed both regular 
and irregular migration in many regions.3 Frontex reported that in March 2020 the ‘number of 
detections of illegal border crossings on Europe’s main migratory routes fell by nearly half’ from 
February, and by 85% between March and April, reaching record lows.4 
In the face of increased obstacles to smuggling operations, some networks previously 
focussing on human movement responded to the higher risk of such activities, as stopping 
human movement became prioritised at borders, by leveraging their networks to smuggle 
goods instead. In many contexts, goods became a secondary focus of border control, meaning 
the risks involved were lower. Smugglers responded to new demands for legal commodities 
whose supply chain has been disrupted by COVID-19 trade restrictions, or which had been 
rendered illegal by new state regulation.5 This has been reported in regions as diverse as Niger, 
where smugglers have confirmed switching to moving goods and fuel from Libyan cities in the 
south to goldfields in northern Chad in reaction to heightened interdiction risk, and Thailand, 
where gemstone traders have used human smugglers to move their wares (Senior organized 
crime analyst, Personal Communication, 14 April 2020). 
However, given that the factors driving demand for human movement had not diminished, 
the lull was predicted, from the beginning of the pandemic, to be temporary. In line with this, 
across many regions, irregular migration started to increase, reaching and in some cases ex-
ceeding pre-pandemic levels, as soon as restrictions started to ease. 
Illustratively, while interceptions of migrants and refugees departing from Algeria and 
Tunisia in March 2020 were dramatically fewer than January 2020 figures, which had been 
particularly high for the season, by July interceptions had once again increased (GI-TOC 
analysis of Algerian Ministry of defense data etc.; 2020). The economic stress caused by 
COVID-19, compounding the challenges faced by two faltering economies, continues to drive 
irregular emigration, with nationals of both countries constituting a far higher proportion of 
arrivals in Italy than in the previous year (UNHCR, 2020; The New Humanitarian, 2020). 
Similarly, as movement restrictions in Guatemala eased in late July 2020, irregular migration 
towards the United States increased sharply, with both detentions of Guatemalan nationals by 
US Border Force, and deportations experiencing a significant spike (Road, 2020). Overall US 
Border Patrol apprehensions across the border with Mexico plummeted between March and 
April 2020, but quickly started increasing again from May onwards, exceeding pre-pandemic 
figures, and those of the same month of 2019, by September (US Customs, 2020). 
4Mi survey data collected by the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) between April and 
September 2020 regarding the impact of COVID-19 on refugees and migrants travelling across 
mixed migration routes in Africa, Asia and Latin America found that, in parallel to the in-
creasing difficulties of migration journeys, 37% of respondents indicated a greater need for 
smugglers (rising to 44% and 46% respectively in West Africa and Latin America) (Mixed 
Migration Centre, 2020). 
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As legal pathways shrink and the obstacles to independent irregular migration grow (due to 
enhanced border control), a growing proportion of migrants are forced to move irregularly, and 
require the help of smugglers to so (Reitano and Bird, 2018). Consequently, they will have to 
endure the heightened protection risks associated with more clandestine modi operandi. 
Growing demand for human smuggler services 
Smuggling markets react quickly to increased demand. The March 2020 closure of the Benin- 
Niger border in response to the COVID-19 pandemic significantly increased human smuggling 
activity in the region. Before March, a small smuggling industry helped irregular migrants refused 
entry at official border crossings. Following the border closure, the market quickly adapted to 
cater for increased demand by local Nigerian and Beninese migrants wishing to cross the border. 
Profits from this expansion have been re-invested in enhancing transport infrastructure, cutting 
the journey times by adding motors to the pirogues traditionally used for smuggling activity. 
Similarly, the increase in irregular maritime departures from Algeria noted above was, in late 
2020, accompanied by heightened investment in infrastructure (boats with expensive imported 
engines), and levels of organisation (with simultaneous departures of 30 boats). 
The specific context of COVID-19, and in particular the proliferation of domestic move-
ment restrictions, has meant that heightened demand is coupled with difficulties in accessing a 
smuggler – 43% of refugees and migrants surveyed by the MMC reported increased difficulties 
accessing smugglers, with Latin America the only region where respondents reported this less 
frequently (Mixed Migration Centre, 2020). In some contexts, including Niger, heightened 
focus on interdicting smugglers in the context of the pandemic can also present obstacles to 
migrants’ obtaining their services. 
As in any services industry, the price of smuggling services is determined by supply and de-
mand market dynamics. Consequently, as demand for smuggling services grows and supply (or 
access to supply) is restricted, prices are driven upwards. Further price inflation is triggered by the 
increased risk faced by smugglers operating in an environment made increasingly hostile to 
migrants by COVID-19 – the higher price reflects the increased risk of detection and sanction. 
These dynamics can be tracked in Northern Mali, where smuggling operations drastically 
decreased between March 2020 and September 2020. This decrease was in part due to the 
temporary counter-COVID-19 movement restrictions imposed by the Coordination of 
Azawad Movements (CMA), a coalition of armed groups which has consolidated support across 
much of this area, including Timbuktu and Gao, two smuggling transit points on the journey 
northwards to Algeria and Niger. But predominantly due to the uptick in security at the Mali- 
Algeria border, where smugglers reported a significant spike in surveillance and patrolling by 
Police Border Guards, Gendarmerie Gardes Frontières units, and military patrols. When 
smuggling resumed in September 2020, prices paid by migrants travelling from Timbuktu in 
Mali to Algeria had doubled, with the increase attributed by those on the ground to the 
heightened border security. (After a few months prices returned close to pre-pandemic levels, as 
border restrictions eased, facilitating the smuggling of people, but also fuel, lowering fuel prices 
and therefore smuggling prices.) 
The price increase is in line with global trends tracked by the Mixed Migration Centre, 
which found that half of migrants and refugees surveyed in September 2020 noted an increase 
in smuggler fees since the beginning of the pandemic. In line with the supply and demand 
dynamics outlined above, price increases were most widely reported in areas where respondents 
had most identified an increased need for smugglers, particularly where this was coupled with 
reported difficulties in accessing smuggling services.6 
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Increased risk for migrants 
Changes to smuggling mechanics 
Environments which become more hostile to migration enhance the protection risks faced by 
migrants and refugees in both transit and destination (Carling, Gallagher and Horwood, 2015;  
Reitano and Bird, 2018; Tinti and Reitano, 2016). This occurs due to the changing dynamics 
of the migrant-smuggler relationship, but also because of widespread erosion of migrant and 
refugee rights enabled by growing anti-migrant sentiment. 
While the price increases reported above will in some cases translate into heightened profits 
for smugglers, it also makes movement financially unfeasible for some migrants. Migrant po-
pulations in forced immobility – either as a result of increased law-enforcement efforts, un-
affordable smuggler prices, or otherwise – have been found to be at high risk of trafficking 
(Columb, 2019). Adding another layer of risk, in the context of a pandemic, stationary migrant 
populations (including the millions of migrants in camps around the world) living in migrant- 
reception centres and camps characterized by high-density accommodation and poor sanitation 
are highly vulnerable to contagion. 
As more migrants are unable to pay for their journeys at the outset, this engenders growth in 
pay-as-you go structures, where migrants work along the journey to pay the smuggling fee, 
increasing their vulnerability to exploitation. Research shows that ‘pay as you go,’ and parti-
cularly ‘travel now, pay later schemes,’ where migrants work along the journey to pay off debt 
to smugglers for previous travel, make migrants extremely vulnerable to labour or sexual ex-
ploitation, often at the hands of trafficking networks.7 
The risks associated with the smuggled journey itself also increase in contexts where there is 
greater state focus on preventing movement. Smugglers moving further underground to evade 
detection in more hostile operating environments have been repeatedly tracked to take riskier 
routes or use more dangerous transport mechanics, such as sealed lorry containers, or ever 
smaller boats, with catastrophic consequences for migrant safety (Reitano and Bird, 2018). 
An early harbinger of these consequences was the asphyxiation of 64 Ethiopian men on 24 
March 2020 in the container of a goods lorry in which they were being smuggled across the 
border from Malawi into Mozambique (GI-TOC, 2020). This occurred four days after the 
Mozambican government imposed strict border controls to prevent any unnecessary movement 
of people in response to the pandemic (Agence de Presse Africaine, 2020). It is believed that the 
migrants and refugees were being smuggled along the popular southern route towards South 
Africa, and that the enhanced border security measures will drive other smugglers moving 
significant numbers of migrants and refugees across the border to adopt similar, extremely risky, 
approaches.8 
Similarly, following the border closure with Libya, and in order to avoid enhanced presence 
of Nigerien military and Tebu militia, smugglers in Niger reported using more clandestine 
routes to enter Libya, which carry greater protection risks for migrants and refugees. This 
includes the route taken through Chad, usually used only as a last resort given the myriad risks 
presented by military, bandits and traffickers. This heralds further increase in fatalities – in May 
the bodies of 20 Nigerien migrants believed to have been returning home from Libya were 
found in the desert kilometres from Madama, a border settlement on the north-eastern frontier 
of Niger, after the smugglers’ vehicle had broken down. The smuggler had reportedly taken the 
more circuitous route due to the growing number of interceptions of smugglers by Nigerien 
military.9 
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Embedding this incident in a wider global picture, 61% of migrants and refugees surveyed by 
MMC in September 2020 reported a shift to riskier routes by smugglers since the start of the 
pandemic; notably this was even higher (over 70% in Niger), in states focussing on smuggler 
interdiction. 
Compounding the risks of the journey, the increasingly hostile environments faced by 
migrants and refugees in transit – driven by fear of contagion among communities and anti- 
migrant rhetoric – means that those who have engaged smuggling services will find themselves 
more reliant on their smugglers. Evidence shows that in contexts where migrants do not feel 
safe, they are under tighter control of their smugglers, who become their de facto protectors. 
Such migrants are consequently more vulnerable to abuse at the hands of their smugglers 
(Reitano and Bird, 2018). 
Vulnerabilities due to increased anti-migrant sentiment 
Smugglers, however, are only one of myriad actors which pose protection risks to migrants and 
refugees in transit and destination. Anti-migrant sentiment, fuelled by public discourse char-
acterising migrants as carriers of COVID-19,10 increases the threat posed by this broader set of 
actors, including community attacks fuelled by fear and xenophobia, and abuse at the hand of 
state officials, the latter a group repeatedly identified as one of the key perpetrators of abuse 
against migrants and refugees. 
Further, the growth in anti-migrant sentiment enables measures which breach refugee and 
migrant rights enshrined in international law,11 leaving few avenues for recourse in the face of 
abuse. Prior to the pandemic, record forced displacement levels – reaching 79.5 million by the 
end of 2019 – were already putting significant pressure on international legal frameworks and 
commitments in place to protect the rights of those on the move, in particular of refugees 
(UNHCR, 2020). Myriad states, arguably in breach of their obligations to interpret their 
commitments under international treaties ‘in good faith’ were already responding to such 
displacement levels by implementing a range of measures to impede access to asylum, and 
subjected irregular migration to a wide range of criminal and repressive sanctions (Corten and 
Klein, 2011; Fitzmaurice, 2014). The pandemic has offered an opportunity for policy-makers 
seeking to limit extant protections to push through controversial measures, masked in emer-
gency rhetoric. 
To provide one case study, before the COVID-19 outbreak in March 2020, President 
Trump made several attempts to erode the rights of migrants and refugees accorded by in-
ternational law, but such attempts were often met by fierce criticism and subsequently reversed 
or watered down. With COVID-19 widely recognised to constitute a national security threat, 
emergency anti-contagion measures that similarly ride roughshod over migrant rights were 
subject to little public scrutiny. 
In line with this, on 23 March 2020, the US Department of Homeland Security stated it 
would ‘return … aliens [seeking to enter the US] to the country they entered from … Where 
such a return is not possible, CBP [US Customs and Border Protection] will return these aliens 
to their country of origin’ (US Homeland Security, 2020). Although the measures came into 
effect on 21 March for an initial 30-day period, despite widespread condemnation of the order, 
including by UNHCR, (Lakhani, 2020) the Center for Disease Control and prevention in-
troduced an indefinite order in October 2020 (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2020). Human rights organisations have repeatedly highlighted that such orders are not aligned 
with the rights of refugees to seek asylum, and risk potentially catastrophic harms to expelled 
individuals (Sawyer, 2020). Reports of irregular migrants being ejected back into Mexico only 
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96 minutes (on average) after entering the US also suggests that obligations to assess whether 
migrants can return safely are being ignored (Miroff, 2020). 
Research by Freedom House, a US thinktank, found that in 80 of 192 countries surveyed, 
the condition of human rights had deteriorated since the start of the pandemic (Freedom 
House, 2020). The decline is particularly acute in struggling democracies, or repressive states, 
and is expected to continue as the pandemic fades. The erosion of human rights during 
emergencies is notoriously difficult to reverse. 
The commitments made by states to respect the human rights of migrants and refugees in the 
2018 Global Compacts look to be in danger of quickly being forgotten (UNGA, 2019). 
International and national frameworks protecting migrant and refugee rights, already under 
strain, may suffer long-lasting damage. 
If migrants, refugees and asylum seekers lose hope that their rights will be respected and that 
their claims will be dealt with fairly and lawfully, fewer will engage with authorities to reg-
ularize their status. Instead, a greater proportion will remain in host countries with tenuous 
irregular status, forming a shadowy parallel society that is highly vulnerable to exploitation by 
organized crime, including trafficking networks. This trend has already been identified in 
countries whose asylum systems quickly became more hostile, such as Sweden which reacted to 
the 2015/16 ‘migrant crisis’ by amending its legal frameworks surrounding migration and 
asylum (Larsson, 2017). 
The erosion of frameworks in place to protect the rights of migrants and refugees therefore 
increases the vulnerability of those on the move not only at the hands of the smugglers facil-
itating their movement, but to a range of criminal operators in transit and destination, most 
commonly human trafficking networks. 
Rethinking the response? 
Responses to the smuggling industry can be divided broadly into two categories – those fo-
cusing on supply, and those addressing demand. 
Policy-makers have typically prioritised the former, and the COVID-19 pandemic appears 
to have tipped the balance yet more firmly in their favour.12 The focus of these supply-side 
responses is on deterring smugglers from operating by heightening enforcement and increasing 
the risk of interdiction and prosecution. These are underpinned by the criminalisation of 
human smuggling, and consequent adoption of a criminal justice response. 
A more nuanced understanding of the human smuggling marketplace recognises both the 
operation of criminal networks with a high degree of organisation, and of structures more 
accurately perceived as community enterprises with low organisation in contexts where al-
ternative livelihoods are limited. This broad range of operators calls into question whether 
criminal justice measures are always appropriate. 
Human smuggling was criminalised under international law by the UN Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air which came into force in 2004, and constitutes 
one of three Protocols supplementing the United National Convention on Organized Crime 
(UNODC, 2000). The Smuggling Protocol is inherently attached to the UNTOC, and should 
not be read – as it often is – in isolation. One key danger of doing so is that it dilutes the focus of 
the Protocol on organised crime. 
This is misleading, and instead the Smuggling Protocol should be understood as a criminal 
justice instrument intended to have a limited scope: namely, to shape the response to organised 
crime networks involved in human smuggling. The UNTOC definition of ‘organised crime 
group’ is notoriously expansive: 
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a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in 
concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established 
in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a fi-
nancial or other material benefit. (UNODC, 2004)  
However, even taking this into account, research into human smuggling has pointed in-
creasingly towards a market which is dominated by loosely affiliated individuals, or organisa-
tions with limited hierarchy. It is arguable that many of these would not meet the criteria of the 
UNTOC definition, and should therefore fall beyond the scope of the criminalisation ob-
ligations in the Smuggling Protocol, and consequently under national legislative frameworks. 
This is not an approach which has gained significant traction to date, yet deserves greater 
exploration and analysis. 
Conclusion 
COVID-19, and state responses to the virus, bring two long-recognised correlations into sharp 
relief: firstly, that between shrinking legal pathways for migration and the growing need to 
migrate irregularly; and secondly, that between increasing investment in border control to 
restrict irregular migration, and the increased demand for smugglers. 
These linked phenomena call into question the efficacy of existing response frameworks, and 
highlight that they can be counterproductive, because they may heighten demand for smug-
glers, and  drastically increase the vulnerabilities of those on the move. 
As the evidence base surrounding the structure of human smuggling operations grows, there 
is a growing argument that some smuggling dynamics should not be treated as forms of or-
ganized crime, rendering criminal justice responses inappropriate and calling for a fundamental 
pivot in responses (Achilli, Sanchez and Zhang, 2018; McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016). 
Such a pivot would instead focus more on strands of responses which address the structural 
underpinnings of the human smuggling market, including policies and interventions which 
focus on the demand for help to move irregularly. These include enhancing legal avenues for 
movement, seeking to render smuggling services unnecessary, and addressing the original 
drivers for migration and displacement (Carling, 2017). 
It is crucial to ensure that the pandemic does not mark a sharp decline in the protections 
granted to migrants and refugees in law and policy across the world, but instead that policy- 
makers take the opportunity to address flaws in extant counter-smuggling responses. 
The widespread decimation of livelihoods and unprecedented unemployment caused by the 
pandemic across many regions has heightened the underlying drivers for migration, triggering 
increased outflows of irregular migrants as internal controls imposed at the beginning of the 
pandemic are relaxed. 
Considering a wider array of response tools, and moving away from knee-jerk reliance on 
the two-pronged formula of border control and interdiction, are urgently needed in order to 
avoid responding to pandemic-enhanced outflows in ways that drastically increase the harms 
faced by the growing numbers of those on the move. 
Notes  
1 This chapter draws on data collected by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 
through its networks and civil-society partners in the field around the world. 
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2 It is key to distinguish human smuggling from human trafficking, as they are distinct phenomena and 
different crimes under international law. While trafficking broadly constitutes the recruitment or 
harbouring of persons through coercion or deceit for the purpose of exploitation, smuggling takes 
places on the basis of a willing transaction between migrant and smuggler – in effect, a bilateral contract 
for services. Although in some cases smuggling arrangements may end in trafficking, the vast majority 
will not. For further discussion see: Tuesday Reitano and Lucia Bird, Understanding contemporary human 
smuggling as a vector in migration, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 2018, 
https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/TGIATOC-understanding-Contemporary-Human- 
Smuggling-1936-hi-res.pdf.  
3 4Mi survey data collected by the Mixed Migration Centre between April and September 2010 about 
the impact of COVID-19 on refugees and migrants travelling across mixed migration routes in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America found that 47% of surveyed refugees and migrants cited increased difficulty 
crossing borders as an impact of the coronavirus crisis on their migration journey. Mixed Migration 
Centre, update COVID-19 Global Thematic Update #1, 1 September 2020. 
Impact of COVID-19 on migrant smuggling, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/126_ 
Covid_Snapshot_Global_smuggling.pdf.  
4 When analysing Frontex figures, it is key to note that a growing number of migrants are likely stuck in 
transit on their journeys further away from Europe’s borders. Frontex, Situation at EU external borders 
in March – Detections halved from previous month, 16 April 2020, https://frontex.europa.eu/media- 
centre/news-release/situation-at-eu-external-borders-in-march-detections-halved-from-previous- 
month-mZrikq; Frontex Situation at EU external borders in April – Detections lowest since 2009, 
12 May 2020, news release, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/situation-at-eu- 
external-borders-in-april-detections-lowest-since-2009-mJE5Uv.  
5 The rapid emergence of cigarette smuggling markets into South Africa, and alcohol smuggling markets 
into Namibia, following the states’ banning of such products during the pandemic is one example of illicit 
smuggling dynamics quickly emerging to meet new demand. See: Defence Web, Smuggling of alcohol, 
cigarettes on the rise, 20 April 2020, https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/smuggling-of-alcohol- 
cigarettes-on-the-rise/; IOL, Spike in people smuggling beer, whisky into Namibia amid coronavirus 
crackdown, 28 April 2020, https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/spike-in-people-smuggling-beer-whisky- 
into-namibia-amid-coronavirus-crackdown-47308917.  
6 The proportion of respondents reporting higher smuggling fees was especially high in Malaysia (74%), 
Niger (68%) and Libya (65%), all countries in which it was frequently noted that access to smugglers 
had become more difficult (74%, 56% and 66% respectively). Mixed Migration Centre, update 
COVID-19 Global Thematic Update #1, 1 September 2020. 
Impact of COVID-19 on migrant smuggling, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/126_ 
Covid_Snapshot_Global_smuggling.pdf.  
7 Recent research tracking the vulnerabilities to trafficking of irregular migrants travelling across the 
Sahel on their journeys towards Europe found that 83% of migrants who reported paying smugglers 
through ‘travel now, pay later’ structures were trafficked, compared to the average rate of 60% across 
the rest of the migrants surveyed. Arezo Malakooti, The Intersection of Irregular Migration and 
Trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel: Understanding the Patterns of Vulnerability, Global Initiative 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, forthcoming. These percentages are from a quantitative 
survey of 1689 randomly selected migrants across two countries (Niger and Mali).  
8 This is not the case for the far northeast of Mozambique. This region is significantly impacted by heavy 
rain and a failure to maintain bridges, a situation which has cut almost all road traffic from Tanzania. It 
is also impacted by insurgency, particularly as the insurgents are trying to take control of Macomia and 
Quissanga districts. Email exchange with Joe Hanlon, academic, journalist, and editor of weekly 
newsletter on Mozambique, 31 March 2020; email submissions by Mozambican journalist, 1 April 
2020. Email exchange with Joe Hanlon, academic, journalist, and editor of weekly newsletter on 
Mozambique, 31 March 2020.  
9 This specific incident is reported in: https://www.facebook.com/498168007057993/posts/1352274 
041647381/?d=n%0D. Ongoing monitoring of human smuggling by The Global Initiative Against 
Transnational Organized Crime in the Sahel.  
10 Suhret Fazlic, the mayor of Bihać, Bosnia, reportedly told the press that migrants could be dangerous as 
potential carriers of COVID-19. See Lorenzo Tondo, Bosnia crams thousands of migrants into tent camp to 
‘halt COVID-19 spread,’ The Guardian, 27 March 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global- 
development/2020/mar/27/bosnia-crams-thousands-of-migrants-into-tent-camp-to-halt-covid-19-spread. 
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11 Refugees, and to a lesser extent migrants, are ascribed rights both within standalone instruments, 
including the 1951 Refugee Convention, and in the broader international human-rights legal fra-
mework, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
12 For example, throughout the first quarter of 2021 the UK Home Secretary, Priti Patel, has sought to 
push through legislative reform to prescribe life sentences for human smugglers, and the Home Office 
has scaled up the practice of charging migrants steering boats with criminal offences. Although 
COVID-19 is likely only one of the factors driving this, it is certainly a pivotal backdrop shaping this 
response. Jamie Grierson, Priti Patel has not secured deals with European countries over UK asylum 
overhaul, The Guardian, 24 March 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/mar/24/priti- 
patel-has-not-secured-deals-with-european-countries-over-uk-asylum-overhaul.  
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PART V 
Smuggling and conflict  

26 
THE ILLICIT TRADE AND 
CONFLICT CONNECTION 
Insight from US history 
Peter Andreas   
Introduction 
Scholars and policy analysts have devoted considerable attention to contemporary “war 
economies,” particularly the relationship between illicit trade and armed conflict in the post- 
Cold War era (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004). Much of the focus has been on how 
violent non-state actors have increasingly exploited illicit commerce to fund rebellion (Arnson 
and Zartman 2005). It is commonly asserted that this alleged convergence between war-making 
and illicit profiteering is a distinctly post-Cold War phenomenon facilitated by globalization 
and a radically changed geopolitical context – even a defining characteristic of so-called “new 
wars” (Jung 2003; Munkler 2005; Kaldor 2012).1 A frequent argument, for example, is that in 
the absence of formal external sponsorship from the United States or the former Soviet Union, 
insurgents have turned increasingly to alternative forms of material support and taken advantage 
of the same revolutions in transportation and communication that have facilitated licit trade. 
This includes illicit exports dubbed “conflict commodities,” such as drugs, timber, ivory, and 
precious stones (Winer 2005). Partly thanks to the campaigns of international NGOs such as 
Global Witness, therefore, diamonds from conflict zones in West Africa have been labeled 
“blood diamonds” and have been the target of an ambitious international certification system 
for rough diamonds known as the Kimberly Process (Smillie 2005). 
Illegal drugs such as opium and cocaine have come to be associated especially with armed 
conflict, given their role in insurgencies in places such as Colombia and Afghanistan (Kan 2009;  
Felbab-Brown 2010). Government officials charge that insurgents in drug-producing zones – 
often labeled “narco-terrorists” or “narco-guerrillas” – have been driven increasingly by drug 
profits rather than political grievance. As the “greed and grievance” debate in the scholarly 
literature has underscored, it is important to differentiate between commodities causing and 
those facilitating conflict (Berdal and Malone 2000; Ballentine and Sherman 2003). It should be 
remembered, moreover, that the FARC, for example, dates back to the 1960s, long before 
Colombia even became a cocaine exporter (Andreas 2020, 229). 
Much of the attention on the illicit political economy dimensions of conflict is welcome and 
long overdue – all armed conflicts, after all, have a political economy, and this includes an illicit 
side. In various ways and to varying degrees, they use smuggling networks and criminal actors 
to create and sustain the material basis for warfare. Such conflicts are partly made possible by 
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“taxing” and diverting humanitarian aid, diaspora remittances, illicit exports, clandestine trading 
across front lines, and black-market sale of looted goods. The importance of smuggling practices 
and criminal actors becomes even more apparent in the context of evading international 
economic sanctions and arms embargoes imposed to discourage conflict (Andreas 2005; Naylor 
2008). In this respect, external intervention contributes to the criminalization of a conflict, 
creating an economic opportunity structure for clandestine commerce and making the com-
peting sides more reliant on cross-border smuggling channels. Under these conditions, war is a 
continuation of business by clandestine means: military success on the battlefield may hinge on 
entrepreneurial success in the murky underworld of smuggling. Moreover, the smuggling 
networks and embargo-busting infrastructure built up during wartime can leave a lasting legacy 
for the post-war reconstruction period.2 
Too often, however, the end result of this greater attention on war economies and the 
“crime-conflict nexus” has been to distort and exaggerate more than to explain and inform. 
The contemporary novelty of the illicit trade and conflict connection tends to be simply as-
serted rather than empirically demonstrated. As a partial corrective, what is needed is a more 
historically informed, nuanced and critical examination of the complex relationship between 
illicit trade and warfare. 
In this chapter, I offer a brief historical reality check for contemporary debates about illicit 
trade and conflict by examining critically the early American experience, arguing that illicit 
commerce and its connection to armed conflict played an essential role in the very making of 
the nation, and that the distinction between a patriot and profiteer was often a blurry one. I 
focus on three cases: the American War of Independence; the War of 1812; and the American 
Civil War. In all three cases, illicit trade profoundly shaped the nature, duration, and outcome 
of the conflict. In the case of the War of Independence, illicit trade successfully supplied the 
rebellion against Britain, but also complicated postwar reconstruction. In the case of the War of 
1812, illicit trade in the form of “trading with the enemy” extended the conflict, helped to turn 
it into a stalemate, and subverted US efforts to annex Canada. In the case of the Civil War, 
southern illicit cotton exports via blockade running helped to prolong the conflict, allowing the 
Confederacy to persist far longer than would otherwise have been the case. Together, these 
cases illustrate not only the crucial importance of the illicit trade-conflict connection in the 
making of America, but also the utility of a more historical lens in understanding the dynamics 
of cross-border smuggling.3 
The smuggling war of Independence and its aftermath 
By definition, the rebels in Britain’s distant American colonies attempting to break away from 
the Crown in the 1770s were illicit non-state armed actors. Their political grievances against 
the imperial authorities and proclaimed pursuit of “liberty and freedom” – celebrated in 
American history books as the nation’s founding story – are well known. Less widely re-
cognized, however, is the central role of illicit non-state armed actors clandestinely supplying 
George Washington’s Continental Army with smuggled arms and other war materials. 
A rag-tag force of colonial rebels went to war against the world’s greatest military power. As 
American General William Moultrie wrote in his memoirs of the Revolution, the colonists 
rebelled “without money; without arms; without ammunition; no generals; no armies; no 
admirals; and no fleets; this was our situation when the contest began” (Moultrie 1802, 
I:63–54). No wonder, then, that the British expressed such smug confidence that their over-
whelming military superiority quickly and easily would put down the American rebellion. 
Indeed, at first glance, the insurgency should have been short lived. 
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It did not turn out that way. Why not? Smuggling is a crucial part of the answer, and was 
especially important in sustaining the rebellion before the French finally intervened and tipped 
the military balance on the ground. The British lost the war in the American colonies for many 
reasons, including geographic disadvantage and French intervention. Losing the war on 
smuggling – failing to deter and interdict desperately needed clandestine shipments of arms and 
other war supplies to George Washington’s forces – played no small role. While at times 
subverting the Revolution by prioritizing profits over patriotism, illicit traders defying Britain’s 
wartime embargo ultimately proved to be essential to its success. Colonial smugglers put their 
clandestine transportation methods, skills, and networks to good use supplying the insurgency. 
Part of this simply involved building on previously well-established illicit trading relationships, 
such as in the West Indies. It also involved fostering new commercial connections directly with 
Northern Europe, such as France and Sweden – no easy task in wartime (Nuxoll 1985, 
283–286). 
From the very start, the Continental Army was in desperate need of clothes, arms, am-
munition, food, and other supplies – and with the single exception of food, all of these required 
large-scale imports from abroad, in violation of the British blockade. This was especially im-
portant in the years before France formally entered the war in 1778 (followed by Spain in 1779, 
and Holland in 1781), tipping the military balance. Most crucial was gunpowder: “the want of 
powder was a very serious consideration for us;” recounted General Moultrie, “we knew there 
was none to be had upon the continent of America” (Moultrie 1802, I:78). Indeed, there were 
no powder mills operating in the colonies when the war started (York 1979, 27). Virtually all of 
the gunpowder used by the colonists in the first two and a half years of the war had to be 
smuggled in – mostly from France via the West Indies (Herring 2008, 18; Stephenson 1925, 
277–279). Most of these military supplies were exchanged for colonial products, including cod, 
lumber, flour, tobacco, and indigo. Victory on the battlefield hinged on success in the world of 
smuggling. Over one hundred different ships reportedly smuggled in supplies during this time 
period, evading the British warships attempting to blockade the Atlantic coast (Stephenson 
1925, 279). 
Smuggled gunpowder trickled in ever so slowly. The situation was especially bleak by the 
end of 1775. On Christmas Day 1775, George Washington wrote: “Our want of powder is 
inconceivable. A daily waste and no supply administers a gloomy prospect” (Chauncey 2009, 
3:299). Some have argued that if in mid-January 1776 the British had known about the extreme 
scarcity of gunpowder, they “could have marched out to Cambridge and crushed the newly 
recruited colonial army” and “thus the revolution would have ended” (Stephenson 1925, 274). 
The British withdrew from Boston in March 1776, unaware of the anemic condition of the 
colonial forces. At one point, a 13-mile long chain of colonial sentries around Boston did not 
have even an ounce of gunpowder (Huston 1991, 111). There was also a shortage of arms, 
including muskets, cannon, pistols, and bayonets. Unlike gunpowder, however, which had to 
be replenished perpetually, the arms supply was cumulative, and thus dependence on smuggling 
channels declined over time. The same was not true of other military-related supplies, however, 
such as tent materials, clothing, shoes, and blankets, which wore out more quickly, creating 
chronic shortages throughout the war (Nuxoll 1985, 8–9). 
Wartime smuggling blurred the line between patriot and profiteer. Smuggling was both 
essential to the revolutionary war effort and profitable for the well placed and well connected. 
Some illicit traders sold smuggled gunpowder and other supplies at highly inflated prices to the 
Continental Army. The Brown brothers in Providence, for instance, were especially well 
positioned to profit from the war. Their wartime business ventures included organizing 
“powder voyages” to France, Holland, and Spain (Patton 2008, 16). One account of the Brown 
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family history describes the Revolution as a “personal bonanza” for John Brown, who allegedly 
emerged from the war as the richest man in Rhode Island (Rappleye 2006, 210–211). In one 
deal, he offered a shipment of smuggled pistol powder to colonial forces at a substantial mark 
up. Desperate for the supplies, Stephen Moylan replied on behalf of George Washington: “The 
General will take it, though it is a most exorbitant price” (Force 1840, 3:1688). 
General Washington denounced widespread war profiteering, at one point declaring, 
“There is such a thirst for gain, and such infamous advantages taken to forestall, and engross 
those Articles which the Army cannot do without, thereby enhancing the cost of them to the 
public fifty or a hundred pr. Ct., that it is enough to make one curse their own Species, for 
possessing so little virtue and patriotism” (Fitzpatrick 1936, 13:335). He urged that merchants 
should “not take an undue advantage of the Distresses of their Country, so as to exact an 
unreasonable Price” (Fitzpatrick 1931, 3:459). Nevertheless, with the colonies sometimes 
competing with each other for scarce provisions, smugglers could not resist inflating prices and 
selling to the highest bidder (York 1979, 27). For instance, Elias Hasket Derby of Salem ac-
knowledged in 1776 that one hundred percent profits could be made on imported items such as 
gunpowder, cotton, cocoa, and sugar, and that one hundred and fifty percent above normal 
prices was “more than common” on linens and paper (Fairburn 1955, 1:379).4 
Thus, for all the patriotic fervor of the American Revolution, more base economic op-
portunism was also at work in keeping both civilians and rebel soldiers supplied. While sup-
plying the Continental Army, smugglers also used this as a cover and opportunity to bring in 
high-value civilian goods such as silks and chinaware: private trade “piggy backed” on supply 
ships restricted by contract only for military purposes (Patton 2008, 17), This was a form of 
“smuggling within smuggling,” often involving clandestinely importing consumer goods that 
served little or no military purpose but were in high demand. 
Moreover, the very smuggling interests and practices that kept the Continental Army 
supplied during the War of Independence would prove to be a daunting challenge for the new 
republic. Smugglers, who had subverted British rule in the American colonies, would now also 
subvert government authority in the very nation they helped to create. For some merchants, the 
popular rallying cry of “no taxation without representation” really meant “no taxation even 
with representation.” Old smuggling habits and attitudes would prove hard to change. As 
Massachusetts Representative Fisher Ames described the smuggling challenge in his address to 
the first US Congress in May 1789, “The habit of smuggling pervades our country. We were 
taught it when it was considered rather as meritorious than criminal; …”5 
Illicit trade today also often is blamed for impeding and complicating post-war re-
construction in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo.6 Long forgotten, though, is that this was also 
true for the United States in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War. The very smuggling 
practices that aided the War of Independence turned into an obstacle for the newborn 
American state. The powerful legacy of colonial smuggling contributed to merchant resistance 
to centralized state authority and regulation of commerce. Smuggling now undermined 
American rather than British revenue collection and greatly complicated US border manage-
ment and foreign relations. This was a particularly serious problem for the nascent federal 
government, given that virtually all of its revenue derived from duties imposed on imports. 
Illicit trade was therefore a major challenge to early American state making – just as it is for 
state-making efforts across the globe today. Indeed, this is an often-overlooked part of 
America’s early “strong society, weak state” profile. At the same time, concerns about smug-
gling stimulated government expansion and the creation of a border management infrastructure, 
notably the establishment of the customs service as one of the first pillars of the federal gov-
ernment. Indeed, in a highly fragmented country deeply suspicious of centralized state 
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authority, inhibiting illicit trade and collecting duties on imports through a federal customs 
service was the main rationale for a uniform system of government in the early years of the 
republic (Shapiro 2009). Efforts to combat maritime piracy and embargo busting also stimulated 
the early development of the navy. In other words, illicit trade and related activities were 
double-edged, both challenging and building up the new American state. The same is true 
today – witness the enormous growth of criminal law enforcement in the face of massive drug 
law evasion in recent decades – suggesting more continuity with the past than is typically 
recognized. While we should be careful not to overstate or misinterpret the historical parallels, 
neither should they be glossed over. 
Trading with the enemy in the War of 1812 
The War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain was supposed to be quick and 
short lived. Instead, it turned into a stalemate that dragged on for two and a half years, with 
British forces kept well fed and supplied with the help of American smugglers pursuing illicit 
profits over patriotism. The Enemy Trade Act of 1812 outlawed trade with America’s enemies 
and only permitted American vessels in US ports. This was followed by the sweeping but short- 
lived embargo of 1813 (outlawing all exports and giving officials more invasive powers), and the 
Enemy Trade Act of 1815, passed shortly before the conclusion of the war. These restrictions 
included a further militarization of customs enforcement, as naval and other military forces were 
increasingly tasked with not only fighting British troops but also smugglers. 
Despite these efforts, trade with the enemy flourished, and mushroomed with the heigh-
tened demand generated by the influx of British forces in 1814 (Hickey 1989, 225). “We have 
been feeding and supplying the enemy,” bemoaned a Republican newspaper, “both on our 
coast and in Canada, ever since the war began.” (Hickey 1989, 168). Indeed, much to 
Madison’s dismay, America’s trading spirit often seemed stronger than its fighting spirit. “Self, 
the great ruling principle, [is] more powerful with Yankees than any people I ever saw,” one 
British officer commented disparagingly (Hickey 1989, 216). 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the US-Canada borderlands, where Americans 
proved more enthused about illicitly trading with their northern neighbors than conquering 
them. This diverted scarce supplies to the enemy, increased the costs of feeding US soldiers, and 
undermined popular support for the war (Taylor 2011, 290–292). Even as some state militia 
units simply refused orders to march into Canada (Herring 2008, 128). American smugglers 
were far less inhibited in their border crossings and engagements with the enemy. Indeed, some 
militia members deployed to secure the border instead colluded in border smuggling. Military 
intelligence also covertly flowed across the border. “The turpitude of many of our citizens in 
this part of the country,” commented navy Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough in dismay, 
“furnishes the Enemy with every information he wants” (Hickey 1989, 226). Colonel Zebulon 
Montgomery Pike, commander of the 15th Infantry based in Burlington, described soldiers and 
civilians on the border as “void of all sense of honor or love of country” due to their cross- 
border dealings (Muller 1976, 90–91). 
The US-Canada border became the most important backdoor for wartime trading, building 
on the illicit trade routes and networks that flourished during the embargo era. Smuggling was 
not only good business for border communities, but good for relieving cross-border tensions in 
a time of war. Vermonters in the Lake Champlain Valley, for instance, remained largely 
unprotected from a British invasion and had good reason to maintain peaceful relations with 
their immediate neighbors in Lower Canada. Smuggling fostered an informal form of local 
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cross-border interdependence that had a pacifying effect. Smuggling thus became a peculiar 
mode of peacemaking (Alcock 1995). 
Some illicit trade across the US-Canada line was seasonal. During the winter months, one 
wartime smuggler from Orleans County, Vermont, later recalled, “the goods and merchandise 
which came from Canada were smuggled in winter when the swamps and rivers were frozen 
and when the deep snows could be made into a hard road over the roughest ground” (Little 
2008, 46). He noted that the main threat in the Vermont countryside was not confiscations by 
the authorities but rather the armed gangs who used the cover of patriotism as an excuse to rob 
smugglers. Meanwhile, during the summer, entire herds of cattle were smuggled through the 
forests of Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, and New York into Canada to feed the Royal 
Army (Brandes 1997, 56). With the largest herds of cattle in the northeast, Vermonters were 
especially well placed to take advantage of a tripling of the price of beef during the war (Muller 
1976, 90). 
In late July 1813, an exasperated American General George Izard complained, “On the 
eastern side of Lake Champlain, the high roads are found insufficient for the supplies of cattle 
which are pouring into Canada. Like herds of buffaloes, they press through the forest, making 
paths for themselves…Nothing but a cordon of troops, from the French Mills [in northern 
New York] to Lake Memphramagog [in northern Vermont] could effectively check the evil. – 
Were it not for these supplies, the British forces in Canada would soon be suffering from 
famine, or their government subjected to enormous expense for their maintenance” (Dobson 
1816, 57). Two years into the war, the British governor-general in Canada reported to the 
Foreign Office that, “Two-thirds of the army in Canada are at this moment eating beef pro-
vided by American contractors, drawn principally from the States of Vermont and New York” 
(Whitehead 1963, 44). Some New England cattle smugglers never even had to step foot into 
Canada: after marching their livestock to the border, their Canadian counterparts would woo 
the animals across with a basket of corn (Hickey 1989, 227).7 
The border was equally porous further east, with the major smuggling hot spots changing 
with the shifting geography of the war (Strum 1983). When the British invaded and then 
occupied part of eastern Maine in the summer of 1814, British merchants flocked to 
the town of Castine to exploit wartime trading opportunities for the next eight months. The 
British authorities fully encouraged the brisk cross-border illicit trade to compensate for the 
severe shortage of foodstuffs and other supplies in Canada (Smith 2001). Wartime smuggling 
was about everyday survival, but it was also about profits. Take the case of William King, a 
successful Maine merchant who also headed the local militia: he supplied the British military 
with provisions, and the British supplied him with blankets, which he then sold at a profit to 
the American military (Nagel 2002). King went on to be elected the first governor of Maine 
in 1820, and later served as the collector of customs at Bath from 1830 to 1834 
(Taylor 1977). 
Early on in the war, the British government even sold trading licenses to American mer-
chants that exempted them from seizure by British privateers and the Royal Navy. American 
naval officers had an especially difficult time identifying US merchant ships operating with these 
licenses, since the captain would keep the license hidden unless boarded by a British ship. To 
dupe the captain into voluntarily producing the incriminating license, American naval officers 
would at times masquerade as British when boarding the vessel, wearing British uniforms and 
showing the British flag. These ruses sometimes worked, but smugglers became less gullible and 
more wary of such deceptions over time. The owners of a licensed American merchant ship 
smuggling goods into Canada warned the master that 
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you must be aware of the facility with which American cruisers may pass as English … 
When in with any of the B.[ritish] B.[lockading] squadron, come forward with your 
Ex.[port] Li.[cense] which will safely pass you … If you have any suspicions destroy all 
at once … (Crawford 1986, 167).  
The British favored New England shippers in allocating trading licenses, since the 
commercially-oriented northeast was most opposed to the war.8 Britain’s blockade of the 
eastern seaboard initially did not extend to New England, a strategy meant to secure illicit 
supplies but also create division and discord between the anti-war Federalist northeast and the 
Republican administration in Washington. It was certainly politically awkward that New 
Englanders were supplying British vessels blockading the rest of the American seaboard. Even 
after the Royal Navy extended its blockade to include New England in April 1814, the British 
continued to facilitate and encourage illicit American trade (especially to Canada) as long as it 
aided their subjects and military forces (Hickey 1989, 533). Rhode Islanders on Block Island, 
for instance, regularly brought both supplies and intelligence to British ships off the coast 
(Brandes 1997, 56). The British openly used the harbor at Provincetown, Massachusetts, to 
resupply their ships: small American vessels reportedly brought “[f]resh beef, vegetables, and in 
fact all Kind of supplies” to these ships on a regular basis (Hickey 1989, 537). “The fact is 
notorious,” announced the Lexington Reporter, “that the very squadrons of the enemy now 
annoying our coast … derive their supplies from the very country which is the theatre of their 
atrocities” (Hickey 1989, 171). 
At the same time as American smugglers supplied enemy forces, the battle against smuggling 
distracted US troops from their war-fighting mission. In October 1813, General Wade 
Hampton even ordered military raids into Canada from the Lake Champlain region of Vermont 
to try to disrupt the “shameful and corrupt neutrality of the lines, for the purpose of gain” 
(Cruikshank 1905, 3:194). Similarly, the following March, Colonel Clark headed a detachment 
toward Missisquoi Bay, Vermont, 
with a view to cut up by the roots the smuggling intercourse which had been carried 
on to a great extent; besides it was necessary to prevent the constant supply of pro-
visions which were daily passing to the enemy from this state.9  
“Blood cotton” and blockade running in the American Civil War 
Few of today’s illicit exports from conflict zones rival the importance of Confederate cotton – 
we could call it “blood cotton” – in fueling a war that cost more US lives than any other 
conflict in American history. Well over 600,000 soldiers lost their lives, and hundreds of 
thousands more were injured. Illicitly exchanging cotton for arms contributed to this heavy 
human toll by supplying Confederate forces and enabling the war to drag on much longer than 
would otherwise have been possible. The illicit flow of arms and other materials, funded by 
contraband Confederate cotton, could not in the end shift the military balance on the ground 
and change the ultimate outcome of the war, but it did profoundly shape its character and 
longevity. Although attracting far less attention than the Civil War’s famous battles, southern 
success on the battlefield depended on commercial success in the underworld of smuggling. 
The North attempted to impede such clandestine commerce by imposing an ambitious naval 
blockade on southern ports. On April 19 1861, President Lincoln announced a naval blockade 
on the South – soon dubbed the “Anaconda Plan” – with the aim of squeezing the Confederacy 
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into submission by blocking contraband of war. Although it was an impossible task to police 
with patrolling the 3,549 mile-long Confederate coastline, blockaders could focus primarily on 
the handful of major southern ports with the requisite infrastructure and transportation links to 
handle large volumes of external supplies. During the course of the war, the Union’s four 
blockading squadrons captured 136 blockade-runners and 85 more were destroyed (Wise 
1988, 221). 
The runners, though, usually outmaneuvered the blockaders. Historian Stephen Wise cal-
culates that almost 300 steamships were involved in blockade running between the fall of 1861 
and spring 1865, and out of an estimated 1,300 runs, more than 1,000 succeeded (Wise 1988, 
221). Blockade runners managed to smuggle out roughly half a million bales of cotton, and 
smuggle in a thousand tons of gunpowder, half a million rifles, and several hundred cannon 
(McPherson 1988, 380). Wise estimates that blockade runners provided the South with 60% of 
its weapons, one-third of the lead for its bullets and the ingredients for three-fourths of its 
powder, and most of the cloth for its uniforms (Wise 1988, 7). Clearly, the Confederacy could 
not have survived without this clandestine lifeline to the outside world. 
Successful blockade running sometimes meant that Confederate soldiers were better supplied 
than their Union counterparts. At one point, General Ulysses S. Grant replaced his own rifles 
with captured southern weapons: 
At Vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon, about 60, 
000 muskets with a large amount of ammunition. The small-arms of the enemy were 
far superior to ours … The enemy had generally new arms which had run the 
blockade and were of uniform caliber. After the surrender I authorized all colonels 
whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them in the stack of 
captured arms and replace them with the latter (Dattel 2009, 198).  
In the first year of the war, the blockade was so thin that it scarcely deserved to be labeled as 
such. The Confederate government dismissively called it a “paper blockade.” Over time, 
though, the blockade tightened and thickened considerably, targeting the relatively small 
number of key southern ports, especially Charleston and Wilmington, that remained in 
Confederate hands (New Orleans, the largest southern port, was captured and occupied by the 
Union early on in the war, and by 1863 blockade-runners were largely restricted to the ports of 
Wilmington, Charleston, Mobile, and Galveston). The blockade typically had multiple layers, 
with a layer of smaller ships patrolling closer to shore able to signal to warships several miles out 
when a blockade-runner was leaving port. 
Blockade-runners adapted to these Union tactics by deploying faster, more agile and lower- 
profile British-made steamer vessels, painted gray or bluish green and burning smokeless an-
thracite coal for added stealth. Under the cover of fog and darkness, these blockade-runners 
could sneak by a Union warship in close proximity without being detected. When detected, 
many blockade-runners could simply outmaneuver and outrun their would-be captors. Despite 
the wartime context, the blockade enforcement-evasion game was mostly nonviolent: blockade 
running ships were typically not armed (to save weight but also to avoid being classified as an 
armed pirate ship, which brought much harsher penalties), and Union warships preferred to 
capture rather than destroy them in order to seize the cargo and receive the prize money. 
Two British island ports, Bermuda and Nassau, served as the main hubs for blockade- 
runners, not unlike the transshipment role that the Dutch island of St. Eustatius played during 
the American Revolution. Bermuda and Nassau became bustling island warehouses for Europe- 
bound cotton and southern-bound contraband. Cotton – “white gold” – served as the de facto 
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currency for purchasing European war materials and other supplies. One blockade-runner 
described the wartime scene at Nassau’s port: “Cotton, cotton, everywhere! Blockade-runners 
discharging it into lighters, tier upon tier of it, piled high upon the wharves, and merchant 
vessels, chiefly under the British flag, loading with it” (Underwood 2008, 55). 
Nassau, with a sympathetic governor and local population, was the favored transshipment 
point given its proximity to southern ports. In 1863, some 164 steamers departed Nassau for 
southern ports, while only 53 cleared for Bermuda (Wise 1988, 132). From Nassau, blockade- 
runners could reach Wilmington (570 miles) or Charleston (515 miles) in just three days. This 
not only saved time but also coal, and less space devoted to coal meant more space devoted to 
profitable cargo. Secretary of the Navy Welles complained about Nassau’s complicity: 
Almost all of the aid which the Rebels have received in arms, munitions, and articles 
contraband have gone to them through the professedly neutral British port of Nassau. 
From them the Rebels have derived constant encouragement and support … It is 
there that vessels are prepared to run the blockade and violate our laws, by the 
connivance and with the knowledge of the colonial, and, I apprehend, the parent, 
government (Mahin 1999, 170).  
Mexico also served as a backdoor for smuggling cotton out, bringing in war supplies, and 
getting around the blockade (Irby 1977). As the only neutral country sharing a land border with 
Confederate territory, Mexico enjoyed a special niche in wartime trading. The Mexican border 
town of Matamoros became a smuggling depot, where war supplies could be ferried across the 
Rio Grande to Brownsville, Texas, and exchanged for southern cotton. A Union general la-
mented that “Matamoros is to the rebellion west of the Mississippi what the port of New York 
is to the United States. It is a great commercial center, feeding and clothing the rebellion, 
arming and equipping, furnishing the materials of war” (Underwood 2008, 72). One historian 
describes the area as resembling the California gold rush of 1849, with entrepreneurs, spec-
ulators, agents, and brokers drawn to it like a magnet (Meiners 1977). According to one es-
timate, more than 20,000 speculators from the Union, Confederacy, England, France, and 
Germany arrived in four years (Delaney 1955). 
The tiny Mexican coastal hamlet of Bagdad, at the mouth of the Rio Grande some thirty 
miles from Matamoros, experienced an equally dramatic growth spurt, mushrooming in size 
from a handful of huts to a town of some 15,000 residents virtually overnight. In April 1863, 
the commander of the Eastern Gulf Blockading Squadron was informed that there were as 
many as 200 ships waiting to unload their cargoes and load cotton at Bagdad. During this same 
period, the commander of the Confederate raider Alabama reported that business was booming 
in Bagdad: “The beach was piled with cotton bales going out, and goods coming in. The stores 
were numerous and crowded with wares” (Underwood 2008, 71). 
There was little that Union naval authorities could do about the use of Mexico to cir-
cumvent the blockade. As stipulated in the 1848 treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Rio Grande 
was neutral and therefore could not be blockaded by Mexico or the United States within a mile 
north or south of its entrance. Union warships slowed the trade down through harassment (by 
constantly boarding and inspecting vessels), but could not stymie it completely (Wise 1988, 88). 
This supply line was crucial in sustaining the Confederate war effort West of the Mississippi. 
Due to geographic distance and a poor transportation system, however, the Mexico connection 
was far less consequential than blockade running for supplying Confederate forces elsewhere. 
Blockade running officers and crews were well rewarded for their risk-taking. This is il-
lustrated by the pay scale of the commercial blockade runner the Venus. The captain received 
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$5,000, the first officer $1,250, the second and third officers $750 each, the chief engineer 
$2,500, the pilot $3,500, and each crewmember $250. These wages were paid in gold, half up 
front and the other half after the successful round-trip run (Wise 1988, 110–111). Crews and 
officers also greatly supplemented their income on the inbound trip by carrying scarce ne-
cessities and luxury items in their personal belongings, ranging from toothbrushes to corsets, 
which they could sell for many times their original value. On the outbound trip, they were 
allowed to carry personal supplies of cheap cotton, which they similarly sold at greatly inflated 
prices. 
Confederate cotton exports were much reduced from pre-war levels, but reduced supply 
also meant highly inflated prices – assuring substantial profits for those who managed to evade 
the blockade. Cotton prices in Europe soared to as much as ten times their prewar levels. At 
such prices, the incentives to run the blockade remained high even as the risks increased over 
time – with the chances of being caught one in three by 1864 and one in two by 1865 
(McPherson 1988, 380). Blockade-running cotton traders were challenged by the blockade but 
also enriched by it. A popular toast captured this dynamic: 
Here’s to the Southern planters who grow the cotton; to the Limeys who buy the 
cotton; to the Yankees that maintain the blockade and keep up the price of cotton. So, 
three cheers for a long continuance of the war, and success to the blockade-runners 
(Dattel 2009, 195).  
Relying on private commercial shippers for desperately needed war materials, however, had a 
serious downside for the Confederate government. Transportation costs were extremely high, 
accounting for much of the increase in cotton prices. These high transportation costs also 
decreased the incentives to ship bulky items, notably much needed machinery and railroad iron 
(Surdam 2001, 6). Moreover, commercial blockade-runners motivated more by profits than 
patriotism – or in the case of Rhett Butler, “for profit only,” as he told Scarlet O’Hara in Gone 
With the Wind – devoted scarce cargo space to high-value luxury goods and civilian items, 
ranging from books to booze, rather than strictly military necessities.10 
Confederate officials had little choice but to outsource most blockade running to private 
shippers. The Confederacy simply lacked the administrative capacity and apparatus to impose 
centralized control over the business of blockade running, even had it wanted to. Moreover, 
doing so would reduce the profit incentives that sustained the blockade running system – as was 
evident when the Confederacy banned the importation of luxury goods. Even as it attempted to 
impose greater regulation, therefore, the Confederate government remained dependent upon 
appealing to the profit motives of foreign merchants (Mahin 1999, 91).11 
Blockade-runners fed, armed, and clothed the Confederacy until Union forces sacked the 
ports of Charleston and Wilmington. In late 1864, General Lee’s army in Virginia depended 
almost entirely on imported food from Europe. The supply lines to Europe were severed when 
the last Confederate port on the Atlantic was shut down in the first months of 1865. With the 
Wilmington supply line cut, Lee’s army was starving when he surrendered at Appomattox in 
April (Mahin 1999, 173). 
In the end, the northern blockade can be seen as both a failure and a success. Its porosity 
suggests it was a failure, as evidenced by the repeated success of blockade-runners throughout 
the war years. Historians tend to agree that the war would have ended much sooner if the 
North had been able to seal off southern ports. As historian James McPherson points out, 
though, in evaluating the effectiveness of the blockade we must also ask: what would the 
supplying of the South have looked like in the absence of the blockade? He notes that the 
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South’s pre-war seaborne trade levels were significantly higher than wartime levels despite 
much higher supply needs during the war years. Wartime seaborne trade was less than one-third 
of its pre-war level. Importantly, the blockade forced the Confederacy to rely on ships built to 
maximize speed and stealth at the expense of cargo capacity. He concludes that the blockade 
succeeded in significantly reducing southern supplies, even if it did not cut them off entirely 
(McPherson 1988, 381–382). The blockade also forced the Confederacy to rely on less con-
venient ports, including Matamoros, which was far from the war’s main battlefields (Surdam 
2001, 6). 
The Union blockade also appears relatively more successful when compared with blockades 
during earlier American wars. The British Royal Navy attempted to blockade American ports 
during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. As we saw early on in our story, the 
British lost the American War of Independence partly because they failed adequately to in-
terdict smuggled European gunpowder and other war supplies to the colonial rebels. The Royal 
Navy’s blockade of the eastern seaboard had more success in the War of 1812, contributing to a 
stalemated outcome. Fast forward to the American Civil War, where for the first time the side 
imposing the blockade was the victor. On balance, it seems that the Union naval blockade was 
porous enough to help prolong the war and provide an enormously lucrative opportunity for 
contraband traders, yet was also sufficiently effective ultimately to constrain Confederate 
fighting capacity. 
Conclusion: Historical déjà vu 
What is really new and different about the connection between illicit trade and conflict in the 
contemporary era? Not nearly as much as we are often led to believe, and indeed there may be 
more continuity with the past than is typically recognized. The historical parallels should not, of 
course, be overstated or misinterpreted, but neither should they be glossed over – as is too often 
the case in contemporary accounts of the illicit trade-conflict nexus. While the links between 
illicit trade and conflict have received considerable attention in scholarly and policy debates in 
recent years, it is certainly not a post-Cold War invention. It goes back not just decades (the 
drugs-conflict connection was an important feature of the Cold War, from Southeast Asia to 
South Asia and Central America (McCoy 2003)), but centuries. This has been strikingly evident 
by looking at America’s own early history. Much to the dismay of the British imperial au-
thorities, transatlantic smuggling kept George Washington’s Continental Army supplied during 
the American War of Independence. Much to the delight of the British however, American 
colonial merchants illicitly traded with the enemy and helped keep English forces supplied 
during the War of 1812. No contemporary “conflict commodity,” whether diamonds, ivory, 
or cocaine, has been more important in shaping war than was the case of smuggled Confederate 
cotton during the American Civil War. 
Then, as now, smuggling provoked anti-smuggling initiatives that built up state policing 
capacities. Then, as now, it was often difficult to differentiate clearly between financial gain and 
political grievance in motivating and sustaining rebellion. There is certainly no evidence to 
suggest that today’s insurgents are much more profit driven than some of their American 
predecessors. The grievances were real, but so too were the fortunes made from war. 
Notes  
1 For a critique of the “new wars” label, see Stathis Kalyvas (2001).  
2 For a more detailed case study of the criminal aftermath of war, see Peter Andreas (2008). 
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3 For a more detailed account, from which this chapter partly draws on, see Peter Andreas (2013). Some 
notable historical works beyond the American case include Michael Kwass (2014); Philip Thai (2018); 
Eric Tagliacozzo (2005).  
4 Derby wrote this letter to his ship captain, Nathaniel Silsbee, stationed at Hispaniola.  
5 Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 1st sess., 311.  
6 On post-conflict reconstruction and the criminalized legacies of war in the western Balkans, see 
especially the special issue of Problems of Post-Communism, May–June 2004.  
7 This illicit trade sometimes also included use of counterfeit American bank notes forged in Lower 
Canada. The problem of counterfeit American bank notes coming in from Canada predated the war, 
but the Canadian government only cracked down on the forgers in December 1813 when a substantial 
amount of bogus Lower Canadian army bills manufactured in Boston was about to be introduced via 
northern Vermont. See Little, Loyalties in Conflict, 48–49. For a more detailed discussion of coun-
terfeiting in early America, see Stephen Mihm (2007).  
8 When Madison was informed of this British favoritism toward New England in the license trade, he 
told Congress in February 1813 that this was an “insulting attempt on the virtue, the honor, the 
patriotism, and the fidelity of our brethren of the Eastern States” (Hickey 1989, 528).  
9 Quoted in the Vermont Republican 18 April, 1814, available in, Records of the Governor and Council of the 
State of Vermont, ed. E. P. Walton (Montpelier: J. & J.M. Poland, 1878), 6:497-498.  
10 Some scholars argue that the importation of luxury items actually helped the South, since it made 
blockade running profitable. See Robert B. Ekelund Jr. et al. (2004).  
11 The most important exception to this was the handful of ships operated by the Ordinance Bureau, the 
only Confederate agency that directly carried out its own blockade running.  
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SMUGGLING, SURVIVAL, AND 
CIVIL WAR ECONOMIES 
Aisha Ahmad   
Civil wars create serious consequences for neighbouring states, such as mass displacement, 
weapons proliferation, and other deadly contagion effects (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Bourne, 
2005; Greenhill, 2008). One of the less obvious spillover effects of civil wars is the militarization 
and criminalization of economic networks in border regions. In many parts of the world, 
informal trading economies existed for centuries before the formation of modern state borders; 
however, when civil wars break out, these conflicts mutate old commercial systems into new 
criminal networks. In this chapter, I explain why and how civil wars alter pre-existing 
smuggling economies, turning the informal into the illicit. 
To help the reader understand this phenomenon, I present evidence from three key 
countries where smuggling and civil war intersect: Afghanistan; Somalia; and Mali. An historical 
and political analysis of contemporary wartime smuggling economies in these three cases is 
essential to understanding the intersection between criminality and insurgency today. By taking 
seriously the effects of colonialism and Cold War interference on longstanding informal trade 
economies, this chapter provides needed context on both contemporary civil wars and the war 
economies that sustain them. 
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Mali are three of the most volatile conflict zones in the world 
today, and each of these border regions is home to rampant smuggling and criminal activity. 
Drawing on over a decade of field research, my analysis reveals why these states were pre-
disposed to crisis and collapse, resulting in the militarization and criminalization of the informal 
economies in their borderlands. My empirical observations presented in this chapter draw from 
the scholarly literature, as well as my own qualitative and quantitative data collected in each of 
these regions. My field research, conducted as part of larger global projects on civil war 
economies, was conducted in compliance with strict university research ethics protocols. 
The chapter unfolds in the following four parts. In the first section below, I outline the 
historical and political origins of smuggling, specifically looking at how colonial borders affected 
existing economic systems in each of these three countries. Second, I show how international 
interference helped catalyze the eruption of civil war in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Mali. Third, 
I critically examine the concept of legality in contemporary civil wars, and then outline some of 
the features of smuggling in civil wars. In the fourth and final part, I conclude with some 
observations on smuggling and human survival. 
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Old trade routes and modern borders 
In order to analyze smuggling operations in contemporary civil wars, it is first necessary to 
unpack the historical origins of these economic networks. Much of the existing literature on 
civil war economies focuses on how resources can fuel conflict processes (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004; Le Billion, 2006). Scholars such as Ross (2004), Fearon (2004), and Lujala et al. (2005) 
investigated the relationship between natural resources and civil war onset or duration, and 
found that having large mineral endowments can worsen conflict in low- and middle-income 
countries. Building on this core “resource curse” literature, other scholars have investigated 
how oil or aid resources also may produce similar consequences on conflict duration and se-
verity (Shearer, 2000; Ross, 2006; Cotet and Tsui, 2013). 
More recent developments in the civil war economy literature have focused more closely on 
how rebel groups finance their operations. Specifically, the “rebel governance” literature draws 
on insights from the resource curse scholarship, but focuses on why insurgent groups often tax 
and govern communities, much like states do (Hoffmann, Vlassenroot and Marchais, 2016). For 
example, Weinstein (2007) shows that rebels with natural resource endowments engage in 
more predatory violence, but insurgents who rely on taxes to stay afloat are more likely to 
curtail their violence and develop governance relationships with citizens. Building on these 
insights, Mampilly (2011) draws on years of fieldwork in multiple conflict zones to explain why 
rebels govern in some cases more than others. Similarly, through her extensive field research in 
Colombia, Arjona (2016) explains how rebels seek to rule over citizens, resulting in the 
emergence of an unexpected type of wartime social order. 
The civil war economies literature is not, however, limited to the study of natural resources 
or rebel taxation. A burgeoning body of scholarship has also emerged that examines the role of 
private businesses in conflict zones. Shelley (2014) uncovers how corruption, organized crime, 
and terrorism become entangled in conflict zones around the world. Ahmad (2017) explains 
why and how business elites played a role in jihadist takeovers in Somalia, Afghanistan, Mali, 
and Iraq. Much has also been written on the relationship between organized crime and ter-
rorism, particularly on the relationships between narcotics trafficking and insurgent or terror 
groups (Hutchinson and O’malley, 2007; Boeke, 2016). 
This chapter builds on, but also diverges from, this literature by uncovering how these 
economic systems have evolved and mutated over time. The transnational criminal networks 
that dominate civil war economies today did not materialize out of a void. Rather, these illicit 
economies are often modern mutations of informal trade and transit networks that existed long 
before the state. This historical context is essential for understanding what is referred to as 
smuggling today. As this volume has made clear, smuggling is the clandestine import or export 
of goods across an international border, which evades the payment of trade taxes and customs 
duties levied by the state (Forstater, 2018). When traders skirt past government taxes and 
regulations at a border, we call them smugglers. 
Herein lies the problem. For much of the world, the modern state and its borders are a 
relatively new construct, spread through the violence of colonialism, and with little con-
sideration of social and economic realities on the ground (Griffiths, 1986). When European 
imperialists drew these borders across Africa, Asia, and the Americas, their goal was to carve up 
land and steal resources from these civilizations (Rodney, 1972). These colonial lines, often 
drawn on a map with a ruler, haphazardly divided ancient social and economic systems into 
separate territories (Asiwaju, 1985). 
When postcolonial states inherited these borders decades later after regaining independence, 
they thus became responsible for regulating movement across these foreign-drawn lines. In 
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many cases, these boundaries existed on maps, but had no meaning on the ground. It is 
therefore unsurprising that precolonial social and economic systems often continue to play a 
more significant role in everyday life than the state itself (Meagher, 2005). 
Nonetheless, many of these newly independent states desperately needed revenue, and 
therefore tried to levy import-export taxes at their borders (Bird, 2012). This move rendered 
informal precolonial trade networks – a primary source of income for many families – illegal 
(Meagher, 2014). Of course, in many cases these newly independent governments also lacked 
mechanisms to enforce the collection of these duties (Prichard et al., 2019). As a result, many 
people simply ignored these new trade taxes, and continued to move goods as they had for 
many hundreds of years (Boone, 2014). 
The majority of these people do not see themselves as smugglers, nor do they believe their 
cross-border businesses are illicit or illegitimate (Reitano and Shaw, 2014). Traders and 
transporters in these borderlands often have centuries-old family connections along ancient 
trade routes, and believe in the legitimacy and appropriateness of continuing trade in their 
traditional ways (Bøås, 2012). Rather, it is these new borders, taxes, and regulations that often 
have no legitimate historical or social basis within these borderland communities. 
For example, in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, trade has flowed across 
these mountain passes for many hundreds of years before the delineation of the so-called 
Durand Line, drawn by British diplomat Mortimer Durand in 1893 (Omrani, 2009). Durand, 
who knew nothing of these ground realities, drew this line through an ancient and well- 
established social and economic community (Omrani, 2009). This line remains politically 
contentious to present day, and has produced a slew of devastating security crises. 
From an economic standpoint, the Durand Line is also the origin point of the contemporary 
smuggling industry in this border region. In the 1960s, Pakistan’s imposition of customs duties 
on trade inadvertently gave birth to a new smuggling industry that profited off the evasion of 
these taxes. Of course, traders circumventing these duties insisted that their business dealings 
were appropriate, rooted in both kinship and history. They argued that these caravan passes 
were part of the centuries-old Silk Route that connected China, Persia, and Rome, and that 
their families had transited goods through these mountain routes for generations.1 For many of 
these businesspeople, it was not their trade that was illegitimate; it was the border and the duties 
that were a sham. 
The Malian-Algerian border proved equally problematic. This border was drawn by French 
imperialists, with a ruler, and cut through the middle of the Sahara desert (Lecocq, 2010). Once 
again, there was no demarcation of this border on the ground, and yet it officially divided 
Tuareg and Moorish communities and families in the region into separate countries (Hoehne 
and Feyissa, 2013). This French-drawn line also cut straight through well-established and vital 
trade networks that had connected the Sahelian and Saharan regions (Scheele, 2012). Tuareg 
and Moorish traders in this border region have moved goods and gold along these ancient 
caravan routes for centuries (Lydon, 2009) and continue to rely on these networks to acquire 
everyday essentials. The French-drawn border arbitrarily cut up these old caravan routes. When 
the Malian and Algerian states gained independence, the line became an international border, 
and so the unregulated movement of goods along these routes could now be called smuggling. 
Of course, few consider their historic trade to be smuggling. In fact, Tuareg and Moorish 
communities in this region see their everyday commercial and transport businesses as not only 
legitimate, but also critical to survival.2 These communities live in remote and scarce border 
regions, and have received very little state support for economic development (Lecocq, 2010). 
In both the colonial and postcolonial periods, their relationship with the state has been distant 
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and fraught (Kone, 2017). Unsurprisingly, the Malian-Algerian border region has also produced 
a plethora of disastrous security problems. 
The same story applies to Somalia’s troublesome borders. These modern borders cut through 
ancient economic networks that connected the Indian Ocean sea trade to the East African 
interior (Mubarak, 1997a; Ahmad, 2017). Decided by British, French, and Italian colonialists, 
these lines were once again drawn with a ruler on a map in the middle of a desert (Lewis, 1980). 
European avarice and competition over lucrative African territories led to the demarcation of 
these colonial borders in the late nineteenth century, which had serious political and economic 
consequences for the entire region (Thompson, 2015). 
In terms of social and political impact, these lines divided ethnic Somalis into five different 
colonial polities: French Somaliland; British Somaliland; Italian Somaliland; British-colonized 
Kenya; and Italian-occupied Ethiopia. These divisions also had serious repercussions for the 
traditional trade networks that supported livelihoods across the region (Thompson, 2015). For 
many hundreds of years, Somalia’s coastline has housed important seaport entrepôts connecting 
East Africa to important Indian and Middle Eastern maritime trade networks. French, Italian, 
and British colonial borders slashed through these well-established economic systems. 
These borders carried forward into the postcolonial period, resulting in the formation of 
modern-day Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya (Lewis, 1980). Each of these newly in-
dependent countries was responsible for its own trade regulations and customs duties, and for 
controlling the movement of people and goods across these borders. While this technically 
turned informal trade into smuggling, in practice, the remote desert regions between these 
countries remained largely ungoverned. As such, most people living in these peripheral border 
areas – almost all who are Somalis – simply carried on with their business as usual (Rasmussen, 
2017; Majidi, 2018). Like many other countries that inherited colonial borders, Somalia has also 
had violent and fraught relationships internally and with its neighbours (Bereketeab, 2013). 
In each of these three cases, European colonialists created absurd borders that divided and 
disrupted well established social and economic systems. Ancient trading economies existed in 
these regions over many centuries, and had no connection to the colonial borders that were 
forced upon them. This historical context is essential for understanding the origins of smuggling 
economies, well before the outbreak of modern civil wars. 
The road to civil war 
Having established where each of these smuggling economies came from, it is necessary next to 
outline why and how civil wars erupted in the cases examined here, and how these civil wars 
then further mutated these economic systems, turning the informal into the illicit. This his-
torical political analysis requires an evaluation of the consequences of both inherited colonial 
borders and aggressive Cold War interference. It is no surprise that the disastrous civil wars in 
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Mali all occurred after the Cold War. Close examination of these 
three cases reveals that these civil wars were the result of sustained external interference by 
foreign powers. 
Afghanistan is arguably a quintessential case. The decade-long 1979–1989 Soviet military 
invasion and American-backed mujahideen rebellion left over a million people dead, and 
millions more injured or displaced (Edwards, 2002). The Soviets irreparably ruined much of 
Afghanistan’s agricultural land, in an effort to starve the population into submission (Byman, 
2015). Meanwhile, the United States colluded with Pakistan to traffic weapons and supplies 
through the smuggling channels in the mountains (Rubin, 2000). Because the Soviets had 
scorched orchards and farmlands across Afghanistan, farmers turned to hardy and reliable opium 
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crops to stay afloat (Kreutzmann, 2007). The smuggling community in the Pakistan- 
Afghanistan border region soon found itself moving guns into Afghanistan, and drugs out 
(Ahmad, 2017). 
When the Soviets finally withdrew in defeat, the war-ravaged country proved unable to 
recover from such brutal political and economic devastation (Byman, 2015). Then-President 
Mohammad Najibullah attempted to steward a transition between 1989 and 1992, but he had 
remained dependent on Soviet support to stay afloat (Cordovez and Harrison, 1995). This 
transitional government was also strongly opposed by the mujahideen rebels who resented 
Najibullah’s communist and Soviet affiliations (Rubin, 2013). 
The abrupt end of the Cold War catalyzed another wave of conflict. By 1992, Soviet 
support had dried up, and Najibullah’s government went bankrupt. Between 1992 and 1996, 
Afghanistan descended into a civil war among the former mujahideen rebel factions, many 
backed by neighbouring Pakistan (Akhtar, 2008). Bodies piled in the streets and rape gangs 
terrorized women and children from rival ethnic and religious communities. This ethnic civil 
war was so brutal that it eventually led to the rise of the Taliban, and further exacerbated 
militarization and radicalization in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region (Goodson, 2001). 
After both the Americans and Soviets lost interest in Afghanistan following the end of the 
Cold War, Pakistan continued its aggressive, blatant interference via the unruly border (Akhtar, 
2008). The Pakistan-Afghanistan border region remained the chief conduit of this interference, 
and the epicentre of both insurgency and illicit trade. The infiltration of Arab terrorist networks 
in Afghanistan culminated in the devastating 9/11 attacks, followed by a 20-year American-led 
occupation. After 40 years and repeated international interventions, Afghanistan has not re-
covered from this legacy of external interference and internal fragmentation. 
Somalia suffered a similar fate. Although Somalia did not suffer a full-scale superpower 
invasion during the Cold War, it did become dangerously entangled with both the Soviets and 
the Americans. From 1969 until the late 1970s, dictator and then-President, Siad Barre adopted 
a socialist political and economic platform in order to win desperately needed foreign support 
from the Soviet Union (Samatar, 2016). However, Barre was also obsessed with redrawing the 
ruler-drawn colonial borders that divided ethnic Somalis into different countries (Mukhtar, 
2003). In 1977, Barre launched a military offensive to recapture the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, 
and act that provoked international condemnation, including from the Soviets. This border war 
not only failed, but the Ogaden War also ended Somalia’s relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Given his dependence on foreign support, Barre was therefore forced to court an American 
alliance (Mukhtar, 2003). To prove his new loyalty and secure a desperately needed IMF loan, 
in the early 1980s Barre implemented a number of drastic economic reforms that reversed his 
previous socialist policies (Mubarak, 1997b; Samatar, 2008). Fearing disloyalty and opposition, 
he also began favouring his own clan faction and violently targeting his rivals, which only 
worsened economic disparity and increased clan conflict (Lewis, 2008). 
The end of the Cold War sent Somalia into a tailspin. The combination of dwindling foreign 
support and haphazard IMF-imposed economic reforms culminated in an economic crisis. With 
no superpower to bail him out, the Barre government went bankrupt. Hawiye clan militias 
seized control of Mogadishu, and Barre’s Darod-Marehan clan were butchered in the streets. 
The government dissolved in 1991 and Barre fled. The Somali countryside was overrun by 
armed groups that created their own fiefdoms, each run by a local clan warlord (Makinda, 
1999). An ill-timed drought compounded the crisis; together, civil war and famine produced a 
devastating humanitarian disaster. 
Between 1992 and 1995, the UN launched an intervention in Somalia, which aimed to 
protect food aid deliveries and restore political order. Instead, these aid convoys unwittingly 
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helped empower the reigning Hawiye-Abgal, while marginalizing the rival Hawiye-Habr-Gidr 
clan (Ahmad, 2012). In response, the aid convoys were attacked, and the UN was dragged into 
a clan conflict it did not understand. Food aid became a wartime currency, and traditional 
traders grew rich by looting and trafficking these sacks of grain. After the UN withdrew in 
failure in 1995, Somalia descended into a brutal clan-based civil war. 
In 2006, a local movement of Islamic courts overthrew the clan warlords, established a new 
government, and briefly restored peace and security (Barnes and Harun, 2007). By 2007, 
however, this Islamic government was quickly overthrown by a new US-backed Ethiopian 
invasion (Samatar, 2007). Not only did this external interference plummet Somalia back into a 
clan-based civil war, but it also gave birth to a new jihadist insurgency, al-Shabaab, that 
continues to control large swaths of the countryside (Ahmad, 2017). Despite countless inter-
national interventions, or perhaps because of them, Somalia has now been at war for three 
decades. 
The Malian case was, for many years, heralded as a shining example of post-Cold War 
success, even after suffering years of foreign interference, brutal IMF-imposed structural ad-
justment policies, economic upheaval, and military dictatorship.3 Unlike Afghanistan and 
Somalia, Mali survived the end of the Cold War without a civil war. Despite widespread 
protests and a military coup in 1991, the country avoided either a return to authoritarianism or 
a civil war. In the 1990s, analysts were quick to hail Mali as a grand success (Storholt, 2001). 
These optimistic observers did not, however, pay close attention to what was happening in 
the northern border region at these critical time periods. While Mali appeared to be a de-
mocratic success, severe conflict processes had already developed in the north of Mali and in 
Algeria, which would eventually catalyze a devastating civil war. First of all, during the Cold 
War, then-President Moussa Traoré had clamped down on the restive Tuareg population in 
northern Mali, leaving them impoverished and marginalized (Lecocq and Klute, 2013). When 
the Cold War ended, these repressed populations pushed back, once between 1990 and 1995, 
and again between 2007 and 2009 (Lecocq and Klute, 2013). While the government quelled 
these Tuareg revolts, these repeated uprisings revealed a systemic failure by the Malian gov-
ernment to control and integrate its northern border region into the country. The French- 
drawn border between Mali and Algeria and decades of western-backed dictatorship guaranteed 
conflict with these northern communities. 
Second, while Mali was relatively peaceful in the 1990s, neighbouring Algeria was not.4 In 
fact, the 1991–2002 civil war in Algeria gave birth to a jihadist movement that had serious 
implications for Mali. When Algerian government pushed back its jihadists, they retreated into 
the Saharan hinterland (Bøås, 2015). By 2002, the extremist Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC) was the only significant jihadist group left in Algeria, and it had retreated south 
towards the ungoverned Malian border region. On its heels, the GSPC launched a lucrative 
kidnapping-for-ransom campaign (Bøås, 2015). With its ransom moneys, these Algerian jiha-
dists then built relationships with both Tuareg rebel leaders and smugglers in the border region. 
By 2006, the GSPC has transformed into Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and 
emerged as the leading terrorist group in the region, with strong links to smuggling networks in 
northern Mali. Therefore, while democracy in Bamako appeared politically stable, an un-
precedented conflict was fomenting in the restive northern border region. 
The third major catalyst of the 2012 Malian crisis came not from neighbouring Algeria, but 
from nearby Libya. This Libyan-Malian connection had been developing for many decades, as 
disenfranchised Malian Tuaregs long sought refuge and economic opportunities in oil-rich 
Libya. Notably, many young Tuareg men from this Malian diaspora had found jobs in 
Muammar Gaddafi’s paramilitary Islamic Legion (Shaw, 2013). As a result, when in 2011 
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NATO launched a military operation that toppled Gaddafi and plummeted Libya into a de-
vastating civil war, the Malian Tuareg diaspora fled Libya. At this time, many Malian Tuareg 
who had been living in Libya returned home to northern Mali with advanced weapons and 
training (Marsh, 2017). 
The NATO intervention therefore not only collapsed the Libyan state, but also catalyzed the 
civil war in Mali (Ronen, 2013; Shaw, 2013). The evidence suggests that returning diaspora 
fighters from Libya joined forces with Tuareg rebels and their new AQIM allies, and in 2012, 
launched a countrywide separatist campaign (Boeke and de Valk, 2019). Since this uprising, 
Mali has become one of the most dangerous and extreme conflict zones in the world today. 
Each of these cases reveals an important underlying fact. Civil wars are international phe-
nomena. Not only did these countries inherit problematic colonial borders, but foreign parties 
also incited and inflamed conflicts inside their already fraught borders. Afghanistan, Somalia, 
and Mali all collapsed under the weight of these external pressures. The causes of these domestic 
political crises were international, and so it is not surprising that their ramifications cross 
borders. 
It should now be clear that the sophisticated transnational smuggling networks in con-
temporary conflict zones do not originate out of the ether at the moment war breaks out. 
Rather, these are modern mutations of longstanding informal economic systems, many of 
which have existed and evolved over hundreds of years, and have adapted to survive multiple 
external shocks. Civil wars, therefore, do not cause smuggling; rather, these conflicts further 
mutate longstanding informal trading networks into new militarized and criminalized bor-
derland economies. 
Legality in lawless lands 
Understanding these criminal economies requires a critical analysis of what legality means in a 
civil war. Law is a manifestation of power. For example, European imperialists created laws that 
allowed them to steal from and enslave local people. These moral crimes were legal because 
those in power wrote the laws. Indeed, law and justice are often incongruent. Yet, in all 
modern states, the government is supposed to define rules and enforce compliance, and this 
coercive power is the cornerstone of modern political order-making. However, when the 
power behind that order weakens, or collapses, the law loses its hold over society. When the 
rule of law is absent, contested, or unenforceable, it can be difficult to determine what is legal or 
illegal, or whether these terms even make sense. 
Of course, most contemporary conflict zones are hubs of both insurgent violence and 
criminal activity. When rebel groups compete for power and territory, they necessarily require 
resources and supplies to finance their war effort: guns; bullets; food; and medical supplies. To 
acquire these supplies, rebels tax, steal, pillage, divert, swindle, mine, and traffic. Much of the 
existing scholarship on smuggling in civil wars therefore investigates the intersections of 
criminality, insurgency, and terrorism (Cornell, 2005). When researchers “follow the money,” 
they are investigating how armed groups capture diamond mines (Ross, 2006), divert huma-
nitarian aid (Ahmad, 2012), traffic drugs (Björnehed, 2004), or extort civilians (Sabates- 
Wheeler and Verwimp, 2014). In order to make sense of these civil war economies, however, it 
is necessary to reflect critically on the concept of legality. 
In each of the three cases in this chapter, state weakness and failure produced legal grey zones 
in the borderlands. For the smuggler in northern Kidal, the Malian government sitting in 
southern Bamako has no right to interfere with his longstanding trade relations. The busi-
nessman in Spin Boldak has little time for economic policy debates in either Kabul or 
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Islamabad. The trader in Gedo region is not interested in tariffs and regulations that benefit 
Somali politicians sitting in Mogadishu. These cases reveal a disparity between what govern-
ments declares to be law, and what communities consider to be appropriate. 
The outbreak of civil war is an intensification of this disparity. Rebellions usually happen 
when communities hit a breaking point, turning tensions into violence (Keen, 2000). It is often 
a justice motive that sparks rebels to take up arm against the government, based on a perceived 
disparity between benefits and entitlements (Gurr, 1970; Welch, 1993). When rebels challenge 
the state for the right to rule, not only is there no longer a monopoly on the use of force, there 
is also an active competition over the system itself. Regardless of which side is officially re-
cognized by the international community, a civil war is evidence of a violent domestic dis-
agreement about who has the right to rule. 
This does not mean that the rebel challenger needs to articulate or codify an alternative set of 
laws. The act of violently contesting power inherently implies a challenge to the rules and 
regulations of the state. When rebels seize control of territory from the state, they may declare 
certain contraband goods legal, or government taxes forfeit. They may also impose new taxes 
and regulations of their own (Mampilly, 2011; Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp, 2014; Arjona, 
Kasfir and Mampilly, 2015; Arjona, 2016; Revkin, 2020). Communities that are caught be-
tween government and rebel actors in this military contest are often forced to accept whatever 
version of law is imposed on them. 
Of course, it is more likely that rebellions will emerge in regions where the government 
already has less influence and where its ability to enforce its laws is already weak (Herbst, 2001). 
Peripheral regions and borderlands that are located far from government centres of control are 
often more vulnerable, especially if there are pre-existing grievances that insurgents can coopt. 
As rebel challengers assume control over these territories, they necessarily build new re-
lationships with the informal economic communities in these borderlands, whether through 
incentives or coercion (Malik and Gallien, 2020). 
For the informal traders who have long operated in these borderlands, the outbreak of civil 
war presents a slew of new challenges and opportunities. There are new forms of rebel extortion 
and taxation, as well as dramatic shocks to supply and demand in local and regional markets. 
However, civil wars also often attract new connections to transnational criminal organizations, 
and greater opportunities in illicit trade (May 2017; Adetiba, 2019). 
To start, it is common for cash-strapped rebels to shake down businesses for “taxes,” so that 
they can finance their war effort. For smugglers who have made a living off of tax-free trade, 
rebel taxes can eliminate their competitive edge. Even more, when there are multiple, com-
peting armed groups operating in a border region, a businessperson can get taxed by each 
faction along a trade route. These compound rebel taxes dramatically increase the price of goods 
at point of sale, and can have a crushing effect on an entire smuggling industry (Ahmad, 2017). 
Civil wars do not, however, produce only debits. In many cases, rebels also create new 
opportunities for businesses, especially in illicit trade. Not only can armed groups provide 
protection for traffickers operating in active conflict zones, but they often also bring forward 
new investments and connections that can expand business opportunities. As noted earlier, 
AQIM earned tens of millions of dollars in kidnapping for ransom, which then allowed it to 
invest in revamping the smuggling industry in the Malian-Algerian border region (Bøås, 2015). 
Within a few years, the traditional smuggling community in northern Mali had mutated into 
the hub of the cigarette trafficking across West Africa (Raineri and Strazzari, 2015). This success 
then drew the attention of even bigger transnational criminal organizations. With AQIM and 
other armed groups providing cover, the Malian-Algerian border region became a conduit for 
cocaine trafficking, connecting Latin American drug cartels to European markets (Ellis, 2009). 
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Of course, it is not only rebels who become entangled in criminal activity. With such 
lucrative opportunities available, many political actors on the side of the state also become 
heavily involved in organized crime. In Mali, for example, the leader of the pro-Government 
Groupe autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés (GATIA) has been heavily implicated in narcotics 
trafficking (International Crisis Group, 2018). In Afghanistan, former President Hamid Karzai’s 
brother was known for running a massive heroin operation in Kandahar (Risen, 2008). State 
officials in Guinea Bissau are allegedly heavily involved in narcotics trafficking, allowing Latin 
American drug cartels to move product into West Africa an onwards to European markets 
(BBC News, 2020). 
State officials can also get incredibly rich through a plethora of other corrupt activities, such 
as looting state coffers and pilfering international aid. Tens of millions of dollars simply went 
missing in Karzai’s government (Epstein, 2011; Rosenberg, 2013; Press, 2019). In Somalia, 
parliamentary positions were often treated as opportunities to loot foreign aid.5 When the rule 
of law functionally has collapsed, it is often players that have access to the halls of power that are 
the most heavily engaged in criminality and corruption. 
When civil war breaks out, state actors, transnational criminal organizations, rebel groups, 
terrorists, and ordinary citizens all become embroiled in these complex conflict economies (L.  
Shelley, 2014; Ahmad, 2015). Despite fighting each other on the battlefield, sometimes these 
actors even make business deals across enemy lines. In Mali, for example, there is evidence that 
bitterly opposed ethnic factions have forged secret “gentlemen’s agreements” to ensure their 
respective trafficking routes are not disrupted as they go to war against each other.6 As Andreas 
(2008) shows, even international peacekeeping forces have found themselves entangled with 
criminal organizations and predatory militias, even as they try to curtail these pernicious actors 
on the battlefield (Andreas 2008). 
Civil wars not only involve a diverse set of competing actors, but also a messy mix of licit 
and illicit activities. Not all of the business activities in a civil war economy are dangerous or 
criminal. People living in a conflict zone still need to buy onions, shoes, gasoline, and cell 
phone chargers. A trucker may transport sugar and flour on one route, and cocaine and assault 
rifles on another. Rebels may illegally acquire weapons from states or private suppliers, but then 
may barter these arms in the marketplace to buy other essential supplies, like blankets or 
medicine (Adetiba, 2019). Even seemingly obvious illicit activities, like human trafficking, 
often have a more complex story at ground level. For example, according to ECOWAS 
regulations, it would be perfectly legal for a Burkinabe citizen to travel through Niger to the 
Malian-Algerian border without a visa; a bus company taking migrants to this border point 
would have broken no laws, even though it is part of a transit route connected to human 
smugglers in Libya (Opanike, Aduloju and Adenipekun, 2015). Similar legal questions can arise 
with other types of smuggling. Some border points are unregulated, whereas others may be 
subject to laws that have no enforcement, or that have competing claims of authority and 
legitimacy. 
When civil wars break out, there is a challenge to the authority of the state to create and 
enforce such laws. Under these conditions, it may be less useful to focus on teasing out what are 
legal versus illegal activities, especially in places where the rule of law functionally has collapsed. 
Rather, it makes more sense to examine how the shock of civil war forces local business actors 
to adapt to survive, including in ways that may create, empower, and enrich transnational 
criminal cartels. This dynamic adaptation among multiple, interdependent actors better explains 
the complex civil war economies we see today. 
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Smuggling and survival 
For most people, civil war brings poverty, loss, and terrible hardships. For savvy traders and 
transporters, however, war can also bring about new opportunities for wealth generation. To 
succeed under difficult wartime conditions, smugglers must be able to adapt quickly to new 
market demands, locally and regionally. They must strike deals with armed groups across 
multiple turfs, and buy off crooked politicians, police officers, and border control agents. After 
greasing these wheels, they must hire or negotiate enough muscle to secure their convoys from 
bandits and other rivals on the roads. Finally, they must push their product and ensure their 
buyers can and will pay. 
The financial rewards of this hustle can be lavish (Ahmad, 2017). Smugglers who demon-
strate competence and success in navigating goods through a conflict zone can crush their 
competition, and quickly grow into wartime tycoons. With their trafficking windfalls, they 
form monopolies, invest in new business ventures, and build multi-company conglomerates. 
These powerful mafias are then able to use their economic might to influence conflict dynamics 
on the ground. They not only forge agreements with armed groups, but also with corrupt 
government actors on the take. 
These business elites also play a critical role in the lives of the ordinary people living in 
wartime conditions: the truckers, wholesalers, merchants, shopkeepers, and even tea-sellers on 
the streets. Together, these diverse characters co-create the business ecosystem of the civil war 
economy, one that is truly interdependent. While relationships among business tycoons, rebel 
groups, and ordinary citizens are unequal, there is also an overall symbiosis in this business 
ecosystem that keep goods and cash moving. 
Consider, for example, a smuggling tycoon who makes a deal with a rebel coalition to move 
his product, allowing each rebel faction in the alliance to take a cut in exchange for their 
“security.” With these funds, the commanders pay their foot soldiers, who then buy liquor 
from their local shopkeeper. The smuggler also pays off a local government official, who 
distributes a cut to his cronies to ensure their loyalty. These cronies then refurbish their old 
jeeps at their local garage. When the smuggler finally delivers his convoy and receives his 
windfall, he refurbishes his home, creating new jobs and construction contracts. Of course, 
there is coercion and theft throughout this system. There are also everyday business activities 
that keep the money supply moving. When the tycoon earns and spends, the contractor, liquor 
store owner, driver, bricklayer, mechanic, shoemaker, and tea-seller all go home with a little 
extra in their pockets. 
If this smuggling tycoon and the armed groups disappeared today, the cash flow would 
freeze and those people who are dependent on this illicit business ecosystem would go hungry. 
Nonetheless, narcotics, human, and weapons trafficking have a devastating effect on local and 
regional security, and these businesses worsen violence and human rights abuses against civi-
lians. From both a moral and security standpoint, this unhealthy economic activity needs to 
stop. Indeed, the vast majority of people living in these war zones would heartily agree. In fact, 
even most ordinary traders and transporters who are caught up in these dangerous businesses 
want to transition to a safer, licit option, if another profitable opportunity was made available.7 
The challenge then becomes supporting safe and sustainable alternative livelihoods for people 
living in these troubled borderlands. 
It would be erroneous, however, to frame the economies of war-torn border regions solely 
in terms of criminality and corruption. Transnational criminal organizations and trafficking 
tycoons are not the only businesspeople in these civil war economies. Ordinary people living 
under wartime conditions also hustle to protect their lives and livelihoods. They respond to 
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fluctuations in supply and demand, adapt to changing battlefield conditions, and build un-
expected alliances to advance their security and prosperity. Even under extraordinarily chal-
lenging circumstances, human beings continue to truck, barter, and trade, in a demonstration of 
human resilience. 
This local economic adaptation is also often a response to serious environmental and climate 
pressures. In each of the three cases outlined in this chapter, threats to agricultural land forced 
local economies to adapt (Raleigh, 2010; Ogallo et al., 2018; Privara and Privarova, 2019). 
During the nineteenth century, the British deforested swaths of the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border region (Tucker, 1983), causing lasting desertification and soil salinization (Faiza et al., 
2017). Climate change now compounds the damage caused by this historic British theft and 
destruction. Somalia and Mali also suffered colonial theft, and are now both located in deadly 
climate change red zones. Both of these countries are experiencing rapidly increasing droughts 
and losses of arable lands (Doucet, 2019). These environmental pressures, caused almost entirely 
by wealthy foreign powers, have pushed already fragile ecosystems to the brink of collapse. 
Naturally, human beings living in these regions must adapt their economic activities to adjust to 
this barrage of externally imposed political, economic, and environmental shocks. 
Given this fragility, it would therefore be disastrous for the international community simply 
to attack wartime business ecosystems that are currently sustaining vulnerable communities. 
Rather, human beings in these troubled regions need economic and environmental alternatives. 
This is not a security problem that can be solved with force. The solutions to these problems lie 
in sustained investment, climate change adaptation, and new seed technologies. Most people 
living under these difficult conditions would welcome the development of safe and stable 
economic options. 
Finally, it is easy to label drug smugglers and arms traffickers in unruly border regions as 
nefarious criminals. Yes, these are serious economic and security problems. Nonetheless, this 
use of language has consequences. It allows decision-makers to call the rich cocaine-sniffing 
European partygoer a victim, while labeling the 15-year-old Malian truck driver a villain 
worthy of an air strike. It labels Somali and Afghan shopkeepers arms trafficker, while ignoring 
the fact that the weapons they are selling were surreptitiously brought into their countries by 
America, Russia, and other great powers. Indeed, it requires an audacious level of intellectual 
and moral dishonesty to wax poetic about illegality in fragile border regions, while ignoring the 
sheer magnitude of colonial theft and illegal interventions these countries have suffered. Any 
honest conversation about these serious security and economic issues must therefore include a 
frank discussion about reparations. 
Notes  
1 Author fieldwork and interviews with traders in Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.  
2 Author fieldwork, Mali. See also Bensassi et al. (2016).  
3 Political leadership played a role in Mali’s transition. In March 1991, the military coup led by Amadou 
Toumani Toure deposed Traoré. Yet, instead of claiming power for himself, Toure set up a transi-
tional council to usher in a new democratic government. Toure stepped down from power, and in 
1991 Alpha Oumar Konaré became Mali’s first democratically elected President.  
4 The Algerian Civil War began when the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) party realized it was 
set to lose the first-ever Algerian election to the popular Islamist Salvation Front (FIS). The FLN 
cancelled the election and banned the FIS, sparking a new Islamist rebellion.  
5 Author’s fieldwork, Nairobi, February 2013.  
6 Author’s fieldwork, Bamako, February 2018.  
7 Interviews with arms smugglers in Afghanistan and Somalia.  
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Exploring the relationship between insurgents  
and illicit trade 
Shalaka Thakur   
Vehicles pass through our land, it is our duty to receive tax from them. 
KNO (non-state armed group) member1  
Introduction 
When you visit the Government of India Land Ports Authority website and check the amount 
of trade at the official Indo-Myanmar border crossing ‘Moreh,’ the total import and export 
presented2 is INR 0 per year. The truckloads of products – from everyday electronics and 
medicines to areca nuts and cigarettes – that you see crossing at this buzzing border paint a 
different picture. When you speak to the traders doing business across this border, their estimate 
for licit goods is INR 10–15 crores (EUR 1.4–1.7 million) per day. Much of the trade that 
happens across this border, therefore, is ‘informal trade,’ done without import/export tariffs, 
commonly understood as smuggling. Illicit goods like drugs carve out a separate space for 
themselves. Security forces at the border on the Indian side estimate an approximate INR 4,000 
crores (EUR 463 million) worth of heroin and meth entering Manipur through Moreh 
each year. 
This border crossing is also dotted with various non-state armed groups, state security forces, 
and other state actors. This chapter seeks to explain the role that non-state armed groups play in 
shaping the smuggling economy.3 While non-state armed groups and smugglers are often in-
stinctively considered natural allies, given the covert nature of their functioning, as evidence 
from this case shows, their role in the smuggling economy is far more complex than commonly 
understood. Furthermore, it is often intrinsically tied to their relationship with the state and 
state actors. By exploring the relationships non-state armed groups have with the state and 
traders/smugglers,4 this chapter seeks to elucidate how the three create and mould the informal 
cross-border economy. 
Most literature around insurgents and smuggling has focused on the role smuggling plays in 
rebel finance and the role of informal economies in sustaining rebel groups. However, the 
reverse – the role that non-state armed groups play in the wider smuggling economy – has not 
been explored as much. Predominantly ensconced in literature on ‘war economies’ (see Berdal 
384                                                                             DOI: 10.4324/9781003043645-28 
and Malone 2000, Keen 1998, Nordstrom 2004), works arguing ‘greed’ as a key driver of 
conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2001), and viewing war economies as a ‘malignant form’ of 
economic activity (Ballentine and Sherman 2003) put the role of insurgents in economically 
viable areas like cross-border trade in a primarily exploitative light. Other accounts speak to the 
ambiguities of war economies and the livelihoods they create, and the communities that come 
to depend on them (Duffield 2001, Nordstrom 2004). Moving beyond the lens of war 
economies, Weigand (2020) finds that the role non-state armed groups play in the smuggling 
economy depend on and are tempered by the amount of territorial control they enjoy and the 
extent to which they depend on public legitimacy, offering more nuance to the rebel-smuggler 
link. As van Schendel and Abraham (2005) postulate, law and crime both emerge from his-
torical and ongoing struggle over legitimacy. Understanding the role that insurgents play, 
beyond being merely economically driven actors, is hence imperative to understanding their 
role in the smuggling economy. 
Many borderlands, and certainly this one, are a space of overlapping and competing state and 
non-state authorities, blurring the lines of what the ‘state’ is in terms of both monopolisation of 
violence and questions of legitimacy. They are thus, as scholars have argued, places where state 
authority may be contested or at times even entirely supplanted (van Schendel 2005). Moving 
beyond the Weberian idea of the state is therefore an imperative step to understanding the 
functioning of the smuggling economy. It is useful then, to take what Hagmann and Peclard 
(2010, 46) would call a ‘more grounded approach to statehood whose starting point is empirical 
and not judicial.’ The rebel governance and wartime orders literature (see e.g., Arjona 2016;  
Mampilly 2011; Staniland 2012) looks at rebels as actors with an interest in and ability to control 
and govern territory, beyond simply engaging in violence against the state, and has much to 
contribute in this regard. The role of non-state armed groups in this economy, conversely, also 
allows for a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of authority and regulation in 
informal cross-border trade. This trade itself can be viewed as a function of hybrid governance 
resulting from the interactions of state and non-state actors (Titeca and Flynn 2014), including 
armed groups, and economic informality viewed, not as a lack of state regulation, but rather as 
alternative forms of regulation, operating below and beyond the framework of the state 
(Meagher 2011). Furthermore, this kind of informal regulation may at least in part be based on 
socially accepted understanding (Raeymaekers 2010). 
Drawing on these insights, this chapter sets out to further our understanding of the role of 
non-state armed groups in informal cross-border trade through the case of Moreh at the Indo- 
Myanmar border. To explore some of the ways in which non-state armed groups shape the 
smuggling economy, it firstly investigates the micro-dynamics of the way fees and access of 
goods and vehicles across the border are negotiated by such groups. This section of the chapter 
also delves into the logics of taxes, as expressed by them, levied by non-state armed groups. The 
variations in manner of involvement speak to questions of authority, with professed logics of 
their involvement in the smuggling economy seemingly state-like in their ambition. This 
section also illustrates that, contrary to distinct zones of control, with territories clearly de-
marcated between state and rebel control, there is an intertwining of the state and non-state 
actors, who operate in the same space and time. 
The next section looks into how non-state armed groups incentivise smuggling. On the one 
hand, it finds that by levying informal fees on traders, non-state armed groups incentivise them 
to skirt state-imposed tariffs. Traders can often avoid state taxes, but not those of non-state 
authorities, which speaks to dimensions of how control and authority are exercised in the 
borderlands. It also finds that rules and taxes levied at the border by non-state armed groups 
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create informal barriers to entry, allowing only certain types of traders and smugglers, who are 
organised and rich enough to deal with these groups, access to some cross-border trade. 
The last section in this chapter looks at the effect of ceasefires and other agreements geared 
towards reducing violence in the smuggling economy. It finds that groups in agreements with 
the state play a much bigger and more systematic role in the smuggling economy, and that this, 
in turn, perpetuates corruption on the side of the state. Creating a type of political order which 
lies somewhere between coexistence and collusion and occasional confrontation, these agree-
ments, while playing the much-needed role of reducing active fighting and conflict, also 
perpetuate systems of methodical exploitation and entrench vested interests. 
Mapping Moreh: micro-dynamics of informal cross-border trade 
Slip kaatne se hi gaadi ja sakti hain 
(without their (non-state armed group’s) receipt, your truck cannot move).5 
– Trader, Moreh  
In some ways, the relationship that informal traders have with non-state armed groups and with 
the state are strikingly similar. Many traders interviewed in Moreh do not find the involvement 
and taxes taken informally from the non-state armed groups any more or less unacceptable than 
the tariffs levied formally by the state, or the bribes taken informally by state actors. It is 
amounts and process of involvement that concerns traders, not the legality of the actor in-
volved. For some smugglers dealing in illicit goods, they avoid detection by non-state armed 
groups and state security with equal determination. For others, the non-state armed groups are 
akin to ‘business partners’ who create conditions that are favourable to them and their business. 
This section will touch upon all three of these relationships. 
The actors 
The non-state armed groups found in this border region6 can be divided broadly into three 
ethnic groups: the Kuki groups like the KNA (Kuki National Army) and UKLF (United Kuki 
Liberation Front) whose area of influence is (AoI) Moreh town; the Naga group NSCN-IM 
(Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah); and various Manipur valley-based 
groups, who are currently based on the Burmese side of the border, while making the occa-
sional appearance in Moreh. All groups stand on a platform of secession or greater autonomy. 
The state actors found here are customs and sales tax officers, police, IRB (Indian Reserve 
Battalion), paramilitary (called Assam Rifles), and the army. The presence of the insurgent 
groups, in part believed to be covertly supported by China,7 explains the presence of various 
Indian security forces. All these actors play a direct or indirect role in the smuggling economy. 
While some actively get involved in trading of different goods, usually, taxes and bribes in the 
form of cash or cuts from the shipment are taken by all the non-state armed groups and many of 
the state actors. Contrary to how the smuggling economy is often envisioned, the areas of state 
and non-state control are not clearly divided or demarcated; rather, they are all operating in the 
same space. 
While some traders belong to the Meitei communities that are originally from Manipur, 
many big traders based in Moreh are ‘Mayangs’ or ‘outsiders,’8 mostly from other parts of India. 
Though from different communities and dealing in different goods, they speak of ‘Mayang 
unity’ while dealing with non-state armed groups. The trader community has formed a 
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‘Chamber of Commerce’ in Moreh that not only has to deal with the state, but also negotiates 
with non-state armed groups. The yearly lump sums to be paid are negotiated with different 
groups by the whole community so as to get beneficial rates from the non-state armed groups. 
Their relationship with the non-state armed groups is to a great extent similar to the one with 
state actors, when paying fees and taxes. In addition to this, the traders also pay a house tax to 
some Kuki non-state armed groups.9 As many of the traders do not belong to ethnicities that are 
originally from the region, and whose non-state armed groups function in this region, friction 
between the trader communities and non-state armed groups sparks up from time to time. 
However, the degree of violence has gone down over the past couple of decades. A trader who 
has been in Moreh since the 1980s described ‘They were very violent, they would threaten. 
Now it has been systemised.’10 Despite the reduction in violence that long-term traders spoke 
of, paying the non-state armed groups is not optional. 
Informal taxes and unseen roads 
Paying non-state armed groups in this region is something that every big trader crossing the 
border must do. The payments are made in different forms. Some are fixed yearly costs paid as 
lump sums to different groups in the form of ‘godown tax’ or ‘entry tax’ usually ranging 
between 5000 and 10,000 euros per group per year. In addition, vehicles carrying the goods are 
taxed along the road to and from the border crossing. Receipts are given by different non-state 
armed groups. While some have their organisation’s name on the receipt, others issue receipts 
under the names of non-existent transport associations. More recently, receipts have started 
being issued in the form of text messages. 
On average, when crossing from Moreh to Imphal, the capital of Manipur a mere 107 km 
away, traders pay informal fees at least nine checkpoints on an average ride, as a part of the 
border crossing process into the main city. A truck carrying cigarettes or betel nuts, for ex-
ample, would be taxed approximately INR 10000 (around EUR 110) per journey by non-state 
armed groups. In addition, there are various payoffs the traders have to make to state actors 
along the way, being stopped at three police checkposts, two customs posts, and occasionally 
one army post. They pay small bribes, usually less than EUR 10 per stop, although this varies 
depending on the shipment and its size. Traders at the border put the average of the informal 
taxes they pay to both state (in the form of bribes) and non-state armed groups at 20% of the 
value of their shipment, a substantial amount of it attributed to non-state armed groups. 
Some goods, particularly illicit ones (teak, drugs, exotic wildlife) are often transported on 
parallel make-shift roads in the jungle that have been created expressly with the intention of 
skirting the authorities. In these cases too, they are skirting all authorities – state and non-state – 
equally, rather than simply avoiding detection by state authorities while actively colluding with 
insurgents to avoid detection. For example, a teak smuggler explained that he takes other 
routes, even though they are much slower and inconvenient, as he finds ‘fewer UGs (under-
ground groups, local term for non-state armed groups” after “under ground groups” within the 
brackets)11 and fewer police’ along these routes.12 
Some non-state armed groups play an active role in smuggling and cross-border trade. For 
example, the NSCN-IM budget shows ‘cement,’ ‘betel nuts’ and ‘trade in Moreh’ as sources of 
income,13 which indicate a more active role in informal cross-border trade. For the most part, 
however, when it comes to non-state armed groups in the ‘informal trade’ or illegal smuggling, 
their involvement is mostly confined to taxation of goods crossing the border. Traders’ re-
lationships with state actors is quite similar when it comes to the payment of these fees. As one 
trader put it, ‘We can’t just blame the UGs – if they take 10 rupees, government (Indian state) 
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will take 20’.14 Traders also accuse the state of making legal trade extremely difficult, and 
wanting to keep their own informal checkpoints, where they collect bribes on crossing the 
border – a steady source of income. 
Drugs and drawing lines 
The role of non-state armed groups in the drug economy is a surprising one. According to 
sources within Moreh and the state security forces on the ground, while a few non-state armed 
groups in Moreh tax drugs arriving from Myanmar, this is in no way the norm. 
Heroin and World is Yours (WY) tablets (methamphetamine mixed with caffeine) come in 
from Myanmar, while ephiderenes and amphetamines go across from India to Myanmar 
(Shivananda 2011). These ingredients are then often used to convert opium into heroin, known 
locally as ‘number 4.’ At the Assam Rifles checkpoints, cars and people are thoroughly checked. 
Drug addiction rates in Manipur are very high, with more than 10% of the general population 
being opioid users (GoI report 2019). According to the Indian Army webpage ‘this drug 
corridor is an easy source of income for insurgents who collaborate with criminal gangs to 
smuggle drugs across the border’ (Indian Army webpage 2019). According to Indian security 
forces on the field though, non-state armed group involvement is limited. The non-state armed 
groups that are involved in the movement of drugs do not play a major role and also do not 
treat drug trafficking as a major source of income for their group. Furthermore, despite the 
lucrative nature of the drug business at this border, many non-state armed groups do not take a 
cut on drugs at all, on the basis of ideology, a view claimed not only by them, but reiterated by 
traders and locals in Moreh. It is often politicians and state security forces that are linked to large 
movements of drugs, according to traders and media reports.15 The non-state armed groups of 
communities (like the Kuki community), that are known traditionally to grow opium are also 
described by the Indian state security forces as playing a very small role in the drug economy, 
mostly as runners and small fry. During a meeting I attended of an NGO which has been 
working with drug addicts and protesting the rise of the drug economy, many of them believed 
that the drug trade had grown considerably since the valley-based non-state armed groups had 
been driven out by the Indian security forces. Although it is difficult to triangulate this claim, 
the perception of these NGOs and civilians that the non-state armed groups keep the drug trade 
in check is an interesting and unintuitive one. 
Another example of the tempering effects legitimacy is seen to have on the type of trade 
non-state armed groups get involved in can be seen with human trafficking. Despite India’s 
being a lucrative market and a major destination for human smugglers, and despite the very 
porous nature of the border, non-state armed groups at this border are largely not involved in 
human trafficking, as per accounts of the local community and traders in Moreh. In 2018, when 
the trafficking of underage girls was taken up by some businessmen in Moreh, it was con-
demned by the local community, including the non-state armed groups.16 The traffickers were, 
according to locals, outsiders – not a part of the usual trader community or tribal population of 
Moreh – and were driven out as they were seen as a threat to the ‘social fabric’ of Moreh. 
Narratives of non-state armed groups 
A member of the KNA, a major player in the Moreh informal economy, explained why his 
group took cuts from vehicles crossing the border. He frames this sort of involvement as their 
‘right towards their mission’ as they are fighting for their land and their people. He framed their 
involvement in cross-border trade as an articulation of their presence, beyond just financing of 
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their group. This authority is backed by evidence from constituents in the group’s area of 
influence. On occasions when the state security forces take action against collections on goods 
entering and leaving Moreh, they are often faced with violent protests by locals, indicating a 
degree of legitimacy of the KNA in the area. Similarly, as a minister from the non-state armed 
group the NSCN-IM proclaimed, ‘They can never stop the NSCN from collecting taxes, they 
cannot stop this contribution to the movement.’17 While his quote was in reference to all taxes 
taken by the group in all their areas of influence, the cuts taken from cross-border trade form a 
substantial amount.18” 
Making of the smuggler: how non-state armed groups  
incentivise smuggling 
‘They (referring to a non-state armed group) will call me and say “Eat well. Today is 
your last dinner”. 
– Smuggler, Moreh19  
Although it is the state that, through legislation, makes an act of trade smuggling, within these 
established legal bounds the presence of non-state actors often pushes traders dealing in licit 
goods into trading their products across the border illegally, thereby incentivising smuggling. 
The presence of non-state armed groups provides a new set of authorities to deal with and pay. 
Paying multiple sets authorities is unfeasible for many traders, and when having to choose 
whom to pay, it is often easier (and safer) for traders to avoid paying the state authorities rather 
than non-state armed groups, thereby leading to more traders dealing in legal goods to choose 
to avoid state-imposed tariffs and resort to smuggling. 
In line with this, non-state armed groups also create systems of informal regulations and 
barriers to entry on the movement of certain goods, in some cases incentivising certain types of 
people and smugglers over others. In some cases therefore, the presence of non-state armed 
groups helps certain smugglers and traders capture a larger share of the market by creating 
barriers to entry, not unlike what the state does. 
Incentivising smuggling 
Peter Andreas (2009) postulates that if tariffs are high, smugglers are incentivised to smuggle 
legal commodities trying to evade these tariffs. The presence of non-state armed groups, in a 
similar vein, makes the (informal) taxes20 to be paid by traders high, even if the state is not 
levying them. At some crossings, where non-state armed groups are the only authority present, 
they might replace the state and determine the tariff prices. At other places, like in Moreh, 
where they function alongside the state, it changes the traders’ calculation of whether and how 
much to pay each authority in question. 
High state-imposed tariffs are a reason traders give for avoiding formal, legal trade. However, 
they blame, in equal part, the presence of non-state armed groups and the less avoidable taxes 
that they charge. Many cite the difficulties of paying non-state armed groups as the reason they 
cannot afford to pay state tariffs in addition to these informal tariffs. In many cases, if it were just 
the state taxes they had to pay, they claim they would. However, knowing that they have to pay 
taxes to various non-state armed groups, often under the threat of violence, makes paying both 
unfeasible. Since non-payment to non-state armed groups is a dangerous option, having far 
harsher implications, they instead opt for not paying the official state tariffs, bribing state actors 
whom they meet along the way instead. 
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The cycle of increased informal trade at Moreh can thus be attributed to the tariffs by both 
the state and non-state armed groups. The state often kicks it off with high tariffs. For example, 
at the Indo-Myanmar border in Moreh, there is an ‘Integrated Check Post (ICP).’ Equipped 
with state-of-the-art infrastructure, multiple lanes for trucks to ply and sophisticated screening 
devices, it is usually, nevertheless, empty. At the time of my last visit in early 2020, it was 
absolutely desolate. When I met the officer in charge and complimented him on the scale and 
grandeur of the checkpost, he sheepishly commented on how it would be even nicer if anyone 
used it.21 He is referring to how most traders avoid it on account of the official tariffs they 
would have to pay there. Moving a few hundred meters away from the slick, lonely ICP 
concrete roads to the blurry dirt paths, trade is abuzz. 
Trucks carrying goods from Myanmar stop on the Myanmar side. The goods are then 
carried as headloads or piled on to motorcycles and carried to trucks on the Indian side, where 
they are piled onto Indian trucks. Police sit languidly by, watching the trucks load. Their 
lookout is for drugs and arms, and the movement of the electronics, garments, cigarettes, toys, 
cement and medicine before them now is not of much interest. They understand, like everyone 
else here, that this trade is important, and its technically being ‘informal’ is little reason to stop 
it. The trucks on the Indian side, having entirely avoided the ICP, then embark on a journey 
dotted with stops by the state and non-state armed groups. 
In some cases, the state tariffs are considered too high to pay, irrespective of non-state armed 
group taxation and fees. Multiple traders mentioned the example about the remarkably high 
tariffs on importing betel nuts (40%) under India’s new ‘Normal Trade’ policy from 2015, up 
from a previous concessionary rate of just 5%. One of the most traded items across the border, 
traders are now unable to pay this high tariff, and betel nut is traded informally, with reports 
showing that smuggling surged in the aftermath of the change in these tariffs (see, for example  
Ambedkar et al. 2019). While customs offices can sometimes be seen overflowing with seized 
betel nuts, some customs officers in their interviews also admit the counterproductive effect of 
this tariff on formal trade and the difficulties traders face because of it. Paying state-imposed 
tariffs can avert the bribes traders pay to the ‘uniformed’ (state) collectors along the way, but the 
latter option often proves to be more economical and expedient. Multiple traders complained 
of how they had tried going down the legal route a couple of times, and how it was made 
extremely difficult for them. As one trader grumbled ‘Instead of telling us (to do formal trade), 
why don’t they change their rules?’22 However, state officers and customs officials speak to the 
entrenched vested interests traders have in operating outside the legal system, arguing that they 
would be unwilling to pay even if official tariffs were reasonable.23 
As illustrated in the section above, paying non-state armed groups in this region is something 
that every big trader crossing the border must do. These are costs that traders cannot avoid or 
forgo, under the threat of violence, and must factor into their expenses. Paying the formal tariff 
in addition would make no business sense, explained traders. Non-state armed groups on the 
Indo-Myanmar border thus play no small role in encouraging traders to forgo the payment to 
the state. They make traders who have been working in these regions ‘smugglers’ from the 
Indian state’s point of view. As far as the non-state armed groups are concerned though, this is 
their land, their area of control, and dues have been paid. 
Barriers to entry and informal regulation 
The presence of non-state armed groups can determine the level of organisation of the 
smugglers. According to Andreas, the level of organisation in smuggling economies varies 
considerably, depending especially on a state’s ‘tough’ enforcement practices at a certain border 
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(ibid., p. 20). Non-state armed groups in Moreh and their enforcement of taxes also plays a role 
in pressurising traders into more organised structures. It creates a sort of barrier-to-entry which 
only seasoned traders and smugglers are able to cross. 
As one teak smuggler candidly declared ‘I consider them (the UGs) as business partners.’24 In 
his line of work, he explained running a successful business meant keeping others out of it and 
the non-state armed groups served as partners in making this happen. Since he has been in this 
industry for a while, he is able to negotiate with the groups and pay their charges. In exchange, 
the higher tariffs the groups would charge newcomers dissuades competition, giving him a near 
monopoly. 
Peace deal/piece meal: how ceasefires and suspension of operations play  
a role in the smuggling economy 
Earlier they (referring to a non-state armed group) used to be scared, now as they have 
an agreement, they take openly. Now they’ve just set up a gate (to collect money).25 
– Trader, Moreh  
De-escalation of violence through ceasefires and other peace deals comes at a price and with the 
non-state armed groups along the Indo-Myanmar border areas, this price often takes the form 
of offering a larger piece of the pie in the smuggling economy. Smuggling becomes a larger, 
more organised part of the ceasefire economy for both non-state armed groups as well as state 
actors, playing an arguably larger role during halfway peace than it did during the peak of 
conflict. 
Certain features of ceasefires and suspension of operations deals (SoO) at Moreh lead to a 
degree of impunity from state actions against non-state armed groups, as the trade-off for the 
state would be a return to active fighting. This leads to increased territorial control, as their 
territory is no longer actively contested militarily by the Indian state, although they may 
continue to fight other groups over territory. As territorial control sets the outer limits to which 
they can involve themselves in the smuggling economy, agreements with the state enhance the 
possibility of non-state armed groups involving themselves in the smuggling economy in a 
larger and more systematic way. This, in turn, cements their presence in the area, which en-
trenches a large presence of state security forces in the region, with quite a substantial slice of 
the smuggling arranged for themselves. Agreements can also be seen as a form of ‘external 
legitimacy,’ or recognition by the Indian state. Non-state armed groups who are (tacitly) al-
lowed to operate may therefore alter their dependence on internal legitimacy from their own 
constituents, thereby changing the calculus of what sorts of smuggling a group might get in-
volved in. 
Restructuring the calculus of territorial control and internal legitimacy 
The role that non-state armed groups play in the smuggling economy depends heavily on 
public legitimacy and territorial control (see Weigand 2020). The sort of state-insurgent re-
lationship can affect directly how much territory a non-state armed group is able to control, as 
well as the extent to which internal legitimacy factors into its role in informal trade. 
Confrontation, coexistence or collusion of/with the state is what, to a large extent, determines 
how much territory a group controls, as well as how dependent they remain on internal 
legitimacy in their decision making. 
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While legitimacy and accountability might regulate what types of smuggled goods non-state 
armed groups get involved in, it is territorial control that sets the external limits to where and 
how they are able to get involved in smuggling. The extent of territory controlled determines 
the amount and method of collection and how regularised the taxation is. Non-state armed 
groups that control territory would be able to set up collection checkpoints, where they take a 
specific cut based on certain criteria, like vehicle and shipment size and type. Apart from this, 
they also collect fixed yearly contributions from regular traders. Groups that do not control 
territory would have a more ad hoc manner of collection, taking as much as they can, when 
they can. While traders lose a far greater percentage in taxes to the non-state armed groups 
controlling territory, they can account for it based on regularisation and predictability. Traders 
interviewed in Moreh were able to map out where they had to pay and an approximation of 
how much for the non-state armed groups that control territory. From the groups that do not 
control territory, the monetary pinch is considerably less, but the ad hoc nature of collection 
makes it harder to prepare for. A trader may or may not have to pay a cut to a non-state armed 
group not controlling territory, but when he does it is difficult to predict the amount and when 
it will happen. 
To illustrate, let us do a case comparison of non-state armed groups in varying relationships 
with the state. You see two kinds of groups – the ones who are still actively fighting with/ 
hiding from the state, and with whom the Indian state currently has no form of a peace deal, are 
Meitei groups, from the Manipur valley. Groups with which the state is currently in ceasefire or 
suspension of operations are the NSCN-IM and the Kuki groups. Valley-based groups pre-
viously had an allocated spot that they operated out of on the Myanmar side of the border. 
Multiple traders recalled being called in for meetings to determine rates to be paid, and the 
valley-based non-state armed groups were considered heavyweights even among the crowded 
non-state armed group space in this border region. After heavy securitisation/military inter-
ventions over the past decade, including a couple of joint operations with the Myanmar army to 
oust valley-based groups, the usual post they used to function out of remains empty and unused. 
Constantly being on the run from security forces has pushed them into hiding, and the valley- 
based groups who now no longer control territory, and their role in the smuggling economy on 
this border has been reduced to that of an ad-hoc collector. According to traders, the collection 
from these groups has been reduced to close to nothing26 over the last two years. The removal 
of this once big player in the smuggling economy due to militarisation has, however, not 
drastically reduced the ‘cut’ of non-state armed groups in the smuggling economy. Despite this, 
they make ad-hoc payment demands, particularly in the form of the big sums to be paid by 
smugglers yearly. 
Let’s compare this type of involvement with that of non-state armed groups that are in some 
sort of agreement with the state. As per the rules of the ceasefire, which the state has with the 
Naga group the NSCN-IM, they are not allowed to engage in ‘extortion.’ Similarly, as per the 
SoO, which the state has with various Kuki groups, the non-state armed groups are to remain in 
their camps and suspend all operations (as the name would suggest), including taxation of goods 
from across the border. However, these arrangements, rather than forcing non-state armed 
groups to toe this line, tend to offer a degree of tacit permission by the state, who would prefer 
this buy-out to a resurgence of violence. The NSCN-IM is a Naga group that has been in 
ceasefire with the Indian state since 1997. The 1990s saw turf wars for the control of Moreh. 
While the Kukis won this turf war and Moreh is considered their area of influence, traders 
doing business in Moreh need to factor in the NSCN-IM and negotiate the yearly rate they pay 
the group on goods coming from across the border. In addition, they have a collection point a 
few kilometres from Moreh. The ceasefire has increased the income of the NSCN-IM, 
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a sizeable amount of which comes through their cuts and involvement in cross-border trade. 
For example, the trade of betel nuts is one of the sources of income for the military wing of the 
NSCN-IM, the Naga army, adding about INR 1275000 (EUR 146,500)27 to their revenue in 
the year 2019-2020. The taxes and fees taken by the group are stated as an income source in 
their budget. Apart from the betel nuts and other major goods, ‘Moreh market, transport of 
goods to and fro’ is another entry that can be found in the ‘sources of income’ part of the 
NSCN-IM budget. The actual sum collected probably differs substantially from the numbers in 
the budget, much like the fees taken by state actors in ‘informal’ ways would not show up in 
import duties or customs reports of the state. The NSCN-IM also takes onus for many taxes 
they levy on the goods going through their area of influence/territory. When the IM takes a cut 
from a shipment, the name of the organisation, as well as a signing authority is on the receipt 
they issue. The ceasefire further allows them this symbolism, as the tradeoff for taking sustained 
action against this taxation would tip the precarious balance of the ceasefire. In a way, through 
the claiming of the taxes they are charging on goods coming from and going into Myanmar, 
they differentiate themselves from other armed actors who take cuts without attaching their 
name to it, creating the impression of a proper signing authority that levy taxes on shipments 
moving through their area. 
The role of the state, in many cases, does not remain that of turning a blind eye to the cuts 
taken by non-state armed groups in order to maintain peace, but a far more active role in this 
smuggling economy themselves. The murky borderland is in in fact a much-desired posting 
with rumours of police heads paying up to an equivalent of 1 crore rupees (EUR 113,000) for 
the postings. In Moreh, non-state armed group collection points that I observed were a stone’s 
throw away from police and security forces along the same route. 
David Brenner’s chapter, (following this one) compellingly describes the case of economic 
pacification, geared towards breaking ‘rebel-smuggler nexus,’ can increase violence, conflict 
and insecurity. This is not only because economic interventions in contexts of conflict can shift 
the incentives of warring factions in unforeseen ways. In the context of Moreh, you see how 
halfway peace is bought by incentivising non-state armed groups to get a larger part of the 
smuggling economy, while simultaneously incentivising an informal state-smuggler nexus. 
While reduction of violence and eventual peace is an imperative goal to move towards, as one 
trader complained in reference to the consequences of the suspension of operations arrange-
ments, ‘Agreements with government should not be a mandate for harassing public.’28 
Conclusion 
Dono ka phayda hain, magar public ka phayda nahi hain.29 
(They both (non-state armed groups and state actors) profit, but the people lose.) 
– Trader, Moreh  
The relationship among traders, non-state armed groups and the state is a complicated one, and 
in its many permutations and combinations, is an important factor in shaping the economy of 
informal and illicit cross-border trade. This chapter attempted to throw some light on this 
relationship. 
The findings in this chapter challenge the idea that smuggling occurs in rebel-controlled 
borderlands, beyond the purview of the state. On exploring the micro-dynamics of the 
smuggling economy, it finds that the role of non-state armed groups are in fact often in-
extricably interwoven with state actors. It demonstrates how non-state armed groups play a 
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large role in incentivising smuggling in a space that they often share with state actors, while at 
the same time creating parallel informal barriers-to-entry for different goods and types of 
smugglers. They are not alone though, with state legislation and state actors also encouraging 
the informal trading of goods across the border. The presence of non-state armed groups leads 
to the presence of many state security forces in this region, increasing the number of actors in 
the movement of goods across the border, and determining the calculus of what informal 
arrangements must be made or what fees must be paid. Finally, the chapter shows that a larger 
piece of the smuggling economy for non-state armed groups and state actors is often the price 
for (relative) peace. Traders consider agreements between the state and non-state actors con-
tributing factors to more systematic and larger cuts taken by both. The fear-infested environ-
ment of constant conflict was, contrary to popular belief, less fertile a field for smuggling. 
The case of Moreh presents useful insights into the role of non-state armed groups, and how 
their entangled relation with state actors shapes the smuggling economy. These findings speak 
to an undeniable need to pay closer attention to non-state armed groups while studying the 
smuggling economy and to the value of using smuggling as a lens through which to understand 
non-state armed group governance and authority in the borderlands. 
Notes  
1 Interview, April 2021.  
2 In Indian Rupees (INR) crores.  
3 Based on research conducted in the border town of Moreh, in the state of Manipur at the Indo- 
Myanmar border 2019–2021. Interviews were conducted primarily with traders, who deal with both 
state and non-state armed groups to negotiate cross-border trade and also with members of non-state 
armed groups, customs officers and state security forces. Alongside this, observations on how cross- 
border trade takes place were conducted. This choice of methodology takes an empirical rather than 
legal approach to the actualities of mapping informal trade and governance of border regions.  
4 I use the word ‘trader’ instead of ‘smuggler’ in many cases as this is term used by the traders themselves 
and even the customs officials and state security forces in the region for people who trade in licit goods 
even if they are not paying state tariffs. Interviewees across the board would draw a clear distinction 
between what they consider ‘informal trade’ – the trade of electronics, food items, cigarettes, betel and 
areca nuts, clothes, toys and other licit goods traded – and ‘smuggling,’ a term that they reserve for 
drugs, exotic wildlife products, people and arms. Trader, customs officers and security forces, while 
describing trade in Moreh would use the categories ‘formal trade,’ ‘informal trade’ and ‘illegal 
smuggling.’ These different understandings of trade do not fit into the neat categories of external 
observers. In fact, he need for ‘informal trade’ version of this smuggling economy is considered as 
necessary, even by actors within the state apparatus. In the state of Manipur alone, more than 50,000 
people out of the 2.8 million population are estimated to depend on the smuggling economy for their 
livelihood, 90% of it attributed to the crossing in Moreh (see Mahadevan 2020).  
5 Interview, trader, Moreh January 2020.  
6 My findings for this chapter are primarily based on the Indian side of the border, and the different 
actors traders would encounter at the Moreh-Tamu border.  




8 Term used in Manipur for people who are not Meitei, Kuki or Naga but from mainland India.  
9 According to interviewees in the community, during the turf wars between Naga and Kuki non-state 
armed groups, both organised on the basis of tribe and ethnicity, when both groups tried to recruit the 
then large Tamil trading community to join their non-state armed groups as they had numbers and 
sizeable resources, an offer which they declined.  
10 Interview, trader, Moreh January 2020.  
11 term used locally for non-state armed groups. 
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12 Interview, Manipur February 2021.  
13 Based on NSCN-IM budget for the year 2019–2020.  
14 Telephonic interview, trader, August 2020.  




16 Interview, Moreh, January 2020.  
17 Interview, Manipur November 2019.  
18 based on the NSCN-IM budget for 2019-20.  
19 Interview, Imphal, February 2021.  
20 I use the term ‘tax’ as it the term used by the non-state armed groups and by the traders and often times 
‘illegal tax’ as referred to by state authorities.  
21 Interview, Moreh January 2020.  
22 Interview, trader, Moreh January 2020.  
23 Interview, state official, Manipur August 2020.  
24 Interview, Manipur February 2021.  
25 Interview, trader Moreh January 2020.  
26 Interview, trader, Moreh January 2020.  
27 Budget for the NSCN-IM 2019-20.  
28 Telephonic Interview, Trader, August 2020.  
29 January 2020. While in this quote he is referring to the non-state armed groups and state actors, it 
should be noted here that the trader community is also amongst those who profit as per local accounts 
in Moreh and Imphal and as can be seen in the example of the teak smuggler.  
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REBELS, SMUGGLERS AND (THE 
PITFALLS OF) ECONOMIC 
PACIFICATION 
David Brenner   
Introduction 
Rebels and smugglers often make natural bedfellows. This is due to the clandestine and peri-
patetic nature of both rebel movements and smuggling economies, as well as their borderland 
geographies. State actors thus seek to dry up smuggling flows in order to erode the revenue 
streams of armed groups that tax smuggling operators or operate smuggling economies 
themselves. Economic pacification strategies can pursue breaking up the rebel-smuggler nexus 
in two different ways.1 The state can attempt to restrict the flow of goods that are linked to 
armed group funding by sanctioning the trade of certain commodities. Alternatively, the state 
can aim to undercut the profit margins of smuggling operations by liberalising restrictive trade 
regimes, thereby turning smuggling into official trade. 
The effect that economic pacification has on the dynamics of conflict are, however, far from 
straightforward. As this chapter suggests, such strategies can, in fact, increase rather than de-
crease violence, conflict and insecurity. This is not only because economic interventions in 
contexts of conflict can shift the incentives of warring factions in unforeseen ways. More 
importantly, economistic approaches to conflict operate on limited assumptions about the 
nature of political violence and consequently fail at addressing the underlying political causes of 
conflict. To explore some of the unintended effects and pitfalls of economic pacification, the 
following chapter will proceed as follows. It will first discuss the nexus between smuggling and 
rebellion and contextualise economic pacification policies on the basis of political economy 
scholarship. It will then explore two different approaches to eroding smuggling revenues 
through two empirical case studies. The chapter will look to attempts of restricting smuggling 
economies in the case of US sanctions on so-called conflict minerals in the border areas of the 
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It will then turn to eastern Myanmar for an 
example where state policy sought to undermine rebel revenues by liberalising rather than 
restricting border trade. In both cases, economic policies to weaken rebel groups have not 
translated into a decrease of insecurity and violence, let alone in the pacification of armed 
conflict itself. 
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Smuggling as a source of rebel revenue 
Smuggling makes for a good source of revenue for rebel movements. Taking up arms against 
the state is costly but illegal. In order to fund a rebel movement, including the purchase of arms 
and munition, the mobilisation of people, the training and payment of recruits, the provision of 
services to people in rebel-held territories, among other needs, rebels must generate revenue. As 
rebels cannot fund themselves through formal economic activities, partaking in illicit econo-
mies, including cross-border smuggling, is imperative. Moreover, arms and munition are 
normally not available for purchase through legal channels and must be acquired on the black 
market (at least in the absence of other sources). 
At the same time, the black market itself often expands in contexts of war as smuggling 
becomes the lifeline for many people in a context where large parts of the formal economy 
collapse. From besieged Sarajevo to the Afghan and Myanmar borderlands, during war people 
often depend on smuggling to make a living while communities depend on smugglers for 
everyday goods (Goodhand 2004, Andreas 2011, Brenner 2019). From the rebel perspective, 
the clandestine and peripatetic nature of smuggling economies is compatible with the mobility 
and surreptitiousness dictated by guerrilla warfare. Most formal economies, including agri-
culture, manufacturing or resource extraction, are dependent on at least relatively stable ter-
ritorial control. By contrast, smuggling or taxing smuggling operators is feasible in contexts of 
lose, fragmented and often mixed control of territory. Even if rebel movements rule territory as 
a quasi-state within the state, however, smuggling remains key to their economic orders. This is 
because flows of goods within or across rebel territory avoid official tax and tariffs, by definition 
turning trade into smuggling. This is most pronounced when rebel territory spans inter-state 
borders (Weigand 2020, pp. 134–135). 
In fact, many rebel groups are located in remote border areas where smugglers operate across 
international borders. This is due to a mix of factors. Borderlands are geographically distanced 
from the centre of state power. While borders themselves are mostly highly securitised, bor-
derlands are often less territorialised in terms of the geographic reach and penetration of state 
power. In many contexts, it is simply more feasible to recruit and mobilise armed resistance to 
the state (Buhaug and Gates 2002). This lack of state territorialisation in many borderlands is far 
from coincidental. The drawing of borders itself left many borderland communities disaffected 
with the nation-states in which they had come to be placed (Korf and Raeymaekers 2013). The 
contested nature of the state in many borderlands is thus a direct effect of state formation 
processes. This is particularly important for contemporary conflicts in the Global South, most of 
which are ethnonational conflicts directly linked to colonial border drawing and state formation 
(Wimmer 2012, pp. 2–3, Mamdani 2018). 
To sum up, the organisational mode and particular geography of smuggling turn it into an 
ideal source of revenue for rebel groups. This is true for a range of contemporary conflicts: non- 
state armed groups in the eastern DRC smuggle minerals and marijuana (Seay 2012); rebels 
in Myanmar are involved in the smuggling of timber and gemstones (Brenner 2019); and 
insurgents in Syria engage in the smuggling of weapons and everyday goods (Herbert 2014). 
The reliance of rebels on illicit economies in general and commodity smuggling in particular is 
anything but new. This is despite the oft-heard notion that many rebel groups were less reliant 
on illicit economies during the Cold War because they received financial support from one or 
the other superpower (e.g., Kaldor 2012; Malešević 2008). Despite Cold War alliances, rebel 
groups often sought financial self-reliance. Notwithstanding US support, the Afghan muja-
hideen, for instance, financed their struggle against the Soviet Union by smuggling heroin, just 
as the Angolan UNITA financed its operations through ivory and diamond smuggling (Naylor 
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1993). In some cases, the US even aided the smuggling activities of its non-state allies in order 
to ensure their financial self-reliance. In the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia (the restive 
border regions of Myanmar, China, Laos and Thailand), the CIA aided anti-communist forces 
during the Cold War by providing logistical support for large-scale smuggling of heroine, 
including transportation in CIA airplanes, in effect turning the region into one of the world’s 
largest exporters of narcotics (McCoy 1972). 
Despite this long-standing nexus between smuggling and armed conflict, the issue of 
armed group financing has only attracted scholarly interests since the political economy turn 
of Conflict Studies in the 1990s. Grappling with the post-Cold War outbreak of new or 
thought-to-be frozen conflicts in the Global South, some voices initially forwarded culturalist 
explanations that stressed ethnic difference as the main driver of civil wars from Yugoslavia, to 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Huntington 1993, Kaplan 1994). Others, however, stressed the 
economic rationale underlying these armed conflicts, highlighting how elites took an interest 
in perpetuating violence because they profited from globalised war economies (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998, Keen 2008, Kaldor 2012). Political economists dedicated considerable work to 
disentangling different types and facets of war economies and how they relate to conflict 
dynamics. They have, for instance, discussed what kind of resources are more or less asso-
ciated with violent conflicts, given how lootable or transportable they are (Ross 2004,  
Le Billon 2012, Rigterink 2020). Their findings stress that the state is mostly as deeply im-
plicated in the economic orders that emerge during protracted armed conflict as are non-state 
actors (Berdal and Keen 1997). Smugglers, for instance, often cooperate with state actors, 
such as border officials and security forces. This is particularly so for large-scale smuggling 
operations that need access to the infrastructure of the formal economy, such as ports and 
airports (Weigand 2020, pp. 123–125). In a similar vein, critical scholars have highlighted the 
need to analyse war economies in a regional and global perspective rather than simply locating 
them within one or another seemingly bounded nation-state container (Duffield 1999, Pugh 
et al. 2004, Keen 2008). Building on this, discussions focused on the implications of war 
economies on war-to-peace transitions, including conflict resolution, post-war reconstruc-
tion, state-and peacebuilding (Goodhand 2004, Turner and Pugh 2006, Le Billon and 
Nicholls 2007, Wennmann 2009). 
Economic pacification and its pitfalls 
From an economic perspective, ending armed conflict is about making conflict a) less eco-
nomically feasible by undercutting the revenue base of warring factions and b) less economically 
desirable by decreasing the profitability for conflict entrepreneurs. While political economy 
scholars of civil war stress the deep involvement of the state in most war economies, economic 
pacification policies predominantly target non-state armed groups. After all, policies are for-
mulated by states (or state-based international organisations). Economic pacification of the 
rebel-smuggler nexus thus aims at undercutting the revenues that non-state armed groups 
generate by smuggling or taxing smuggling operators. Generally speaking, the state can attempt 
this in two different ways. On the one hand, the state can attempt to restrict the flow of goods 
linked to armed group funding with targeted sanctions. On the other hand, the state can aim to 
undercut the profit margins of smuggling operators by liberalising restrictive trade regimes, 
thereby turning smuggling into official trade. 
The remainder of this chapter will explore both approaches through two different contexts: 
a) international sanctions on so-called conflict minerals smuggled from the eastern DRC; and b) 
the liberalisation of border trade in eastern Myanmar. Both cases compare and contrast in ways 
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that illuminate different economic pacification attempts as well as their unintended con-
sequences. In the case of the DRC, the US sanctioned the cross-border trade of industrial 
minerals in an attempt to erode the funding base of non-state armed groups in northern Kivu. 
In the case of Myanmar, the country’s military regime liberalised a highly restrictive border 
trade regime in order to undercut the funding of rebels that control the main smuggling routes 
to Thailand. While both policies decreased the immediate smuggling revenues for non-state 
armed groups, they did not lead to a reduction of conflict, violence or insecurity. 
Restricting border trade: the case of the DRC 
Economic sanctions are an established tool in contemporary international relations. States, 
groups of states, and international organisations regularly use sanctions to force governments 
into political concessions by restricting flows of goods, finance and people (Jones 2014, p. 1). In 
the context of civil wars, non-state armed groups have also become the target of international 
sanctions as a means of economic pacification. Such sanctions include the freezing of inter-
national assets and capital of non-state combatants and restricting the smuggling of commodities 
from or to territories controlled by non-state-armed groups. In 1992, the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) has, for instance, imposed an embargo on the export of timber from 
and the import of petroleum to areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge (resolution 792) (Lapaš 
2010). In 1998, the UNSC legislated a ban on the trade of diamonds from UNITA-controlled 
areas of Angola (resolution 1173). The latter developed into the Kimberley Protocol 
Certification Scheme, a multi-stakeholder effort to prevent so-called ‘blood diamonds’ – i.e., 
diamonds that are mined in conflict areas – from being sold internationally (Ibid.). 
Similarly, section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (hereafter Dodd-Frank) seeks to restrict what 
has come to be known as ‘conflict minerals’ from entering the global market. The law was 
passed by US Congress as a wide-ranging legislation on global finance regulation under the 
Obama administration in 2010. The insertion of the ‘conflict minerals section’ was due to 
considerable lobbying efforts by human rights groups. It requires US electronics manufacturers 
to trace and report the source of minerals from the eastern DRC and certify that they are 
‘conflict free.’ Conflict minerals from the eastern Congo include gold and the ‘3Ts:’ tin; 
tantalum; and tungsten. These metals are relatively rare but essential for the production of 
consumer electronics such as mobile phones and computers. The eastern DRC provinces of 
North and South Kivu, Maniema, Orientale, and Katanga are among the few places in the 
world where all four metals can be found in relatively large quantities. 
Eastern DRC – especially the Kivu provinces – is also home to one of sub-Saharan Africa’s 
most protracted armed conflicts among a variety of non-state armed groups and the Congolese 
state. Campaigners behind Dodd-Frank – locally known as ‘Obama’s law’ – view the profits 
from extracting and trading gold and the ‘3Ts’ as the main driver of armed conflict as well as its 
associated human rights violations (Bafilemba et al. 2014). Armed groups are estimated to have 
generated $185 million per year from the trade of these minerals before Dodd-Frank by 
controlling mines and smuggle operations (Ibid.). According to the Enough Project – one of 
the main organisations behind Dodd-Frank – the act has been highly successful in eroding these 
revenues by squeezing armed actors out of the mineral business. Following their logic, the act 
created a certification scheme for conflict-free minerals, which made non-certified minerals 
realise much lower market prices (30% to 60% less). This, in turn, made mining and trading 
much less profitable for armed actors (Ibid.). 
Independent assessments of Dodd-Frank, however, paint a much more sobering picture. 
Scholars point to both important regulatory loopholes and unintended consequences of conflict 
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and violence (Seay 2012, Cuvelier, Van Bockstael, et al. 2014, Parker and Vadheim 2017,  
Stoop et al. 2018). In terms of loopholes, it is far from clear whether Dodd-Frank has an actual 
impact on the funding base of armed groups in the DRC. As the act’s co-sponsor Barney Frank 
put it: ‘The purpose is to cut off funding to people who kill people’ (Aronson 2011). To be 
sure, Dodd-Frank worked to reduce the profitability of conflict minerals. This was because 
Dodd-Frank acted as a de-facto boycott of conflict minerals from eastern DRC. The cheapest 
way to comply with the new legislation for US manufacturers was not to certify minerals from 
eastern DRC as ‘conflict free’ but to avoid sourcing minerals from the country’s conflict zone 
altogether (Parker and Vadheim 2017, p. 9). That said, the most profitable ‘conflict mineral’ in 
the region – gold – has been exempted from regulation under Dodd-Frank, which only im-
posed certification on the ‘3Ts.’ This is because most of the gold from DRC is exported to the 
jewellery market rather than the electronics sector, and gold is much less traceable than the 
‘3Ts’ for geological reasons (Parker and Vadheim 2017, p. 11). According to a report produced 
by the Congolese senate in 2009, about $1.24 billion worth of gold – or 98% of all gold mined 
in the DRC – was smuggled out of the country per year (de Koning 2010, Bafilemba et al. 
2014, p. 5). 
Dodd-Frank has not eroded the funding of armed groups in the eastern DRC in a significant 
way. Besides falling back on revenues from gold mining, armed groups also increased smuggling 
of other commodities – including beer, cigarettes, cannabis and palm oil – in order to make up 
for the shortfalls of funds produced from the ‘3Ts’ (Seay 2012, p. 16, Parker and Vadheim 2017, 
p. 11). Moreover, it is not clear whether Dodd-Frank actually decreased conflict, violence and 
insecurity or had the contrary effect. Indeed, a variety of studies indicate the latter. Geo- 
referenced data suggests that fighting among armed groups might have intensified, especially in 
areas of gold mining sites, as competition over the last unregulated conflict mineral increased 
due to banning the ‘3Ts’ (Parker and Vadheim 2017, p. 41, Stoop et al. 2018, p. 2). Moreover, 
armed group violence against civilians might have also increased because some armed groups 
who governed mining sites before and provided basic protection now fell back on looting to 
make up for their lost income (Parker and Vadheim 2017, p. 3, Stoop et al. 2018, p. 2). In many 
communities of eastern DRC, mining moreover constitutes the only paid work available. 
Despite the deplorable conditions in which many miners work, the ban on minerals has led to 
large-scale unemployment and loss of livelihoods in the region (Seay 2012, pp. 14–15). After 
Dodd-Frank came into effect, local researchers estimated that about one to two million artisanal 
miners in eastern Congo lost their jobs (Ibid.). This had a paralysing effect on the regional 
economy more generally (Cuvelier, Van Bockstael, et al. 2014). Consequently, human in-
security seems to have risen considerably as a result of Dodd-Frank. Infant death rates in policy- 
affected mining communities, for instance, increased by at least 143% (Parker et al. 2016). 
On a more general level, attempting to reduce conflict, violence and insecurity by restricting 
the smuggle of minerals mistakes the means for the ends of violence. In eastern Congo – as 
arguably in all contexts of armed conflict – war economies are but one driver of conflict. In fact, 
the main advocates of Dodd-Frank reduce a protracted conflict rooted in long imperial histories 
to a monocausal economistic logic of profiteering. To be clear, country experts confirm the 
importance of violent economies beyond conflict minerals for understanding the dynamics of 
conflict in the eastern DRC (Laudati 2013, Verweijen 2013). They also, however, highlight the 
need for understanding and addressing dynamics of ethnic identity, the predatory and exclu-
sionary nature of state institutions, as well as competing land claims among different com-
munities in a conflict that is bound up with a wider, regional complex of conflicts (Vlassenroot 
2002, Van Acker 2005, Autesserre 2006, Prunier 2008). Country experts thus point out that the 
key problem of economic pacification policies in the DRC is their underlying reductionist 
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assumptions about the relationship between illicit economies and armed conflict, as well as the 
thin empirical evidence that is used to substantiate these claims (Cuvelier, Vlassenroot, 
et al. 2014). 
Liberalising border trade: the case of Myanmar 
Dodd-Frank illustrated some of the pitfalls and unintended consequences of economic inter-
ventions that aim at eroding armed group finances by restricting transborder trade in certain 
commodities. In contrast to restricting border trade with economic sanctions, economic pa-
cification can also aim at eroding armed group revenues by liberalising the trade in commodities 
from which armed groups benefit. While this is a less common approach in contexts of civil 
war, it is an established policy debate in the context of organised crime profiting from illegal 
market activities (Lavezzi 2014). One way of undercutting the profits of organised crime is to 
decriminalise its trade and the commodities or activities it is based on. Prohibiting commodities 
and activities does not only push their production, trade and operation into the realm of the 
illegal. It also increases their profitability. US prohibition of alcohol in the 1920s and 1930s, for 
instance, gave unprecedented rise to the mafia in America after an ‘entire industry – one of the 
most important in the country – had been gifted by the government to gangsters’ (Dash cited as 
in Mappen 2013, p. 5). Decriminalising activities ranging from narcotics, to gambling and 
prostitution is often debated as one way of combatting organised crime (Lavezzi 2014). Some 
scholars and activists thus view the liberalisation of drugs as an alternative, and more effective 
way of addressing the war economy in contexts like Colombia, especially when compared to 
highly restrictive and militarised policies such as the US-funded Plan Colombia (Francis and 
Mauser 2011, Vergara 2014). 
In the context of economic pacification, Myanmar is an instructive place to study the effects 
of government policies aimed at eroding the funding base of armed groups by liberalising 
border trade. This is because rebel groups in the Southeast Asian country have long profited 
from one of the least open border trade regimes. Between 1962 and 1988, the military regime 
in Burma2 followed a self-isolationist economic policy. Under the so-called ‘Burmese Way to 
Socialism’ Burma nationalised all trade and levied heavy tariffs on imports in order to build an 
independent economy with the effect that people in Burma suffered an immense shortage of 
everyday goods. At the same time, almost all of the country’s borderlands have come under the 
control of numerous armed groups since the 1950s ( Jones 2014, p. 786). Most of these armed 
groups emerged as ethnonational rebel movements seeking more autonomy or outright in-
dependence from an ethnocratic postcolonial state after the failure of post-independence set-
tlement between the country’s ethnic majority and its ethnic minorities over questions of 
equality and power sharing. Other armed groups included the Chinese-backed Communist 
Party of Burma, itself largely recruited from ethnic minority communities in the country’s 
northern border areas (Smith 1999, pp. 102–110, Brenner 2019, pp. 35–40). 
The combination of official trade restriction and de-facto lack of state control over the 
country’s border areas meant that the black market in Burma was booming during much of the 
Cold War. While everyday goods – such as fuel, medicine, agricultural machinery and textiles – 
were smuggled into the country in vast quantities, they were paid for with the illicit export of 
raw materials, including opium, timber, gemstones, rice and cattle. According to estimates, 
Burma’s smuggling economy comprised of about 40% of the country’s gross national product in 
1988, equivalent to approximately $3 billion (Smith 1999, p. 25). Rebel groups controlling 
most of the smuggle routes in and out of the country were the main beneficiaries of illicit trade. 
They taxed smuggling operators between 5% and 10%, so smuggling in fact became the ‘armed 
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opposition’s lifeblood’ (Smith 1999, p. 99). One Karen rebel officer, for instance, recollects that 
during the 1980s the Karen rebellion made several thousands of US dollars at one smuggle gate 
between Thailand and Myanmar per day (Ralph and Sheera 2020, p. 83). Consequently, some 
of the heftiest battles in Myanmar’s civil war have been fought over smuggling routes and 
border gates (Ibid., pp. 83–87). 
In fact, this is a dynamic that can be observed even today as large parts of Myanmar’s 
borderlands, including border crossings, remain under the control of non-state armed groups. 
Since the 1990s, however, smuggling revenues declined steeply for many of the country’s rebel 
movements. Partly this was because Myanmar’s armed forces have managed to take control 
over some of the country’s main trading routes. More important was a strategy of economic 
liberalisation. By abandoning self-isolationist economic policies and legalising most transborder 
trade with its neighbours, the ratio of smuggling to official trade from 1990 to 2005 fell from 85 
to 50% (Jones 2014, p. 794). This was not a purely economic measure, but formed part of a 
bundle of policy reforms with which the Myanmar state aimed to pacify its restive border areas 
and consolidate its own presence instead ( Jones 2014, Brenner 2019, pp. 40–46). It is important 
to note, though, that the consolidation of state control over transborder economic flows has 
been highly uneven. This is dependent on territorial control, state-armed group relations in a 
given region, and the involvement of military units in smuggling. It also depends on legal status 
of commodities and amount of protective tariffs on certain economies (Meehan 2011, Woods 
2011, Jones 2014). In 2013, for instance, Thai beer, Malaysian palm oil, and second-hand cars 
from Japan were still smuggled on a large scale from Thailand to Myanmar (Figure 29.1). 
Figure 29.1 A palm oil smuggler on the Moei River that marks the border between Myanmar and 
Thailand  
Source: author (David Brenner)  
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This uneven and contested nature of state consolidation over the country’s smuggling 
economy has not led to the pacification of Myanmar’s protracted civil war. Similar to the 
sanctions on smuggling minerals from the DRC, liberalising border trade has transformed 
conflict, violence and insecurity. While economic opening up has eroded the revenue base of 
some armed groups – such as Karen rebellion – it empowered other armed actors, mostly militia 
groups that emerged as splinter factions of ethnic rebel movements and operate in close co-
operation with the state (Buchanan 2016). Many of them benefit from the increased openness 
of trade in a context where the rule of law remains suspended. This is not least because there is 
insufficient interest from powerful state authorities in bringing the country’s smuggling 
economy into the formal and legal fold. Military and civilian officials themselves remain in-
vested in some of the country’s most lucrative smuggling industries, including the country’s jade 
and narcotics industries, both of which are deeply intertwined with the formal economy 
(Meehan 2011, Jones 2014, Weigand 2020, pp. 43–74). 
Consequently, insecurity and violence for civilians in Myanmar’s border areas has not re-
ceded in areas where rebel groups themselves were weakened by way of economic pacification. 
On the contrary, civilians need to navigate an even greater plethora of armed actors today than 
they had to in the past (Brenner 2019, pp. 56–57). This also holds true for the places where the 
actual fighting between warring factions has stopped (Hedström and Olivius 2020). In large 
parts of Myanmar’s border areas, the civil war continues unabated. At the time of writing, 
Myanmar’s army is battling various rebellions in the country. As with the DRC, this is mainly 
because economic pacification policies in Myanmar do not address the root causes of political 
conflict. While they might have achieved the temporary erosion of rebel revenues or even the 
partial co-optation of rebel elites, they do not address underlying political demands and grie-
vances among large parts of the country’s ethnic minority communities. As a matter of fact, 
attempts at economic pacification that do not address the political dimensions of conflict are 
likely to result in the remobilisation of armed resistance, as seen in the country’s north (Brenner 
2019, pp. 98–102). 
Conclusion 
Smuggling is a well-suited economic activity for rebel movements to fund their struggle against 
the state. This is not least because the modus operandi and geography of smuggling operators is 
often compatible with the guerrilla operations of armed clandestine movements. Unsurprisingly 
then, pacification strategies aim at undercutting lucrative smuggling operations by restricting 
illicit trade flows or formalising them through liberalising trade regimes. This chapter explored 
two cases that shed light on such strategies and their pitfalls. It first traced the effects of section 
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, a US law that effectively works as a sanction on so-called ‘conflict 
minerals’ in the eastern DRC. It then reviewed how Myanmar’s military regime liberalised 
border trade with its neighbours with the aim of eroding smuggling revenues of border-based 
rebel movements. In both contexts, economic pacification policies ultimately failed to mitigate 
conflict, violence and insecurity. 
While Dodd-Frank succeeded in squeezing armed actors out of the trade of certain minerals 
in the eastern DRC, it has neither resulted in the erosion of armed group funding nor in 
reducing the intensity of armed conflict and its ramifications for the civilian population. In fact, 
armed groups could easily switch to other modes of funding, including the mining and 
smuggling of gold and the looting of civilians. This, in turn, increased fighting and insecurity in 
the region. Moreover, the boycott on minerals from the eastern DRC decimated the local 
economy, having disastrous effects on the human security of local communities. Economic 
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pacification strategies in Myanmar also led to mixed results. Liberalising border trade in the 
attempt to bring clandestine economies under state control worked to undercut smuggling 
revenues of some rebel groups. State consolidation, however, has been highly contested and 
uneven. This is not least because powerful state actors themselves remain deeply invested in the 
country’s smuggling economies. Rather than formalising most border trade completely, 
the state has thus come to rely more heavily on militias in governing illicit trade, leading to the 
proliferation of armed actors in the Myanmar’s border areas. Shifting economic flows also led to 
the increased fragmentation and power struggle within armed movements, as well as renewed 
armed conflict. 
Both cases demonstrate that the main problem with economic pacification strategies is not so 
much that shifting economic incentive structures can have unintended consequences that in-
crease rather than decrease conflict, violence and insecurity. This is part of the story. The main 
pitfall of economic pacification strategies lies in their limited assumptions. In fact, they are born 
out of a reductionist understanding that views economic rationale and feasibility rather than 
political motivations as the main drivers of contemporary armed conflict. This understanding 
has increasingly underpinned the disciplinary study of civil war and rebel groups in political 
science, international relations, and development studies ever since these fields have become 
dominated by the paradigms of neo-positivism and methodological individualism (Cramer 
2002; Baczko, Dorronsoro, and Quesnay 2018, pp. 2–18). To be sure, there has been sub-
stantial critique against simplistic accounts that reduces human motivation to take up arms to 
mere economic profiteering (e.g., Cramer 2002; Keen 2008; Malešević 2008). The spectre of 
economism haunts scholarship on and policy responses to armed conflict up until today, ef-
fectively depoliticising the actors, drivers, and the very nature of conflict itself. In fact, rebel 
groups today are often viewed primarily through the lens of the so-called “conflict-crime 
nexus,” a perspective that has come to be particularly influential in formulating international 
policy responses (de Boer and Bosetti 2017). Pacification strategies born out of this under-
standing, such as the Dodd-Frank Act’s provision on ‘conflict minerals’ in the eastern DRC, 
thus primarily aim at undercutting rebel revenues in order to make conflict less desirable and 
less feasible. In the case of Myanmar, army generals have not followed Western-led scholarship 
and policy. Their counterinsurgency strategies, however, are also tied to an economistic un-
derstanding of conflict and pacification. Here the state does not try to undercut smuggling 
revenues of rebel groups only. It also tries to consolidate its presence in restive border areas 
through co-opting non-state elites by way of economic incentives, and restive populations by 
way of economic development (Brenner 2019, pp. 110–111). What transpired clearly, though, 
from both scenarios is that scholars and policy makers need to move beyond an economistic 
understanding of conflict in order to address the political drivers of conflict, violence and 
insecurity. 
Notes 
1 The term pacification is chosen deliberately in order to highlight the fuzzy border between counter-
insurgency, conflict resolution and peacebuilding practices. Some scholars see this nexus between 
peacebuilding and counterinsurgency as a pragmatic turn in peacebuilding, which partly stems from 
the failure of liberal peacebuilding and partly from the increased entanglements between counter-
insurgency and peacebuilders in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where UN peacebuilding in-
terventions cannot be viewed separately from US counterinsurgency wars (Moe and Stepputat 2018). 
Critical scholars highlight that analytically liberal peacebuilding has always been ‘a form of riot control 
directed against the unruly parts of the world’ to uphold liberal world order (Pugh 2004, p. 41). In 
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many parts of the world, the technologies of peacebuilding and counterinsurgency are in fact not all 
too different (Turner 2015).  
2 Myanmar’s military rulers changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989. Using 
one or the other name has sometimes been contentious since. In recent years a scholarly consensus 
emerged to use Burma when discussing events prior to 1989 and Myanmar for events after 1989. This 
convention is followed here.  
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In pursuit of smugglers at sea 
Carina Bruwer   
1 Introduction 
‘Smuggling’ refers to the act of intentionally trading in a legal commodity in violation of 
national or international laws (see, for example, Bruwer, 2020).1 Smuggling has an economic 
goal, such as making a profit and evading taxes and sanctions (Basu, 2013). For example, even a 
small price differential can be an incentive for cross-border fuel smuggling, as has been seen in 
the waters around places like Venezuela, Iran, Nigeria and Thailand (Ralby & Soud, 2018:9). 
Central to many smuggling operations, therefore, is the movement of these commodities in a 
way that is obscured from law enforcement. As criminal networks moving commodities are 
experts at this clandestine form of transport, they often turn to the oceans where their com-
modities can either be hidden behind 80% (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2018: 23) – 90% (Hudson, 2018) of global trade, or where they can merely avoid 
the limited maritime law enforcement and security entities operating across the 70% of earth’s 
surface which is made up of the oceans. It is also at sea and in port where many smuggling 
attempts are countered. 
Although the oceans are often portrayed as lawless (Prada & Roth, 2008; Urbina, 2019;  
Allott, 2021), such a blanket statement fails to reflect the reality of many state and non-state 
actors working to counter criminal activities at sea. It also fails to acknowledge that although the 
maritime domain is used as a vector for trade, the commodities being moved are almost ex-
clusively destined for land. This highlights the importance of also considering territorial, and 
especially port security in efforts to achieve maritime security. This chapter considers smuggled 
commodities typically moved by sea and the impact which these commodities have once they 
reach land. It then turns to the international laws regulating human activity at sea and the 
challenges in implementing them in efforts to counter smuggling activity at sea and in ports. 
2 Commodities smuggled at sea and modes of transportation 
Most traded goods have historically been transported by sea, therefore making smuggling ar-
guably as old as maritime trade. As the oceans as transport node benefit licit traders, so too the 
benefits attract illicit traders. Maritime transport allows for the movement of large quantities of 
goods, much more so than via land or air. It also allows for less law enforcement scrutiny due to 
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the vast size of the oceans and the challenges of responding to smuggling activities in waters 
where states have limited law enforcement assets and are afforded limited law enforcement 
powers. This is either due to international law limitations, failure to enact sufficient national 
laws providing for extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction to counter crimes far from land, or 
even because states have no desire to exercise any form of control over their vessels at sea. 
For these reasons, anything and everything can be moved across the seas. Migrants can be 
moved in containers or on board migrant smuggling vessels which are nearly certain to sink. 
Narcotics can be moved in makeshift submarines designed specifically for drug trafficking, or on 
board container vessels moving legal goods, passing through many transit destinations in- 
between as states struggle or neglect to secure their borders, and shipping companies ask few 
questions about their loads. Similarly, going out and illegally catching tons of fish is as easy as 
faking a fishing license, turning off your Automatic Information System (AIS) or merely 
plundering the fish stocks of a state which has little capacity to prevent it. To make the journey 
even more worthwhile, a drug shipment could be added on board. 
The vessels used to move illicit goods depend on factors such as the commodity being 
moved, the region through which the conduit is moved, available resources and technologies, 
and law enforcement pressure. The modus operandi may change as law enforcement efforts to 
counter it are successful, sometimes even causing smuggling networks to copy other networks’ 
successful modus operandi. An example is Iran and North Korea which turned to techniques 
refined by drug traffickers to move sanctioned military equipment in containers on board vessels 
from states known for lax oversight. This also reflects how, as containers became increasingly 
used over time, it became a low risk and effective concealment method for many illicit 
commodities (Griffiths & Jenks, 2012: 35–36). As smuggling networks gain expertise in ex-
ploiting transport systems, they may also use these expertise to expand to other commodities 
(Basu, 2013: 323). 
When it comes to smuggling at sea, criminal networks have nearly free reign, especially on 
the high seas where no State enjoys sovereignty. This does not mean that there isn’t an in-
creasing amount of entities responding to such criminal activities at sea, or that there aren’t any 
legal frameworks regulating the seas. It does however reflect that the resources and expertise 
required to address criminal networks are often outweighed by those smuggling or trafficking 
illicit commodities at sea. Smugglers are masters of evasion and have adjusted over time to allow 
them to expand markets and avoid law enforcement. It is also no secret that the transnational 
nature of contemporary smuggling activity holds many benefits for smugglers, as well as the 
increasingly large global maritime fleet behind which illicit commodities can be hidden. 
3 The potential dangers of smuggled commodities moved at sea 
One of the biggest tragedies of 2020 illustrates the potential catastrophe which can result from 
illicit or dangerous goods shipped by sea. The COVID-19 pandemic has been linked to the 
consumption of wildlife (Wu, Chen & Chan, 2020). COVID-19 is a zoonotic disease which, 
though yet to be confirmed, is suspected of originating from the human consumption of il-
legally traded wildlife like pangolins (Lam et al., 2020), thereby causing the disease to be 
transmitted from animals to humans. Pangolins are the most trafficked mammal in the world 
(TRAFFIC, no date) and as Asia’s own pangolins numbers have plummeted, the overwhelming 
majority of pangolins are now moved from Africa to Asia (World Wildlife Foundation, 2016), 
either alive, dead or stripped of their scales, in multiple tonnes in containers on board com-
mercial shipping vessels (UNODC, 2020: 53). Had such shipments never left Africa for Asia, 
the pandemic might have been prevented. Multiple tonnes of illegal wildlife products are 
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shipped at sea and have driven many species to the brink of extinction. While the annihilation 
of species is the primary impact of the illegal wildlife trade, it often also funds conflicts, causes 
violence and leads to endemic corruption across the globe (see for example, Barron, 2015;  
Brooks & Hopkins, 2016; CITES, n.d.; EIA, 2018: 32; UNODC, 2020). 
Many other commodities are moved in direct violation of national and international laws 
and trade embargoes, posing a similar security risk. Examples include charcoal smuggled from 
Somalia and heroin smuggled from the Makran Coast off Iran and Pakistan, both funding terror 
organizations in Somalia and Afghanistan respectively. Smuggling at sea also holds particular 
dangers for crewmembers and migrants who pay to be smuggled. Thousands of migrants and 
refugees armed only with hope and often fearing persecution in their country of origin drown 
at sea as people smugglers make use of vessels which are unseaworthy, sometimes purposefully 
relying on the responsibility of other vessels, both law enforcement and merchant, to rescue 
vessels in distress (Røsæg, 2020).2 Migrants may also fall victim to human traffickers (Karim, 
2020). Crew members of vessels used exclusively for smuggling, such as dhows, are also easily 
forsaken by vessel owners once they have been intercepted and have failed to deliver their illicit 
cargo. Smuggling at sea therefore threatens a wide variety of interests, including human life, the 
environment and security across the globe. In response to this, an increasing number of state 
and non-state actors are entering the maritime domain in efforts to respond to smuggling 
activity at sea. State actors include maritime entities like navies and coast guards, while private 
entities include the shipping and transport industries. 
4 The international legal framework regulating responses to smuggling at sea 
Despite the oceans being vast and the number of actors able to operate at sea being limited, they 
are not unregulated. There is a legal framework dedicated exclusively to regulating human 
activity at sea – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS, 
along with more general international legal frameworks which also apply at sea, is however 
consistently under-enforced, perhaps especially so when it comes to criminal activity, which 
was never intended to be the convention’s principal focus. 
Three key questions determine the response to smuggling activity at sea – which actors may 
respond, what may they do and do they wish to exercise this right? The answer to the first two 
questions lies in the international legal frameworks of UNCLOS and the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). It is however important to 
remember that, although international law specifies the rights and obligations of states, it re-
mains the responsibility of states to incorporate these international law rights and obligations 
into their domestic legislation in order to allow them to establish jurisdiction over smuggling 
activities at sea. This is because states establish jurisdiction in terms of their national laws, not 
international law. This section covers selected international legal frameworks applicable 
specifically to smuggling at sea. 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
Flag State Jurisdiction 
UNCLOS Article 92 provides that a vessel may only sail under the flag of one state and that the 
primary jurisdiction over the activities of that vessel, when operating on the high seas, lies with 
that state, also known as the Flag State. A vessel’s Flag State is the state in which the vessel is 
registered or is otherwise entitled to fly its flag, such as through ownership.3 UNCLOS Article 
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94 places a duty on Flag States to exercise this jurisdiction over their vessels “in administrative, 
technical and social matters”.4 Flag State jurisdiction therefore implies that the Flag State holds 
the primary responsibility to prevent and punish acts of smuggling committed on board its 
vessels, both on the high seas and in certain Coastal State waters as discussed in the following 
sections. 
Coastal State Jurisdiction 
In certain waters nearest to land, Flag State jurisdiction gives way to Coastal State jurisdiction. A 
Coastal State for the purpose of this chapter is a state which borders the sea and in which waters, 
known as maritime zones, a vessel is located when it commits an offence. Depending on how 
far away from a Coastal State a foreign vessel suspected of smuggling is intercepted, the Coastal 
State has varying powers to respond thereto. The further away from a Coastal State a crime is 
committed, the weaker the Coastal State’s right to respond becomes. Figure 30.1 indicates the 
different maritime zones and their distance from the coast. 
Internal waters 
A Coastal State’s internal waters,5 such as river mouths or ports, are sovereign. When a sus-
pected smuggling vessel is identified by a Coastal State within its internal waters, the Coastal 
State has the right to board that vessel, search for smuggled commodities and arrest and 
Figure 30.1 Maritime zones  
Source: Illustration by Louw and Keyser, 2020  
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prosecute the crew for that crime, provided the crime has been criminalized and jurisdiction 
established in terms of the Coastal State’s national legislation. No authorization needs to be 
sought from the Flag State to board its vessel. In this case, it will not matter where the vessels or 
the crew are from and it will be as if the crime was committed within the Coastal State’s land 
territory. This right to board and respond to smuggling activity in any Coastal State’s maritime 
zones, however, only applies to merchant vessels, not vessels on government service for non- 
commercial purposes,6 such as naval vessels. In all Coastal State maritime zones, only authorized 
vessels on government service, such as warships or law enforcement vessels, may intercept 
smuggling activity. 
Territorial sea and archipelagic waters 
Coastal States also have sovereignty in their territorial sea7 and archipelagic waters.8 UNCLOS 
Article 27 allows Coastal States to establish jurisdiction over certain crimes in these maritime 
zones, which includes smuggling activity:  
1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal state should not be exercised on board a 
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct 
any investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the ship 
during its passage, save only in the following cases:  
a. if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state;  
b. if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order 
of the territorial sea;  
c. if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of 
the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag state; or  
d. if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs or psychotropic substances.[…]  
As smuggling activity aimed for the Coastal State’s territory will impact on the Coastal State, the 
Coastal State may board such vessels and prosecute for smuggling activities. In accordance with 
UNCLOS Article 27(5), the Coastal State may however not establish such criminal jurisdiction 
for crimes committed before a foreign flagged vessel entered the Coastal State’s territorial sea 
and the vessel is merely passing through its territorial sea without the intentions of entering its 
internal waters. The only exception to this is for resource related crimes, as discussed under the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) below. 
Contiguous zone 
The Coastal State must claim a contiguous zone (Guilfoyle, 2009: 13)9 in its national legislation 
before being afforded the jurisdiction applicable in that zone. The contiguous zone was in fact 
established to allow Coastal States to respond to smuggling activity beyond their territorial seas 
(UNODC, 2019: 40). In this zone, the Coastal State may only establish criminal jurisdiction 
over activities which violate its fiscal, immigration, sanitary or customs laws. This jurisdiction is 
twofold and distinguishes between Coastal States’ right to prevent and punish certain crimes (see, 
for example, Guilfoyle, 2009:13): 
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1. When encountering a vessel suspected of smuggling activity in this zone and the vessel is 
heading towards the Coastal State’s territorial sea, the Coastal State may only board the 
vessel and warn it not to proceed into its territorial sea, as doing so will violate its fiscal, 
immigration, sanitary or customs laws. It may not arrest the vessel or prosecute for any 
smuggling offence which has not yet taken place in the Coastal State’s land territory, 
territorial sea or internal waters. However, if the commodity being smuggled is a resource, 
such as fish, in violation of the Coastal State’s sovereign rights in its EEZ, the Coastal State 
may board, arrest and prosecute the vessel and crew.10  
2. If the vessel is suspected of having already committed smuggling activity within the Coastal 
States’ land territory, internal waters or territorial sea, the Coastal State may stop, board, 
search and arrest the vessels and crew and prosecute if evidence of smuggling activity is 
found. This applies only to crimes which have already been committed within the Coastal 
States’ territory. 
As smuggling activity will typically breach customs regulations, or, in the case of people 
smuggling, immigration laws (see, for example, UNODC, 2004: 11), the Coastal State is en-
titled to establish jurisdiction over vessels which have already committed smuggling offences in 
its territory, territorial sea or internal waters. This means that up to 24 nautical miles from the 
Coast, States have the right to arrest and prosecute those suspected of smuggling activities in 
their territory. 
Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
The Coastal State’s powers are much more limited with regard to the crimes it may respond to 
in its EEZ11 as these are limited to resource related crimes.12 If a vessel is therefore suspected of 
transporting fish caught illegally in the Coastal State’s EEZ, criminal jurisdiction may be es-
tablished over the vessel in this zone. However, if a vessel is suspected of trafficking drugs in the 
EEZ, criminal jurisdiction over the vessels may only be established once it enters the Coastal 
State’s territorial sea. This is in accordance with UNCLOS Articles 27 and 33. There are 
however exceptions, such as hot pursuit which applies once a vessel flees from law enforcement 
after committing an offence in a Coastal State’s relevant maritime zones.13 
High seas 
The high seas are all waters which do not form part of internal waters, territorial seas, archi-
pelagic waters or exclusive economic zones. The primary jurisdiction and responsibility to 
respond to smuggling on the high seas14 rests with the Flag State.15 UNCLOS does however 
contain a few exceptions to this, most notably in Article 110, which allows foreign flagged 
vessels to be boarded on the high seas under certain conditions in order to confirm their flag.16 
Of these exceptions, none are aimed specifically at smuggling, though some may be used to 
board suspected smuggling vessels. Article 110(1)(d) allows visitation of vessels suspected of 
being without nationality, while Article 110(1)(e) allows vessels to be boarded if they, although 
hiding it, are in fact from the same state as the law enforcement vessel wishing to board. Article 
110(b) might also apply, as it allows vessels suspected of engaging in the slave trade to be 
boarded, but this depends on differing interpretations of whether human trafficking can be 
considered a modern form of slave trade (See, for example, Davidson, 2015; Davidson, 2010). 
Which steps intercepting States may take if illicit activity is indeed found on vessels without 
nationality, remains debated. Most States argue that there is no legal basis to arrest and prosecute 
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(Papastavridis, 2013: 208.), while others argue that by virtue of being without nationality vessels 
attempt to escape any jurisdiction and therefore enjoy the protection of no state (Guilfoyle, 
2009: 17–18; 297), therefore they can be prosecuted by the intercepting State in accordance 
with its national laws. 
Additional exceptions to Flag State jurisdiction on the high seas are found in other inter-
national legal instruments. For example, in order to allow states to respond to drug trafficking 
on board foreign vessels on the high seas, the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 allows states to request Flag State 
permission to board foreign flagged vessels and establish jurisdiction over drug trafficking 
activity, as discussed below. 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention) 
The Vienna Convention was established to promote cooperation among states wishing to 
counter transnational drug trafficking.17 It contains a section aimed specifically at drug traf-
ficking at sea which provides an exception to Flag State jurisdiction on the high seas. Article 
17(3)18 allows states to request confirmation of registry from a foreign Flag State upon rea-
sonable suspicion of their vessels being engaged in drug trafficking on the high seas. Only once 
registry has been confirmed may the vessel request further authorization from the Flag State to 
board the vessel, conduct a search and take steps should evidence of drug trafficking be found.19 
If the Flag State confirms the Flag, but refuses their vessel to be boarded or searched, the 
interdicting state may take no further action. If the Flag State allows their vessel to be boarded, 
they can authorize the interdicting state to take such steps as they deem fit to counter drug 
trafficking. This could include arrest and prosecution. 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000 and 
Protocols (UNTOC) 
UNTOC is the primary international instrument applicable to smuggling activity. Trafficking 
and smuggling, when conducted by a group, are forms of organized crime, which are typically 
crimes which have a profit or other material benefit as motive (Varese, 2010; Von Lampe, 
2016).20 While UNCLOS forms the jurisdictional basis for responding to smuggling activity at 
sea, UNTOC was established with the aim of countering transnational organized crime on 
land, sea and air by enabling cross-border cooperation. UNTOC has three protocols, namely 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and 
Children, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Migrant 
Smuggling Protocol) and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition. From the protocols it is already clear 
which crimes are typically considered forms of trafficking or smuggling – human trafficking, 
migrant smuggling and arms trafficking. This list is hardly exhaustive and commodities like 
fauna and flora, drugs and counterfeit goods can all be added thereto. UNTOC, however, only 
applies to crimes which are executed by an organized criminal group,21 which are of a 
transnational22 nature and which are punishable by at least 4 years imprisonment.23 
UNTOC Article 15 reflects Article 94 of UNCLOS, confirming Flag Sate jurisdiction over 
vessels engaged in smuggling or trafficking activity at sea.24 UNTOC, being aimed at coun-
tering transnational organized crime, has numerous provisions which provide for transnational 
counter-efforts and investigations. Examples include Articles 16–20 on mutual legal assistance 
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(MLA), joint investigations and extradition, all providing a useful tool which states can use to 
conduct cross-border law enforcement operations and investigations. Again, it is important that 
states must incorporate the provisions of UNTOC into their national legislation in order to 
exercise their rights to respond to smuggling and trafficking activity at sea in terms of UNTOC. 
UNTOC’s Migrant Smuggling Protocol, for example, reflects similar provisions to the 
Vienna Convention. It contains a section aimed specifically at migrant smuggling at sea which 
also allows foreign flagged vessels to be requested to confirm their registry and once confirmed, 
to be requested permission to board the vessel on suspicion of migrant smuggling and to take 
steps as authorized by the Flag State if evidence of migrant smuggling is found.25 It goes further 
than the Vienna Convention, however, in that it also allows states to board vessels without 
nationality if they are suspected of smuggling migrants.26 Key to the Protocol is therefore that it 
allows an additional jurisdictional basis to board foreign and stateless vessels on the high seas if 
suspected of migrant smuggling. The Migrant Smuggling Protocol is aimed at migrant smug-
glers and not migrants, who must have their rights protected despite their status of attempting to 
enter another state illegally.27 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
Often, international legal frameworks are insufficient to address the contemporary manifesta-
tions of threats to security and crime. This has necessitated additional jurisdiction regimes, such 
as those authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in terms of resolutions. 
Resolution 2240 of 2015 applicable to migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean (See, for ex-
ample, United Nations Security Council, 2019a) is one such an example, where the UNSC 
concluded that migrant smuggling between North Africa and Europe is of such serious concern, 
posing a threat to international peace and security, that it required the authorization of an 
additional jurisdictional regime than that contained in UNCLOS and UNTOC. 
UNSC Resolution 2240 allows for flagged vessels to be boarded by foreign navies on the 
high seas if they believe the vessel to be engaged in migrant smuggling. While the Resolution 
notes that attempts must be made to notify the Flag State of such actions, this is not a pre-
requisite for boarding.28 Similarly, the UNSC has imposed embargoes on the smuggling of arms 
and charcoal into and out of Somalia (United Nations Security Council, 2014; United Nations 
Security Council, 2019b). In terms of UNSC Resolution 2082 of 2014, foreign flagged vessels 
can be boarded on the high seas and in Somalia’s territorial sea if they are suspected of 
smuggling arms or charcoal. Similar to Resolution 2240 on migrant smuggling, while good 
faith efforts must be made to gain authorization from the Flag State, this is not a prerequisite for 
boarding (United Nations Security Council, 2014). These are clear exceptions to Flag State 
jurisdiction when the existing legal frameworks seem insufficient to address serious threats 
within a defined region at a certain moment in time. 
Bilateral and multilateral treaties 
In addition to international laws and UNSC authorizations, states may conclude agreements 
amongst themselves agreeing to a specific interdiction regime which is perhaps not provided for 
in existing international legal frameworks. Examples are often found in regional agreements in 
response to drug trafficking. One example is the 1995 Council of Europe Agreement on Illicit 
Traffic by Sea, implementing Article 17 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of the 1988 Convention. In terms of this 
agreement, Member States of the Council of Europe undertake to exercise jurisdiction over 
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each other’s vessels engaged in drug trafficking, but also over vessels without nationality. Where 
UNCLOS Article 110 is silent on which enforcement actions may be taken against a vessel 
without nationality once it has been boarded to confirm its flag, the Council of Europe 
Agreement Article 5 allows Members to establish their jurisdiction over such vessels.29 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code 
The ISPS Code is the primary international instrument applicable to port security and therefore 
applies to Coastal State efforts to counter smuggling through ports. The Code is a 2004 
amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention of 1974 and applies to vessels on 
international voyages. Although the Code was initially established to provide protection against 
terror activities, its application also benefits efforts to counter smuggling, provided its guidelines 
are implemented. It establishes minimum standards to which vessels and ports must adhere to 
ensure safety and security in ports and on board vessels. This is aimed at protecting both vessels 
entering ports and ports from arriving vessels. Multiple tonnes of smuggled or trafficked goods 
however continue to pass through ports on vessels across the globe and efforts to counter 
smuggling through ports are arguably some of the least effective measures due to massive 
volumes of trade, corruption, concealment of illicit shipments and limited security measures 
on land. 
5 Challenges in responding to smuggling at sea 
The previous section has described the options available to those working to combat smuggling 
activity at sea and in ports. But when it comes to putting these rights and obligations into 
practice, there are many obstacles. In addition to rough seas, unpredictable weather, dilapidated 
vessels and the inherent challenges in responding to smuggling at sea, many additional factors 
come into play for those wishing to respond to smuggling activity at sea. Below are selected 
examples. 
Flags of Convenience 
Flags of Convenience (see, for example, Marine Insight, 2019), also known as international or 
open registries (Watt, & Coles, 2019: 45; Ford & Wilcox, 2019: 98), refer to flagging regimes 
whereby vessels register in a state to which it does not necessarily have a link, such as the owner 
being a national of the Flag State or the shipping company being registered there. Once a vessel 
is registered in a Flag State, it has the nationality of that state.30 Although UNCLOS Article 91 
requires a genuine link between the Flag State and the vessel, a ‘genuine link’ is not defined. 
Economic motivations are one of the key factors influencing flagging to an open registry and a 
‘genuine’ link might include such an economic link (Hamad, 2016: 207). Flagging under open 
registries, can however also be done to evade Flag State jurisdiction when a vessel is purpo-
sefully flagged to a state which is known to exercise little control over its vessels. This is when a 
Flag becomes referred to as ‘convenient’ (Hamad, 2016: 213-214; Ford & Wilcox, 2019: 298). 
If a vessel suspected of smuggling is flagged to a known Flag of Convenience, this might raise 
additional suspicion. A vessel may also be deregistered and reregistered under a Flag of 
Convenience in order to avoid sanctions (Griffiths & Jenks, 2012: 41), for example. 
If those wishing to smuggle commodities at sea use vessels registered under Flags which are 
known to exercise little control over its vessels, it allows them the freedom to do as they wish 
on board the vessel (see, for example, Hamad, 2016: 221). This may include, for example, 
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employing a foreign crew and paying them sub-standard wages or not adhering to ISPS code 
requirements. Key Flags of Convenience include Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands, 
which have open registries due to the financial benefits it brings. In turn, vessel owners may 
choose to flag to such States because registration is easy and cheap, and because in doing so they 
may avoid having to pay income tax (Chapsos, 2018). A Flag is also considered as a Flag of 
Convenience if a vessel flies more than one flag and switches between them. UNCLOS Article 
92 provides that such a vessel shall be assimilated to a vessel without nationality as a vessel may 
have only one Flag State.31 One example of how multiple flags are used is of the STS 50, a 
notorious fishing vessel used to plunder the seas illegally. It claimed to be flagged to eight Flag 
States, all of whose exercise of Flag State authority leaves much to the imagination 
(Tory, 2020). 
Flags of Convenience pose a particular problem to countering smuggling efforts, especially 
on the high seas. Not only do Flag States which are unable or unwilling to exercise control over 
their vessels pose a threat to safety and security at sea (Hamad, 2016: 215), they also limit foreign 
law enforcement efforts in response thereto as the Flag State has the primary responsibility to 
respond to smuggling activity on board its vessels. It is only once such a flagged vessel enters 
Coastal State waters that Coastal States may respond to smuggling activity on board those 
vessels. The challenge, however, remains when these vessels operate on the high seas and may 
never even enter Coastal State waters if they instead tranship their illicit cargo to other vessels 
going to shore.32 Such at-sea offloads simulate a port without any port state control (Long, 
2018). The use of Flags of Convenience may also make it nearly impossible to establish who 
owns a vessel, as owners may have gone out of their way to conceal their identity (Hamad, 
2016: 220–222; Tory, 2020). 
Vessels without nationality 
The second and perhaps most challenging smuggling vessel to counter, is one without na-
tionality. While no vessel can ever be truly without a nationality, as all vessels belong to 
someone who is a national from somewhere, and typically returns to one specific state after 
voyages are complete, a vessel is considered without nationality under the following conditions:  
1. UNCLOS Article 92 (2) provides that a vessel is without nationality if it is flying more than 
one flag and uses them according to convenience;  
2. If the Master fails to make a valid claim of registry, such as when it cannot provide the 
necessary documents as proof of its Flag State upon a request by law enforcement;  
3. If the flag which is claimed by the master is denied by the state which has been 
claimed;  
4. If the claimed Flag State cannot confirm or deny that it is their vessel; and  
5. If the Flag State being claimed is not recognized by the intercepting state (McLaughlin, 
2016: 486–487). 
As noted earlier, UNCLOS Article 110 provides exceptions to Flag State jurisdiction on the 
high seas and allows certain vessels to be boarded in order to confirm their flag. One of these 
grounds is suspicion of being a vessel without nationality.33 The UNTOC Migrant Smuggling 
Protocol also allows the boarding of a vessel suspected of being without nationality and en-
gaging in migrant smuggling.34 
There is no consensus among states on whether vessels without nationality can be assimilated 
to a vessel of the state wishing to intercept its smuggling activity, based on the fact that the 
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vessel enjoys the protection of no State. Some states therefore argue that they can establish their 
national jurisdiction on board that vessel and seize illicit commodities, arrest the vessel and crew 
and prosecute for that crime as if the vessel is their own. For example, Seychelles, a victim of 
the Indian Ocean heroin trade, has incorporated the right to try any drug trafficking offences 
committed outside of Seychelles on board vessels displaying no flag.35 The US historically also 
has asserted that it may exercise enforcement jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas 
because their activities threaten the interests of the US (Guilfoyle, 2009: 80–83). 
Most states, however, feel that while they may board such vessels to verify their nationality, 
they have no further jurisdictional basis to establish their national laws and prosecute the crew 
for the crimes they have committed on the high seas. Instead, they would require an additional 
basis, such as a link to a crew member or the victim of a crime (see, for example, Guilfoyle, 
2009: 17–18; 297; Gallagher, 2014: 246). As the second approach seems to be most prominent, 
stateless smuggling vessels enjoy a great deal of impunity when intercepted on the high seas. At 
best their illicit cargo will be seized, but the crew and vessels are likely to be allowed to 
continue on their way. This is why vessels without nationality are considered by some as 
inherently criminal as their main aim may be to avoid any form of jurisdiction (Hamad, 
2016: 208). 
The trafficking of Afghan heroin from Iran and Pakistan illustrates the challenges posed by 
vessels without nationality, which heroin trafficking dhows active in the Indian Ocean often 
are. While these dhows, which show no sign of registry, may be boarded by foreign navies to 
confirm their flag, few states have enacted national legislation which allows them to estab-
lishment enforcement jurisdiction over vessels without nationality engaged in drug traf-
ficking.36 The current practice is therefore to board these vessels to confirm their flag and if no 
nationality can be proven and heroin is indeed found on board, the heroin shipment is seized, 
samples taken and thrown overboard, after which the vessel and crew are let go. This practice 
has however resulted in the same vessels continuing to ferry heroin up and down the Indian 
Ocean with little consequence. Only once these vessels enter Coastal State waters may they be 
intercepted and seized for prosecution, allowing the vessels to be removed from circulation 
(Bruwer, 2020: 67–68). 
Lack of private industry responsibility for vessel actions and illicit cargo 
While some vessels used to smuggle goods are without nationality or privately owned and used 
exclusively to smuggle goods, vast amounts of commodities are smuggled on board commercial 
shipping vessels moving the overwhelming majority (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2018; Hudson, 2018) of world trade. As the global shipping industry expands, so 
will its exploitation by smugglers and traffickers. Despite this, the shipping and transport in-
dustry has not fully taken responsibility for what is moved on board their vessels. While the 
primary responsibility for enforcing laws lies with the Flag State, an additional responsibility falls 
upon vessel owners and shipping companies which need to ensure that they have the necessary 
measures in place to prevent their vessels being used for smuggling. The ISPS Code aims to 
achieve this by setting minimum standards to which vessels must adhere to prevent their use for 
illicit purposes. With sea-borne insecurity threatening all corners of the globe, not only through 
smuggling, but also terror activity and environmental threats, it is long overdue that shipping 
companies take more responsibility for their fleet and the cargo they carry. Granted, this is no 
easy task. The largest container vessels carry over 20,000 twenty-foot equivalent unit con-
tainers. There are however few alternatives which are equally likely to prevent the use of cargo 
vessels for illicit means than those imposed by the shipping and transport industry. 
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Human rights concerns 
Vessels on the high seas are notorious for human rights abuses – from the slave trade, to forced 
labour on fishing vessels and human trafficking. Another, lesser mentioned manifestation 
presents itself in response to illicit activities at sea. Smuggling vessels might come from regions 
where human rights enjoy little protection. This not only threatens the human rights of the 
crew while at sea, but also once they are returned home after being intercepted by law en-
forcement. If a smuggling vessel is intercepted in line with international law and smuggling 
activity is found on board, the vessel and crew’s arrest and prosecution might not be considered 
an option by foreign law enforcement, despite having the necessary jurisdiction to do so. This 
can be the case when the crew might be subjected to human rights abuses due to their 
smuggling activity should they be returned to their home state. 
Another example illustrating the tension between human rights and law enforcement at sea 
is migrant smuggling operations which turn into rescue operations. International law places a 
duty on states to render assistance to vessels in distress.37 Foreign law enforcement, may 
however actively avoid rescuing migrant vessels as they do not wish to take responsibility for 
those migrants (Neuman & Allafort-Duverger, 2018). Not only does this put migrants’ lives at 
risk, but it fails to take action against smugglers. Migrant smuggling is perhaps the most vivid 
example of states neglecting their international law duties at sea, driven not by the lack of a 
framework allowing them to assist, but rather by politics and fear (International Chamber of 
Shipping, 2019). Many European states, for example, do not wish to allow the thousands of 
migrants who cross the Mediterranean in search of a better life into their states, thereby ne-
glecting their duties towards them at sea. This has caused merchant vessels and non- 
governmental organizations to shoulder the responsibility of rescuing distressed migrants, rather 
than navies or coast guards (See, for example, Roche, 2016; Amnesty International, 2019;  
Tondo, & Stierl, 2020). This, however, does not solve the issue of few states agreeing to 
disembarkation of migrants at a place of safety and possible violations of the right to non- 
refoulement. 
Some smuggling crews have also turned to setting their vessels alight (Rubira, 2019) or 
purposefully sinking vessels to avoid detection of illicit activities, thereby destroying evidence, 
endangering the crew and environment and forcing rescue operations (Bennett, 2012). 
Opportunities in responding to smuggling at sea 
While international legal frameworks allow states to act against certain smuggling activity at sea, 
states do not always have the resources or appetite to do so. This is why counter-responses are 
ideally implemented in partnership, such as by the naval coalitions collectively responding to 
migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean (Coventry, 2019: 9–10; EUNAVFOR MED 
Operation Sophia, n.d.) and heroin trafficking in the Western Indian Ocean (Bruwer, 2020: 
67–68). Such cooperative efforts are increasingly seen as traditional maritime security threats 
have made way for non-state threats which individual states and their navies are unable to 
counter effectively. Where a state fails to respond to smuggling activity around its littoral, either 
due to an inability to counter it themselves, or perhaps due to other motivations, such as 
corrupt interests in the smuggling of a commodity, the international community often steps in. 
The smuggling of charcoal from Somalia is one such an example (see, for example, Rawlence, 
2015). This, however, depends on whether the smuggling activity also threatens the interests of 
the responding states. A more recent, yet successful effort, is the contribution of non-state actors 
joining the response to smuggling at sea. Examples include NGOs like Global Fishing Watch 
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working on IUU fishing and NGO vessels rescuing migrants. While this illuminates the in-
ability of states to address smuggling alone, it illustrates the success which can be achieved if a 
whole of society approach is taken to address a scourge which indeed harms all of society. 
It must be noted that a typical response to increased law enforcement activity at sea is that 
criminal networks merely shift their activities to where there is less law enforcement scrutiny 
(see, for example, West African Commission on Drugs, 2014). Examples of law enforcement 
displacement are found in the South American cocaine trade. As the market for cocaine in 
Europe grew and law enforcement pressure on places like Mexico and the Caribbean became 
increasingly stringent, traffickers began to move cocaine via West Africa (see, for example,  
UNODC, 2007: 17–18; McGuire, 2010: 16; O’Regan, 2010). This was also seen in the heroin 
trade off eastern Africa. As traditional heroin trafficking routes across the Balkans became in-
creasingly policed and unstable, traffickers shifted to the sea (Bruwer, 2020: 62). 
Law enforcement measures alone, therefore, rarely have the desired effect of combatting 
smuggling activity. Instead, as with all forms of transnational crime motivated by profit-making, 
smuggling needs to be addressed at the level of demand, supply and the logistics facilitating the 
movement of these commodities. However, this is easier said than done. Supply reduction 
efforts are particularly challenging as supply often serves as a livelihood for people with few licit 
alternatives. In addition, if demand is not addressed, sources of supply are likely to continue to 
be found if the demand for an illicit commodity remains high. Demand reduction efforts, 
however, pose particular challenges, as they are not only neglected, but badly understood. 
The need to address demand and supply on land in addition to the movement of illicit 
commodities at sea, also illustrates the disconnect often found in responding to criminal activity 
at sea. While seizing smuggled goods at sea indeed prevents large quantities from reaching 
shore, it does little to address demand apart from perhaps driving up the price of the 
commodity. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated that the oceans are not a lawless void. Instead, states, the shipping 
industry and criminals interact on the seas daily. Licit and illicit actors therefore compete for the 
use of the seas and are joined by those working to protect regular shipping and to counter illicit 
trades. As the traditional response to smuggling activity has been to step up security and law 
enforcement efforts, smugglers have not only shifted to the sea to evade such efforts on land, but 
they have also expanded their modus operandi by using a wider variety of vessels, with some 
even expanding their trade to other commodities in doing so. While these non-state criminal 
actors entering the maritime domain have given rise to previously unseen forms of inter-state 
and public–private cooperation, these actors, even when acting in unison, remain ill-equipped 
to successfully counter these activities at sea as criminal networks typically outsmart and out- 
resource them. Most importantly, maritime counter-efforts also fail to address demand and 
supply. 
What should perhaps worry states most about smuggling activity is not necessarily the ac-
tivity itself, but rather the corruption which nearly always facilitates smuggling activity. While 
the impact of some smuggled commodities might seem harmless, its potential to hollow out 
state institutions is a very real threat, especially in the developing world. No amount of law 
enforcement can rid states of endemic corruption and alternatives must therefore be sought to 




1 There is a difference between trafficking and smuggling, as trafficking refers to the trade in prohibited 
commodities, such as humans, while smuggling refers to trade in commodities which themselves are 
not prohibited but their trade in contravention of laws is, such as illegally traded cigarettes. For the 
purpose of this chapter, any reference to ‘smuggling’ may be assumed to also refer to ‘trafficking’ if the 
commodity being traded is illegal, like humans or narcotics.   
2 UNCLOS Article 98; Regulation V-33 of International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974.  
3 UNCLOS Article 2: “1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one state only and, save in exceptional cases 
expressly provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive 
jurisdiction on the high seas.” 
4 UNCLOS Article 94: “1. Every state shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in admin-
istrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag. 2. In particular every state shall: (a) 
maintain a register of ships containing the names and particulars of ships flying its flag, except those 
which are excluded from generally accepted international regulations on account of their small size; 
and (b) assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and its master, officers 
and crew in respect of administrative, technical and social matters concerning the ship. […] 6. A state 
which has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and control with respect to a ship have not 
been exercised may report the facts to the flag state. Upon receiving such a report, the flag state shall 
investigate the matter and, if appropriate, take any action necessary to remedy the situation.”  
5 UNCLOS Article 8: “waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the 
internal waters of the State”.  
6 UNCLOS Article 32: “With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 
31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships op-
erated for non-commercial purposes.”  
7 UNCLOS Article 2 (1): “The sovereignty of a coastal state extends, beyond its land territory and 
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic state, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, 
described as the territorial sea.”; UNCLOS Article 3: “Every state has the right to establish the breadth 
of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined 
in accordance with this Convention.” 
8 UNCLOS Article 46: “‘archipelagic state’ means a state constituted wholly by one or more archi-
pelagos and may include other islands; (b) ‘archipelago’ means a group of islands, including parts of 
islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such 
islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, 
or which historically have been regarded as such.”; UNCLOS Article 47: “An archipelagic state may 
draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying 
reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in 
which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 
to 1.”; UNCLOS Article 49 (1): “The sovereignty of an archipelagic state extends to the waters 
enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic 
waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.”  
9 UNCLOS Article 33: 
1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal state 
may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, im-
migration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish in-
fringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. 2. 
The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.   
10 UNCLOS Article 73: 
1. The coastal state may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and 
manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including 
boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance 
with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention. 2. Arrested 
vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other 
Carina Bruwer 
424 
security. 3. Coastal state penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive 
economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary by 
the states concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment. 4. In cases of arrest or detention 
of foreign vessels the coastal state shall promptly notify the flag state, through appropriate 
channels, of the action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.   
11 UNCLOS Article 55: 
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the 
specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the 
coastal state and the rights and freedoms of other states are governed by the relevant provisions 
of this Convention.” Article 57: “The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.   
12 UNCLOS Article 56: 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has: (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or 
non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with 
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds; (b) jurisdiction as provided for in the 
relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to: (i) the establishment and use of artificial 
islands, installations and structures; (ii) marine scientific research; (iii) the protection and pre-
servation of the marine environment; (c) other rights and duties provided for in this 
Convention.   
13 UNCLOS Article 111: 
1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the 
coastal state have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of 
that state. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within 
the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the 
pursuing state, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if 
the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship 
within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the 
order should likewise be within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is 
within a contiguous zone, as defined in article 33, the pursuit may only be undertaken if there 
has been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone was established. 2. The 
right of hot pursuit shall apply mutatis mutandis to violations in the exclusive economic zone […] 
3. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own 
state or of a third state. 4. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has 
satisfied itself by such practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued or one of its 
boats or other craft working as a team and using the ship pursued as a mother ship is within the 
limits of the territorial sea, or, as the case may be, within the contiguous zone or the exclusive 
economic zone or above the continental shelf. The pursuit may only be commenced after a 
visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard 
by the foreign ship.   
14 UNCLOS Article 86: 
The provisions of this part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive 
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic 
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waters of an archipelagic state. This article does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms 
enjoyed by all states in the exclusive economic zone in accordance with article 58.   
15 UNCLOS Article 94.  
16 UNCLOS Article 110: 
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which 
encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity in 
accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable 
ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged in piracy; (b) the ship is engaged in the slave 
trade; (c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag state of the warship has 
jurisdiction under article 109; (d) the ship is without nationality; or (e) though flying a foreign 
flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. 2. In 
the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to verify the ship’s right to fly its 
flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If 
suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further ex-
amination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible consideration.   
17 Vienna Convention Article 2.  
18 Vienna Convention Article 17(3): 
A Party which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel exercising freedom of navigation 
in accordance with international law, and flying the flag or displaying marks of registry of 
another Party is engaged in illicit traffic may so notify the flag state, request confirmation of 
registry and, if confirmed, request authorization from the flag state to take appropriate measures 
in regard to that vessel.   
19 Vienna Convention Article 17(4): 
4. In accordance with paragraph 3 or in accordance with treaties in force between them or in 
accordance with any agreement or arrangement otherwise reached between those Parties, the 
flag state may authorize the requesting state to, inter aria: a) Board the vessel; b) Search the vessel; 
c) If evidence of involvement in illicit traffic is found, take appropriate action with respect to the 
vessel, persons and cargo on board.   
20 The term ‘organized crime’ is debated. See, for example, Varese, F. 2010. What is organized crime? In: F. 
Varese F, ed. Organized crime: critical concepts in Criminology. London: Routledge; Von Lampe, K. 2016. 
Organized crime: analysing illegal activities, criminal structures, and extra-legal governance. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
21 UNTOC Article 2(a): “Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more 
serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly 
or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.  
22 UNTOC Article 3(2): 
An offence is transnational in nature if: (a) It is committed in more than one state; (b) It is 
committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control 
takes place in another state; (c) It is committed in one state but involves an organized criminal 
group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state; or (d) It is committed in one 
state but has substantial effects in another state.   
23 UNTOC Article 2 (b).  
24 UNCLOS Article 15(1): 
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention when: […] 
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(b) The offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that State Party or an 
aircraft that is registered under the laws of that State Party at the time that the offence is 
committed.   
25 UNTOC Migrant Smuggling Protocol Article 8 (2): 
A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel exercising freedom of navi-
gation in accordance with international law and flying the flag or displaying the marks of registry 
of another State Party is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea may so notify the flag state, 
request confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, request authorization from the flag state to 
take appropriate measures with regard to that vessel. The flag State may authorize the requesting 
state, inter alia: (a) To board the vessel; (b) To search the vessel; and (c) If evidence is found that 
the vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, to take appropriate measures with 
respect to the vessel and persons and cargo on board, as authorized by the flag state.   
26 UNTOC Migrant Smuggling Protocol Article 8(7): 
A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of 
migrants by sea and is without nationality or may be assimilated to a vessel without nationality 
may board and search the vessel. If evidence confirming the suspicion is found, that State Party 
shall take appropriate measures in accordance with relevant domestic and international law.   
27 UNTOC Migrant Smuggling Protocol Article 5.  
28 UNSC Resolution 2240 Para 7: 
Decides, with a view to saving the threatened lives of migrants or of victims of human trafficking on 
board such vessels as mentioned above, to authorise, in these exceptional and specific circum-
stances, for a period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution, Member States, 
acting nationally or through regional organisations that are engaged in the fight against migrant 
smuggling and human trafficking, to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels that they 
have reasonable grounds to suspect are being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from 
Libya, provided that such Member States and regional organisations make good faith efforts to 
obtain the consent of the vessel’s flag state prior to using the authority outlined in this paragraph.   
29 Council of Europe Agreement Article 5: 
1. A Party which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel without nationality, or as-
similated to a vessel without nationality under international law, is engaged in or being used for 
the commission of a relevant offence, shall inform such other Parties as appear most closely 
affected and may request the assistance of any such Party in suppressing its use for that purpose. 
The Party so requested shall render such assistance within the means available to it. 2 Where a 
Party, having received information in accordance with paragraph 1, takes action it shall be for 
that Party to determine what actions are appropriate and to exercise its jurisdiction over any 
relevant offences which may have been committed by any persons on board the vessel. 3 Any 
Party which has taken action under this article shall communicate as soon as possible to the Party 
which has provided information, or made a request for assistance, the results of any action taken 
in respect of the vessel and any persons on board.   
30 UNCLOS Article 91.  
31 UNCLOS Article 92(2): 
A ship which sails under the flags of two or more states, using them according to convenience, 
may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other state, and may be 
assimilated to a ship without nationality. 
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32 In the case of a mother vessel using smaller vessels to smuggle commodities ashore, constructive 
presence can form the basis for interception. This however falls outside the limited scope of this 
chapter.  
33 Article 110(1)(d).  
34 Article 8(7).  
35 Misuse of Drugs Act.  
36 Article 52 (1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act of Seychelles, Act 5 of 2016, for example, allows Seychellois 
courts to prosecute crimes of drug trafficking on board vessels displaying no flag.  
37 UNCLOS Article 98; SOLAS Regulation 33; Chapter 2 International Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue, 27 April 1979, 1403 UNTS 27.  
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Adaptation and resilience 
Matt Herbert, Tuesday Reitano, and Siria Gastelum Felix  
Introduction 
Smuggling, as many of the chapters in this volume have underscored, is not inherently per-
ceived or experienced to be a deviant phenomenon for communities living in zones where 
contraband is rife. Rather, as Titeca and Quitoriano underscore in their chapters in this volume, 
it can be an essential means of livelihood generation and coping in situations in which eco-
nomic opportunities are sparse and state support limited or non-existent. 
However, even while acknowledging the broad stabilizing effect smuggling and the con-
traband trade can have, it is clear that smuggling can, and in a growing number of instances, has 
transformed into something destabilizing and threatening to communities located on its per-
iphery. Frequently, such a shift coincides with the emergence of structured organized crime 
groups seeking to dominate or monopolize an emergent trade in high-value contraband 
(Herbert, 2019). 
The last 30 years have manifest a rising challenge by transnational organized crime, both 
globally and specifically along key smuggling and trafficking routes, posing a growing challenge 
to local communities, states, and regions (Walker, Kemp, Shaw, and Reitano, 2021). 
Institutions have become compromised, inequalities become more evident, and violence has 
risen, while at the same time becoming increasingly difficult to resolve. 
Under these circumstances, the line between crime and the state has become blurred. In a 
rising number of instances, organized crime groups have functionally supplanted authorities, 
both in rural and borderland smuggling zones and urban areas where contraband markets are 
concentrated, establishing zones where criminal governance is a de facto reality for large swaths 
of population. 
Though still an exception to the norm, situations in which smuggling, or areas astride 
contraband routes, come to be dominated by organized crime groups are important to focus 
upon for several reasons. First, they are substantially destructive to often vulnerable populations, 
menacing them with violence, coercion and exploitation, with risks especially concentrated 
upon women, girls and youth. (Gastelum Felix, 2017; Thomas and Pascoe, 2018; Burger, 
2019). Communities face the preoccupation of lives consumed by violence, or fear that their 
youth will be recruited, voluntarily or not, by criminal actors (Burger, 2019). Further, efforts by 
organized crime groups to control smuggling routes can lead to the targeting, taxation or 
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exclusion of forms of smuggling which do support local livelihoods, further menacing the 
livelihoods of often vulnerable and marginalized populations. 
Further, the emergence of organized crime in a contraband zone can be highly visible, 
sometimes by design, when covered by local and international media (Lantz, 2016). This 
visibility, and the political pressure it can induce, can in turn skew the policy responses of 
governments on public safety issues more broadly, impacting both organized criminal actors and 
smugglers more broadly, with the latter category often far less able to weather securitized 
government efforts than the former. 
The challenge in countering transnational organized crime is often perceived to be a binary 
struggle between states and criminal organizations. Responses and lessons learned often emanate 
from this, heavily focused on what states should do or what aid can be extended to make state 
capacities more effective. These responses broadly fail to acknowledge that state actors can also 
play a significant role in criminal predation, or that with the communities most affected, 
longstanding failures in service delivery mean that state institutions have little legitimacy 
(Reitano and Hunter, 2016). Rarely are the local communities that face the challenge posed by 
organized crime analyzed and recognized as actors with agency, resources, and capacities, who 
often hold innovative and inspiring lessons on how to surmount criminal conflicts, promote 
better local governance and identify opportunities to shift beneficial forms of smuggling from 
criminalized to licit economic opportunities. 
While often vulnerable, community members are neither static nor powerless actors. Their 
members can be criminal participants, victims, and advocates for accountability – sometimes all 
within the same family. In numerous cases, communities have sought to respond to the 
challenge posed to their families and societies by organized crime and alter the status quo, taking 
robust, yet non-violent approaches to build resilience within their communities (Olson, Shirk, 
and Wood, 2014). 
Community resilience as a practice is not new. Rural and indigenous communities have 
long self-organized to protect their people and sustain their livelihoods against acute challenges, 
including environmental degradation, natural disasters and structural violence. Community 
resilience remains, however, imprecisely understood and ephemerous, to the detriment of at- 
risk communities and the international community seeking to help them through programmatic 
intervention. Community resilience against transnational organized crime as a concept is even 
more nascent, with limited attention given to the approach by governments and civil society 
actors. The intersections among insecurity, insufficient or threatened livelihoods, violence and 
the breakdown of the rule of law touch on all themes where civil society action has become 
more prominent and important. 
This chapter focuses on building understanding of community resilience as a concept and in 
practice as a means of addressing the negative impacts on communities in contexts where 
smuggling economies have become penetrated or dominated by organised crime groups.1 The 
chapter begins by offering a definition of community resilience, including the identification of 
the actors involved, and offers illustrative examples of resilience approaches. Next, it offers 
illustrative examples of resilience-building approaches. Third, the challenge posed to resilience 
efforts, by both criminal and government actions, is detailed. Fourth, it analyzes the counter- 
intuitive resilience offered by smuggling and illicit economies, and the risks posed to such 
stability by securitized approaches to organized crime. Finally, the chapter concludes with a 
brief set of reflections on resilience, and avenues forward for research and activism. 
The analysis in this chapter is derived from the Global Initiative Against Transnational 
Organized Crime’s work on the issue. Beginning in 2015, the organization began to document 
community responses to organized crime, largely as a means to present those voices into 
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international development discussions. This chapter is based on that work, as well as further 
programmatic work done by the Global Initiative with resilience actors between 2017 and 
2021.2 
The concept of resilience to transnational organized crime 
While the practices involved in resilience are ancient, the concept of resilience as a develop-
ment tool is relatively new, emerging from the Disaster Risk Reduction field and coming into 
wider usage only since the 1990s (United Nations, 1994; Kimber, 2019). Over the last three 
decades, resilience has, however, been widely adopted in a variety of different fields, such as 
development, peacebuilding and counter-crime, and by different actors, including various 
United Nations agencies, donors (including the United States and the United Kingdom), and 
various international NGOs (Norris et al., 2008; Van Metre and Calder, 2016; Barbieri, Fessler, 
Hermes, and Lehne, 2019; DFID 2011; Seelke and Finklea, 2016). 
The concept of resilience as applied to organized crime is newer, and in many ways still 
evolving. Conceptual work on the issue largely started to crystalize in the late 2000s and early 
2010s (see, for example, Felbab-Brown, 2011; Davis, 2012), accompanying an increasing focus 
by international donors on efforts to support directly efforts to buttress communities against 
criminal violence and threats, including in the 2011 bilateral U.S.–Mexico “Beyond Merida” 
strategy, which encompassed an explicit focus on resilience (Seelke, 2021). Since that point, 
donor interest in the subject has grown, along with efforts to clarify and expand the field, 
including by authors such as Olson, Shirk and Wood, Carpenter and Cooper, Gastelum Felix, 
Thomas and Pascoe, Maringira and Gibson, Gutierrez, and Bird (Olson, Shirk and Wood, 
2014; Carpenter and Cooper, 2015; Gastelum Felix, 2017; Thomas and Pascoe, 2018;  
Maringira and Gibson, 2019; Gutierrez, 2020; Bird, 2021). 
Despite a rising interest in resilience by academics and practitioners focused on organized 
crime, the broader concept of resilience remains relatively elastic and loosely defined (Imperiale 
and Vanclay, 2020). Gastelum Felix has defined resilience as “the capacity of any system…to 
respond to and recover from shocks and stressors that threaten and/or disrupt its structure and 
functional capacities” (Gastelum Felix, 2017). Shocks are “sudden events that impact on the 
vulnerability of the system and its components,” while stressors are “long-term trends that 
undermine the potential of a given system or process and increase the vulnerability of actors 
within it” (DFID, 2011). 
Resilience capacity is inherently a multilevel concept, identifiable at the individual, familial, 
community, and national levels, with the capacity of each of those levels reenforcing – or 
weakening – that of the others (Barbieri, Fessler, Hermes, and Lehne, 2019). Crucially, each of 
the levels, and actors within each level, do not need to respond in the same way to shocks and 
stressors. Rather, the emergence of different responses – as long they are diffused and shared and 
not mutually incompatible – is broadly beneficial, increasing the chances that shocks and 
stressors will be surmounted or recovered from (Van Metre and Calder, 2016). Resilience 
capacity also necessarily operates along a dynamic continuum rather than being an end state: the 
same community can increase or decrease resilience capacity depending on the confluence of 
endogenous and exogenous factors, such as the shocks and stressors, the actors involved, and the 
broader political, social or security context. 
It is important to note that a number of different actors, operating at different levels, can play 
a role within resilience building efforts and contribute to countering the negative impacts of 
transnational organized crime. This can include governments, especially those at the local level. 
However, situations in which the worst impacts of organized crime are manifest and where 
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resilience needs are most acute exist due to failed institutional responses, often where the state is 
weak, complicit, or non-existent. For this reason, it is import to focus on resilience at the 
community level, undertaken through actors such as community members and other non-state 
actors, such as civil society organizations, religious forums, and local media organizations. 
Gender is a key component of multi-actor analysis around resilience. In part, such a focus is 
essential as while both men and women are involved in organized crime, the vulnerability and 
impact of involvement can differ by sex, and forms of vulnerability within communities can be 
similarly stratified by gender (Shaw and Skywalker, 2017; Ghanem, 2020; Bird, 2021). 
Therefore, the design of approaches to resilience – especially those meant to engage directly 
with participants – necessarily need to be tailored with an eye towards gender dynamics in order 
to achieve success. In approaching resilience building, it is essential to recognize that women 
often play vitally important roles. They are able, for example, to leverage traditional gender 
roles to interrupt effectively cycles of violence via negotiation and the creation of safe space. 
However, they often have only limited representation in or access to the shaping of formal 
responses to organized crime (Bird, 2021). The inclusion of a gender lens is acutely important 
for programs and activities which seek to ‘build back better,’ in order to ensure that the 
programs and initiatives address, rather than entrench, gender based structural inequality and 
representation (Bird, 2021). 
When applied to organized crime issues, the abstractions in the above definitions become 
clearer. Gastelum Felix and Tennant argue that “when applying resilience building to situations 
affected by organized crime, communities need to respond to not only long-standing negative 
situations (stressors such as embedded corruption, culture of extortion or protection etc.), but 
also immediate negative impacts (shocks such as an assassination or a sudden campaign of 
violence and/or intimidation)” (Gastelum Felix and Tennant, forthcoming). Further, as re-
sponses to the negative impacts of organized crime similarly are inherently multilevel, and 
multi-approach, actors within the same community, stratified by gender or social markers, for 
example, can adopt different approaches to transgressive violence or predation, even as national 
level authorities adapt tools at their disposal to do the same. Finally, on the issue of continuum, 
a community or family may hold well developed strategies for addressing impacts of stressors 
linked to some forms of the illicit economy, such as handling extortion or predation, but may 
be ill-prepared to respond if the context of the local illicit economy shifts, such as if a violent 
drug trafficking organization begins to operate in the area in which they live (Herbert, 2019). 
It is important to distinguish the concept of resilience from that of resistance or contestation. 
In instances in which organized crime has emerged as a destabilizing threat, some communities 
have sought to counter it via the formation of community self-defence groups or militias 
(International Crisis Group, 2013; Lagrange and Vircoulon, 2021). This, however, differs 
substantially in aim and act from resilience, which according to Thomas and Pascoe, involves 
non-violent approaches to shocks and stressors (Thomas and Pascoe, 2018). Such a differ-
entiation is key both in approach and impact, with numerous cases underscoring that the move 
towards the development of armed groups often can be a gateway to further shocks and 
criminality, with little positive impact on long term stressors (International Crisis Group, 2013). 
Emanating from this, approaches to community resilience building to counter organized 
crime should be conceptualized as “a transformative process of strengthening the capacity of 
people and communities to effectively respond to and recover from the shocks and stressors of 
pervasive criminal governance” (Barbieri, Fessler, Hermes, and Lehne, 2019). In practice, re-
silience building aims to build structures to enable communities to weather adverse events or to 
recover to a status quo ex-ante after the emergence of an acute challenge. When possible, 
however, the aim is to fuse the two aspects, endeavor to assist communities in ‘building back 
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better’ by identifying and supporting novel solutions and resilience activities to ensure that if 
similar challenges reoccur in the future, communities are better placed to lessen or dodge the 
damage (Gastelum Felix and Tennant, forthcoming). 
Forms of resilience building 
Forms of resilience, and the resulting nature of resilience-building activities, are situation 
specific. There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach. Rather, they differ based on a variety of factors, 
including the nature of the organized crime challenge, the interplay of stressors and shocks, a 
community’s internal dynamics and existent coping strategies, the nature of broader engage-
ment and capacity of the state, and the structure and nature of local illicit economies 
(Amerhauser and Kemp, 2021). 
For this reason, resilience building is a bottom-up exercise, rooted in engaging with and 
supporting local actors, and often highly dependent on their social capital, the “links, shared 
values and understandings that enable individuals and groups to trust each other and work 
together” (Gastelum Felix, 2017). Such actors understand both the structure and impact (po-
sitive and negative) of local illicit economies and the formal and informal networks and social 
capital which exist within local communities (Gastelum Felix, 2017, Thomas and 
Pascoe, 2018). 
As noted, the specific forms of resilience building are necessarily locally grounded. However, 
at a broad level, resilience activities can include activities designed to address directly issues of 
violence, improve community cohesion, offer individual or group support to victims or at-risk 
populations (including current or former criminal actors), buttress information sharing and 
awareness raising on resilience and crime issues, and strengthen connections and capacities 
within communities. 
Below are some particularly important approaches which the authors have documented 
amongst organizations operating throughout the globe. The approaches are not exhaustive; 
rather, they are illustrative examples which underscore both the dynamism and the contextually 
tailored approaches undertaken by communities, civil society organizations and other non-state 
actors in confronting the challenges posed by organized crime. 
The first, and most immediately important for communities menaced by organized crime 
related killings or disappearances, is violence interruption. Gang mediation by community 
members, aimed not at eliminating organized crime, but at addressing the acute negative impact 
it poses, has emerged in recent decades as a particularly important strategic approach (Sharkey, 
Torrats-Espinosa and Takyar, 2017). Outside of Cape Town, South Africa, the Manenberg Safety 
Forum has been deeply involved in such mediation. As Roegchanda Pascoe, chairperson of the 
Safety Forum, noted, “Whether we like it or not, we must live with them [gangs], so it is 
important for us to engage with them because we have to share the space with them. It was 
through this realization that our work in gang mediation started” (Thomas and Pascoe, 2018). 
The second is the creation of ‘safe spaces,’ such as youth centres. Such safe spaces are not just 
meant to be physically safe from violence, but also to offer a space removed from criminal 
stresses and pressures, diverting those who might otherwise be targeted by organized crime 
actors. This can help to break the cycle of organized crime recruitment and offer pathways away 
from crime for those already enmeshed within illicit economies (Amerhauser and Kemp, 2021). 
In Cali, Colombia, the organization Vicaria para la Reconciliación y La Paz builds safe spaces for 
youth, especially those who previously were involved in gang activity. Yesid Perlaza, from the 
organization, noted the importance of providing an avenue of escape for such youth. 
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Youths see that someone has been able to escape from their condition of violence, of 
drug dependency, or the condition that allowed them to be out of legality. To be-
come part of legality is important because it gives them hope. They have lost hope, 
they have lost faith, what we want is for them to recover hope and faith in in-
stitutionalism and to aspire to that offer which is limited but is always present. It’s 
bringing institutions to the territories, taking away that space from criminal networks, 
and preventing them from having offers for their criminal activities.3  
The work of Vicaria para la Reconciliación y La Paz took on added importance during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, when youth involved in the organization’s programmes were mobilized 
to help the community, via the delivery of food and sanitary information. Such an activity was 
both an example of efforts by the community to stabilize itself in response to the immediate 
threat posed by the disease, and a manifestation of longer-term efforts to ‘build back better’, 
with the youth previously involved in organized crime, and stigmatized for it, using their 
involvement to change the way the community perceived of them. 
Another example, in Tanzania, is the development of safe spaces for drug users. There the 
Salvage CSO provides support and shelter to drug users, focusing in particular on women. The 
aim is to offer opportunities for harm reduction, access to psycho-social services and a means of 
reintegrating drug users into the community. 
Third is the provision of support to individuals at risk or impacted by organized crime. This 
does not only entail protective support, but also legal, financial, health and education assistance. 
Practically this can take the form of violence shelters, hotlines, and reintegration assistance for 
community members previously involved in illicit economies (Amerhauser and Kemp, 2021). 
In Haiti, for example, the CSO Rapha has worked to address the issues of human trafficking 
and sexual exploitation. This is particularly important for the country, as, in recent years 
proliferating violence by criminal armed groups has triggered a crisis of forced internal dis-
placement in a number of disadvantaged and marginalised communities. This displacement, 
exacerbated by continuing insecurity, has led to a situation of extreme social and economic 
vulnerability for those displaced, and exposed, many – particularly women and children – to an 
increased risk of sexual exploitation. 
To address this, Rapha has sought to assist and aid victims directly, as well as build the 
resilience of high-risk communities and improve the capacity of state protection structures. In 
February 2020, Rapha launched a program to identify and help vulnerable people, via the 
provision of psychosocial and medical care to both victims of sexual exploitation and heads of 
household in vulnerable communities. Gerson Nozea, from Rapha, explains that “among the 
victims, families internally displaced due to organised crime now have access to safe housing, 
women heads of households have launched income-generating initiatives, and a network of 
cooperation and support has been created for women heads of small business enterprises.”4 
Fourth is information sharing and awareness. While local information on the manifestations 
of organized crime and criminal governance may exist, broader knowledge about organized 
crime, the nature of challenges in other locales or regions, and successful resilience efforts 
elsewhere is often limited or non-existent. This, in turn, effectively poses “a structural barrier to 
building resilience” (Gastelum Felix and Tennnant, forthcoming). Non-state organizations 
focused on research, journalism and education are keenly important in addressing these gaps, 
though often these same organizations need support and time to build the specific knowledge 
on organized crime issues (Amerhauser and Kemp, 2021). 
Finally, resilience activities are – fundamentally – about community building. Ideally, re-
silience activities should be aimed both at retarding the key challenges communities face, and 
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enhancing issues and ethical approaches communities hold dear (Amerhauser and Kemp, 2021). 
The latter, in particular, is keenly important within the ‘build back better’ approach to 
resilience. 
Community building, however, does not simply entail the strengthening of bonds within 
geographically distinct communities, but also the building of a community of individuals and 
organizations working on resilience building issues. At a local level, such connectivity is par-
ticularly important to prevent large numbers of unconnected and uncoordinated actors and 
initiatives within a given community fragment rather than reinforce resilience building efforts 
(Davis, 2012). 
There is, however, also a utility in strengthening global bonds amongst resilience actors. As 
will be detailed in greater depth in the following section, resilience building can be a dangerous 
activity, with efforts often surveilled by both governments and criminal organizations, and 
activists sometimes harassed, intimidated and attacked. 
Challenges to resilience building 
The narratives of building and rebuilding resilience are arguably powerful and positive, offering 
an avenue to marginalized communities and individuals to non-violently address challenges 
emanating from organized crime. However, they are not easy. The situations in which com-
munities seek to enhance resilience are frequently unsafe, and rife with spoilers – including both 
criminals and states – whose interests run counter to or differ from those of communities. 
Simply, individuals, organizations and communities working on resilience often do so at great 
cost to themselves, while menaced by an ever-growing set of challenges. 
The most dire challenge facing resilience proponents is physical violence and murder. 
Targeted killings – especially those of activists involved in countering environmental crime and 
journalists reporting on organized crime – have long been an issue, but it has become more 
acute over the last two decades as criminal groups have grown in global scope and power. In 
Mexico alone, 137 journalists were killed between 2000 and 2020 (Triana, 2021). Mexican 
journalist Javier Valdez, murdered on 17 May 2017, once explained the risks he faced, noting: 
In Culiacán (Mexico), living is dangerous, and working as a journalist means treading 
an invisible line drawn by the bad guys from both the drug cartels and the government – 
a sharp floor covered with explosives (The Global Initiative Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 2020).  
As intimated by Valdez, the risk comes not just from organized crime actors. Police and other 
security forces officials, acting either as hired assassins or due to complicity in criminal activity, 
have also been implicated in the killing of journalists and activists (The Global Initiative Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 2020). 
The goal of such killings if often two-fold. In part, the killings are aimed at silencing actors 
and halting initiatives which criminal actors perceive as threatening their business interests or a 
status quo advantageous to them. In some instances, such as with journalists, the goal can also be 
to prevent the dissemination of information highlighting links between criminals and state 
actors. 
Targeted killings, however, are also intended to intimidate, implicitly threatening the 
broader social networks, community and society of those killed. Murder is not the only form of 
intimidation which resilience actors, and their communities, face. In a number of instances 
documented by the authors, criminal actors have resorted to cyber harassment or physical 
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threats. In others, criminal actors have publicly sought out activists, overtly querying com-
munity members as to the activist’s location and activities.5 In some cases, state agents have been 
implicated in intimidation efforts, including targeting family members of murdered journalists 
(The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020; Amerhauser and Kemp, 
2021; Triana, 2021). 
Resilience activists have also been menaced by a rise in legal intimidation. Defamation suits, 
for example, have emerged as key approaches by actors seeking to target and deter individuals 
and activists working against organized crime. One activist who had been reporting on crime 
and corruption issues around the illicit mining industry, was sued for defamation by one of the 
alleged criminals involved. The suit led to the temporary seizure of the activist’s organization, as 
well as other harassment of the organization’s staff. Despite the ultimate dismissal of some 
lawsuits, the process can often be ruinously expensive for activists, forcing a halt to their ac-
tivities and deterring others from becoming involved in resilience work. 
Intimidation has always been a key tool of TOC activities, such as extortion and territorial 
control, due to the limited risk it involves for criminal actors, with police and security forces 
often less likely to investigate or prosecute it. Intimidation, however, can have a particularly 
acute chilling effect on efforts to buttress community resilience, impacting both the willingness 
of community members to discuss the challenges they face and efforts to address them 
(Connolly, 2019; Gastrow, 2021). 
Apart from active threats from criminal actors meant to halt and deter resilience work, there 
are also inherent risks in the nature of some specific forms of resilience building. The most 
direct of these is gang mediation, where resilience actors are seeing to limit violence between 
antagonistic, often heavily armed groups of youth. One Liberian mediator explained that that 
“with gang violence, you have the physical situation where you can be physically attacked if 
people misunderstand your position while you’re trying to facilitate.”6 
In addition to the challenges detailed above, resilience actors also face some very specific 
risks posed by states and state agents. While in an ideal situation, the latter actors should be 
proponents of resilience building, too often communities face predatory states that view 
resilience- building efforts with deep distrust. Amerhauser and Kemp, writing about resilience 
in the Western Balkans note that “In some cases, positions [between governments and CSOs] 
become entrenched to the point that one or both sides regard the other as ‘the enemy,’ which is 
unfortunate given that fighting organized crime should be a shared goal” (Amerhauser and 
Kemp, 2021). 
Antipathy and mistrust of resilience actors by governments can sometimes lead to the in-
tentional weaponization of state resources, to include physical assaults or murder by state agents, 
or intimidation via the legal system. However, more frequently, state efforts which curtail the 
activities of resilience actors occur via broader policy or legal initiatives. 
Moves in recent years to expand defamation laws, especially to encompass speech on social 
media platforms, are one example of this, as detailed previously on legal intimidation 
(International Press Institute, 2020; Guterres, 2020). In some cases, such as in Mexico and 
Niger, government actors, or those linked to powerful officials, have been protagonists in such 
suits seeking to halt reporting on corruption or organized crime links (Edmonds-Poli, 2014;  
The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020). 
Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (AML/CTF) policies have also emerged as 
a problematic issue for resilience actors. In some instances, this is due to the instrumentalization 
of such policies by governments to harass and target resilience actors, such as in Serbia in July 
2020, when the government issued a list of journalists and NGOs who bank accounts were to 
be reviewed for AML/CTF violations (Amerhauser and Kemp, 2021). Such instrumentalized 
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approaches can be a particular issue in locales where criminals and state actors are closely in-
terlinked (Knoote and Malmberg, 2021). 
However, a more sustained challenge emanates from the underlying structure of AML/CTF 
legislation, including best practices promoted by international organizations. The Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), a key AML/CTF standard setter, has recommended the regulation 
of the non-profit sector since the 1990s. This despite both FATF and other international actors, 
such as the World Bank and European Commission, acknowledging the limited risk NGOs 
pose for terrorist financing (Knoote and Malmberg, 2021). 
FATF’s promotion of non-profit regulation has furthered efforts by governments to control 
and target NGOs, all under the patina of an AML/CTF approach. This, in turn has led to 
operational, financial, and legal ramifications for such organizations. Already limited donor 
support for resilience activities against organized crime are further impeded by the difficulty 
recipient organizations have in navigating and adhering to strict AML/CTF requirements 
(Amerhauser and Kemp, 2021). Knoote and Malmberg, in reviewing the issue, note a “policy 
incoherence on the national and international arena: the very organizations whose mandate is to 
fight organized crime, corruption or terrorism, are being hampered in their valuable work by 
CFT/AML regulations” (Knoote and Malmberg, 2021). 
Smuggling, stabilization and the risk of securitization 
Securitized approaches to organized crime, smuggling and illicit markets are a final aspect of 
official policy which shape the activities and challenges of resilience actors. Much of this hinges 
on the counterintuitive stabilizing impact of some forms of smuggling and illicit markets. As a 
range of chapters in this volume have noted, in areas where economic opportunities are limited, 
smuggling and illicit markets are a key livelihood support strategy for local communities. This is 
especially the case for contraband activities in which barriers to entry are low and financial 
stakes widely distributed (Herbert, 2019). 
Activities which contravene national laws do not necessarily contravene local social norms, 
nor are they considered taboo. Herbert and Gallien underscore, for example, that on the 
Tunisia-Algeria border, low level smugglers rarely perceive their activities to be deviant, even if 
they are criminal, with one Tunisian smuggler explaining “What we do is not really illegal 
trafficking” (Herbert and Gallien, 2020). This dynamic is not limited only to individuals directly 
involved in smuggling, but rather is reflected in the broader social context of many commu-
nities where smuggling or illicit trade is perceived as a livelihood necessity. Witbooi under-
scores this, noting that “research conducted on gangs elsewhere in Jamaica, particularly in 
Kingston, suggests a significant degree of tolerance, if not support, for the social benefits that 
these illicit activities bring vulnerable communities” (Witbooi, 2020). 
Officials too can allow tacitly some forms of smuggling, turning a blind eye to cross-border 
commerce as long as specific norms and unofficial rules are adhered to by smugglers (Herbert, 
2019; Gallien, 2019). This is often based upon the rationalization that the risks of destabilization 
and protests in the borderlands substantially exceed the dangers posed by low level smuggling 
(Hanlon and Herbert, 2015). 
The advent of new security threats, including violent organized crime groups or terrorist 
networks perceived to be enabled by smuggling networks, can change this calculus, however. 
In such circumstances, states can seek to adopt blunt, security-focused strategies as a means of 
mitigating the risk. 
However, government efforts to address nominally illegal activity and markets via securitized 
approaches that do not incorporate alternative development efforts acceptable to local 
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communities risk primarily impacting small scale smugglers. Such actors have limited ability to 
surmount concerted government security or border closure campaigns, which, in turn can lead 
to destabilization of borderland communities. 
In North Africa, for example, the governments of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco sub-
stantially shifted their border security strategies between 2011 and 2020, moving from defacto 
tolerance of low-level smuggling to militarized approaches which sought to halt smuggling and 
other unauthorized cross-border movement. The net impact of this shift was to create a crisis in 
the region’s borderlands, leading to an increase in social tension, irregular migration and in-
volvement in more violent forms of criminality, such as drug trafficking (Herbert and Gallien, 
2020). Similar unintended consequences can be seen with other securitized approaches, in-
cluding that of early ‘Mano Dura’ policies in Central America’s Northern Triangle or initiatives 
pursued in Afghanistan around narcotics cultivation ( Jones, 2014; Goodhand, 2009; Gutierrez, 
2020; Koehler, Rasool and Ibrahimkhel, 2021). 
Thus, even in cases in which state intentions are nominally positive, poorly thought through 
policy approaches to informal and illicit economies, especially on what is meant to replace them, 
lead to a negative effect on community livelihoods and security. This, in turn, can increase the need 
for resilience actors, both to address the negative ramifications of state action and to address criminal 
entrepreneurs – such as drug traffickers in North Africa – who seek to profit from the upending of 
previously established markets and systems to increase their own power and influence. 
Finally, securitized approaches also pose a risk to resilience actors, especially those perceived 
to oppose government approaches or maintain connections to criminals (such as resilience 
actors involved in gang mediation). In such instances, resilience actors can face investigation, 
harassment and physical violence by state agents not due to the initiatives they promote, but 
rather due to the broader social networks they and their communities exist within. 
Conclusion 
As the chapters in this book underscore, the negative impacts which manifest when smuggling 
economies have become penetrated or dominated by organised crime groups has emerged as a 
increasing global challenge. Much of the attention has focused on the macro-level impacts, such as 
state capture, rule of law erosion, and the functional ejection of state presence from areas domi-
nated by organized crime actors. The micro-experience of organized crime has been more opaque, 
such as how communities deal with heightened insecurity and the rise of criminal governance. 
However, such a micro-focus is important, because it is out of these local contexts that some of the 
most active and successful efforts to deal with the impacts of organized crime are emerging. 
In a vast range of countries and contexts globally, community activists, journalists and NGOs 
are working, often in circumstances of acute personal risk, to aid communities impacted by 
organized crime in addressing the damaging ramifications of the phenomenon. These resilience 
efforts are, in effect, efforts at stabilization from below, grounded in local context and re-
sponsive to local needs. Support of them should be key components of national and donor 
efforts to address organized crime. 
National and international supporters, however, should not make the mistake of viewing 
community resilience as an end state in itself. Resilience is instead a multi-level continuum, 
with different levels – individual, family, community, national – deploying coping strategies to 
different effect at different times as organized crime risks and threats change (Davis, 2012). 
Because of this, support should be both durable and focused at connecting resilience actors with 
their peers, to ensure that good practices and approaches can be spread, innovated and 
employed. 
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International actors – including both donors and the research community – should also 
remain attuned to the challenges faced by local individuals and organizations working on re-
silience. Those working on the ground are doing so against an ever-increasing set of challenges, 
and often at great personal risk. 
Finally, while the focus of this chapter has largely been on how communities act to build 
resilience in the absence of the state, or its capture by criminal actors, promoters of resilience 
should not lose sight of the need to bring the state back into the conversation. Ultimately, if 
community efforts to counter organized crime are to be effective and durable, the state must 
play a role. The challenge then is to build trust and connections between state officials and 
community actors, and ensure that local knowledge and understanding fits both local admin-
istration and more national level responses to organized crime. This is particularly challenging, 
and yet highly salient, in communities where livelihoods are predicated upon smuggling and 
forms of petty contraband, and which the risk of destabilization is significant if state approaches 
to combat organized crime are bluntly applied. 
The challenge posed by transnational organized crime is likely to continue to grow in the coming 
years and decades. This in turn, necessitates that those in the international community – such as 
governments, civil society, and academia – continue to work to support those resilience actors 
working on the ground and promulgate the novel solutions and approaches they come up with. 
Notes  
1 The authors would like to emphasize that while smuggling and organized crime are interrelated, they 
should not be construed as synonymous. Organized crime groups can emanate from smuggling net-
works, as the advent of high value goods leads to heightened barriers to entry, and a subsequent 
concentration of power and profit within specific groups and individuals. They can also become 
involved in taxing smugglers moving goods across a given territory, in some cases acting as gatekeepers 
on which individuals or groups can be active in smuggling activities. However, on a per person basis, 
members of organized crime groups are a distinct minority within the broader universe of smuggling.  
2 Beginning in 2019, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime launched the 
Resilience Fund to further support community and civil society responding to organized crime. The 
Resilience Fund not only provides financial support to its grantees but builds capacity of its bene-
ficiaries by offering a learning curricula and networking opportunities, along with mentoring and other 
programmes to amplify the local impact of the projects and share lessons internationally, while building 
a global community of resilience actors.  
3 Author Interview, Yesid Perlaza, remote, 2020.  
4 Author interview, Gerson Nozea, remote 2020.  
5 Author communication, activist, remote, April 2021.  
6 Global Initiative interview, Yvette Chesson-Wureh, remote, September 2020.  
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32 
THE “WAR ON SMUGGLERS” 
AND THE EXPANSION OF THE 
BORDER APPARATUS 
Lorena Gazzotti   
Introduction 
The website of the EU Directorate for Migration and Home Affairs includes a page dedicated 
to “migrant smuggling.” It states that “migrant smuggling is a profitable business for criminal 
networks with estimated annual turnover reaching multiple billion Euros.” It then goes on 
detailing that “Migrant smuggling is increasingly associated with serious human rights violations 
and deaths, in particular when it occurs by sea.” The website continues by arguing that “The 
loss of migrants’ lives at the hands of smugglers in the Mediterranean Sea is an acute reminder of 
the need to tackle migrant smuggling,” an endeavor that justifies resorting to “all of the legal, 
operational, and administrative levers available” (European Commission, n.d.). Similar in both 
forms and content to speeches recited by both right-wing and left-wing European political 
leaders, this short extract exemplifies the role that the “smuggler” plays in current political 
discourses. Together with the archetypical figure of the “terrorist” (De Genova, 2010), the 
“homeless,” or “the drug trafficker” (De Noronha, 2020), the “smuggler” quintessentially 
condenses the anxieties of late liberal societies: they are stigmatised as deviant because they do 
not conform to the established order, and they are therefore portrayed as a source of threat that 
conspires against the status quo. 
Literature has now widely acknowledged that the public portrait of the smuggler as an 
inherently deviant, dangerous figure is deceiving. In this chapter, however, I will not focus on 
the mismatch between the realities and political fantasies about the “smuggler.” Rather, this 
paper interrogates the “uses”1 of smuggling. I ask: what political function does the figure of the 
“smuggler” fulfill in border control? I contend that the demonization of the smuggler enables 
the expansion of the border apparatus. Casting the “smuggler” as the main source of danger for 
people crossing the border irregularly (and for destination countries enacting restrictive mi-
gration policies) displaces attention away from the structural sources that create a demand for 
human smuggling in the first place. Individualizing and pathologizing the dangers connected to 
smuggling facilitate the deployment of further border control measures. Following Rob 
Nixon’s concept of “slow violence” (Nixon, 2011), I argue that anti-smuggling activities can be 
categorized into fast control instruments, that deploy military-style interventions focusing on de-
stroying the infrastructures that facilitate irregular border crossing; and slow control methods, that 
aim at transforming potential migrants and former smugglers into immigration-law-abiding 
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subjects through welfare-like initiatives. Although they might not appear to be successful in 
their intent to disrupt smuggling networks and economies, these projects do succeed in ad-
vancing the border project: they further precarise the life conditions of migrant people, and 
they reinforce the idea that migration is a “problem” that can be “solved” through ad-hoc, 
time-bounded, rapid interventions. 
The rest of the chapter unfolds into four sections. The first section explores the existing 
academic literature on smuggling, providing a more nuanced and complex understanding of the 
facilitation of irregular migration. The following section provides a framework to conceptualise 
the expansion and diversification of the bordering apparatus. I then move on to discussing the 
difference between “fast” and “slow” anti-smuggling instruments of smuggling control, and 
how they contribute (explicitly and implicitly) to the expansion of the border apparatus. 
“Dangerous smugglers” vs. “moral smugglers”? 
In both policy literature and journalistic prose, people smugglers are generally described as 
“inherently hypersexual and violence-driven men from the global South, members of all- 
mighty, hierarchical, transnational criminal organisations, involved in markets ranging from 
weapons trafficking to terrorism and from drug trafficking to nuclear smuggling” (Sanchez, 
2016, p. 390). In its ‘Migrant Smuggling FAQs’, for example, UNODC specifies that “Migrant 
smugglers are criminals and not humanitarians. They are motivated by financial or material 
gain” (UNODC, n.d.). The report continues by specifying that “migrant smugglers often 
conduct their activities with little or no regard for the lives of the people whose hardships have 
created a demand for smuggling services.” The International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
shares such universal views about the indifference of smugglers to their clients: in its ‘IOM’s 
comprehensive approach to counter migrant smuggling’ report, the organisation describes 
migrant smugglers are predatory figures, asserting, ‘once paid, smugglers often have little or no 
regard for the well-being of migrants, who are particularly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation’ 
(IOM, n.d.). 
Academic research, however, has proven that reality is much more complex (Stock, 2019). 
First of all, the relations between smugglers and migrants can fall on a wide spectrum between 
mutual trust and overt violence. Trust and ethical commitment can be essential to the relation 
between smugglers and migrants, as the former can be seen as care providers who help the latter 
fleeing a situation of unease and danger when wealthy countries have closed most legal channels 
for escape (Achilli, 2018; Vogt, 2016). Second, smuggling is not necessarily a secret practice 
occurring away from the prying eyes of the public. Rather, it can be a mundane activity that is 
deeply embedded in the local political economy of border regions (Vives, 2017). The demand 
and supply for smuggling should be understood in the broader context of increasingly secur-
itized borders that generate a source of precarious income for people available to facilitate the 
crossing of labourers across the border (Sanchez, 2016). Regions that have become central hubs 
of irregular border crossing have seen the emergence of a parallel service economy that caters to 
potential border crossers and smugglers, composed of activities as unnewsworthy as “shops, 
boutiques, restaurants, grocery stores, bus and taxi companies, nightclubs, and pubs” (Achilli, 
2018). In this context, the smuggler can be a member of the same community that navigates a 
complex economic landscape by juggling multiple social positions (Magallanes-Gonzalez, 
2020). Third, smuggling is not necessarily a male-dominated economic activity. Building on 
fieldwork at the US-Mexico border, Sanchez highlights that “smuggling” writ large is un-
dertaken also by women, working either to arrange crossings or to provide a range of services 
(like maintaining accommodation for potential crossers) that are intimately linked to the 
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facilitation of irregular migration (Sanchez, 2016). Fourth, smuggling does not systematically 
take place far away from the eyes of the authorities. The latter are, in a lot of cases, informed 
and essential to the everyday working of irregular crossing (Achilli, 2018; Stock, 2019). 
The fact that smuggling should not be systematically represented as a hyper-violent activity 
does not mean that the facilitation of irregular border crossing never relies on threat. Scholars 
have widely documented that migrants can be victims of sexual violence (Tyszler, 2019), 
kidnapping (Slack, 2019) and robbery (Magallanes-Gonzalez, 2020) at the hand of smugglers. 
The level of violence that smuggling implies, however, is intimately linked to the expansion of 
border securitization policies. In her piece on irregular migration between Senegal and Spain, 
Luna Vives points out that before 2005, most smuggling was conducted occasionally by 
Senegalese fishermen, who had the skills to sail the Ocean, and who belonged to the same 
communities where their clients originated (and that could therefore more easily be held ac-
countable for their wrongdoings). The criminalization of smuggling, however, discouraged this 
kind of occasional smuggler, paving the way for larger, foreign, criminal organisations to take 
their place in the facilitation of irregular migration. The change in actor determined an increase 
in vulnerabilities: migrants were deprived of the accountability systems that provided them with 
guarantees against deception and threat, and the business of smuggling became the monopoly of 
people with no experience in sailing in Senegalese waters (Vives, 2017). 
“The dangerous smuggler” and the expansion of the border apparatus 
The unwavering attention that political leaders cast on the figure of the “dangerous smuggler” 
is part of an established pattern of evidence-averse policy-making that characterizes the field of 
migration. The EU, in fact, tends to adopt policy responses to migration phenomena that are at 
odds with the existing evidence on the topic. Most important is the perseverance of European 
governments in adopting ever-more restrictive migration policies to curb immigration, even 
though scientific evidence exists that prove that tighter borders do not halt existing migration 
flows. Rather, they oblige migrant people to travel irregularly and to take more dangerous 
routes (Andersson, 2014). Evidence-averse policy-making happens despite the fact that national 
governments express a public commitment to evidence-based policy-making, implemented 
through the funding of research programmes (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019). The fact that 
migration policies are rooted in biased perceptions and racist stereotypes should not be un-
derstood as a question of “misinformed” public discourse or policy-making (see also Ferguson, 
1994). Rather, it depends on the fact that policy-making is influenced by a number of com-
peting factors, from the bureaucrat’s background to the broader political context (Baldwin- 
Edwards et al., 2019). Building on his work on development programs in rural Africa, James 
Ferguson argued that seemingly ‘apolitical’ policy reports fulfil a precise political function. By 
providing a representation of social problems where “politics is conspicuous by its absence” 
(Ferguson, 1994: 66), these reports prepare the ground for technical intervention, that claim to 
solve complex social, political and economic issues through the deployment of “highly stan-
dardized operations” (Ferguson, 1994: 69). 
Although Ferguson writes about a starkly different political field, his observations apply to 
the analysis of anti-smuggling policies. Casting attention on the figure of the “smuggler” ob-
scures the political conditions that make the service of smugglers necessary in the first place, and 
that make border areas and migration routes more generally so dangerous for people racialized 
as “migrant others” (Gross-Wyrtzen, 2019). This enables a massive expansion of the border 
apparatus (Carling and Hernández‐Carretero, 2011). In the past three decades, anti-smuggling 
activities have proliferated across the North and the South. European countries, the US and 
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Australia have adopted laws criminalizing irregular migration and its facilitation. Their partner 
countries in the Global South followed suit, juggling between externalization pressure and 
desire to strategize migration as a diplomatic tool (Ben Jémia, 2012; Khrouz, 2016). In aid- 
recipient countries qualified as countries of “transit” or of “origin,” the implementation of anti- 
smuggling infrastructure was supported by donors as part of their border externalization efforts 
(Watkins, 2017). Anti-smuggling interventions can be divided broadly in two categories: 
military-style interventions implemented by traditional security actors (like the police and the 
army); and welfare-like interventions, implemented by non-traditional security actors like non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations (IOs).2 In the aftermath of 
the 2015 migration “crisis,” for example, the EU has funded a plethora of anti-smuggling and 
anti-trafficking activities through its EU Trust Fund for Africa, including a €42 million project 
on “Support to Integrated border and migration management” in Libya, a €44 million project 
on “Support to the integrated border and migration management” in Morocco, and a 
€8 million project supporting “Rapid Economic Impact Action Plan in Agadez” (PAIERA). 
The first two projects work according to a clear military approach, as they aim at expanding the 
capacity of the Moroccan and Libyan state apparatus to surveil their land and sea borders. As we 
will see later in this chapter, the PAIERA project, instead, was based on a softer approach, 
aiming at dismantling smuggling by providing alternative work opportunities to those facil-
itating irregular migration movements in Niger. 
The proliferation of military/humanitarian responses to smuggling could be conceptualized 
in terms of a combination between “fast” and “slow” instruments of border control. In a 
seminal book, Rob Nixon draws a distinction between a form of direct violence that is “im-
mediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational 
visibility” (Nixon, 2011, p. 2) and “slow violence,” “a violence that occurs gradually and out of 
sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional 
violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (Nixon, 2011, p. 2).3 
Fast control 
Fast violence instruments deployed to counter smuggling operate in a deductive fashion, 
through the destruction of the social and logistical infrastructures enabling smuggling. Scholars 
have pointed out that border policing focuses on three different types of smuggling infra-
structures: infrastructures of waiting, through the destruction of makeshift camps (Tyszler, 
2019) or the eviction of residents from temporary accommodation in areas hosting people 
waiting to cross (Bajalia, 2020); infrastructure of crossing, through the interception, seizing and 
destruction of vessels used by irregular migrants and their facilitators (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2018); 
and infrastructures of community, through the forcible dispersal and relocation of migrants 
away from the borders, either through arrest and forcible abandonment in areas far away from 
the border and from urban centres, or through relocation to other reception or detention 
centres (Gazzotti & Hagan, 2020; Tazzioli, 2019). Such techniques of destruction and dispersal 
have become commonplace at the French-UK border, especially in the Calais region (Hagan, 
2020), at the French-Italian border, especially in Ventimiglia (OXFAM, 2018), and at the 
Spanish-Moroccan border, mostly in the Moroccan regions surrounding the Spanish enclaves of 
Ceuta and Melilla (Gazzotti & Hagan, 2020). In the latter case, police forces tend to attack 
migrant camps in the early morning, destroy migrant shelters and set the remainder on fire, then 
force migrant people on buses that forcefully lead them to areas in the Centre and South of 
Morocco, in areas far away from the border, and often far away from the main urban centres. 
Such destruction and dispersal campaigns have continued even after the outbreak of the 
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COVID-19 pandemic, leaving migrant people particularly vulnerable to the risk of infection 
and of destitution (Gross-Wyrtzen, 2020). 
Although these military-style initiatives operate through fast violence, political leaders often 
justify them as humanitarian in nature. In 2016, French president Hollande defined the dis-
mantling of the migrant camp in Calais, which become famous as “The Jungle,” as responding 
to a “humanitarian urgency” generated by migrants spreading false rumours and unduly at-
tracting potential border crossers to the North of France: 
Everybody must understand that the Calais Jungle is an impasse for migrants. It is also, 
I know, an action field for smugglers that let [migrants] believe this illusion that it will 
be possible to cross the border. 
It is also necessary to inform those that think that a life here is possible and that at a 
certain point this will open. No, it will not open (Hollande, 2016, translation mine).  
Similarly, Garelli and Tazzioli highlight that the anti-smuggling purpose of the EU’s Operation 
Sophia was framed as humanitarian. It aims at protecting migrants by preventing them access to 
unsafe migration routes, and by decreasing the logistical capacity of smugglers to prey on 
migrants by charging them exorbitant prices for extremely risky journeys (Garelli & Tazzioli, 
2018). In Morocco equally, the dismantling of migrant camps in the North was disguised in a 
humanitarian nature, and justified as both responding to fighting smuggling networks and of 
redirecting people to cities where integration might be easier (Benjelloun, 2017). These dis-
courses depict destruction as a way to protect migrants from the risks of border crossing, and as 
such makes them more acceptable in the eyes of the public. This obviously obscures the fact 
that, beyond the violence to which migrants might be exposed during anti-smuggling opera-
tions, the latter potentially leave migrants without any form of shelter, without any alternative 
legal crossing pathway, and potentially stuck in countries like Libya. 
Slow control 
Compared to fast instruments of control, slow violence distinguishes itself by being less physical, 
less recognizable and, thus, less likely to meet resistance (Gazzotti, 2021). Slow methods of 
border control include protracted waiting to be regularized, granted asylum, or resettled, the 
exclusion from healthcare, education and work, and a structurally higher vulnerability to ex-
ploitation. These are forms of containment that are less legible, but no less assertive, than 
building fences (Gross-Wyrtzen, 2019) because they are based on a “discontinuous ‘hold’ over 
migrants’ lives,” made of some sites and moments in which migrants are highly controlled and 
others in which their movements are managed through (partial) non-governing, not-seeing and 
non-registration” (Aradau & Tazzioli, 2019, p. 201). 
As I mentioned earlier, anti-smuggling activities too can rely on methods that are much more 
mundane than military-like interventions, and on actors that lie beyond the security apparatus of 
the state. NGOs and IOs, in particular, have been coopted in the implementation of anti- 
smuggling activities based on welfare-like methods. These include information campaigns 
(Oeppen, 2016; Pécoud, 2010; Williams, 2019), and the re-deployment of former smugglers or 
“would-be” migrants into alternative business opportunities (Gazzotti, 2018; Howden & 
Zandonini, 2018; Tazzioli, 2014). Information campaigns have become quite popular as an in-
strument deployed to curb people’s willingness to rely on smugglers to cross the border irre-
gularly. The campaigns thus try to dismantle “false myths” about smugglers; for example, they 
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would spread false rumours about the journey conditions and the living opportunities in the 
destination countries to deceive “potential clients” into travelling (Oeppen, 2016). These cam-
paigns are generally premised on the belief that, if given correct information about the “realities” 
of the journey, “would be migrants” would make better decisions about their potential journey. 
According to policy-makers, the “right” decision corresponds to refraining from migrating, or to 
migrating legally (even though legal migration avenues are only accessible for an extremely 
limited audience of people). Rather than disrupting smuggling through methods that destroy 
physical spaces, disperse communities, and physically constrain people, information campaigns 
operate in intimate, non-conventional security spaces. Information leaflets are attached to the 
walls of a community centre, or they are distributed at football matches (Andersson, 2014). In 
other cases, messages revealing “the real truths” about migration are included in speeches recited 
by religious leaders during services (Watkins, 2020), or screened before movies projected in open- 
air, donor-funded mobile cinemas (Heller, 2014). These information campaigns thus try to 
disrupt smuggling by leveraging on the feelings of fear, compassion and empathy that migrants 
might have (Williams, 2019). In other words, they hope to unmake smuggling by shaping the 
subjectivity of ‘potential’ migrants, by influencing their capacity of decision-making, by trans-
forming them into actors that think and move according to the logics of the border. 
The provision of vocational training and alternative business opportunities to both “potential 
migrants” and former smugglers is another form of slow policing that aspires to disrupt the 
facilitation of irregular migration not through destruction, but by fulfilling the needs and as-
pirations through other means. Labour has always played a central role in border control stra-
tegies, and on development-based security interventions more broadly (Gazzotti, 2018). Since the 
early 2000s, donors, NGOs and IOs have on many occasions resorted to labour integration 
programmes to immobilise different categories of migrants, or ‘potential’ migrants. All these 
programmes were based on the (simplistic) belief that employment, often in the form of pre-
carious jobs, could alone constitute an alternative to emigration (Rodriguez, 2015). Such projects 
have been recently trialled in Niger, where the approval of the 2015 Law Against Illicit 
Smuggling of Migrants, which criminalized the facilitation of irregular migration, disrupted the 
human smuggling business, which was deeply embedded in the local political economy of Agadez 
and the surrounding region. The imposition of tighter border control norms by Nigerien au-
thorities, under the pressure of the EU, thus considerably increased unemployment levels in an 
area already marked by very high poverty rates (Comolli, 2019). The EU thus decided to im-
plement the Action Plan for Rapid Economic Impact in Agadez (PAIERA) programme. Funded 
through the EU Trust Fund for Africa, the €8-million programme aimed at reconverting the 
former smuggling economy writ large – not only the people arranging the crossing and driving 
people through the desert, but also those providing services (namely “owners of hostels or 
brothels [maison close] that accommodate migrants,” “the prostitution sector that developed 
alongside migrant smuggling,” and “the business owner of legal activities that developed alongside 
smuggling”) (EU Commission, n.d.). According to an article published by Open Migration, 
around 6,000 former “migration players” in the Agadez region submitted applications for projects 
to be funded by the PAIERA programme, which granted up to 1500,000 CFA (around €2,300) 
to start new businesses (Zandonini, 2017). Like information campaigns, labour-based approaches 
to anti-smuggling also individualise the responsibility for disrupting irregular migration onto the 
single (former) smuggler, smuggler’s client, or indirect beneficiary from the smuggling business. 
Building on a sedentary and colonial approach to human development and wellbeing (Bakewell, 
2008; Landau, 2018), these projects thus try to shape the subjectivity of potential migrants, 
smugglers and their communities to produce law-abiding subjects who make a living through licit 
rather than illicit means (the latest including all migration or smuggling-related endeavours). 
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On the “unintended effects” of the military/humanitarian war against 
smugglers 
Whether anti-smuggling operations are actually effective in reducing smuggling is a source of 
debate. In Morocco, activists and journalists label destruction-and-dispersal policies as “non- 
sense.” Migrants forcibly displaced to the Centre and South of the country, in fact, often go 
back to their places of residence within a few days (Gazzotti and Hagan, 2020). This specific 
anti-smuggling operation, therefore, does not seem “effective” because it does not achieve its 
stated intent – i.e., dismantling smuggling networks or keeping migrants away from the physical 
borders of the state. Similarly, both researchers and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) have raised doubts regarding the capacity of information campaigns to curb 
the propensity for irregular migration and the actual magnitude of existing migratory flows. 
Brachet found that information campaigns lacked cultural sensitivity, and paradoxically utilised 
symbols associated with health and prosperity, which induced more people to leave (Brachet, 
2016). Hernandez-Carretero and Carling, instead, argue that information campaigns do not 
compound the fact that taking the risk to pursue dangerous border crossing activities might be 
considered socially acceptable in areas with high-emigration rates (Hernández-Carretero & 
Carling, 2012). IOM researchers, instead, found that rigorous evidence on efficiency was scarce, 
and that information campaigns, in other words, had become widespread as a border control 
tool in spite of any consideration about whether they actually worked or not (IOM GMDAC, 
2018). Similar critiques exist for the PAIERA programme (Howden & Zandonini, 2018): local 
stakeholders claim that the economic packages provided by the programme are too meagre to 
facilitate the creation of alternative jobs for the over 5000 former smugglers living in the region. 
In the field of migration control, anti-smuggling policies are not the only ones to be im-
plemented despite not being effective even on their own terms: Ruben Andersson brands the 
entire border economy as absurd, because it keeps on expanding and reproducing itself even 
though irregular migration continues unabated (Andersson, 2014). 
Although anti-smuggling activities might not be effective in curbing smuggling and irregular 
migration tout-court, this does not mean that they do not do anything. Much to the contrary, 
these activities expand control over the mobility of people moving from marginalized com-
munities in the South to the North in ways that are not captured in project factsheets or in 
journalistic prose. In Morocco, for example, dispersal policies aiming at dismantling smuggling 
networks activate multiple mechanisms of dispossession that keep migrants both far away from 
the border and at the margins of Moroccan society. Although many migrants manage to go 
back to their places of residence, many others remain stuck in the areas where they have been 
abandoned due to lack of funding to buy return tickets or to the refusal of public transport 
companies to carry people profiled as irregular migrants. The destruction of one’s belongings 
and the forcible displacement to other areas, where employment opportunities are scarce or the 
working conditions are exploitative, prevent people from really settling and enjoying the 
economic and personal security needed to have a decent life. Many migrants get stuck in a state 
of hyper-mobility, in a cycle of mobility and forced displacement that leads them to wander 
from city to city, in an unbearable state of living (Gazzotti & Hagan, 2020). 
Similarly, information campaigns or labour programmes aiming at converting the smuggling 
economy into a licit market might not reduce the structural causes creating the need for the 
facilitation of irregular border crossing in the first place. However, they do create the feeling 
that smuggling can be managed through a set of light-touch, technical instruments that do not 
put into question the status quo, including the existence of restrictive migration policies, the 
stark inequalities and economic precarity affecting border areas, and the existence of a tradition 
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of migration in areas of origin and transit. Although military and humanitarian responses to 
human smuggling might appear neatly distinct, they both consolidate restrictive migration 
policies: they displace attention away from the structural causes that produce irregular migra-
tion, smuggling, and border violence in the first place; they pathologise smuggling and irregular 
migration as ‘deviances’ that need to be prosecuted; and they legitimise security-based inter-
ventions aimed at containing people deemed dangerous to the security of countries in the 
Global North. 
Conclusion 
The ramping up of border surveillance policies around the world has transformed human 
smuggling into the target of both hard and soft security interventions. In this landscape, the 
figure of the “smugglers” has become demonized as a source of threat for both migrants (who 
are deceived into and abused during dangerous border crossings) and destination countries 
(whose borders and integrity are supposedly violated by irregular migrants and their facilitators). 
Academic literature has widely discarded the idea of “smugglers” as inherently dangerous and 
deviant figures. Scholars have highlighted that a more accurate understanding of “smuggling” 
should read this activity within the situated moral and political economy of borders. Depending 
on the context, the relationship between smugglers and their “clients” can thus lie on a var-
iegated spectrum ranging from overt violence to trust and care. Furthermore, smuggling can be 
a mundane activity that is deeply embedded in the local economy of border regions. 
Nevertheless, this biased representation has remained commonplace in policy discourses, to the 
point of being upheld as a justification for militarized border interventions. 
In this chapter, I have argued that casting attention on the “dangerous smuggler” as a societal 
enemy (which endangers both migrant people and the population in countries of destination) is 
strategical. By obscuring the complex, political causes of irregular border crossing, demonizing 
smugglers allows policy-makers to tighten the objective of border intervention to a series of 
time-bound, space-bound, manageable interventions. This process of strategy reduction and 
technicalisation thus facilitates the reproduction of the migration control apparatus, which 
expands into a number of heterogenous interventions aimed at disrupting the business model of 
smugglers. Building on the work of Rob Nixon, I argued that anti-smuggling operations could 
be divided into fast and slow policing instruments. Fast methods of smuggling policing rely on 
military-style interventions, implemented by actors close to the traditional circuits of state 
security. They aim at disrupting smuggling through destruction – of migrants’ gatherings, of the 
spaces where migrants wait, of the infrastructures used to cross. The violence that characterize 
these interventions is deeply physical – it acts through the destruction and annihilation of 
things, spaces, and people themselves. Slow instruments of anti-smuggling rely on a radically 
different from of intervention, that takes the form of welfare-like initiatives promoted by actors 
that lie outside the traditional circuits of state security. Rather than focusing on the physical 
destruction of smuggling infrastructures, slow anti-smuggling interventions utilize a productive 
approach to border control, which is less physical in nature as it does not operate at the level of 
the body or of the physical space, but rather aims at shaping the subjectivities of both potential 
migrants, former smugglers, and the communities revolving around the smuggling business. 
Notes  
1 I paraphrase here the title of James Ferguson’s piece on the “uses” of neoliberalism (Ferguson, 2010).  
2 Whilst seemingly paradoxical, the combination of such different types of intervention has become 
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commonplace in contemporary conflicts. In a 2003 article, Michel Agier explained the symbiosis 
between humanitarian and militarized intervention as “the left and right hand of the empire.” Building 
on Bourdieu, Agier argues that the humanitarian apparatus (the left hand) is left to mend the damages 
created by armed operations (the right hand) – in a sinister symbiosis where “one hand […] strikes, the 
other one […] heals” (Agier 2003: 67). However, conceptualizing the military-humanitarian security 
apparatus in terms of a left and right hand risks to understate the explicit (rather than collateral) control 
functions performed by “softer” interventions.  
3 Other scholars have named this form of chronic dispossession as “abandonment,” or a technique of 
governance premised on the “state’s selective presence and absence in community members’ lives” 
(Denyer Willis, 2018, p. 333), which operates through “exhaustion, destitution, continual surveillance, 
paternalist policies, and formal and informal incarceration” (Gross-Wyrtzen, 2020: 8).  
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